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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will explore the proposition central to liberal political thought that liberal 
civil societies are artefacts of a process of pacification. It will be argued that liberal 
attitudes to violence have been framed within an overarching discourse of civilisation in 
which the elimination of some forms of violence appears as the pre- eminent social 
problem confronting the creation of a civil society composed of autonomous, productive 
individuals. The aim of the thesis is to explain why particular forms of violence have 
been identified as problematic while other forms have been tolerated, accepted, or 
ignored. It will be argued that in liberal thought, this has been achieved by separating 
certain types of violence from the ends and values of liberal civilisation. These forms of 
violence are defined as barbaric, uncontrolled, and destructive, and the thesis will 
explore the opposition within liberal thought between `barbaric' violence and `civilised' 
peace. Throughout the thesis it will be argued that liberal thought has been shaped by 
the view that violence is corrosive of civil order and that the creation of civil societies 
requires the maintenance of conceptual and physical boundaries which `exclude' certain 
forms of `barbaric' violence while obscuring or tolerating the persistence of other 
violence. 
In the first chapter it will be argued that this `exclusion' has been achieved under the 
auspices of states which claimed a monopoly on the right to use violence within their 
borders. The next three chapters will examine the way that liberal discourse on violence 
has been shaped by the fear that the appearance of violence heralds the destruction of 
the rights and securities upon which civil society rests. The following four chapters of 
the thesis will discuss the persistent attempts made by liberal thinkers to envisage a 
civilised, pacified civil realm inhabited by self -governed and self -restrained individuals. 
In the ninth chapter the assumption that there is a boundary separating an `inner' realm 
of peace and security within liberal- democratic states, and an `outer' realm of violence 
and warfare will be discussed. In the final and concluding chapter, the focus will shift 
to the boundaries operating within the apparently already pacified realm of liberal - 
democratic states and societies. The effect of such boundaries has been to sustain the 
image of a pacified society despite an intensification of violence alongside the values 
and institutions which claim its elimination from civil society. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LIBERAL CIVILISATION, 
VIOLENCE, AND PACIFICATION IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 
One of the effects of civilisation... is, that the spectacle, and even the very idea of pain, 
is kept more and more out of the sight of those classes who enjoy in their fulness the 
benefits of civilisation. The state of perpetual personal conflict, rendered necessary by 
the circumstances of all former times, and from which it was hardly possible for any 
person... to be exempt, necessarily habituated everyone to the spectacle of harshness, 
rudeness, and violence... They [savages], however thought less of the infliction of pain, 
because they thought less of pain altogether. ... In our own time, the necessity of 
personal collision between one person and another is, comparatively speaking, almost at 
an end. All those necessary portions of the business of society which oblige any person 
to be the immediate agent or ocular witness of the infliction of pain, are delegated by 
common consent to peculiar and narrow classes: to the judge, the soldier, the surgeon, 
the butcher, and the executioner. ... for it is in keeping as far as possible out of sight, not 
only actual pain, but all that can be offensive or disagreeable to the most sensitive 
person, that refinement consists. 
- John Stuart Mill "Civilisation" [1836], Essays on Politics and Culture, edited by G. Himmelfarb, 
Anchor Books, New York, 1962, pg. 57 -58. 
This thesis will explore the proposition central to liberal political thought that liberal 
civil societies are artefacts of a process of pacification, the elimination of destructive 
violence. It will be argued that liberal attitudes to violence have been framed, as John 
Stuart Mill's (1806 -1873) opening quotation illustrates, within an overarching discourse 
of civilisation in which violence appears as the pre -eminent social problem confronting 
the creation of a civil society composed of autonomous, productive individuals. The 
identification of this problem and its resolution have not been uniformly expressed 
within the liberal tradition, but it will be suggested that continuities can be detected in 
the approaches taken by a variety of thinkers within this tradition. This thesis will in 
part be concerned with the identification of those continuities, but will focus most 
discussion upon the assumptions that inform them, and their implications. The primary 
object of study throughout the thesis is not `violence' or `liberalism' per se, but the way 
in which the understanding of each has shaped the evaluation of both. The objective is 
not to define or redefine violence nor to defend or execrate liberalism, but to understand 
the way in which violence has been understood within the liberal tradition and how 
those understandings have shaped both the solution to violence and the interpretation of 
liberalism, its values, goals and central institutions. 
It will be the contention throughout this thesis that liberalism has been shaped by a 
discourse of civilisation in which the process of pacification was one of the most 
important tasks confronting the proponents of civil society. This interpretation contrasts 
with those which represent liberalism as doctrine of non -violence or active pacifism.' 
On the surface, this view may not seem that different to the one to be developed in this 
thesis, but as the argument of this and following chapters will demonstrate, liberalism is 
a discourse of pacification rather than a doctrine of pacifism. The crucial distinction lies 
in the fact that rather than promoting the values of non -violence, liberalism throughout 
its development has incorporated an implicit, and at times explicit discourse of 
civilisation in which violence has been defined as alien to the requirements of liberal 
civil societies. Civilisation has thus been conceived as a process of pacification resting 
on disciplines of self -control and self -mastery, as Frederick von Hayek makes clear, 
Carter, A., "Nonviolence and Democratic Theory", in Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the 
Australasian Political Science Association and European Union Studies Association of New Zealand, 
Vol. I, Christchurch, 1998, pg. 146 -150. 
2 
The transition from the small band to the settled community and finally 
to the open society and with it to civilisation was due to men learning to 
obey the same abstract rules instead of being guided by innate instincts... 
And although we still share most of the emotional traits of primitive 
man, he does not share all ours, or the restraints which made civilisation 
possible.' 
While liberalism is not the only tradition of thought to have been concerned with the 
idea of civilisation, for liberals such as Hayek civilisation appears as a synonym for 
progress, the upward movement in the evolution of human society from the `primitive' 
band to the complexity of modern society. The key feature of this `liberal' view, as 
Hayek presents it, is that civilisation involves the willingness of individuals to obey 
rules rather than animal instincts, and importantly, this means self -rule. In other words, 
a liberal theory of civilisation seeks to demonstrate that progress is accomplished by the 
extension of disciplines of self -mastery. Conducting oneself in a restrained manner 
facilitates one's participation in the great project of creating a productive and peaceful 
society. Individual freedom within this society is in Hayek's words, "an artefact of 
civilisation... made possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline of civilisation... 
[which] protects [individuals]... by impersonal abstract rules against the arbitrary 
violence of others and enables each individual to try to build for himself a protected 
domain... ".' 
Critics of liberalism have often failed to appreciate the significance of the discourse of 
civilisation within liberal thought, and thereby have usually failed to understand the 
connection between the `pacification' of society and the promotion of the defining goals 
and values of the liberal tradition. Chief among these goals and values was the notion 
of a civil social order based on the primacy of autonomous, self - governing individuals 
whose self -sovereignty was founded upon the possession of exclusive rights to 
protection and the private ownership of property, each ensured by a system of law. 
Though separate from an older and not always complimentary democratic tradition, the 
liberal emphasis on individual rights and liberties was conducive to a variety of 
democracy which incorporated representative legislatures, regular though often 
2 Hayek, F.A., Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. III, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pg. 
160. It should be noted at the outset that I have maintained the original spelling, grammar, and gender - 
specific language used in the editions from which each quotation referred to in this thesis has been taken. 
3 Ibid., pg. 163. 
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restricted franchises, and executives with strictly limited powers.' Though tensions 
have often arisen between liberal and democratic values, the concept of liberal - 
democracy as it will be discussed in this thesis refers to the combination of a state 
bound by constitutional constraints, incorporating some form of popular franchise and 
an executive with limited powers, with a liberal civil society understood as a pacified 
zone, a realm of interaction between rights- bearing, autonomous individuals free from 
the taint of violence. Within this tradition, important questions revolved around what 
sorts of violence, or more particularly, whose violence was to be prevented and how this 
was to be accomplished. It will be argued in this thesis that the liberal discourse of 
civilisation was thus primarily concerned with the identification and exclusion from 
civilised society of those types of violence deemed most injurious to the needs and 
requirements of liberal society. This should not be mistaken for the elimination of 
violence as such, but the representation of certain varieties of violence and certain 
individual or collective perpetrators as problematic or dangerous, requiring exclusion 
from civil society. Within this discourse of civilisation, problematic violence has been 
overwhelmingly represented as uncivilised and barbaric, while civilised conduct has 
been seen not only as peaceful but rational and self -governed. This has lead to the 
mistaken impression that civilised societies are free of violence or at least have 
controlled or eliminated violence from areas of social life in which civilised individuals 
conduct themselves non -violently. 
According to one recent commentator, liberalism represents the "summit" of "civility" 
by successfully absorbing antagonism and irreconcilable interests in the form of 
"cultivated conflicts" mediated by a shared respect for law and mutual participation in 
the "democratic public sphere ".5 Such interpretations rest on a view of civilisation most 
clearly developed in Norbert Elias' account of the development in Western Europe of 
"internally pacified but externally belligerent" states in his Power and Civility.6 Elias' 
The literature on liberalism, democracy and liberal- democracy is immense, and elements of this 
literature will be referred to throughout the thesis. For present purposes however, much has been gained 
from the discussions of liberal and democratic themes in: Beim, S.I. and Peters, R.S., Social Principles 
and the Democratic State, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1959; Hindess, B., "Liberalism, Socialism 
and Democracy: Variations on a Governmental Theme ", Economy and Society, 22 (3), 1993, pg. 300- 
313; Dean, M. and Hindess, B. "Introduction: Government, Liberalism, Society" in Dean, M. and 
Hindess, B., Governing Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pg. 1 -19; and Bobbio, 
N., Liberalism and Democracy, Verso, London, 1990. 
Dubiel, H., "Cultivated Conflicts ", Political Theory, 26 (2), 1998, pg. 217 -219. 
6 Elias, N., The Civilising Process: Volume II, Power and Civility[1939], translated by E. Jephcott, 
Pantheon Books, New York, 1982, pg. 64. 
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account, which will be discussed in the first section of this chapter, linked the 
pacification of society through the extension of patterns of self -restraint with the 
increasing monopolisation of violence by the state. In common with liberal theories of 
civilisation, Elias' account was based on the assumption that violence was barbarous, an 
artefact of uncontrolled nature, and therefore underestimated the degree to which 
civilisation has intensified rather than eliminated or even reduced violence. Critics such 
as Zygmunt Bauman argue that the patterns of self -restraint Elias associated with 
civilisation were mechanisms of moral distantiation which enhanced rather than reduced 
the likelihood of violence. It will be argued in the second section that Bauman's 
analysis, despite identifying an intensification of violence attributable to civilisation, 
fails to provide a suitable explanation of why this intensification should occur. Both 
Elias and Bauman's approaches highlight the problem inherent in liberal approaches to 
violence. In common with the liberal approach, Elias represented violence as a 
phenomenon of untamed nature, an outburst of unrestrained, barbaric passion while the 
peace of civilisation was seen as an `artificial' construct separating society from nature. 
Bauman on the other hand reverses this position and views violence as `artificial' and 
peace as `natural'. In neither case are we given a sense in which violence can be seen as 
something both natural to human beings and intrinsic to civilised society. This line of 
criticism will be developed in the third and last section in which Foucault's analysis of 
the connection between the intensification of violence and the development of self - 
governing or self -policing methods of managing conduct will be explored. Following 
Foucault's insights, it will be argued in this thesis that liberalism has been shaped by an 
implicit discourse of civilisation which has aimed to inculcate patterns of self - 
government from which violence is excluded or circumscribed by carefully constructed 
boundaries between realms of `peaceful' self -governing conduct and non -self -governing 
realms in which violence is acceptable. Subsequent chapters will explore the 
construction of those boundaries and the representation of particular forms of violence 
as intrusive, barbaric, or merely problems requiring solution, while tacitly accepting the 
continuation of violence outside those boundaries. 
5 
I LIBERAL CIVILISATION 
Elias' aim in Power and Civility, the second of his two- volume study of the "civilising 
process" was to trace the development of modem Western civilisation.' His account of 
that civilisation and the process by which it emerged and assumed its current dominance 
was based on an approach he called "historical psychology ", the attempt to explain 
modern psychological traits in reference to the social, economic and political 
development of European history from the Medieval to the modern period.' Elias' 
`liberal' analysis emphasised the elimination of "the coarser habits, the wilder, more 
uninhibited customs of medieval society with its warrior upper class, the corollaries of 
an uncertain, constantly threatened life" and were "softened ", "polished" and "civilised" 
[by the] pressure of court life... [which] enforced a constraint on the affects, a self - 
discipline and self-control..." .9 In developing his argument Elias incorporated the 
central themes of a liberal theory of civilisation, one which tied pacification to the 
extension of self -control and self -government associated with the rise in instrumental 
reason and self -interest, placed considerable emphasis on the importance of opinion, and 
the development of productive, market economies. The achievement of self -control, 
initially at court though subsequently outside it, and the consequent elimination of 
violence from most types of social interaction Elias argued, was the distinguishing 
feature of modern Western civilisation!' This achievement however, developed 
alongside and in conjunction with the increasing development of the state and its 
successful monopoly of both violence and taxation. 
The details of Elias' account of the transition from pre -modern to modern society and 
the consequent changes in our psychological constitution are of less importance to the 
present study than the conception of violence which informs his discussion and the ways 
The phrase "civilising process" is used throughout the book to refer to the complex psychological as 
well socio- political developments in Western Europe; see ibid. 
s Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 282. 
9 Ibid., pg. 7. 
10 This conception of civilisation is discussed in Volume 1 of The Civilising Process, The History of 
Manners, translated by E. Jephcott, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, pg. 1 -9, 35 -39, and 51 -59. Here he 
makes it clear that the term `civilisation', national differences in usage notwithstanding, denotes a 
progression from an "uncivilised" to an ever more "civilised" condition. For present purposes, however, 
I have chosen to focus on the second volume of The Civilising Process, Power and Civility which is 
concerned less with the precise nature of the attitudinal changes in the Western psyche than with the 
social and political forces which brought them about. 
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in which he thinks our attitudes toward it have been altered." Elias' view was that 
Medieval men, and to a lesser extent women, experienced "free and unfettered play in 
all the terrors and joys of life" were "wild, cruel, prone to violent outbreaks and 
abandoned to the joy of the moment. "'Z Members of the knightly class in particular 
were given great liberty to "indulge" their passions for violence, but were consequently 
more exposed to the fear of becoming a victim to the violence of others.13 Elias 
suggests that this unsatisfactory situation was the result of the economic structure of 
medieval society, in which nobles lived from the labour of their peasants or from 
proceeds of their violence, and therefore did not need and could not achieve any self - 
control. Consequently, their lives seemed to "oscillate... between extremes" allowing 
"savage joys, the uninhibited satisfaction of pleasure from women, or of hatred in 
destroying and tormenting anything hostile.s14 
The lack of self -control among the upper stratum of medieval society meant that an 
entire class of society took "delight in plundering and rape" as a livelihood.15 Elias' 
view, like those of other liberals before him, was that Medieval societies were caught in 
a web of violent relationships upheld by economic forces which impelled the feudal 
nobility to sustain themselves by violence and "constituted a regular form of income for 
the warriors in the barter economy, and moreover, the only one open to them. "16 
Consequently, the nobility were motivated by violence, obtained incomes by violence, 
and feared the loss of wealth by the violence of others. They exercised no restraint on 
their passions except when induced by the superior force of more powerful lords or 
" Elias' account of the nature of medieval society and psychology reflected the work of the scholars of 
his time, the most notable of whom was the Dutch historian Jan Huizinga. It is worth keeping Huizinga's 
interpretation of the role of violence in medieval society in mind for later comparison to Elias' work. 
Thus, in a memorable passage, Huizinga writes, "...the contrast between silence and sound, darkness and 
light, like that between summer and winter, was more strongly marked than it is in our lives. ... All things 
presenting themselves to the mind in violent contrasts and impressive forms, lent a tone of excitement 
and of passion to everyday life and tended to produce that perpetual oscillation between despair and 
distracted joy, between cruelty and pious tenderness which characterises life in the Middle Ages." 
Huizinga, J., The Waning of the Middle Ages [1924], Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1955, pg. 10. 
12 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 72. 
" Ibid., pg. 241. 
14 Ibid., pg. 236 -237. 
15 Ibid., pg. 73. 
16 Ibid., pg. 69. An obvious comparison here is with Adam Smith's characterisation of the "state of 
property and manners from which the disorders" of Medieval societies arose because the great lords 
"continued to make war according to their own discretion, almost continuously upon one another, and 
very frequently upon the king; and the open country continued to be a scene of violence, rapine, and 
disorder." Smith A., An Enquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776], edited by E. 
Cannan, Methuen, London, 1961, Volume I, pg. 437 
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monarchs." In this environment, the power of the nascent central authorities remained 
unsophisticated and brutal. The operations of power, the relations of dominance and 
submission were unconcealed, unmediated by complex legal systems and an 
autonomous system of courts.'8 If power was to be asserted it had to be backed by a 
capacity for violence superior to that of the local magnates who constantly opposed the 
will of centralising authorities. The perpetual "centrifugal" forces of the Medieval 
societies and economies meant that central authorities were constantly grappling with 
the problem of decentralised power divided among a nobility possessing their own 
means of violence.19 Echoing Adam Smith, Elias argued that the crucial transition from 
Medieval to modem society was the gradual centralisation of power driven by the 
development of a market economy requiring greater geographic, social and economic 
integration.20 Importantly, the emergence of market structures favoured the 
development of cities dominated by a bourgeois class in contrast to the dispersed, rural 
settlements of peasants 2' It was in this latter development, Elias contends, that the 
twinning of self -discipline and state monopolisation began to assert itself. 
Urbanisation encouraged the development of both royal courts and the growth of cities 
as centres of manufacture. The proximity of court and city life intensified and spread 
the need for patterns of civil conduct.22 Royal courts in particular became the arena in 
which individuals engaged in a variety of non -violent activities such as administration 
and entertainment requiring a degree of education, refinement of taste and moderation of 
" Ibid., pg. 72. See also, Elias, N., The History of Manners, pg. 191 -205. 
18 On this point see Manchester, W., A World Lit Only by Fire; The Medieval Mind and the 
Renaissance, Papermac, London, 1992, pg. 47 -48; and Weisser, M. R., Crime and Punishment in Early 
Modern Europe, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1979, pg. 29 -67. We shall return to this point in the later 
discussion of Foucault's analysis of Medieval and modem modes punishment. 
19 Thus, "[e]very baron, every viscount, every seigneur controlled his estate or estates from his castle or 
castles, like a ruler over his state. The power of the nominal liege lords, the more central authorities, is 
slight. The compelling mechanisms of supply and demand... make the vassal actually controlling the land 
generally less dependent on the protection of his liege lord than the latter on his services [in war]..." 
Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 65. 
20 Smith for instance argued that feudal societies were characterised by weak central authority, and it 
was only through the largely "silent and insensible operation" of commerce that a more effective central 
government with a regular administration of laws was able to develop. Smith A., op.cit., pg. 435 -437; 
and Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 25 -28. 
21 Georges Sorel argued in his Illusions of Progress that the process of civilisation became the 
instrument of bourgeois economic and political domination. See, Sorel, G., The Illusions of Progress 
[1908], translated by J. and C. Stanley, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969, pg. 30 -71. 
22 On the relationship between urbanisation and a decline of violence see Chesnais, J. -C., "Worldwide 
Historical Trends in Murder and Suicide" in J.L Simon (ed.), The State of Humanity, Blacicwell, Oxford, 
1995, pg. 91 -97. One should also note Mumford's argument that cities have been the sites of intensified 
violence. Mumford, L., The City in History, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1961, pg. 46. 
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conduct.23 Within this sphere of interaction "for the first time in secular society" 
individuals "lived in constant close contact in a hierarchical structure, under the eyes 
of... the territorial lord. "24 In this atmosphere of regular contact, interdependence, 
supervision and surveillance, people who were otherwise unaccustomed to self -control 
began to learn the need for "moderation of passions, [and] sublimation" of violent urges 
leading to the regularisation of a more peaceful form of interaction.25 This "polishing of 
conduct" under the influence of the court became more pronounced at a later point in the 
progress of political centralisation, but the process itself depended upon the demand for 
luxury goods at the courts which facilitated increasing trade specialisation and an 
intensification of interdependence between trades.26 The development of a market 
economies in which goods were manufactured for sale rather than exchange marked a 
decisive point in the progress of civilisation, intensifying the chains of interdependence 
between the increasing number of individuals who now earned a living by 
manufacturing.27 The geographic and social integration achieved by the extension of 
market relations was directly related to the successful monopolisation of violence by the 
nascent medieval state. This internal integration and pacification resulted in external 
belligerence driven by "continuing integration" which created "stable government and 
internally pacified" states which turned "their weapons outwards against human 
aggregates of the same size until, with a further integration, a still greater reduction of 
distances" they would converge and pacify "world society" as a whole.28What Elias 
calls the "monopoly mechanism" was in reality a long and gradual process by which 
central authorities began to accrue the power both to exercise violence and levy and 
collect taxes at the expense of local lords.29 These two monopolies - of violence and 
taxation - were complimentary; the growth of one sustained and fuelled by the growth of 
the other, and the successful development of both together became the foundation of 
modern states.30 By means of a monopoly of violence, sustained by the revenues from 
23 Elias, op cit., pg. 75. 
za Ibid., pg. 81. 
23 Ibid., pg. 77. It was at this stage, Elias argues, that the status of women at court began to rise. 
26 Ibid., pg. 86. 
27 Ibid., pg. 55. 
2E Ibid., pg. 88. 
29 Ibid., pg. 104. 
° Elias' conception of state -building here has something in common with Michael Mann's notion of 
"infrastructural power ", or the ability of states to penetrate and dominate areas of social life through the 
provision of infrastructural facilities such as roads, bridges, and administration. See for example, Mann, 
M., "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in J. Hall (ed.), States in 
History, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pg. 113 -119. The relation between the monopolisation of 
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taxation, the state was able to create a secure domestic environment for the "economic, 
non -violent" competition of the market" The growing numbers of people brought into 
contact and mutual dependence upon one another in the development of a market 
economy, fuelled the need for "more complex and stable control of conduct" driven by 
the overwhelming need to conform.32 Self -control of conduct Elias argued, was 
achievable solely within the confines of modern monopoly states, for only such states 
possessed the capacity to instil regimes of self -control. "When a monopoly of force is 
formed..." Elias contended, "pacified social spaces are created which are normally free 
from acts of violence.i33 Because the use of physical violence is denied to citizens, 
other forms of non -physical pressure may be used to induce or to coerce individuals to 
conform to standards of good conduct.34 
The reduction of physical violence did not mean that people were subjected to less 
pressures to conform, nor even that those pressures were benign, but merely that they 
did not involve the direct infliction of physical harm. The substitution of physical for 
non -physical forms of pressure Elias argued, was one of the defining characteristics of 
the civilising process; it also became in Wolin's view a defining characteristic of liberal 
discourse, 
Liberals proved to be unconcerned about the compulsions arising from a 
system of property because the pressures seemed to be impersonal and 
lacking in physical duress. On the other hand, liberals could become 
agitated over political power because it combined both a personal and a 
physical element's 
It was for this reason that liberalism championed impersonal, economic methods of 
managing individual conduct, the aim of which was to moderate "spontaneous 
emotions ", extend "mental space beyond the moment into the past and future ", connect 
"events in terms of chains of cause and effect ", each of which were, 
violence and taxation is discussed in detail in Charles Tilly's Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 
990 -1990, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, 1990. 
3' Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 114. A more controversial claim is that the monopoly mechanism has an 
inherent tendency toward democratisation. While the initial phases of the monopoly process tends 
toward the concentration of power in the hands of one or a few rulers who govern in their own interests, 
the later phases tend toward the involvement of larger numbers of people and the recognition of the 
general as opposed to the private good. See for example, ibid., pg. 115. 
32 Ibid., pg. 233. 
33 Ibid., pg. 235. 
34 Ibid. One of the more important of these is what he describes as the "monopolisation of the means of 
production" by an ascendant class, protected by the monopoly of violence held by the state. 
35 Wolin, S.S., Politics and Vision, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, pg. 312. 
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...different aspects of the same transformation of conduct which 
necessarily takes place with the monopolisation of physical violence, and 
the lengthening of the chains of social action and interdependence 36 
Subject to fewer of the terrors of life before state monopolisation, individuals moderated 
their emotional responses becoming enmeshed within networks of more 
"depersonalised" pressures intensifying their self- control.37 One of the most important 
features of subjection to what Elias called the "more permanent compulsions of peaceful 
functions based on the acquisition of money or prestige" was the familiarity with and 
tacit acceptance of the monopoly of violence held by the state, 
Through the formation of monopolies of force... violence [was]... 
confined to the barracks... the whole monopoly organisation of force, 
now [stood]... only in the margin of social life as a control on individual 
conduct. ... a continuous, uniform pressure is exerted on individual life 
by the physical violence stored behind the scenes of everyday life, a 
pressure totally familiar and hardly perceived...38 
While this stored violence was rarely used directly to induce the moderation of conduct, 
its more vital role was to underpin the life -long inculcation of self -controlled conduct.39 
36 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 236. 
37 Ibid., pg. 237. 
38 Ibid., pg. 238 -239. 
39 It should be noted here that Elias' account of the emergence of more rigid forms of self -control 
underpinned by the state has little to say on the role of religion in this development, although he does 
concede at one point that the greater attention paid to the inner spiritual life by puritanism and Jesuitism 
contributed to the civilising process (see the footnote in ibid., pg. 295). Max Weber's views on the 
relationship between Protestantism and capitalism established the view that religion, and especially the 
Protestant sects in sixteenth -century Europe played a crucial role in the discipline of conduct. According 
to Weber, membership of these sects required that individuals actively display valued "qualities" or 
behaviours that the sect prescribed such as probity and honesty, which were "constantly and continuously 
bred" in the individual. See Weber, M., "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism" in H.H. Gerth 
and C.W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Kegan Paul, London, 1947, pg. 320. 
According to R. H. Tawney, puritanism was the "schoolmaster of the English middle -classes" shaping 
and justifying the ideas and values of the rising middle class. See Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1922, pg. 211. Michael Walzer has argued however, that 
puritanical discipline was more attuned to the need for providing regimes of regular hard work and labour 
for the wandering poor and unemployed of seventeenth -century England. See Walzer, M., The 
Revolution of the Saints, Atheneum, New York, 1970, pg. 209. The German historian Otto Hintze 
suggested that state monopolisation in Germany was advanced by the adoption of Calvinism by the rulers 
of Brandenburg -Prussia in the sixteenth -century, offering these princes a "powerful organisation" and 
"church discipline throughout all areas of life." See Hintze, O., "Calvinism and Raison d'Etat in Early 
Seventeenth -Century Brandenburg" in F.Gilbert (ed), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1975, pg. 97. More recently, it has been argued that both Lutheranism and 
post -Reformation Catholicism offered similar avenues for the discipline of populations outside Calvinist 
strongholds and that Calvinism in particular was responsible for the emergence of a doctrine of 
individualism which became critical in the pacification of society. "With its stress on individual 
conscience, culpability, and discipline, and with its regime of endless self -examination and ascetic self - 
abnegation, Calvinism succeeded, over the generations in transforming outward emotional expression to 
inner severity. One of the key themes in Calvinist sermons after the Reformation was the need to control 
sudden outbursts of anger: violence was unbecoming of a Christian and subversive of the social order.... 
[This] resulted in the redirection of social conflict to inner psychological space." Hsia, R.P. -C., Social 
Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550 -1750, Routledge, London, 1989, pg. 164. The 
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It is important to note at this stage the nature of Elias' opposition between violence and 
civil conduct. For Elias, violence was wild and uncontrolled while civilised behaviour 
was restrained, rule- bound, and predictable. The length of chains of interdependence 
induced individuals to develop a greater capacity for "foresight ", and allowed the 
development of knowledge of what effect(s) one's actions were likely to have.40 This 
foresight depended on the mutual acceptance of the need for "subordinating momentary 
inclinations" and for the elimination of "irregularities from behaviour ".4t This 
moderation and regulation of conduct constituted the means by which "animalic" 
behaviours such as violence and sex were "progressively thrust behind the scenes of.. 
social life and invested with feelings of shame... ".42 The environment in which this 
regulation of behaviour, the elimination of irrationality and libidinal impulses and with 
it the elimination of physical violence and refinement of conduct reached its zenith were 
the royal courts during the period of European Absolutism in which the decisive shift 
within the nobility of "warriors to courtiers" was accomplished.0.3 The court became 
the arena in which increasing self -control and rational regulation of conduct was driven 
by the decline in the independent power of the nobility and the corresponding rise in 
importance of court life as an avenue for favour and patronage .a Careers sustained by 
patronage however, depended upon the success with which prospective clients were able 
to win favour by displaying their refinement and civility. Success in this quest was 
increasingly divorced from the threat of violence from rivals, but was accompanied by 
the perpetual fear of loss of status through committing a faux pas. This anxiety over the 
loss of position, prestige, and status enforced a constant foresight, a calculation of the 
greatest advantage, the sacrifice of present gain for greater gains in the future.45 In other 
words, the development of instrumental reason and the cool calculations of self -interest 
promised an end to outward violence, but intensified inner anxieties and fears, 
Liberal man moved in a world where pain and deprivation threatened 
him from all sides. His fears were compressed into a single demand: 
social and political arrangements must ease his anxieties by securing 
shaping of political discourse by religious concerns is traced in Conal Condren's The Language of 
Politics in Seventeenth -Century England, St Martin's Press, Houndmills, 1994, pg. 32 -36. 
40 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 247. 
41 Ibid., pg. 248. 
42 /bid., pg. 230. 
4s Ibid., pg. 259. Italics in original. This transition is driven in part by the growth of state 
monopolisation, but also by the decline of land as a source of wealth and power. 
44 All following information is taken from ibid., pg. 264 -271. 
4s Ibid., pg. 271 -281. 
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property and status against all threats... to be secure was to be able to 
"count on things ", to be able to act with the comforting knowledge that 
one's property would not be snatched away, a contract would not go 
unperformed, a debt would be honoured. Everything hinged on having 
secure expectations.46 
It was in this sense that Locke wrote of freedom requiring training, education and the 
judicious "government" of parents and tutors, and Adam Smith urged the need for 
"frugality, industry, and application" as the means to a good and prosperous life.47 
The pervasive fear and anxiety over the loss of prestige and status was a sign of the 
increasing importance attached to opinion, which in turn required the emulation of 
socially acceptable standards of behaviour, manners, etiquette, and the studious 
avoidance of shame.48 Opinion operated most forcefully at court where strict rules of 
conduct were expected, and their abrogation threatened a loss of favour and the good 
opinion of others. Within the circle of court "mutual observation" of conduct served to 
highlight the most "minute" and "subtle" deviation from norms arousing embarrassment 
and shame, tinging the inner life of individuals with greater anxiety.49 This complexity 
consisted in the internalisation of fears, which in less civilised periods were focussed 
more on external threats from others or from the environment. In this context, Elias 
contrasts the medieval conception of nature as fraught with danger from beasts of prey, 
the extremes of climate, or from the violence of thieves and vagabonds with more 
modern and romantic conceptions of a softened, benign natures° 
The over -riding fear of loss of status and prestige was intensified not only by the loss of 
favour from the powerful, but by the rise of the bourgeoisie who sought a share in the 
power and influence hitherto enjoyed by the nobility.51 The models of conduct which 
developed within what Elias called the "courtly- aristocratic society" were eventually 
subsumed by the rise to political dominance of the bourgeoisie necessitating new 
models of conduct specific to a class who "expected to work for a living ".52 Despite this 
46 Wolin, S.S. op.cit., pg. 329. 
47 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government [1690], edited by P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, pg. 307; Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759], Edited by D.D. Raphael 
and A.L. Macfie, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, pg. 25. 
48 Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 292. 
as /bid., pg. 297. 
sa Ibid. 
51 Ibid., pg. 305. 
sz Ibid., pg. 308, 306. 
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transition however, fears of overstepping boundaries of acceptable conduct and the 
consequences of overstepping them remained. Indeed, for Elias, the internalisation of 
fear was to be understood as one of the crucial achievements of Western civilisation, the 
most effective means of governing people "through themselves, through the moulding 
of their super- egos.s53 Modern fears were directly related to increased interdependence 
and did not come to us from dark recesses of our long- repressed primeval memory, but 
were produced directly by the social structure. In other words, 
Shame, fear of war and fear of God, guilt, fear of punishment or of loss 
of social prestige, man's fear of himself, of being overcome by his own 
affective impulses, all these are directly or indirectly induced in him by 
other people. Their strength, their form and the role they play in the 
individual's personality depend on the structure of his society and his 
fate within it. ... the constant production and reproduction of human fears 
by people is inevitable and indispensable wherever people live 
together...54 
The manipulation or manufacture of fears as a tool of governance has a long history, and 
has played no inconsiderable role in the growth of the modern state.55 Elias' argument 
rests heavily on the notion that what modern people fear most is deliberate, physical 
violence, a violence which is unquestioningly associated with the past or with 
uncivilised peoples. For Elias, violence represented an unrestrained, passionate urge, an 
untamed and uncontrolled eruption of physical destruction. Despite all the civility of 
our modern restrained conduct, violence retained a link with the primal and primitive 
past, a dark and threatening force. The potential violence of the state Elias contended, 
was not feared by citizens of modern, civilised societies but accepted because it was 
thought to be safely secured by constitutional safeguards.56 This violence however, 
though it may indeed often be brutal and wild, may also be restrained and controlled, 
and the modern failure to notice violence may in part be attributed not simply to its 
successful camouflage, but to the very insinuation of state (and non -state) violence 
within the civilisation which claims to have eliminated it. To what degree Elias 
53 Ibid., pg. 314. 
54 Ibid., pg. 328. 
ss On states and fear see Charles Tilly's "War- Making and State -Making as Organised Crime ", in 
T.Skocpol, et.al. (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pg. 
169 -191. The importance of fear in liberal thought will be discussed more fully in the following chapter. 
56 For instance, the English liberal theorist T.H. Green argued that the gradual disappearance in Europe 
of states based on arbitrary rule ( "dynasteia ") and the development of modem constitutional states 
("politeia") had involved a gradual, though still incomplete control over the state's ability to demand 
military service. As he put it, "Standing armies... though existing on a larger scale now than ever before, 
are not products of the civilisation of Europe, but of the predominance over that civilisation of the old 
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celebrated civilisation as an achievement of the modern world has been a matter of 
considerable debate. At issue in this debate is the question of whether modern 
`civilisation' has in fact made us intolerant of violence, or simply more passive in the 
face of the peculiarly modern notion that the state has the sole right to exercise violence. 
H GENOCIDE AND CIVILISATION 
According to Hans Joas, Elias' work on civilisation can be divided into an earlier and 
more strident celebration of the "linear process" of advancement and a later, more 
"ambiguous" account of civilisation and its problems.57 Burkitt suggests that Elias' 
position may indeed be ambiguous and argues that Elias "did not celebrate" civilisation 
but rather was deeply aware of what he called its "inherently ambivalent" nature.58 
According to Bauman however, Elias' work is far from ambivalent and is in fact a prime 
example of the "etiological myth" dominating Western self -understanding - not to 
mention mainstream sociological discourse - which represents the last four or five 
hundred years of Western history as a "morally elevating story of humanity emerging 
from pre -social barbarity.i59 There is debate of course on whether Elias considered 
violence to have been `eliminated' or simply "hidden behind the scenes" of social life, 
but he clearly believed that although pacified social spaces may still contain coercive 
pressures they were largely non-physical in nature.ó0 The irreducible core of Elias' 
position, in common with liberalism, is that civilisation has succeeded in changing our 
attitudes toward to the incidence of violence resulting in a distinct aversion for its 
barbarity, wildness, and physicality. 
It is this claim that Bauman finds so misleading and dangerous, for while he agrees that 
our attitudes toward violence have changed so too has the nature of modern violence, 
making it both less noticeable and more dangerous than mere wild cruelty. The very 
dynasteiai." Green, T.H., Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, edited by P.Harris and 
J.Morrow, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pg. 135. 
57 Joas, H., "Bauman in Germany: Modern Violence and the Problems of German Self -Understanding ", 
Theory, Culture and Society, 15 (1), 1998, pg. 50. 
58 Burkitt, I., "Civilisation and Ambivalence ", British Journal of Sociology, 47 (1), 1996, pg. 139, 142. 
According to Dunning and Mennell, Elias' theory of civilisation is more complex than either Bauman or 
Burkitt suggest, arguing that Elias took account not only of ` civilising' but `decivilising' forces such as 
the trauma of war and the weakeneing of the state's monopoly of violence. See, Dunning, E., and 
Mennell, S., "Elias on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust: on the Balance Between `Civilising' and 
`Decivilising' Trends in the Development of Westem Europe ", The British Journal of Sociology, 49 (3), 
1998, pg. 339 -357. 
59 Bauman, Z., Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity, Cambridge, 1989, pg. 12. 
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idea of civilisation as pacification "...diverts attention from the permanence of the 
alternative, destructive potential of the civilising process..." which in effect divests "the 
use and deployment of violence from moral calculus ".6' Bauman argues that far from 
introducing restraints upon state violence modern civilisation, with its emphasis on 
technology, bureaucratic efficiency, and rationalising judgement became the "necessary 
condition" of genocides such as the Holocaust by giving rise to what he dryly terms the 
"gardening state ".62 The `gardening state' metaphor is used to convey the modern 
state's interest in social engineering, the pursuit of a "social order conforming to the 
design of the perfect society.s63 Social gardening is the raison d'etre of modern 
civilisation which pursues a `design' for society, determines courses of action on the 
basis of its own blue -prints, and above all is concerned to weed -out any "pests" or other 
obstacles. Genocide is therefore the logical accompaniment to modern civilisation. 
Genocide Bauman tells us, "is a gardener's job" because "...visions of society-as- garden 
define parts of the social habitat as human weeds. Like all other weeds, they must be 
segregated contained, prevented from spreading, removed and kept outside... if all these 
means prove insufficient, they must be killed. "64 
The distinguishing feature of Bauman's conception of violence is that it is far from wild, 
barbarous and cruel, but on the contrary merely forms part of the everyday continuum of 
routine bureaucratic procedure. The crucial ingredient in the production of genocide for 
instance is the modern institution of bureaucracy with its procedures of scrupulous 
"authorisation" of instructions from above and "routinised" operation allowing the 
effective "dehumanisation" of its victims.65 The individual bureaucrat is shielded by the 
6° See for example, Burkitt, I., loc.cit., pg. 144 -146, and Elias, N., op.cit., pg. 235. 
61 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 28. Italics in original. 
62 Ibid., pg. 13; see pp. 87 -88 on the notion of limits to state power. 
63 Ibid., pg. 91. 
64 Ibid., pg. 92. The use of gardening metaphors for the state has a long history, and one is reminded 
here of the discussion between the gardeners in Act III, scene iv, of Shakespeare's Richard II which 
compares Richard's difficulties in governing England to the ruthless maintenance of a garden: "Oh, what 
pity is it, That he had not so trimm'd and dress'd his land, As we this garden!" A more direct early use of 
the metaphor in the context of the discourse of civilisation and the use of violence can be found in Sir 
John Davies' discussion of the English Crown's difficulties in subduing the Irish, "...the Husbandman 
must first break the Land, before it be made capable of good feed: and when it is thoroughly broken and 
manured, if he do not forthwith cast good seed into it, it will grow wilde again, and bear nothing but 
weeds. So a barbarous Country must first be broken by a war, before it will be capable of good 
Government; and when it is fully subdued and conquered, if it be not well planted and governed after the 
Conquest, it will eft -soons return to the former Barbarism." Sir John Davies, Historical Relations: Or, a 
Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued Nor Brought Under Obedience of 
the Crown of England [1664], second edition, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 4 -5. 
65 Ibid., pg. 21. 
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complex interaction between different levels within the bureaucratic structure, 
preventing her or him from having to acknowledge the effects of their actions. 
Therefore, 
The Holocaust did not just, mysteriously, avoid clash with the social 
norms and institutions of modernity. It was these norms and institutions 
that made the Holocaust feasible. Without modern civilisation and its 
most central essential achievements, there would be no Holocaust.66 
To convey his point Bauman contrasts two modes of anti -semitic violence under the 
Nazis, viz, the largely spontaneous barbarity of the mob on Kristallnacht, and the more 
thorough, meticulously organised and bureaucratic mass murder of the Endlosung. 
The ` Chrystal Night' of 9 November 1938 was a dramatic incident in the escalation of 
the anti-semitic policies of the Nazi regime, but although many Jewish Germans were 
beaten or had their property destroyed, only about 100 lost their lives. According to 
Bauman the Chrystal Night was a "pogrom ", a largely spontaneous outpouring of mob 
violence, quite deadly in particular areas but unsustainable beyond the undisciplined 
rage of the moment.67 What distinguished the Nazis from centuries of such pogroms 
was the carefully planned, technologically advanced, purposeful, and sustained killing 
which took place under the auspices of the bureaucratic plan of the `Final Solution'. 
Now Bauman does not argue that genocide itself was a modern creation, but that the 
Holocaust was "unique among other historic cases of genocide" because it combined 
bureaucratic planning and efficiency with technology (especially in transportation and 
chemistry), under the cover of the modern inability to apply moral reasoning to the 
state's claim to exercise violence in the name of the social good.68 Far from eliminating 
or even suppressing violence, the process of civilisation has resulted in the mere 
"redeployment" and "re- distribution of access to violence" resulting in its increasing 
invisibility.69 The monopolisation of violence by the state has rendered it neutral, it has 
become a tool or "technique" administered through bureaucratic procedures and state 
functionaries.70 Bauman argues the monopolisation of violence by the state entails that 
violence is not simply directed at other states, but is also used within states. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to Elias, Bauman contends that the division of labour has 
66 Ibid., pg. 87. 
67 Ibid., pg. 89-90. 
68 Ibid., pg. 94-95. 
69 Ibid., pg. 96-97. 
70 Ibid., pg. 98. 
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created a greater sense of distance between individuals thus increasing the likelihood of 
violence. 
Within bureaucratic structures the division of labour results in an ever more restrictive 
specialisation of tasks and functions enabling fewer functionaries to know precisely how 
the entire structure functions and what purposes it fulfils." The only considerations that 
matter within the bureaucratic structure Bauman contends, are those of efficiency, the 
measurement of how successfully tasks get completed and these `technical' 
considerations are far removed from moral evaluation of the purposes and ends 
bureaucracies serves.'Z The emphasis on technical knowledge and judgement 
accompanying the division of labour creates a moral "distantiation" between individuals 
who can be bureaucratically classified as "a set of quantitative measures. "" This is 
what Bauman refers to as dehumanisation, and it not only characterises the way in 
which bureaucracies operate but in fact enables modem states to pursue genocide. 
Modem bureaucracy, Bauman contends "has a logic and a momentum of its own" which 
"like the brooms of the sorcerer's apprentice - easily move beyond all thresholds at 
which many of those who gave it the push would have stopped, were they still in control 
of the process they triggered.i74 In other words, modern bureaucracies have evolved all 
the techniques and procedures for dealing with human beings as if they were no more 
than a set of numbers, a problem to be solved. The employment of violence against 
those people can be more efficiently administered by bureaucrats who are structurally 
and functionally incapable of seeing the violence, or of recognising its `victims'. 
Modem bureaucracies are thus "intrinsically capable" of pursuing genocidal purposes; a 
capability which is awakened by the modern obsession with a planned society.75 
The Holocaust Bauman contends, was the result of the pursuit of a racially pure society 
by means of the functional specialisation and routine operation of Germany's 
bureaucracy. The Jews themselves became a category precisely defined by rigorous 
legalistic methods which stipulated the criteria of Jewishness (and thereby of 
71 Ibid., pg. 99. 
72 Ibid., pg. 101. 
73 Ibid., pg. 102. 
° Ibid., pg. 104. 
75 Ibid., pg. 106. Italics in original. 
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Arianism).76 The `Jewish problem' became a matter of administration; the signification, 
housing, Ghettoisation and eventually the transportation and extermination of Jews were 
questions requiring precise, technical knowledge. As the Jews increasingly became the 
objects of bureaucratic procedure and administration they were also increasingly 
divorced from the rest of society, both physically in terms of having to wear badges and 
live in ghettos, and psychologically in terms of being seen as a problem, as carriers of 
disease or agents of racial degeneration." The more the bureaucracy administered the 
Jews and the `Jewish problem' the more the Jews themselves were separated from 
normal society and robbed of their humanity, increasing the probability that they would 
become the targets of bureaucratically administered violence. According to Bauman 
therefore, the Holocaust and genocide in general is inherent in modern civilisation, and 
is not attributable to the particular historical circumstances in Germany at the time.78 
Bauman's approach explicitly diverges from the Sonderweg or `special way' thesis 
which explains the Holocaust in terms of the special economic and cultural conditions 
which caused Germany's modernisation to `go wrong', leading to an "excessive 
dependence on the state" and eventually to genocide.79 
For Bauman genocide can only be attributed to the convergence of the two most central 
features of modern civilisation, the bureaucratic state and the desire to pursue a planned 
society.80 The moral distantiation separating perpetrators from victims is not the 
product of a deficient morality but of the elimination of moral considerations by 
'6 Ibid., pg. 125. 
Ibid., pg. 124 -129. 
78 Freeman, M., "Genocide, Civilisation and Modernity ", The British Journal of Sociology, 46 (2), 
1995, pg. 215 -221. 
Varcoe, I., "Identity and the Limits of Comparison; Bauman's Reception in Germany ", Theory, 
Culture and Society, 15 (1), 1998, pg. 58 -60. According to Gilbert Geis, the Holocaust can be attributed 
to the special virulence of German xenophobia, which he argues still leads German policy- makers today 
to see immigrants "as weeds in a lovely and pristine Teutonic garden." By tracing the origins of the 
Holocaust to the process of civilisation and modernisation, Bauman's analysis explicitly refutes the thesis 
that genocides can be explained in terms of psychological factors, or human `evil'. See for example, Geis, 
G., "Is Germany's Xenophobia Qualitatively Different From Everybody Else's ? ", Crime, Law and Social 
Change, 24 (1), 1995, pg. 66. Staub, E., The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group 
Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pg. 28 -33, 76, 232 -236; and Sterba, J.P., 
"Understanding Evil: American Slavery, the Holocaust, and the Conquest of the American Indians ", 
Ethics, 106, 1996, pg. 445 -446. 
80 Bauman, Z., op. cit., pg. 106. One should note here similar analyses such as Henry Reynolds' 
attribution of the genocide of Australian aboriginal peoples by European settlers and colonial authorities 
to continuous policies of exterminism throughout the colonial period lasting well into the twentieth - 
century. Reynolds, H., Frontier, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996, pg. 53 -57, 83 -130. 
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instrumental, rational calculation.81 Bureaucratic procedures are the chief "morality - 
eroding mechanisms" and are, 
...strengthened by the principle of sovereignty of state powers usurping 
supreme ethical authority on behalf of the societies they rule. Except for 
diffuse and often ineffective `world opinion', the rulers of states are on 
the whole unconstrained in their management of norms binding on the 
territory of their sovereign rule. ... What follows is that under modern 
order the ancient Sophoclean conflict between moral law and the law of 
society shows no signs of abating. If anything, it tends to become more 
frequent and more profound - and the odds are shifted in favour of the 
morality- suppressing societal pressures.' 
Genocide is thus literally inseparable from the orderly functions of the bureaucracy, and 
the violence it entails becomes unrecognisable because we moderns are incapable of 
morally evaluating the bureaucracy and its functions. For Bauman then, genocidal 
violence is neither barbarous, untamed, or uncontrolled, and to see it in those terms is to 
fall victim to the `etiological myth' of civilisation, that genocidal violence is a 
"manifestation of pre- social or a- social drives bursting out from their socially 
manufactured cages..." signalling a "return to a pre -social state, or a failure to depart 
from it. "S3 This myth is unable, in Bauman's view, to adequately explain why "...the 
culturally trained revulsion against violence" was unable to prevent genocide and more 
importantly, why "civilised manners showed an astounding ability to cohabit, peacefully 
and harmoniously, with mass murder. "84 
This `cohabitation' was accompanied by the moral and physical distantiation achieved 
through the use of various "distancing technologies" such as modern weapons which 
remove the proximity, visual and physical contact between combatants.85 Similarly 
Bauman argues that engineers and scientists working in offices far from the killing 
fields perfected designs for gas chambers without taking any responsibility for the use 
of their ideas.86 The moral separations accomplished by modern civilisation are vital in 
overcoming what Bauman clearly believes is a natural inhibition to commit violence on 
81 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 194. 
82 Ibid., pg. 199. 
83 Ibid., pg. 170, 174 -175. 
84 Ibid., pg. 110. 
85 Shapiro, M., Violent Cartographies; Mapping Cultures of War, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1997, pg. 77 -80. 
86 Bauman, Z., op.cit., pg. 197. 
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those whom one can see, hear, or feel.87 Morality he suggests, is "inextricably tied" to 
"proximity" or the physical and visual connection between subjects, 
...morality seems to conform to the law of optical perspective. It looms 
large and thick close to the eye. With the growth of distance, 
responsibility for the other shrivels, moral dimensions of the object blur, 
till both reach the vanishing point and disappear from view.88 
According to Michael Freeman, Bauman's analysis isolates genocide from other forms 
of violence, such as warfare and state- building.B9 The merit of this charge draws 
attention to Bauman's celebration of the `pre -social', pre- reflexive moral sense implicit 
in visual relations which leads him to argue that the desire to commit violence can only 
be explained by the pervasive influence of "artificial ", un- natural modes of thought.90 
Yet if such modes of thought were artificial, it is hard to understand why they should 
ever have become so pervasive. Bauman admits that genocides are comparatively rare, 
but he fails to address the possibility that genocide is only one of many forms of 
violence in modern societies.91 By focusing on the Holocaust Bauman stops short of 
offering a more developed theory of violence, because the violence of which he speaks 
is by definition episodic and artificial even though the potential for its appearance is 
ever -present in the conventions and norms of civilised society. His position rests on a 
reversal of the liberal view that violence is natural or barbaric and peace artificial and 
civilised, only to leave us without an adequate understanding of `artificial' violence. 
According to Bauman the willingness to commit violence is increased when one is 
unable to `see' it as such, and this involves not only the moral separation of victims 
from perpetrators but the actual shuttering of violent acts behind closed doors. It was 
for this reason that a means had to be found to "optically separate the killers from their 
victims ", resulting in the transition from mass shootings to the gas chambers 92 But is it 
the case that violence has been removed from sight, or is it that we simply cannot 
recognise what we see as violent? What Bauman's approach is unable to address is the 
possibility that perhaps violence may reside as much in what we see as how we see it. 
87 Ibid., pg. 155. 
ea Ibid., pg. 192. 
89 Freeman, M., loc.cit., pg. 209. 
90 Bauman, Z., Modernity..., pg. 95. 
91 Ibid., pg. 106. 
92 Ibid., pg. 26. 
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III. ADMINISTERING VIOLENCE; GOVERNING THE PEACE 
The association of vision and proximity with violence in modern civilised societies was 
an issue of particular concern to Michel Foucault, whose work uncovers some 
connections between the intensification of violence and the development of self -policing 
and self -governing methods of managing conduct. Foucault's analysis provides a 
possibility of seeing civilisation as a process of inculcating patterns of self -government 
from which violence is not necessarily eliminated, but excluded by carefully constructed 
boundaries between the realm of self - governing conduct (civil society) and non -self- 
governing realms (namely uncivil societies such as the family and prisons). The 
development of arenas of `peaceful' self -government is therefore accompanied by the 
concentration, intensification, or simple acceptance of violence in other areas. Violence 
which intrudes upon civil society is therefore represented as barbaric, a problem to be 
solved or an obstacle to be eliminated, while violence outside this realm is overlooked 
or ignored. 
According to Foucault, the rise in population levels and growth of urban centres 
attendant upon the emergence of a market economy in Western Europe heralded an 
important transition in crime and criminality consisting in a reduction in cases of overt 
physical violence, murder, and assault but an increase in cases of property- related crime, 
such as theft and fraud.93 What was important about this transition however, was the 
bearing that it had on the emergence of new social structures and relations of power 
which redefined crime and criminality and its solution. In other words, the decline in 
violence to which Foucault refers was not simply a consequence of an advancing 
`civilisation' or pacification of human relations, rather, 
...the shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of fraud forms part 
of a whole complex mechanism, embracing the development of 
production, the increase of wealth, a higher juridical and moral value 
placed on property relations, stricter methods of surveillance, a tighter 
partitioning of the population, more efficient techniques of locating and 
obtaining information: the shift in illegal practices is correlative with an 
extension and refinement of punitive practices.94 
A concern for the population and its wealth was the defining characteristic of this 
emergent discourse of government. Within established patterns of monarchical 
93 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish; The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan, Penguin, 
London, 1977, pg. 75. 
sa Ibid., pg. 77. 
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authority centred on the person of the ruler as the source of authoritative commands 
within a given territory, a new "art of government" emerged in which government came 
to be seen not simply as the seat of all authority, but a regulator of the health, wealth, 
and stability of a population over which it cast a keen eye.95 As a consequence, modern 
liberalism incorporated the idea that the purpose of government was "the welfare of the 
population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, 
health... on which government will act either directly... or indirectly through techniques 
that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth 
rates, the directing... of population into certain regions or activities... ".96 
These concerns were at the heart of the emergence of a new mode or rationale of power, 
in effect a "bio- power ", which aimed not at the elevation of sovereign authority but the 
creation of healthy individuals and productive societies, the maximisation of the health 
and life of a population.97 Consequently, the aim of government was to understand how 
to nurture a healthy population, requiring knowledge of its "specific phenomena and its 
peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, 
frequency of illness, patterns of diet and habitation.s98 The mechanisms of this new 
"biopolitics of the population" aimed at understanding, evaluating and measuring the 
needs of the population, maintaining its health and growth, encouraging productivity, 
ensuring internal security and stability rather than showing itself in acts of "murderous 
splendour ".99 This new art of government required extensive surveillance, observation, 
and a steady accumulation of detailed knowledge of the identities, beliefs, habits, and 
customs of the people. Foucault's analysis aims to reveal how the violent authority of 
sovereign monarchs gave way to a new form of power based on observation and 
surveillance. In this new form of power the gaze of an un -seen other was crucial in the 
substitution of violent authority by discipline and self -mastery. 
One version of this new art of government, particularly strong in Continental Europe 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth -centuries centred on the activities of `police' in 
95 Foucault, M., "Govennnentality ", in G. Burchell, et.al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Govern mentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, pg. 93 -104. 
9e Ibid., pg. 100. 
Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality; Vol. L, translated by R.Hurley, Penguin, London, 1978, pg. 
140. 
98 Ibid., pg. 25; see also, Simons, J., Foucault and the Political, Routledge, London, 1995, pg. 27 -30. 
99 Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality, pg. 139 and 144. 
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regulating areas of social and economic life representing a "great effort of formation of 
the social body ".100 The rationale of this art of government was that the pursuit of the 
health, wealth and well -being of society required the efficient regulation of areas of 
social life by an exhaustive policy of investigation, supervision and control by 
authorities invested with the power to carry out such functions in order to "produce a 
well ordered civic or territorial community.i101 Another version of the new art of 
government, which is the focus of this thesis, emerged partly in response to the 
discourse of police and came to be associated most closely with Anglo- Scottish thought 
and provided impetus to the development of modern liberalism.102 This `liberal' 
discourse was premised on the view that securing the health, wealth and well -being of 
society could best be achieved by ensuring that individuals would regulate their own 
conduct.103 Liberalism's characteristic concern has therefore been the maximisation of 
personal liberty, which was thought to be necessary if society was to become an 
efficient wealth -producing entity. This liberty however, was under- pinned by a variety 
of disciplinary mechanisms aimed at securing individual self -mastery. Within the 
discourse of police, government was conceived as an activity of integration and 
command of the various institutions of regulation. Within liberal discourse by contrast, 
the chief task of government was to produce a self -regulating society through a variety 
of disciplinary processes, some of which (such as prisons and armies) operated under 
direct government control others of which (such as churches, schools, and work places) 
were relatively autonomous.104 It will be argued in this thesis that a liberal discourse of 
civilisation emerged in response to the perceived need to create a pacified society, to 
eradicate the violence which obstructed orderly discipline and the health, wealth and 
productivity of civil society. 
From a Foucauldian point of view, liberal concerns for individual liberty were premised 
on the effort to arrange social, economic and political institutions in such a way that 
1°° Pasquino, P., "Theatnun Politicum: the Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State of Prosperity" in 
G. Burchell, et.al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, pg. 111. 
01 Oesterich, G., Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, translated by D. McLintock, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pg. 156. 
102 Dean, M. and Hindess, B., "Introduction: Government, Liberalism, Society" in M.Dean and B. 
Hindess (eds.), Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pg. 3 -4. 
03 This is the purpose of Foucault's celebrated discussion of Bentham's Panopticon, discussed below. 
In contemporary societies this style of government manifests itself in reductions in physical police 
presence in favour of pervasive video surveillance on streets, in shops, and work places. 
l04 Ibid., pg. 4. 
24 
individuals could be enabled to manage their own conduct. The problems of 
government thus revolved around the adjustment of "...the mechanisms of power that 
frame the everyday lives of individuals... [and] assumes responsibility for and places 
under surveillance their everyday behaviour, their identity, their activity ".105 The 
development of a liberal art of government had less to do with the exercise of sovereign 
power within a given territory than it did with the development of a range of 
interdependent disciplinary processes which focussed on the well -being of a 
population.106 It was in this vein that reformers such as Henry Fielding stipulated that 
"the Strength and Riches of a Society consist in the Numbers of the People..." and that 
social well -being required, inter alia, the elimination of the burden of the poor.107 It was 
in this light that he counselled the need to focus attention on the "Customs, Manners, 
and Habits of the People" in order to prevent "Disorder ", stimulate trade and commerce 
by which the poor may be disciplined to shake off "their Vassalage" and became 
independent citizens shunning wasteful habits such as drunkenness and gambling.108 
The emergence of such disciplines and the recognition that government's role was to 
ensure that they functioned smoothly represented a fundamental shift from a 
monarchical notion of power based on the absolute sovereignty of the ruler over the 
subjects within a clearly defined territory.109 According to this older view, the power of 
the sovereign consisted in his or her capacity to prohibit or proscribe certain acts; it was 
therefore a negative power conveyed above all in the public use of violence by the 
sovereign. On this view crime and criminality could only be seen as acts of defiance 
against the sovereignty of the ruler, and the punishment of such defiance had to re- 
establish the absolute physical superiority of the sovereign over the felon.10 The 
severity of the punishments meted out to criminals and the publicity given to the 
tortuous executions were symbolic representations of the triumph of the sovereign's 
los Foucault, M., op.cit., pg. 77 -78. 
106 Burchell, G., "Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self", Economy and Society, 22 (3), 1993, 
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power. As Foucault put it, the "right to punish" was "an aspect of the sovereign's right 
to make war on his enemies ", and "public execution" was "a ceremonial by which a 
momentarily injured sovereignty... [was] reconstituted" by a publicly displayed 
"invincible force. " "' The sovereign's right to punish was indissolubly linked to the 
same right to make war; the execution of the criminal was the culmination of a kind of 
war between the all -powerful sovereign and the criminal in which the complete victory 
of the sovereign is publicly displayed and celebrated.12 
The development of a new `governmental' paradigm of crime and punishment was 
characterised by what Foucault called a "double process" marked by the "disappearance 
of the spectacle and the elimination of pain. "'" What this represented was not so much 
a civilised elimination of violence, as an alteration in the forms of violence. The 
emergence of a `governmental' conception of crime and punishment can be charted in 
the work of a host of reformers in a variety of fields, who sought was to replace what 
was increasingly perceived as the "bad economy of power" and punishment of 
sovereign power, being both excessive and inefficient, and to replace it with "a new 
`political economy' of the power to punish" which sought "not to punish less, but to 
punish better ".14 A prime example of this trend can be found in the writings of penal 
reformers such as Henry Fielding (1707 -1754) who argued that execution, 
...should be in some degree private. ...A Murder behind the Scenes... [if 
correctly managed] will affect the Audience with greater Terror than if it 
was acted before their Eyes. ... If Executions therefore were so contrived, 
that few could be present at them, they would be much more shocking 
and terrible to the Crowd without Doors than at present, as well much 
more dreadful to the Criminals themselves...15 
The Italian reformer Cesare Beccaria (1738- 1794), similarly sought reform of what he 
called the "useless prodigality of punishment" which merely hardened criminals, and 
impeded the orderly exercise of the law, concluding that punishment should "never be 
"' Foucault, M., op.cit., pg. 48, 49. 
12 Ibid., pg. 50. 
13 Ibid., pg. 11. 
14 Foucault, M., op.cit., pg. 79, 81, 82. See also, Hindess, B., Discourses of Power; From Hobbes to 
Foucault, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, pg. 114. 
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an act of violence committed by one or many against a private citizen ", used as "little as 
the circumstances will allow, proportionate to the crime, and established by law.s16 
The rationale of this new form of punishment was the development of new and more 
efficient mechanisms for the management of conduct.' The prominence given to 
prison reform is one aspect, albeit a crucial one, of a wider attempt to mould societies in 
such a way that the excessive and inefficient displays of sovereign authority may give 
way to a more subtle, consistent, and comprehensive means of managing human 
conduct which increased the efficiency and productivity of society itself. 18 The 
emergence of a liberal art of government was thus accompanied by the desire to create 
systems of law which were universally applicable throughout society, regulating 
individual conduct and limiting state power.1' While the introduction of more moderate 
and consistent punishments clearly softened the terrors and tortures of public execution, 
it was symptomatic of the substitution of the desire to destroy the body of the felon by 
the need to correct and retrain the mind of the criminal through a whole series of 
techniques designed to manipulate or train the individual criminal to become a 
profitable and productive member of society.120 It is in this context that Foucault speaks 
of the whole range of techniques or disciplines, not only in the penal system but in the 
military, in education, in the hospitals and factories which effect a "meticulous control" 
of the body, aiming to "increase... the mastery of each individual over his own body.i121 
Many of these disciplines incorporated pre- existing forms, but each attempted to 
enclose, partition, and organise the sphere of individual action, to enforce a framework 
of interaction in which each individual looks upon themselves as one part of an 
interlocking social whole. The function of the individual is therefore to independently 
organise their activities in harmony with the activities of everyone else requiring self- 
116 Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments [1764], Preface to A. Manzoni, The Column of Infamy, 
translated by K. Foster and J. Grigson, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, pg. 45, 21, 96. 
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misses the point, for Foucault did not suggest that the changes effected by the penal reformers amounted 
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discipline to include the `correction' of inmates with the intention of making tham capable of freedom 
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penal reformers sought to bring "the idea of liberty to bear on the problem of crime and punishment" 
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control of the minute details of action, timing, gesture, and form.122 The central aim of 
these disciplines was to create an ordered society of "docile" individuals who become as 
it were, well -trained, biddable, and predictable components of the social machine. 
The militaristic overtones of this conception of an ordered society often found 
expression in models of society as a well -drilled military machine.123 The emergence of 
modern military science with its emphasis on tactical skill - the ease and reliability of 
movement - marks for Foucault a decisive point in the rise to dominance of disciplinary 
power. 
It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it must 
not be forgotten that `politics' has been conceived as a continuation, if 
not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military model as a 
fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. Politics, as a technique 
of internal peace and order, sought to implement the mechanism of the 
perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the 
regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises.`24 
The well -drilled, professional armies of Western European states in the Baroque age 
were guarantors of peace in a double sense. They were instruments of peace- keeping 
within states not simply by deterrence, but also in that the process by which such armies 
were created provided a whole series of techniques for disciplining society in general.'25 
Thus the rise of modern armies became a mechanism for "maintaining the absence of 
warfare in society" ensuring the emergence of "meticulous military and political tactics 
by which the control of bodies and individual forces was exercised within states ",'26 
The model of disciplined armies inspired images of a disciplined society from which 
uncontrolled violence had been eliminated and the routine operation of manifold 
disciplines made the use of massive violence to ensure obedience largely unnecessary. 
Nonetheless as Foucault also noted, the "life- administering power" of modern 
governments provides them with the knowledge and the means to wage more bloody 
wars and commit genocide on their own or other populations.127 
121 Ibid., pg. 137. 
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Within the disciplinary regime each subject is observed, information is compiled and 
checked, judgements are made about the subject's responses. This is what Foucault 
refers to as a "physics of power" operating "according to the laws of optics and 
mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and 
without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence.i128 In other words, 
the subject's behaviour is measured and evaluated according to norms of appropriate 
conduct, deviations from which incur penalties administered by authorities within the 
disciplinary structure. This `normalising' judgement required constant observation by 
means of inspection or examination, and its implicit purpose was to implant within the 
individual the will to display a repertoire of predictable, appropriate behaviours. In 
reflecting on this intimate `fabrication' of the individual, Foucault had occasion to offer 
his now famous redefinition of power, 
The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an `ideological' 
representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this 
specific technology of power that I have called `discipline'. We must 
cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: 
it `excludes', it `represses'... In fact, power produces; it produces 
reality... The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him 
belong to this production.'29 
For both Elias and Foucault, the disciplinary processes which have shaped the lives of 
individuals have also wrought a historic shift in attitudes toward violence. The 
similarity ends here however, for whereas Elias stressed the importance of growing 
chains of mutual interdependence in the extension of social pacification, for Foucault 
violence gradually recedes from the social world as it is replaced by institutions which 
subject potentially violent, undisciplined individuals to the rigours of hierarchical 
observation and normalising judgement.130 
For Elias state monopolisation provided the vital framework within which the civilising 
(pacifying) process took place. For Foucault, the question of what role the state plays in 
128 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, pg. 177. 
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the extension of disciplinary power is altogether more ambiguous.' In his lecture on 
governmentality, Foucault argues that the shift toward an art of government centred on 
the management of the conduct of a population reduced the emphasis placed on 
traditional notions of state sovereignty.132 Indeed, in contrast to the fixed certainties of 
older notions of sovereignty Foucault refers to the "governmentalisation of the state" as 
a process of "continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of 
the state and what is not... ".133 This process involved the transition from "the traditional, 
ritual, costly, violent forms of power" to more modern "subtle, calculated 
technolog[ies]... of subjection.s134 As the older violent operations of the state receded 
however, new police and penal functions emerged and new accommodations had to be 
made. Indeed, Foucault argues that modern liberal- democratic notions of popular 
sovereignty and personal rights were underpinned by the enhanced disciplinary power 
developed within the institutional and legal framework of states.'35 
The emergence of a liberal art of government can thus be charted by the criticism of 
arbitrariness, inefficiency and corruption of monarchical authority. As John Milton 
(1608 -1674) asked for example, "[clan the folly be paralleled, to adore and be the slaves 
of a single person... and we without him might do more easily, more effectually, more 
laudably our selves ?" was it "such felicitie to wear a yoke'? ... knockt on by illegal 
injurie and violence ?s136 Behind such attacks upon personal sovereign authority was an 
ambition which became central to the liberal tradition, the creation of a society of self - 
governing individuals guided solely by reason, 
Certainly then that people must needs be madd or strangely infatuated, 
that build the chief hope of thir common happiness or safetie on a single 
person... The happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest 
in a full and free Councel of thir own electing, where no sigle person, but 
reason only swaies. And what madness is it... to devolve all on a single 
person; and more like boyes under age then men, to commit all to his 
patronage... [for] we need depend on none but God and our own 
counsels, our own active vertue and industrie...137 
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The desire to create a productive society of self -mastered citizens is reflected in 
Milton's view that only in a `free commonwealth' could children would be thoroughly 
schooled in the manner of "civilitie" and "vertue" ensuring that the nation would 
become "more industrious ", "ingenuous ", "potent ", and "honourable ", for "...of all 
governments a Commonwealth aims most to make the people flourishing, vertuous, 
noble and high spirited. Monarchs will never permitt: whose aim is to make the 
people... softest, basest, vitiousest, servilest, easiest to be kept under... in minde also 
sheepishest...s18 
For later liberals, these concerns were formulated more explicitly in John Locke's 
(1632 -1704) image of civil society governed by opinion and consent, Adam Smith's 
(1723 -1790) ideal of a self -regulating market, or of Jeremy Bentham's (1748 -1832) 
dream of society as a "gymnasium ", 
...in which every man exercises himself before the eyes of every other 
man. Every gesture, every turn of limb or feature, in those whose 
motions have a visible influence on the general happiness, will be 
noticed and marked down.19 
The notion central to these conceptions of society was that each envisaged significant 
spheres of self -regulation built upon the effective self -mastery of each individual 
citizen. The aim of enhancing this self -mastery was often accompanied by the dream 
that government and the state could be "reduced to the smallest amount possible, and 
freedom increased to the greatest amount possible" when, 
...human nature will have become so moulded by social discipline into 
fitness for the social state, that it will need little external restraint, but 
will be self -restrained... [and] the spontaneous cooperation which has 
developed our industrial system... will leave the primary governmental 
agency nothing beyond the function of maintaining those conditions to 
free action, which make such spontaneous cooperation possible...10 
Such an ideal was premised upon disciplinary power which functioned according to its 
own internal rules and procedures more or less independently of conscious personal 
control by any single individual, group, government or state. This project was the aim 
of liberal theories of civilisation, and central to such theories was the image of civil 
society as a pacified zone. For Foucault however, the operation of the disciplinary 
institution par excellance - the prison - indicates that this pacification was premised on 
18 Ibid., pg. 227. 
19 Bentham, J., Deontology, quoted in Wolin, S. S., op.cit., pg. 348. 
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the exclusion rather than the elimination of violence. Prisons do not eliminate crime or 
violence but administer them, subjecting them to institutional control. Inmates for 
example are introduced to careers of petty criminality or "delinquency" in prisons which 
are "politically or economically less dangerous" to society than vagabondage or 
banditry.141 Unlike the `masterless men' of former ages, modem `delinquents' are 
regulated by the prison system which institutionalises its members and prevents their 
illegality from becoming popular.142 The following chapters of this thesis will explore 
this exclusion of violence in liberal thought, accomplished by an implicit and at times 
explicit theory of civilisation. 
IV THESIS OUTLINE 
Foucault's work on government and on liberalism as a rationality of government in 
particular, takes us well beyond the limitations of the approaches of Elias' `liberal' 
theory of civilisation and Bauman's critique. For Elias, violence was represented as it 
has been in liberal thought as an outburst of natural fury to be controlled by carefully 
crafted manners and rigorous self -control. Bauman's insightful criticism of this 
approach draws attention to the ways in which these apparent mechanisms of control 
have been implicated in the intensification of organised, bureaucratic violence. 
Bauman's approach however, rests on the assumption that peace is a `natural' 
inclination obstructed by violence which is a product of artificial modes of conduct and 
control, and thus can provide few clues as to how forms of `violence' have been used to 
create `peace'. While Foucault's work is suggestive of a different approach to the 
relationship between violence and peace, neither Foucault nor any of those who have 
sought to extend and develop his analyses of liberalism have concerned themselves 
directly with the question of violence and liberal civilisation.'43 
140 Spencer, H., "Reasons for Dissenting From the Philosophy of M. Comte" [1864], in Spencer, H., 
Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Vol. II, Williams and Norgate, London, 1891, pg. 131 -132. 
141 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, pg. 277. 
142 Ibid., pg. 278 -279. Foucault refers to Eric Hobsbawm's work on social banditry here, but Western 
political discourse is replete with examples of denunciations of the `idleness', `criminality', and violence 
of `masterless men'. Christopher Hill has recently provided a useful discussion of the origins of this fear 
of masterless men, vagabonds and pirates within English history in his Liberty Against the Law: Some 
Seventeenth Century Controversies, Penguin, London, 1996, pg. 49 -63 and 115 -118. On Locke's 
response to the problem of idleness and vagabondage see the last section of Chapter Five in this thesis. 
143 A possible exception to this rule are some recent papers by Pasquino to which I refer in subsequent 
chapters. 
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This omission will in part be addressed in this thesis which will be concerned with the 
ways in which violence has been defined and attitudes toward it have been shaped 
within liberal discourse. In writing this thesis the aim has not merely been to assess 
those definitions but to explore the ways in which particular forms of violence have 
been identified as problematic while other forms have been tolerated, accepted, or 
ignored. It will be argued that this has been achieved by conceptually and normatively 
isolating certain types of violence from the ends and values of liberal civilisation. These 
forms of violence are seen as barbaric, uncontrolled, and destructive, and subsequent 
chapters will explore the opposition between `barbaric' violence and `civilised' peace 
within liberal discourse, focussing first on discussion of the conceptual boundaries 
which have been used to limit the definition of violence before turning in the second 
half of the thesis to a discussion of the theory of civilisation itself. Throughout the 
thesis it will be argued that liberal discourse has been shaped by the view that violence 
is corrosive of civil order and that the image of a liberal civil society has been premised 
on the view that civil society has been civilised and pacified. This pacification however, 
is premised upon the existence of conceptual and physical boundaries around and within 
civil society which `exclude' certain forms of `barbaric' violence while obscuring or 
tolerating the persistence of other violence. 
The following chapter (Chapter Two) will examine the fear of both civil and state 
violence in liberal political thought. The predominant liberal response to those fears it 
will be argued, has been a quest to imagine liberal society as a pacified space, a zone of 
personal interaction from which the appearance of violence has been excluded, though 
the threat of it remains. Within liberal political thought violence has been conceptually 
and normatively constrained, its definition circumscribed, and claims of its elimination 
from civil society have provided a basis for legitimacy. The next two chapters will 
explore some of the implications of the conceptual limitation of violence, beginning 
with a discussion in Chapter Three of the limitations placed on the definition of 
violence, political violence, and terrorism. The effect of these limited definitions is in 
part to quarantine violence from the `pacified' public sphere, and the implication of this 
conceptual quarantine, which will be discussed in Chapter Four, is that forms of 
violence which disrupt the order on which civil society depends denote illegitimacy and 
a return to barbarism. The implication of this view, illustrated in liberal analyses of 
civil strife and revolution, is that civil order depends upon the inculcation of orderly, 
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self -governing conduct, and the following four chapters will explore the ways in which 
a liberal discourse of civilisation arose and attempted to embody this design. 
Chapter Five will examine early -modern conceptions of both `civil society' and 
`political society' (that is government and the state) as deliberate creations of bodies of 
men who had the intention of ensuring mutual protection of life, liberty and estate. This 
view was premised on the exclusion from civil society not merely of troublesome 
violence, but those deemed incapable or unworthy of inclusion and therefore subject to 
the harsher disciplines of uncivil society. The boundary between civil and uncivil 
society thus distinguished the realm of freedom, rights, property, and peace from a 
wider realm of subjects over whom violent methods of control were deemed not only 
permissible but necessary. The firm distinction made in early liberal thought between 
the endemic violence of the state of nature and the non -violence of the civil and political 
state however, also entailed fears that while ostensibly protecting society against 
violence the state may threaten a worse violence of its own. The predominant `solution' 
to this problem lead toward the development of a liberal theory of civilisation focussed 
on the development of societies based on commerce and trade. Chapter Six will discuss 
the impact of the transition from a predominantly land -based to a commercial economy 
in late seventeenth -century Britain and its influence on early formulations of the 
`solution' to the `problem' of violence. 
The following chapters will address subsequent attempts to address this `problem', 
beginning in Chapter Seven which will be concerned with the relation between the 
domestic disciplines of civilisation which operated largely within societies, and their 
effect on the external or international behaviour of the states which shielded and 
protected them. In Chapter Eight, the emergence of a `liberal orthodoxy' on the 
connection between commerce and both internal and external pacification will be 
identified. This pacification was nonetheless accompanied by the defence of violence 
outside the civilised world, especially in the colonies of the imperial powers. Chapter 
Nine will assess the influence of such assumptions in contemporary liberal international 
relations literature, while Chapter Ten will discuss the `exclusion' of violence from 
recent literature on civil society. It will be argued in conclusion that such `exclusions' 
obscure the continuation and indeed the intensification of violence within liberal states 
and civilised societies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LIONS AND POLE -CATS: 
FEARS OF CIVIL AND STATE VIOLENCE IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 
...what Security, what Fence is there in such a State, against the Violence and 
Oppression of this Absolute Ruler ? The very Question can scarce be born. They are 
ready to tell you, that it deserves Death only to ask after Safety. Betwixt Subject and 
Subject, they will grant, there must be Measures, Laws, and Judges, for their mutual 
Peace and Security: But as for the Ruler, he ought to be Absolute, and is above all such 
Circumstances: because he has Power to do more hurt and wrong, 'tis right when he 
does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury on that side where the 
strongest hand is to do it, is presently the Voice of faction and rebellion. As if Men 
quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, 
should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the 
State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to 
think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done 
them by Pole -cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by 
Lions. 
- John Locke, Two Treatises of Government; Second Treatise, An Essay Concerning the True original, 
Extent, and End of Civil Government (17041, P.Laslett (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988. pg. 328. 
Western political and social thought has been dominated by `the problem of order', the 
attempt to explain how order is possible, how it is to be achieved, and how best to 
maintain it.' Lying behind the problem of order is often a fear of violence as the 
ultimate negation of order, the chaos which makes order necessary.' The question `how 
is order possible ?' is therefore often accompanied by the implicit question, `how is 
violence preventable ?' The problem of violence or more particularly, the fear of 
violence and what it entails has been a persistent (though at times unobtrusive) theme in 
liberal political thought which, although not the only theory to be worried about the 
prospect of violence, is nonetheless haunted by a particular fear of the origin, nature and 
effects of violence.' It will be the aim of this chapter to identify those fears and to 
indicate how they have shaped the liberal response to the problem of violence and order. 
The argument presented here is that liberalism has been haunted, as John Locke's 
opening quotation exemplifies, by fears both of civil violence (Locke's pole -cats) and 
state violence (Locke's lions); the former fear alleviated by means of a peace- keeping 
state, but the latter fear exacerbated by the suspicion that augmented state power 
threatens a worse violence. Flowing through liberal discourse then is a tension between 
the perceived need for states to avert civil violence, and the concern that such states are 
themselves a danger to the liberal order. Continual attempts to expiate these fears have 
left liberalism caught, as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis, both needing the state 
to ensure protection, but fearing the consequences of state power. 
Neither this chapter, nor the thesis itself will attempt to resolve this problem; rather, the 
aim is merely to explore the way in which the problem of violence has been framed 
within liberal discourse with a particular (though not exclusive) focus on early contract 
theory. The prominent place given to violence in this early literature contrasts sharply 
' See for example, Preston King's The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and 
Thomas Hobbes, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974, pg. 17 -38; Pasquino, P., "Political Theory, 
Order, and Threat ", Nomos, XXXVIII, 1996, pg. 19 -41; Rule, J.B., Theories of Civil Violence, 
University. of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, pg. 3; and Sederberg, P.C., Fires Within: Political 
Violence and Revolutionary Change, Harper Collins, New York, 1994, pg. 11 -15. 
z Wrong, D.H., The Problem of Order; What Unites and Divides Society, The Free Press, New York, 
1994, pg. 10 -11, 37. 
3 On the fear of warfare and other forms of state violence in particular see Buzan, B., People, States and 
Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post -Cold War Era, second edition, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991, pg. 35 -55; and Howard M., War and the Liberal Conscience, Temple 
Smith London, 1978, pg. 13 -30. I shall turn to a discussion of liberal attitudes to war in chapters eight 
and nine. 
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however, with its near absence from more recent liberal thought. Contemporary liberal 
thought focuses more attention upon the debates centred around human rights, 
individual liberty, tolerance and pluralism, constitutional government, the separation of 
powers and legal equality.4 In the wake of the liberal -communitarian debate, critics and 
partisans of modern liberalism were polarised into opposing camps, and liberals tended 
to concentrate their efforts on a vigorous and at times uncritical defence of its key 
values and practices. Some responded by envisioning liberalism as a "...fair and stable 
system of co- operation between free and equal citizens..." regulated and encompassed 
by a conception of `justice as fairness ".5 Others characterised liberalism as a system 
which placed ultimate value on individual choice as an end in- itself, or emphasised 
`political values' such as liberal neutrality toward conceptions of the good.' Other 
defenders sought to uphold the concept of personal autonomy or "the need for 
toleration" as central liberal values.' Partly in response to communitarian attacks on 
`thin' notions of the good in liberalism, other commentators tried to define liberalism in 
terms of distinct and particular liberal goods or ends, such as Galston's identification of 
key `liberal virtues', such as courage, loyalty, and independence.' 
Within this literature the concept of violence, and especially the fear that it was a 
continuing problem in liberal societies received comparatively little attention, outside of 
the acknowledgment that "[v]iolence by the state" and "[p]hysical violence by 
individuals against others" threatened "individual rights and individual dignity... open- 
o Johnston, D., The Idea of a Liberal Theory; A Critique and Reconstruction, Princeton University. 
Press, Princeton, 1994, pg. 17 -27. 
5 Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, pg. 9 and 44. 
Beiner, R., What's the Matter With Liberalism, University. of California Press, Berkeley, 1992, pg. 
22 -25; the issue of state neutrality received considerable attention in the recent `liberal -communitarian 
debate', see for instance, Larmore, C., Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University. Press, 
Cambridge, 1987, pg. 44 -47; Kymlicka, W., "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality ", Ethics, 99, 
1989, pg. 883 -905; and Baynes, K., "Liberal Neutrality, Pluralism, and Deliberative Politics ", Praxis 
International , 12 (1), 1992, pg. 50 -69. 
See for example, Mendus, S., Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, Humanities Press International, 
New Jersey, 1989, pg. 75. There is a huge literature on personal autonomy, but for a representative 
sample see, Moore, M. "Liberalism and the Ideal of the Good Life ", The Review of Politics, 53 (4), 1991, 
pg. 675; Crittenden, J., Beyond Individualism: Reconstituting the Liberal Self, Oxford University. Press, 
New York, 1992, pg. 35 -45 and passim.; and Fitzmaurice, D., "Autonomy as a Good: Liberalism, 
Autonomy and Toleration ", The Journal of Political Philosophy, 1 (1), 1993, pg. 5 -14. 
s Galston, W.A., Liberal Purposes; Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pg. 220 -227. It should be noted here that Bruce Ackerman has argued 
that the liberal ideal of neutrality is itself a value or good. Ackerman, B., "Neutralities" in R.B.Douglass 
et.al. (eds.), Liberalism and the Good, Routledge, New York, 1990, pg. 29. 
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minded, reasoned debate" and indeed "the whole basis of a liberal society. "9 In their 
academic writings, contemporary liberals seem largely to have over -looked the problem 
of violence. The most important exception to this observation has been John Keane's 
recent important study Reflections on Violence which will be discussed in more detail in 
the final chapter. Keane observes that in contemporary liberal (and other) political 
thought violence has been "clothed in an aura of strangeness ", shunted into the 
background and ignored.10 "It is ironic ", suggests another commentator, 
...that contemporary liberalism should appear so naive. The fundamental 
ideas of liberal theory were born in a crucible of violence, or the threat of 
it, in early modem Europe." 
Keane attributes this curious absence of attention to a variety of factors the most 
important of which he says is a "simply inexcusable" failure to learn "to think in pain" 
or the fact that liberalism "has forgotten the experience of pain... ".'Z Neither of these 
explanations seem quite to grasp the nature of the omission which makes it sound rather 
random, a simple slip of the mind. As John Kekes puts it, it is not "that liberals are 
unaware of the relevant facts or that they try to ignore them" but that "their attempts to 
accommodate these facts in their political morality are utterly ineffectual.s13 In other 
words, the omission of violence from contemporary liberal discourse reflects a 
fundamental assumption that liberalism has provided a solution to the problem of 
violence. The result of making such an assumption is a "Panglossian" faith that the 
arrangements of liberal societies will lead to social harmony.14 Such faith sustains the 
central plank of liberalism, that the creation of more individual autonomy will lead to 
greater social harmony and the reduction of violence.15 
This thesis will attempt to establish that the lack of attention given to the problem of 
violence can be attributed to the nature of liberalism itself, for it will be argued that 
9 Carter, A., "Nonviolence and Democratic Theory", in Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the 
Australasian Political Science Association and European Union Studies Association of New Zealand, 
Christchurch, 1998, pg. 150. 
10 Keane, J., Reflections on Violence, Verso, London, 1996, pg. 8. 
Creppell, I., "Locke on Toleration: The Transformation of Constraint ", Political Theory, 24 (2), 
1996, pg. 200. One of the few exceptions to this naivety was Alfred Cobban's In Search of Humanity; 
The Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History, George Braziller, New York, 1960, pg. 13 -19. 
Cobban's focus however, was not on liberalism per se, but the empiricist and utilitarian doctrines of the 
Enlightenment. 
12 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 7. 
13 Kekes, J., Against Liberalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997, pg. 202. 
14 Gray, J., Enlightenment's Wake; Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, Routledge, 
London, 1995, pg. 29. 
is Kekes, J., op.cit., pg. 24 -45. 
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liberalism is above all a discourse premised on the idea of civilisation understood as a 
process of pacification.16 This chapter will focus on the nature of the problem of 
violence within liberal thought, and the prominence once given to the fear of violence. 
The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the fear of violence in recent liberal 
discourse, and it will be noted that conservative critics of liberalism have tended to 
understand far better than most liberals that liberalism is based on a pervasive fear of 
violence. In the second section, attention will turn to the work of Thomas Hobbes 
(1588 -1679) who though himself not a liberal in the modern sense, nonetheless 
established the fear of civil violence that was to recur throughout the liberal tradition. 
The third section will be devoted to a discussion on the fear of state violence in early 
liberal discourse, and especially in the work of John Locke (1632 -1704). Despite the 
fact that fears of violence no longer occupy a prominent place in liberal thought, it will 
be argued in conclusion that the dual fears of violence have shaped characteristic 
features of liberal conceptions of politics. The typical response liberals have made to 
the problem of violence has been to advance a politics of strict containment, a politics of 
limits and boundaries against the threat of violence, the implications of which for the 
understanding and definition of violence (and politics) will be discussed in more detail 
in the following two chapters. 
I. FEARFUL LIBERALISM? 
Some of the strongest critics of liberalism have focussed their attacks on the distinctive 
emphasis placed in earlier liberal thought on the need to exclude violence from the 
sphere of civil relations. Joseph de Maistre for instance was critical of democracy on 
the grounds that it weakened sovereignty by obscuring the distinction between ruler and 
ruled." The basis of any political order, in de Maistre's view was a sovereignty he 
defined as "...a repressive power that acts on the subject and that is external to him. "18 
Such power was manifested in the person of the executioner whom he described as 
"...the horror and the bond of human association., Remove this incomprehensible agent 
from the world, and... order gives way to chaos, thrones topple, and society 
16 See for example, Elshtain, J.B., "Don't be Cruel: Reflections on Rortyian Liberalism ", in D.W. 
Conway and J.E. Seery (eds.), The Politics of Irony: Essays in Self -Betrayal, St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 1992, pg.... ; and Moss, D., "Politics, Violence, Writing: The Rituals of "Armed Struggle" in Italy" 
in D.E. Apter (ed.), Macmillan, Houndsmills, 1997, pg.... 
" de Maistre, J., Study on Sovereignty, in The Works of Joseph de Maistre, translated by J.Lively, 
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1965, pg. 120 -122. 
a Ibid., pg. 120. 
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disappears.s19 In contrast to this rather gruesome image of social order, liberalism 
posited a social order held together not through fear but mutual self -interest resulting in 
a peaceful civil society.20 The rather surprising recent rehabilitation of the work of Carl 
Schmitt has focussed attention upon his strident critique of this aspect of liberal 
thought.21 According to Schmitt, politics could only be understood in terms of the 
fundamental dichotomy "between friend and enemy" in which there was "...the real 
possibility of physical killing" 22 Schmitt castigated liberals however, for denying this 
dichotomy and subordinating politics to the primacy of the market and private property 
confining it thereby "...to securing the conditions for liberty and eliminating 
infringements on freedom.s23 Such an approach was anti -political in denying the 
essentially violent nature of politics. For Schmitt, the "essence" of liberalism lay in 
"negotiation, a cautious half -measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the 
decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate which permits 
the decision to be postponed forever in an unending discussion. "24 
According to John McCormick, Schmitt sought to revive fear in politics by pointing to 
the ever -present possibility of civil war which could be averted only by submitting to a 
state which would determine and enforce the distinction between friend and foe.2s 
Liberalism however, sought to circumvent such fears by emphasising the mutual 
fraternity of pluralistic society and by failing to entrust sufficient power to the state.26 
Where liberalism went wrong in Schmitt's view, was in `neutralising' Hobbes' 
conception of the sovereign state ruling through fear, and in prioritising the individual 
'9 de Maistre, J., The Saint Petersberg Dialogues, in ibid., pg. 192. 
20 Benjamin, W., One -Way Street and Other Writings, translated by E.Jephcott and K.Shorter, NLB, 
London, 1979. pg. 133 -36, 142. According to Pasquale Pasquino, Michel Foucault's last lectures were 
devoted to an examination of the liberal pacification of politics. Pasquino,P., "Political Theory of War 
and Peace: Foucault and the History of Modem Political Theory", Economy and Society, 22 (1), 1993, 
P8. 
See for example, Richard Wolin's "Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State ", 
Theory and Society, 19, 1990, pg. 389 -416, and "Carl Schmitt: the Conservative Revolutionary Habitus 
and the Aesthetics of Horror ", Political Theory, 20 (3), 1992, pg. 424 -447; also see Freund, J., "Schmitt's 
Political Thought ", Telos, 102, 1995, pg. 11 -42; and Palaver, W., "Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism ", 
Telos, 102, 43 -71. 
22 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political [1932], translated by G. Schwab, Rutgers University. Press, 
New Brunswick, 1976, pg. 26 and 33. 
23 Ibid., pg. 71. 
24 Schmitt, C., Political Theology; Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [1922], translated by G. 
Schwab, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1985, pg. 63. 
zs John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism; Against Politics as Technology, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pg. 253. 
26 Ibid., pg. 256. 
7. 
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and their mythical `right to protection'.27 Liberalism thereby denuded the state of true 
sovereignty by seeing it as a mechanism to fulfil the prior right of individuals to 
protection, whereas for Schmitt, any right to protection for individuals was solely 
determined by the "initiative" and "prerogative" of the state itself.2B 
Within contemporary liberal discourse, few now acknowledge that "...the right to 
protection against public and private violence... [is] among the core values of 
liberalism.i29 The reason for this is that contemporary liberalism considers violence 
alien to liberalism and to liberal polities. Researchers such as R.J. Rummel for instance, 
have expended considerable effort to prove that liberal- democracies are non -violent and 
that therefore "...the less democratic a government, the more likely it will kill its own 
citizens in cold blood. "30 Rummel's view is that within liberal- democratic polities 
violent conflict has been supplanted by "...voting, negotiation, compromise, and 
mediation... enhanced and supported by the restraints on decision makers... pluralism... 
rational debate, toleration... conciliation, and conflict resolution.s31 An arguably more 
ambitious example of this celebration of the liberal solution of the problem of violence 
is Francis Fukuyama's End of History which sees in modern liberal states the 
institutionalisation of "compassion" and intolerance for "violence, death, and suffering 
manifested in "popular sovereignty... rights, the rule of law, [and] separation of 
powers..." 32 
Almost alone among contemporary liberals, Judith Shklar argued that liberalism is or 
should properly be based upon a pervasive fear of violence. In Ordinary Vices, Shklar 
reiterated Montaigne's plea that we should put cruelty or the "...wilful inflicting of 
physical pain on a weaker being in order to cause anguish and fear..." first on the list of 
vices.33 Although putting cruelty first on the list of vices did not lead directly to an 
n Ibid., pg. 273 -277. 
n Ibid., pg. 279. 
29 Holmes, S., The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, Harvard University. Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1993, pg. 
212 -213. 
30 Rummel, R.J., "The Politics of Cold Blood ", Society, 27 (1), 1989, pg. 33. He also claims that there is 
a tendency within recent scholarship to deny or attack the liberal pacification of politics. Ibid., pg. 36. 
3' Rummel, R. J., "Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder ", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 
(1), 1995, pg. 4. 
32 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London, 1992, pg. 261 and 333. 
" Shklar, J., Ordinary Vices, Belknap Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, pg. 8. One should note here the 
work of other liberals who have approvingly referred to Shklar's work, such as Rorty, R., Contingency, 
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endorsement of liberalism, the intolerance of cruelty and suffering she thought remained 
"...a powerful part of the liberal consciousness.s34 Shklar's fearful or "dystopic" 
liberalism had its "deepest grounding" in the conviction, 
...born in horror, that cruelty is an absolute evil, an offence against God 
or humanity. It is out of that tradition that the political liberalism of fear 
arose and continues amid the terror of our time to have relevance.35 
The liberalism of fear however, was fearful not simply of state violence per se; even the 
most liberal polity must make use of coercive measures. Rather, the liberalism of fear 
was fearful of invasive or arbitrary acts of cruelty by the state which inflicted pain and 
suffering on individuals, and threatened to corrode the rights and freedoms which were 
the chief virtues of liberal societies.36 Shklar claimed that the separation of the private 
realm of individual freedoms entrenched in a system of rights from the public realm of 
politics and state provided a defensible boundary against the violence and cruelty of the 
state.37 
Shklar's liberalism of fear however, was far from a generalised, passive fear of despotic 
government it was also a positive programme, a conception of politics. This politics 
was based on the mistrust of states and the desire for a "...constant division and 
subdivision of political power ", matched by a commitment to a society consisting of 
autonomous voluntary associations which become " significant units of social 
power..." capable of checking the power of government.38 Indeed Shklar argued that the 
liberalism of fear should be understood as foundational, a visceral response to suffering 
maintained as Harold Laski once put it, "by fear rather than good will.i39 Despite its 
relative absence from contemporary liberal writings, the conception of a social order 
built upon a foundation of fear has played an important part in the development of early 
Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989; and Baier, A., "Moralism and 
Cruelty ", Ethics, 103, 1993, pg. 436 -457. 
Ibid., pg. 43. 
n Shidar, J., "The Liberalism of Fear" in N.L.Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life, Harvard 
University. Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1989, pg. 23. The term ` dystopic liberalism' is taken from the title 
of Selya Benhabib's tribute to Shklar "Judith Shklar's Dystopic Liberalism ", Social Research, 61 92), 
1994, pg. 477 -488. 
36 Ibid., pg. 29. 
3' Shklar, J., loc.cit., pg. 24. Shklar's essentially pessimistic liberalism contrasts with April Carter's 
rather more optimistic "humanist liberalism" which traces `liberal pacifism' to its respect for individual 
autonomy, and toleration of diversity of belief and lifestyle. See Carter, A., loc.cit., pg. 149. 
38 Ibid., pg. 30. 
39 ibid., pg. 38; and Laski, H.J., A Grammar of Politics, fourth edition, Allen and Unwin, London, 1938, 
pg. 20. 
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liberalism. In the following section it will be argued that what was most feared by these 
earlier thinkers was not state but civil violence. 
II. CIVIL VIOLENCE: "WHERE EVERY MAN IS ENEMY TO EVERY MAN" 
The fear of what has here been called `civil violence' is a fear of spontaneous, 
uncontrolled and chaotic violence between individuals and groups in society. Such 
fears were characteristic of, but by no means limited to contractarian doctrines of the 
state of nature in which only a sufficiently strong state could put an end to the endemic 
civil violence of the state of nature and ensure mutual protection and self -preservation 
of citizens4° This indeed was Thomas Hobbes' approach, who although not himself a 
liberal in the modern sense, was chiefly concerned with the problem of how to ensure 
that social order could be imposed on humans whose natural inclination was to look to 
their own advantage. His solution was to argue for a Leviathan state capable of 
preserving social order by denying its citizens the unhindered exercise of their rights, 
foremost among them the right of individual sovereignty, of private judgement and 
complete self- determination.41 Hobbes' political thought can be interpreted as an 
attempt to construct a method by which citizens may be persuaded of the virtue of 
having in the state a supreme, sovereign coercive entity, and to accept that subjection to 
such an authority is in everyone's best interest. The means by which he accomplishes 
this end is to imagine a realm where there is no common power and unchecked civil 
violence rages; this realm is the state of nature.42 
According to Hobbes' all individuals possessed a `Natural Right' to preserve themselves 
and "may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre" to do so." From this 
Hobbes derived the natural law imperative that we should "seek Peace" and that, 
ao King, P., op.cit., pg. 77, 282. 
41 Lund, W.R., "Hobbes on Opinion, Private Judgement and Civil War ", History of Political Thought, 
XIII (1), 1992, pg. 52 -72. 
42 One recent commentator has written that Hobbes may be said to be "...the supreme philosopher of 
fear, and his political theory the apotheosis of fear." Indeed, as Hobbes himself put it in speaking of the 
circumstances of his own birth as England awaited what seemed like immanent invasion from the 
Spanish Armada in 1588, "For Fame had rumour'd that a Fleet at Sea,/ Wou'd cause our Nations 
Catastrophe;/ And hereupon it was my Mother Dear/ Did bring forth Twins... both Me, and Fear." Wood, 
N., "Sallust's Theorum: A Comment on `Fear' in Western Political Thought ", History of Political 
Thought, XVI (2), 1995, pg. 186. 
43 Hobbes, T., Leviathan [1651], Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pg. 190. (All italics in original unless 
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...a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre forth, as for Peace, 
and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right 
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as 
he would allow other men against himselfe.44 
Natural Laws however, no matter how reasonable were not sufficient in themselves to 
ensure observance "[f]or the Lawes of Nature... without the terrour of some Power, to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions... And Covenants, 
without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. "45 
Consequently, no individual would brook obstruction to action and the Natural Right of 
self defence became in effect a "right to everything ", the liberty to seek any advantage 
over others, to protect oneself from attack by pre -emptively attacking, over -awing, or 
otherwise controlling others. Life in the state of nature was therefore dominated by the 
fear of violent death at the hands of some other individual, for Hobbes believed that 
human beings were sufficiently equal that no person could be completely invulnerable 
to attack46 The search for security in such a state Hobbes assured us, impelled a constant 
search for power or the means to obtain one's ends.47 
But while Hobbes was clearly worried that the human desire for prestige, power, and 
wealth made violence inevitable in the absence of authority, he also believed that 
violence was not the most efficient way of ensuring one's self -interest. Self- interest 
could only be partially secured in the state of nature because everything was uncertain. 
The reason was that violence was an option for all to try; individuals were tempted to 
use "[v]iolence, to make themselves Masters of other mens person, wives, children, and 
cattell... [or] to defend them... [or to avenge any] signe of undervalue... ".48 
Consequently, 
...during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in 
awe, they are in that condition which is called Wane; and as such a 
warre, as is of every man, against every man [which] consisteth not in 
Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherin the Will 
to contend by Battell is sufficiently known...4° 
The fear of civil violence then, was a fear that violence stalked every person in his or 
her dealings with others, and that the potential emergence of violence made all 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., pg. 223. 
46 Ibid., pg. 185. See also, Pasquino, P., "Political Theory of War and Peace: Foucault and the History 
of Modern Political Theory", Economy and Society, 22 (1), 1993, pg. 4. 
47 Ibid., pg. 150, 161. 
48 Ibid. 
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uncoerced association, co- operation, culture, industry or agriculture untenable, resulting 
in "continuall feare, and danger of violent death" making "the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short. "50 
Hobbes was quite explicit that social union could only be ensured by binding, 
authoritative laws and that to be effective, laws required a power of enforcement, 
"[w]here there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice ".51 
The ceaseless and chaotic violence of the state of nature was thus contrasted to the 
benefits of social order, law, and justice which were dependent upon a strong central 
power. Of course the state of nature was a hypothetical construction which was used as 
a method of justifying obedience to an all -powerful sovereign state, but as Bobbio 
points out, Hobbes' model of the state of nature was supplied in the horrors of the 
English Civil War and served as a pointed reminder of the consequences, discussed in 
later chapters of the Leviathan, of state disintegration.52 The striking images of 
antagonism, conflict, and violence Hobbes employed in describing the state of nature 
had a deeper symbolic importance. The state of nature represented for Hobbes the very 
opposite of social order; it was as Preston King has put it, "a condition and disposition 
which exists where government is suspended or destroyed. "S7 
For Hobbes therefore, the state of nature was not merely the incarnation of mutual 
antagonism and hostility. It was intended to represent the prospect of a condition in 
which violence was within the reach and right of every person. The state of nature was 
"the negative mirror image of social order... intended to depict disorder as the opposite 
of order: conflict rather than cooperation... ".54 A well- ordered and peaceful society in 
Hobbes view, was one in which contracts or "co- operative understandings involving 
reciprocal obligations" were honoured.55 Such contracts however, were no more binding 
than Natural Laws without some force behind them to compel their observance. 
Consequently, the state had to possess sufficient means of violence to compel, and had 
49 Ibid., pg. 185 -186. 
Ibid., pg. 186. 
51 Ibid., pg. 188. See also, Baumgold, D., Hobbes 's Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, pg. 110 -111. 
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the capacity and right to use `awesome' violence, or "so much Power and Strength... 
that by the terror thereof... [the sovereign] is inabled to forme the wills of them all [the 
subjects]... ".56 The renunciation of the natural right to all means of obtaining advantage 
over others Hobbes argued, could be thought of in terms of a contract between 
individuals to "give up my Right of Governing my seife..." to the sovereign and to 
"Authorise all his [the sovereign's] Actions... ".57 In forfeiting this "right to everything" 
the crucial sacrifices were the individual rights to private judgement, to use violence, 
and to resist the sovereign's commands ss 
In effect, Hobbes argued that the right to resist was incompatible with the powers and 
rights of the sovereign. The individual right to private judgement and the supposed 
right to resistance would threaten to overturn social order.59 According to Reinhard 
Kosselleck, Hobbes recognised that the decline of authoritative standards of ethical 
conduct and the consequent appeals to the authority of private conscience during the 
Reformation represented "a downright causa belli civilis. "60 The sovereign state was 
therefore the guarantor of social order, but as such the sovereign had to possess absolute 
power and be obeyed absolutely. This meant that the state was to possess the capacity 
for massive violence, but such violence was of a different order and magnitude to that of 
spontaneous civil conflict. As opposed to petty, private violence for individual 
advantage state violence was administered, institutionalised and served the overall 
interests of the state and hence was a benefit to society as a whole.61 Nonetheless, 
Hobbes maintained that the sovereign and the order it maintained was haunted by the 
fear of the re- emergence of civil violence and consequent disorder. Whenever the 
sovereign was challenged and overcome by internal revolt or invasion from outside, the 
state of nature loomed as the inevitable result and in such a case, 
...is the Common- wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to 
protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto 
56 Hobbes, T., op.cit., pg. 227. 
57 Ibid. 
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him For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to 
the Common- wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no 
more...62 
The conclusion to which Hobbes' argument headed was that violence was the ruin of 
social order, but that social order could only be forged by institutionalising violence. 
Moreover, the violence of the state of nature could never be securely eradicated; it 
lurked just beneath the brittle surface of civility, and threatened to return all to a state of 
hopeless brutality.63 
Within the liberal tradition violence has continued to be associated with nature, and its 
solution was conceived in terms of the fabrication of a civil order to solve the problems 
of nature. The creation of a civil order was thought essential by Benedict Spinoza 
(1634 -1677) for instance, who was clearly worried that if the supreme law of nature - 
self-preservation - were not curtailed by an independent but benevolent authority 
ceaseless violence would result.ó4 The corollary of such a view was that once the civil 
state had been created, the reappearance of violence between citizens seeking their own 
advantage would ensure a return to the state of nature. This fear was a chief concern of 
Immanuel Kant (1724 -1804) who saw the state of nature in starkly Hobbesian terms, a 
"lawless state of savagery..." in which the "brutish freedom" of individuals made "calm 
and security" impossible." The terror of the state of nature was not simply the fact of 
hostilities, but the potential for it to erupt at any given moment, 
For even if... [the state of nature] does not involve active hostilities, it 
involves a constant threat of their breaking out. Thus the state of peace 
must be formally instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a 
guarantee of peace.66 
A state of peace was only guaranteed within the framework of a "lawful state ", a 
constitutional system of government capable of upholding and enforcing legally binding 
rules.' Kant was quite explicit that a state must be able to restrict the unlimited 
freedom of each individual and establish harmony between individual freedoms (which 
62 Hobbes, T., op.cit., pg. 375. 
63 At one point Hobbes implores his readers to reflect on their own insecurities. Why else, he asks, do 
we travel armed and lock up our possessions at night unless we fear that even those who are close to us 
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Kant referred to as right), thereby securing each "against attack from any others.s68 
Behind his admission that "man is an animal who needs a master ", lay a barely 
disguised fear of the consequences for society and the civilising influences of society if 
civil violence were to break out.69 
This fear was most clearly displayed in his criticisms of the right of rebellion, similar in 
many respects to Hobbes'. For a state to be able to guarantee order and Right it must be 
unchallengeable, for it alone provided the only bulwark against a return to nature. Kant 
was worried however, by the pernicious doctrine that the true end of governments was 
not right but the pursuit of individual happiness.70 Given the abundance and variety of 
human happinesses, no constitution could endure its citizens determining for themselves 
when and if their happiness was sufficiently satisfied. The just commonwealth by 
contrast must be "irresistible" and forbid its citizens the right "to resist the will of the 
legislator by violent means ", because the notion that citizens may have a right to insist 
on securing their happiness was "a maxim which... would destroy the whole civil 
constitution and put an end to the only state in which men can possess rights.s71 Even in 
the case of tyrannous rule, 
...all resistance against the supreme legislative power, all incitement of 
the subjects to violent expressions of discontent, all defiance which 
breaks out into rebellion, is the greatest and most punishable crime in a 
commonwealth, for it destroys its very foundations. This prohibition is 
absolute.72 
What Kant feared most of all was that if human beings only sought happiness in social 
union resistance would become a common right, and this could only end in "...a state of 
complete lawlessness..." a return in other words to the rampant civil conflict of the state 
of nature.73 
es Kant, I., "On the Common Saying: `This may be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in Practice', 
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The creation of the civil state did not completely remove the danger of a return to civil 
conflict, it merely deferred it. As James Madison (1751 -1836) put it, violence was an 
ever present possibility in society, 
So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, 
that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and 
fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly 
passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common 
and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal 
distribution of property.74 
Inequalities attendant upon a market economy in conditions of scarcity,75 were also a 
concern of David Hume (1711 -1776) for whom private possessions were "expos'd to 
the violence of others" due to the insufficient "quantity of them to supply every one's 
desires and necessities.s76 Hume's fellow countryman Adam Smith, was also concerned 
about the appearance of violence which he hoped the impartiality and flexibility of the 
market would largely resolve." Although in favour of a minimal state, Smith clearly 
saw a need for a sufficiently strong and coercive state with instruments of violence at its 
disposal. He considered defence from external threats and the maintenance of internal 
peace the first two duties of the sovereign.'$ But Smith was quite clear that so far as 
civil violence was concerned, the accumulation of substantial property and wealth made 
the state and the use (or potential use) of state violence necessary. As he put it, for "one 
very rich man there must be at least five hundred poor" and consequently, 
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are 
often driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. 
It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of 
...valuable property... can sleep a single night in security. He is at all 
times surrounded by unknown enemies... from whose injustice he can be 
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protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually 
held up to chastise it.79 
Echoes of this fear can sometimes be heard in contemporary libertarian thought. 
Ludwig von Mises for example, warned that social life "would be quite impossible" if 
law -abiding individuals could not obtain protection from the "force and compulsion" of 
the law used against the "enemies of society ".80 We have here a return to the original 
problem posed by Hobbes, that human egoism entails a potential for enduring civil 
violence. This problem necessitated for Smith as it did for Hobbes, the creation of 
states with violent instruments of coercion at their disposal, even though those states 
were differently conceived by each. Although Hobbes was not concerned at the 
prospect of a Leviathan state, subsequent liberals were desperately concerned at the 
prospect that the state, having curbed civil violence would proceed to exercise its own 
worse violence. Caught by fears of these two forms of violence, liberalism has been 
characterised by a continual search to define and control that most ambiguous of liberal 
concepts, the state. 
HI. SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: FEARS OF STATE VIOLENCE 
Notwithstanding the influence of Hobbes' solution to the problem of civil violence, 
liberalism has come to be associated more closely with a fear of state power and the 
violence at the disposal of its functionaries. In Montesquieu's (1689 -1755) Spirit of the 
Laws for instance, the concern for the provision of individual security was outweighed 
by the fear that a government without divisions of power was liable to become despotic 
and rule by force and fear.&] A model of such a government was presented in the harem 
depicted in the Persian Letters, a regime based upon solitary rule and discipline, often 
arbitrarily imposed. Montesquieu was clear that this regime of discipline was held 
together by the twin means of surveillance and violence, described in a letter from 
Usbek the master of the harem to his chief eunuch, in which he wrote, 
Let fear and terror be your accompaniment. ...inflict punishment and 
correction. Put everyone into a state of dismay interrogate everyone... 
subject them all to your formidable inquiry. ... Expose the most hidden 
79 /bid., pg. 232. 
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secrets. Purify this sordid place and return it to the virtue it once 
possessed.82 
The authors of The Federalist Papers, influenced in part by Montesquieu, were of the 
opinion that the correct ordering of the state and government would cure the ills of civil 
and state violence.S3 In the ninth letter Alexander Hamilton (1755 -1804) considered the 
chief virtue of the United States' constitution to rest in the balance it struck between 
centralised (federal) and decentralised (state) power. This balance avoided both 
centralised tyranny and "splitting... into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, 
tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord... ".â4 Madison 
however, was resigned to the persistence of faction or collective conflicts and of the 
inability of any society or government to remove their causes completely.85 Rather, he 
concluded that such conflicts could only be dissipated within a strong state with 
representative institutions, encompassing a large territory and population.86 
Within fifty years of Hamilton's and Madison's advice on how best to avoid discord and 
violence however, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805 -1859) expressed his fear of violence 
from the very same institutions they recommended, 
...the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States 
does not arise... from their weakness but from their overpowering 
strength; and I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which 
reigns in that country, as at the very inadequate securities which exist 
against tyranny.87 
The dilemma in which liberalism had become ensnared was how to ensure sufficient 
protection against civil violence without tipping the balance toward the probability of 
excessive state violence. In formulating the classic statement of this dilemma John 
Stuart Mill returned to the violent and threatening imagery of nature, 
To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed 
upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an 
animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. 
But as the king of vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the 
82 Montesquieu, "Letter CXLVIII ", The Persian Letters in Richter, M. The Political Theory of 
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flock than any of the minor harpies, it was necessary to be in a perpetual 
attitude of defence against his beak and claws... to set limits to the power 
which the ruler should be suffered to exercise...88 
The prominence given to this dilemma within liberal discourse owed much to the work 
of John Locke whose involvement in the political struggle against the rule of James II 
forced him into treading the fine line between the need for strong states, and the 
confinement of their power.89 
Like Hobbes, Locke's thought was imbued with the spirit of Natural Law and his 
thought incorporated the familiar distinction between the natural and the civil condition 
even though his conception of each differed substantially from that of Hobbes. Locke 
began with the axiom that the use of reason revealed the chief propositions of natural 
law namely, that each individual should seek above all else their own preservation, but 
that they should also seek "to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not... take away, or 
impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or 
Goods of another.s90 In the state of nature however, the power and supreme right to 
uphold these natural laws lay in the hands of each individual and there was no superior 
authority to judge or to prevent violations of Natural Law. Consequently the state of 
nature, although quite benign and certainly more peaceful than Hobbes or Kant 
envisaged, was dogged nonetheless by the fear of civil conflict. This problem derived 
from the fact that without a supreme authority individuals could not be hindered from 
pursuing their own interest to the detriment of others, and the right to punish such 
offences lay with each person who suffered such infractions. Locke was quite clear 
however, that the wilful decision to contravene Natural Laws placed the offender 
beyond the pale of reasonable treatment, for their actions threatened to replace reason 
and security with violence, 
In transgressing the Law of Nature, the Offender declares himself to live 
by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity... [essential for] 
mutual security: and so he becomes dangerous to Mankind, the tye, 
which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and 
broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole Species, and 
the Peace and safety of it... every man... by the Right he hath to preserve 
88 Mill, J.S., On Liberty [1859], Penguin, Hannondsworth, 1974, pg. 59 -60. 
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Mankind in general, may... bring such evil on any one, who hath 
transgressed that Law, as may make him repent... and thereby deter 
him...91 
Importantly, Locke spoke of violence as a characteristic of the natural rather than the 
civil state and those who used violence were denounced for "having renounced reason" 
and were therefore no better than "a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, 
with whom Men can have no Society nor Security...s92 The decision to inflict violence 
upon another placed the perpetrator in a "State of War... a State of Enmity, Malice, 
Violence, and Mutual Destruction..." with the rest of humanity 93 In the state of nature 
individuals had the right to kill those who, by their own actions had placed themselves 
in a state of war, 
...for the same Reason, that he may kill a Wolf or a Lyon; because such 
Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason, have no other 
Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be treated as Beasts of 
Prey, those dangerous and noxious Creatures..." 
Locke's state of nature while more benign than Hobbes', was far from Kant's 
"Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self -sufficiency and mutual love.s95 
The fear of civil violence was fuelled by the suspicion that individuals would judge their 
own misdemeanours more lightly than those of others, and that no impartial judge 
would be found.' 
Locke's repeated use of the imagery of nature in describing violence highlighted the fact 
that the solution to the barbarity of violence lay in the manufacture of a `political 
society'. For Locke as indeed for Hobbes, the state alone was capable of guaranteeing 
order and security within which individual freedom, within the confines of law was 
preserved, 
To avoid this State of War... is one great reason of Mens putting 
themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature. For where there 
is an Authority... there the continuance of the State of War is excluded... 
Freedom of Men under Government, is, to have a standing Rule to live 
91 Ibid., pg. 272. 
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by, common to every one... and not to be subject to the inconstant, 
uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.97 
The artifice of government was the bulwark against the state of nature; if government 
toppled, society would return to a natural condition and become a mere "[m]ultitude, 
without Order or Connexion.s98 Locke was quite certain of the benefits of living under 
government and a state, but it was not just any sort of state. The state Locke had in 
mind was a disciplined state with a limited executive, incorporating an elected 
legislature and a constitution, 
...whereby provision is made for the Continuation of their Union, under 
the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws... by the Consent and 
Appointment of the People, without which no one Man, or Number of 
Men... can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to the 
rest.99 
The state of which Locke spoke was a circumscribed and regulated state, bound by 
constitutional rules and dedicated to the preservation of individual property and 
freedom. He also argued however, that a state could only guarantee individual life, 
liberty and estate if it possessed sufficient coercive capacity to deter civil violence.100 
Consequently, in the civil state individuals renounced they ;re natural sovereignty or the 
right to be their own judge and `executioner'. This right devolved upon the state 
making it the sovereign entity which could alone judge and determine when to use 
violence in both international warfare and the punishment of civil offences.101 The 
limitations imposed on government and the state reflected Locke's concern to guard 
against the exercise of excessive violence by the state against the lives, liberty, and 
estate of property -owning citizens in civil society.102 The fear of state violence however, 
was enlivened by the prospect of `undisciplined' conduct in its two most important 
manifestations, tyranny and rebellion. 
For Locke, violence was a dangerous force which threatened to destroy the fragile 
foundations of the artifice of political society, but such threats could originate in the ill- 
97 Ibid., pg. 282. For Locke, violence is to be abhorred because it is tantamount to slavery, the denial of 
a person's freedom of action (which is the chief virtue of the state of nature - the ability to act freely). 
Ibid, pg. 279. 
98 Ibid., pg. 411. 
99 Ibid., pg. 407 -408. 
i°° Ibid., pg. 350 -351. 
101 Ibid., pg. 324, 350 -353. It is just this sovereignty which was possessed by each individual in the 
state of nature and is placed into the hands of the state in civil society. See for example ibid., pg. 324 and 
the First Treatise, in ibid., pg. 238. 
102 Hindess, B., Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, pg. 51 -53. 
54 
discipline of both citizens and rulers. In a remarkable passage which preempted the 
thrust of Lord Acton's warning about the corrupting influence of power, Locke 
expressed his fear of concentrated power, 
...he that thinks absolute Power purifies Mens Bloods, and corrects the 
baseness of Humane Nature, need read but the History of this, or any 
other Age to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been 
insolent and injurious in the Woods of America, would not probably be 
much better in a Throne; where perhaps Learning and Religion shall be 
found to justifie all, that he shall do to his Subjects, and the Sword 
presently silence all those that dare question it.103 
Absolute power was therefore no protection at all, for "...what Fence is there in such a 
State against the Violence and Oppression of this Absolute Ruler ?s104 Here Locke 
implied that absolute rule was prone to ill- discipline because it knew no bounds, no 
limits, no laws or rules to regulate its conduct. To argue as Hobbes did that safety 
required leaving the state of nature for a civil state in which power is absolute, and 
where terror and awe the means of rule, is to suggest that a fear of the relatively minor 
depredations of `pole -cats and foxes' (individuals) should be greater than the fear of 
ravenous `lions' (states). Once again, violence was associated with the imagery of 
nature, an imagery which represented violence as uncontrolled and barbaric. For Locke 
however, the fear of civil violence was at least matched by a corresponding fear that just 
as the "...unjust use of force... puts a Man into the state of War with another..." so a state 
which used violence and terror as a means of rule was illegitimate.105 Such a state in his 
view, was no more worthy of respect than bands of "Robbers and Pyrates..." whose 
associations lay beyond the reach and control of political society and were thus closer to 
nature than to civilised society.106 What made the use of force illegitimate was its use 
by a government against the life, liberty and estate of its citizens, which thereby 
abrogated the free consent of its members.107 
Resistance of such a government Locke argued, was not an offence because by its own 
actions a tyrannous government placed itself in a state of war with its citizens.'°8 
Nonetheless, Locke reserved some of his strongest invective for those who chose to 
rebel against just rule, 
103 Locke, J., op.cit., pg. 327. 
10d Ibid., pg. 328. 
IDS Ibid., pg. 389. 
ioa Ibid., pg. 385-386. 
107 Ibid., pg. 394. 
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...whoever, either Ruler or Subject, by force goes about to invade the 
Rights of either Prince or People, and lays the foundation for overturning 
the Constitution and Frame of any Just Government, is guilty of the 
greatest Crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those 
mischiefs of Blood, Rapine, and Desolation, which the breaking to pieces 
of Governments bring on a Countrey. And he who does it, is justly to be 
esteemed the common Enemy and Pest of Mankind...109 
In other words, the sole end of a just government was to provide for the life, liberty and 
estate of its citizens. So long as it did this, the necessary conditions for mutual felicity 
would obtain, maintaining the balance between individual liberties and state power. But 
this balance was a precarious one; the same forces which impelled individuals into the 
civil state to protect themselves and their liberty, could also impel rulers to overstep the 
boundaries of legitimacy. The crucial element in the balance between just and unjust, 
legitimate and illegitimate was the use of violence. Violence had to be regulated to 
protect social order, but it was also feared as a perpetual source of threat to revive the 
state of nature and endanger all civil arrangements by transgressing the careful 
boundaries securing the liberties and rights of citizens in civil society. 
The contrast between Hobbes and Locke masks a shared concern to overcome the fear 
of civil violence, and their mutual reliance upon the state to overcome this fear. What 
makes Locke's thought more familiar and conducive to contemporary liberalism 
however, was his acute awareness of the dangers in this `solution'. In a sense, Locke's 
liberalism lay in his awareness not simply of a generalised fear of civil violence, but in 
his awareness of a dual fear of civil and state violence. Locke moreover, saw that these 
two fears were connected; the statist solution to the problem of civil violence carried 
with it the dangers of state violence. State violence in turn was to be feared not simply 
for its detrimental effects upon individual victims, but because a state which ruled by 
excessive violence threatened to return society to a state of nature and unchecked civil 
violence.10 The tension between these dual fears and the solutions proposed to deal 
with it have shaped, in part, the distinctive nature of liberal discourse. In particular, it 
has contributed to the precarious nature of the state in liberal political theory. The state 
appeared as both salvation and curse, a defence against chaos and barbarism, but a 
constant potential threat to liberty and personal security. The strength of that defence 
10e Ibid., pg. 416, 419. 
os Ibid., pg. 418. 
10 Grant, R.W., John Locke's Liberalism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987, pg. 179. 
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and the control of that threat rested on the carefully constructed boundaries within 
liberal discourse designed to ensure each citizen of their rights and security, limit 
violence, and sustain the image of liberal civil society as a pacified realm. 
CONCLUSION 
It is an axiom of modern social and political thought that the modern state can be 
distinguished from its precursors by the fact that only modern states have successfully 
claimed "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" 
and thus claims to be "the sole source of the `right' to use violence. ' This conception 
of the state emerged in the wake of continual civil and international warfare in Europe 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The monopoly of violence by the state 
was driven by the need to end internal violence in order that rulers could control and 
direct violence to serve their own political survival. In the previous chapter however, it 
was argued that the pacification of society has been interpreted as a crucial element in 
the civilising process which has made us "more civilised... less rough than... [our] 
forebears.s12 Along with this civilisation modern states have as Charles Tilly put it, 
...made it criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens 
to bear arms, have outlawed private armies, and have made it seem 
normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed civilians.13 
According to Reinhart Koselleck these historic changes were reflected in the emergence 
of liberal political theory, and particularly in its concern to establish a legitimate 
"government of laws" based on uncoerced popular consent.14 
Within liberal discourse then, the state came to be associated with the elimination of 
violence from society, and its monopoly of violence has been accepted as legitimate so 
long as it is held in check by appropriate laws and institutions. "S The state's monopoly 
l' Weber, M., "Politics as a Vocation ", in H.H.Gerth and C.W.Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, Kegan Paul, London, 1947, pg. 78. 
12 Chesnais, J -C., "The History of Violence: Homicide and Suicide Through the Ages ", International 
Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 230. There is an interesting body of opinion on this matter 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. In addition to the works cited below by Foucault, see Elias, N., 
State -Formation and Civilization: the Civilizing Process, translated by E.Jephcott, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1982, pg. 229 -333. 
13 Tilly, C., Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 -1990, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, 1990, 
pg. 69. 
14 Koselleck, R., op.cit., pg. 22. 
15 It is interesting to note here that Preston King identified a "continuity" between pluralism and 
absolutism in their adherence to the "ideology of order ". See, King, P., The Ideology of Order, pg. 21 -22. 
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of violence is understood as legitimate because it is controlled and institutionalised, 
while the violence of non -state actors carries a very strong imputation of illegitimacy, 
The legal violence of police and soldiers, at least, may represent a 
successful effort to bank the destructive fires of aggressive violence in 
socially useful ways, whereas terrorist, revolutionary, and criminal 
violence is, so to speak, violence on the loose.1' 
The concept of order such views imply is reliant upon a state which maintains an 
essentially pacified society. "' Non -state violence (such as terrorism, revolutions and 
rebellions, gang warfare, or the keeping of private armies) is represented as 
discontinuous with normal (pacified) social order while a sharp dichotomy is also 
maintained between violence and politics. In other words, politics is conceived as a 
process by which violence is eliminated from the life of society. Politics is the preserve 
of duly elected governments engaging in public debate, subject to public scrutiny and 
criticism in their negotiations and compromises with interest groups, and hence 
concerned with "boundary- maintenance" against the "corrosive" nature of violence.18 
The task of defining and maintaining those boundaries falls above all to the law which, 
as Spinoza once put it, is the mechanism by which each person may live "securely 
beyond the reach of fear" and thereby "live together as securely and well as possible... 
[and] enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals... ".19 
Legally enforced rights serve as an important boundary between individuals 
demarcating areas of separate activity, separating the legitimate liberties and properties 
of one individual from another. The legal protection of individual rights is thus 
considered an important mechanism for controlling civil violence, circumventing the 
clash of sovereign individuals. But laws are also vital in the enforcement of other 
boundaries within which state violence is held in check. Foremost among these is the 
demarcation of a private realm of individual sovereignty from a public realm of state 
sovereignty. The line separating private from public has not always been drawn in a 
16 Merkl, P.H., "Approaches to the Study of Political Violence ", in P.H.Merkl (ed.), Political Violence 
and Terror: Motifs and Motivations, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986, pg. 51 -52; Miller,D., 
"The Use and Abuse of Political Violence ", Political Studies, XXXII (3), 1984, pg. 406 -409. 
11' Elias, N., "Violence and Civilisation: The State Monopoly of Physical Violence and its 
Infringement ", in J.Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, Verso, London, 
1988, pg. 179 -180. 
"8 Calvert, P., A Study of Revolution, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, pg. 25. See also Rule,J.B., 
Theories of Civil Violence, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, pg. 266; Nardin,T., "Theory 
and Practice in Conflict Research" in T.R.Gurr (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and 
Research, The Free Press, New York. 1980, pg. 467, 482 -483. 
119 Spinoza, B., op.cit., pg. 202. 
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uniform manner, but in the final chapter in particular an evaluation of its role in liberal 
discourse will be made in reference to recent feminist analyses of violence against 
women. Other boundaries have been drawn and operate almost exclusively within the 
public realm alone. Thus the public realm itself is divided by boundaries which mark 
the areas of competing authority designed to limit the capacity of the state to exercise 
violence. The most familiar boundaries of this sort divide state power between 
executives and legislatures each limiting the power of the other while the activities of 
each are watched (and limited) by the independent power of the judiciary. This sort of 
boundary -maintenance however, reinforces the fact that within liberal discourse 
violence has been seen as a problem requiring a political solution or more accurately, 
requiring a liberal politics as the solution.120 As Maurice Duverger put it, 
The first aim of politics is to eliminate violence, to replace bloodshed by 
less brutal forms of struggle. Politics begins beyond the boundaries of 
war, civil or international. It is a form of combat, but it is also a 
restriction of combat.12` 
This solution has been premised upon the conception of violence as an uncontrolled, 
chaotic, and barbaric phenomenon of nature. By associating violence with barbarism 
and nature and opposing it to the settled, law -bound arrangements of civil society, 
violence is defined instrumentally, as a means of gaining power over others which had 
to be short- circuited by a set of civil and political arrangements. Not all forms of 
violence however, are regarded as equally problematic and the relative importance 
attached to particular forms of violence and the consequent urgency of finding solutions 
depends largely upon whether that violence threatens the boundaries required by liberal 
discourse. Violence which threatens the boundaries sustaining liberal civil order, which 
hem state power, divide the state from civil society, contain the reach of politics, and 
regulate the interaction of citizens excites most attention and is regarded as most 
problematic, and is held to consist in the unregulated and undisciplined conduct of 
selves and states in arenas in which regulation and discipline are essential. Violence 
which occurs within the boundaries proposed in liberal discourse and does not threaten 
to transgress those boundaries, is regarded a far less urgent problem. It is in this sense 
that violence in the private sphere, or violence within the prison system (especially that 
120 Leca, J., "The Enduring Dialogue of Conflict and Order in a Changing World ", International 
Political Science Review, 20 (1), 1999, pg. 7 -8 
121 Duverger, M., The Idea of Politics, translated by R. North and R. Murphy, Methuen, London, 1967, 
pg. 121. 
59 
between inmates) has received far less attention than violence between citizens on the 
streets, or the violence of those who resist the commands of legitimate states. The 
identification and definition of violence within liberal discourse is thus crucial in 
determining its status and the urgency of the threat it poses to the liberal order. The 
following chapter will turn to the question of how violence is identified and defined in 
contemporary liberal discourse. The image of a contained politics, a politics within 
bounds, and above all of a state limited to the public realm exercises a significant 
influence over the way in which violence is defined and its `solution' formulated.122 
The next chapter will turn to the concern within liberal discourse over the supposed 
fragility of civil order and its maintenance by boundaries limiting the definition of 
violence, designed in part to protect order and reinforce the precarious position of the 
state. 
122 Pateman,C., The Sexual Contract, Polity, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 39 -41. Elsewhere in my thesis the 
influence of the public /private dichotomy over the conceptualisation and definition of political violence is 
analysed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES: 
VIOLENCE, POLITICS, AND TERRORISM 
When one individual inflicts bodily injury upon another, such injury that death results, 
we call the deed manslaughter; when the assailant knew in advance that the injury 
would be fatal, we call his deed murder. But when society places hundreds of 
proletarians in such a position that they inevitably meet a too early and unnatural death, 
one which is quite as much death by violence as that by the sword or bullet; when it 
deprives thousands of the necessaries of life, places them under conditions in which 
they cannot live - forces them, through the strong arm of the law, to remain in such 
conditions until that death ensues which is the inevitable consequence - knows that 
these thousands of victims must perish, and yet permits these conditions to remain, its 
deed is murder just as surely as the deed of the single individual; disguised, malicious 
murder, murder against which none can defend himself, which does not seem what it is, 
because no man sees the murderer, because the death of the victim seems a natural one, 
since the offence is more one of omission than of commission. But murder it remains. 
- Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England [18451, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1987, pg. 127. 
In analysing the appearance of violence there has been a tendency as Gramsci once 
observed to tell stories which "...isolate the protagonist and limit themselves to doing a 
biography of pathology... [in which] subordinate groups always display something 
barbaric and pathological. "t Within liberal discourse, violence - and political violence 
in particular - is usually interpreted as sensational acts of destruction, beginning and 
ending with the intentions and effect of the terrorist's bomb, the assassin's bullet, or the 
dictator's death squads; as if violence were always alien to normal, stable, and orderly 
democratic polities.2 The liberal view enforces a distinction between `politics' and 
`violence', a distinction that separates liberalism from both conservative and 
revolutionary thought.3 Consequently, those who do violence are often represented as 
one -dimensional characters intent upon mayhem or evil, which in another context, 
Thomas Carlyle once referred to as those "...whom one often hears of under the 
collective name of `the masses', as if they were not persons at all, but mounds of 
combustible explosive material, for blowing down Bastilles with! "4 The effect of such 
definitions, as Friedrich Engels' opening quotation demonstrates, is that within liberal 
discourse violence is most often defined as a deliberate act of individual malice. While 
such definitions draw attention to particular types of violence, they also confine or limit 
the range of what maybe considered to constitute 'violence'.5 
Narrow definitions focus on particular acts of violence and the cogency of these 
definitions depends upon maintaining a limited focus, systematically obscuring other 
I Gramsci, I., II Risorgimento, quoted in Tilly, C., "Collective Violence in European Perspective" in 
Feierabend, I.K., Feierabend, R.L., and Gurr, T.R., (eds.), Anger, Violence, and Politics; Theories and 
Research, Prentice -Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pg. 344. 
2 Huppauf, B., "Changing Images of Violence and War in Public and Academic Discourse ", Arena, 2, 
1993/94, pg. 16 -18. 
3 Clausewitz' defmition of war as not only "a political act, but also a real political instrument, a 
continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means" was adopted by German 
conservatives such as Treitschke who eagerly anticipated the moment in which "we can once more join hands 
with Clausewitz in calling war the forceful continuation of politics. All the peacemakers in the world will 
never never make the political powers all of one mind, and until they are, the sword will be the only arbiter." 
See, von Clausewitz, C., On War [1832], (edited by A.Rapoport), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pg. 119; 
and von Trietschke, H., Politics [1916], Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1963, pg. 244. For a revolutionary such 
as Sorel however, a similar sentiment motivated his suggestion that violence "not only makes the future 
[proletarian] revolution certain, but it seems also to be the only means by which the European nations - at 
present stupefied by humanitarianism - can recover their former energy." See, Sorel, G., Reflections on 
Violence [1906], translated by T.E.Hulme and J.Roth, Collier Macmillan, 1950, pg. 92. 
4 Carlyle, T., The French Revolution; A History, [1837], Random House, New York, 1960, pg. 570. 
Ironically, this seems to have been a trap that Carlyle himself stumbled into on occassions. 
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acts which may equally deserve the label from inclusion in the range of violent 
phenomena. It will be argued in this chapter that such limitations are indicative of the 
concern identified in the previous chapter of maintaining boundaries separating the 
realm of civil peace from violence. The maintenance of such boundaries requires 
especial vigilance not for violence as such, but for those forms of violence which 
threaten to transgress those boundaries. It will be argued in this chapter that the focus 
of liberal discourse is placed on public acts of violence which threaten the ability of 
individuals to exercise their rights, or disrupt the legitimate authority supposed to 
guarantee those rights, namely government, law, and the state. The acceptance of the 
boundary separating civil peace from violence can be seen in the definition of violence 
as a problem that "lurks just outside the institutional door. "6 
In the first section of this chapter it will be argued that contemporary academic 
literature furnishes examples of the definition of violence premised on the existence of 
a boundary between civil and uncivil conduct. The realm of the civil is identified with 
the individual and unhindered enjoyment of rights, liberties, and property in civil 
society. Violence therefore is identified in acts which obstruct individuals from the 
enjoyment and pursuit of their rights. Such violence is defined in transparent terms 
enabling concrete identifications of who is harmed, how they are harmed, and who is 
responsible for harming them. When violence threatens not only individual rights but 
the very public political order supposed to guarantee those rights, the question of 
definition assumes an added significance. In the second section, it will be argued that 
political violence is defined in such ways as to represent those who resort to it as 
revolutionaries whose violent activities represent a transgression of the assumed 
boundary separating politics (understood as the peaceful and legitimate activity of 
maintaining order) from violence. In the third and last section the implications of 
assuming there is such a boundary will be discussed in reference to the analysis of 
terrorism in current academic and policy literature. 
5 Schwartz, M.D., and Friedrichs, D.O., "Postmodern Thought and Criminological Discontent: New 
Metaphores for Understanding Violence ", Criminology, 32 (2), 1994, pg. 224. 
6 Apter, D. E., "Political Violence in Analytical Perspective" in D. E Apter (ed.), The Legitimisation of 
Violence, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1997, pg. 3. 
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I. THE BARBARITY OF VIOLENCE 
Sensational acts of violence, assaults, murders, deliberate killings or brutal beatings 
provoke emotional reactions, a desire to condemn or defend them in the name of some 
higher ideal. Such reactions, natural though they seem, are conditioned by the cultural 
milieu of the interpreters, not to mention the prejudices or motivations of those who 
report the events.? The focus on sensational violence is the stock in trade of the media 
which deals with often one -dimensional representations of human suffering in order to 
excite a vicarious interest from the public.8 Such stories often represent those who 
suffer violence as the innocent victims of a perpetrator's insane malice. While such 
representations appeal to an understandable revulsion against cruelty, they do very little 
to deepen an understanding of why it occurs. This difficulty is largely a product of the 
willingness to treat violence as if it consisted solely in the deliberate, sensational acts of 
brutal individuals who are seen as barbaric, uncivilised, unbalanced, or simply evi1.9 
Images of violence on television or on front pages associate it with illegality and the 
underside of society, or with political phenomena such as the collapse of regimes, 
governments or conflicts between states. In each case an implicit distinction is made 
between violence and the normal order of society which is defined in terms of a system 
of legitimate authority, of laws and administration respected by law- abiding citizens 
whose interactions are normally peaceful. 
The relationship between violence and the normal order of society is however, a matter 
of some dispute within liberal discourse. In a pioneering work on attitudes toward 
violence within liberal political and social thought Aiken argued that there was a 
division between what he called "pragmatic" or "corporate" liberalism and "liberalism 
proper ".10 According to the latter variety of liberalism violence consists in deliberate 
and harmful attacks upon one person by another and thus constitutes a direct abrogation 
of the victim's rights, whereas pragmatic liberals regard violence only as acts harmful 
7 Cohen, D. and Vandello, J., "Meanings of Violence ", The Journal of Legal Studies, XXVII (2), 1998, pg. 
567 -584. 
8 On the conceptualisation of violence in the media see Schlesinger, P., Media, State and Nation; Political 
Violence and Collective Identities, Sage, London, 1991. 
9 Kekes argues that liberals tend to view those who do violence as "moral monsters" while Watts argues 
that the tendency to see violence as an individual phenomenon obscures the far greater collective murder of 
civilians by their own or other governments. See, Kekes, J., Against Liberalism, Comell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1997, pg. 30; and Watts, R., "Sharp on `the Autonomous Mass Killer "', Arena Journal, 7, 1996, pg. 
34. 
10 Aiken, H.D., " Violence and the Two Liberalisms ", Social Theory and Practice, 2 (1), 1972, pg. 47 -66. 
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to the proper functioning of society." The implications of the two views are quite 
different; one sees violence in terms of the denial of individual rights or the infliction of 
harm and suffering, while the other view considers individual harm and suffering as 
violence only when it interferes with the stability or order of the social whole. The 
former view leads to the conclusion that violence is always wrong because it involves 
the deliberate infliction of harm upon individuals, while the second view regards the 
harm which may be inflicted upon some individuals within society a necessary price 
which must be paid for social harmony and stability. 
Both approaches are premised on two pivotal assumptions; first, that the relevant unit 
of analysis is the individual perpetrator or victim, and second, that the violence itself 
represents a regression into a barbarism opposed to the mutual felicity of civil society. 
This latter assumption implies a fundamental opposition between violence and the 
"reasonableness" and rationality of liberal regimes which have as their aim the rather 
more moderate but continual improvement of society based on the universal "right" of 
"every man to arrange his life himself so far as this is compatible with the equal rights 
of others. "i2 Such a view is based on the notion that violence not only involves the 
infliction of "physical pain and suffering" upon people, but that it is "insidious ", 
"corrupts" those who use it and must therefore be conquered and abolished.13 The 
influence of an implicit theory of civilisation here expresses itself in the view that 
violence "on the streets" and in the penal system "recedes with the advance of liberal 
democracy and industrialisation ".14 From this perspective, violence can be seen as 
antithetical to the very principles of liberalism which "look[s] towards a world in which 
individuals neither have to receive nor inflict physical harm upon one another. "t5 
11 Ibid., pg. 60 -61. 
12 Popper, K., Conjectures and Refutations; The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge, London, 1963, 
pg. 355, 358 -359, 363. The dichotomy between violence and reason is powerfully challenged in Edgley, R., 
"Reason and Violence: A Fragment of the Ideology of Liberal Intellectuals" in S.Korner, (ed.), Practical 
Reason, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, pg. 119 -123; and Carter, S., "Making Violence Useful" in H. Bradby 
(ed.), Defining Violence: Understanding the Causes and Effects of Violence, Avebury, Aldershot, 1996, pg. 
127 -129. 
13 Wertham, F., A Sign for Cain; An Exploration of Human Violence, Robert Hale, London, 1966, pg. 1, 13; 
see also Popper, op.cit., pg. 355. 
14 Pestieau, J., " Violence, Powerlessness and Individualism" , International Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 
1992, pg.. 202. 
15 Hoffman, J., "Is Political Violence Ever Justified? A Critique of Violence in its Statist and Anti- Statist 
Forms" , Studies in Crime Order and Policing, Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, 
Leicester, 1994, pg. 18. 
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The violence spoken of here is the deliberate infliction of physical harm by one 
individual (or group of individuals) upon another individual or group.16 The important 
feature of this definition is that the relationship between perpetrator and victim is 
assumed to be transparent - the decision to inflict harm is deliberate, the act of 
inflicting harm is unambiguous, and the harm itself is both obvious and indisputable. 
Thus Robert Holmes argues that in its "strictest sense" violence refers to "the use of 
force with the intent to harm, kill or cause destruction; or at the least... that has harm, 
death, or destruction as a foreseeable outcome... ".17 Similarly, in an edition of the 
International Social Science Journal devoted to "Thinking About Violence ", violence 
is defined in terms of "causing injury through the use of vigorous physical force... [in 
which] the injury be intended or foreseen ", or as action which "leads to the death of 
human beings... [by] direct, physical attack against persons, whose life, health, physical 
integrity or individual liberty is at stake ".'8 Violence is thus represented as "a 
conscious and free act" which is "necessarily... negative" in that it constitutes a 
"violation" denying the victim freedom of will and action, thereby "objectively 
harming" them.19 The focus of such definitions is placed most heavily upon the 
perpetrator of the act, and as Torrance puts it, "...we tend to call an act violent if we 
have no sympathy for the perpetrator, if we regard the act as illegitimate, and if we 
believe something should be done about it. "20 Indeed as Kai Nielsen argues, the 
illegitimacy or illegality of violence implies a normative distinction between 
illegitimate `violence' and legitimate `force'.21 Violence is thus defined in such a 
manner that its appearance can only be interpreted as challenge or threat to the normally 
peaceful liberal order, and is hence "prima facie incompatible with the civil society 
rules of solidarity, liberty and equality of citizens..." 22 Such definitions of violence 
emphasise the deliberate, wilful malice of the act, its intrusive illegitimacy, and the 
16 Torrance, J.M., Public Violence in Canada; 1867 -1982, McGill -Queen's University Press, Kingston and 
Montreal, 1986, pg. 8. 
17 Holmes, R.L., On War and Morality, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pg. 32. 
18 Litke, R.F., " Violence and Power" , International Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 173; and 
Chesnais, J. -C., "The History of Violence: Homicide and Suicide Through the Ages ", International Social 
Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 217. 
19 Wierzbicki, A.M., The Ethics of Struggle for Liberation, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pg. 57- 
58. 
20 Torrance, J., op.cit., pg. 69. 
21 Nielsen, K., "On Justifying Violence ", Inquiry, 24, 1981, pg. 24. 
22 Keane, J., Reflections on Violence, Verso, London, 1996, pg. 68. 
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physical harm in which it results. The key components here are the harm suffered by 
the victim and the intention(s) of the perpetrator. 
The harm spoken of in the types of definition which predominate within liberal 
discourse are assumed to have a physical nature - such as killing, maiming, or otherwise 
inflicting pain upon the body. What I want to suggest is that this `physical' conception 
of violence as a harm done to the body derives its force from the view that whatever 
else it may do, violence is to be condemned because it denies the free agency of the 
victim. Within liberal discourse, free agency consists in the individual being the final 
arbiter of their own choices, and as long as they remain within the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour, whatever ends they choose to follow or whatever desires they 
choose to fulfil is the individual's choice alone. Freedom consists therefore in doing 
whatever one wishes while refraining from deliberately harming others. Such freedom 
is grounded in the capacity of individuals to exercise their right reason, enabling them 
to make choices which will not only be effective in fulfilling their own ends, but will do 
so in a way that will sustain rather than undermine their autonomy. On this view it is 
the capacity to choose and the capacity to act on one's choices in the deliberate 
fulfilment of ends which matters, rather than the deliberative process of making that 
choice. This means that the key to liberty and human fulfilment lies in the capacity to 
follow one's ends, and this involves the capacity for unencumbered action. The 
physical nature of harm therefore amounts to a gross transgression of human dignity 
because it removes or impedes this capacity for free action.23 Violence is thereby seen 
in overwhelmingly physical terms, as 
...unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the 
bodies of others, which are consequently made to suffer a series of 
effects ranging from shock, bruises, scratches, swelling or headaches to 
broken bones, heart attacks, loss of limbs or even death.24 
Such physical damage is denounced not simply for its own sake, but because it also 
amounts to a "denial of a subject's freedom to act in and upon the world... [and] 
obstructs subjects' bodily motion. "25 The definitional emphasis placed on the physical 
nature of violence helps to explain the resistance of many to the extension of the term to 
23 Cauchy, V., "Modem Societies and Innate Violence ", International Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, 
pg. 209 -210; Chesnais, J -C., "The History of Violence: Homicide and Suicide Through the Ages " ", 
International Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 217. 
24 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 67. 
25 Ibid., pg. 67, 68. 
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include forms of psychological or emotional abuse. While liberals often recognise the 
influence of such pressures, they are also often reluctant to describe them as violent 
because "physical force prevents people from acting freely in a way that psychological 
pressures, however harmful and subjugating, do not" and thus "people have a formal 
freedom to develop despite moral and psychological coercion which they do not have 
when they are the victims of violence or force. "26 
As a consequence the illegitimacy of violence derives in large part from the other 
crucial element in the definition of violence, the intention(s) of the perpetrator. 
Liberalism characteristically represents human beings as rational creatures whose 
choices will at least be informed by reason, and can hence be described as free in the 
sense that action will be chosen to obtain certain ends. This in turn entails that action is 
undertaken with at least a reasonable expectation of what consequences are likely to 
ensue 27 It is on this basis that violence is defined not only as physical damage or harm 
but as physical harm or damage that is deliberately inflicted by one person upon 
another.28 As one writer put it, on this view violence consists in, 
...injury or suffering... inflicted upon a person or persons by an agent 
who knows (or ought reasonably to have known), that his actions would 
result in the harm in question.29 
As rational creatures however, human beings are held to be responsible for their actions 
and this means that by choosing to inflict violence the individual can foresee the harm 
and suffering this choice entails Therefore, to choose violence carries with it very 
heavy moral opprobrium, for it amounts to choosing to harm someone else and deny 
26 Hoffman, J., loc.cit., pg. 7 and 9. For another example of the resistance to broadening the definition of 
violence see Platt, T. "The Concept of Violence as Descriptive and Polemic ", International Social Science 
Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 185 -192. An alternative view can be found in Lee, S., "Poverty and Violence ", 
Social Theory and Practice, 22 (1), 1996, pg. 67 -82. Here Lee argues that there are strong grounds for 
considering that " a society does violence to those of its members who are in poverty..." even though "the 
reasonableness of this argument... flies in the face of the way people normally use the term [violence], and 
there seems little prospect that the recommended change will be adopted." Ibid., pg. 80. 
27 Parekh, B., "Marxism and the Problem of Violence ", Development and Change, 23 (3), 1992, pg. 108. [t 
should be noted that this sort of criticism, that we are responsible for violence where we can reasonably be 
expected to know the consequences of our action, or inaction has a place in Engels' celebrated The Working 
Class in England. His argument is that the living and working conditions of English workers in the 
nineteenth century were tantamount to murder because they radically shortened the worker's life -span. 
28 Parkin argues that such individualist assumptions exist uneasily alongside more collectivist, structural 
approaches within liberal discourse, but I shall argue that the apparent tensions mask an underlying 
continuity. Parkin, A., "Liberal Democracy and the Politics of Criminal Justice in Australia ", Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3), 1998, pg. 465 -468. 
29 Hams, J., Violence and Responsibility, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, pg. 19. Italics in 
original. 
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them their freedom.30 The choice to commit violence thus amounts to a denial of the 
`harm principle' which arguably lies at the heart of liberal conceptions of liberty. As 
John Stuart Mill formulated it, 
...that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self- protection. ...the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others.31 
Of course the question such a principle invites is how to define the nature of the harm 
supposed to be prevented. 
The liberal approach tends to focus on a conception of violence as both physical and 
intentional, as in cases of murder or assault. These are usually unambiguous and 
sensational acts, they involve actions deliberately undertaken by individuals who can 
foresee the consequences of their actions. They are also actions in which there is an 
obvious victim and an identifiable perpetrator. Violence is thus associated with 
unambiguous relationships between a mugger and their victim, or between a murderer 
and their victim, each of which is transparent in that the victim suffers verifiable 
injuries as a result of the deliberate actions of another person whose actions break with 
`normal' standards of conduct.32 As Bhiku Parekh writes, 
...in the liberal discourse violence is invariably associated with passion, 
rage, anger and suddenness. It `flares up', `erupts', `spreads like fire', 
`breaks out'... It is noisy, dramatic, visible, involving guns and daggers 
and has clearly identifiable agents and victims. ...the terrorist, the 
murderer, the hijacker, the rapist and the mugger become the paradigms 
of violence. ... [It is] physical harm or harm to the body... more than any 
other type of suffering that dominates the liberal imagination.33 
This domination, Parekh argues is based on the individualist underpinnings of liberal 
thought, and in particular the assumption that individuals possess "a distinct, 
irreducible and unsharable body which ...marks... [them] off from the rest of the 
30 Coady, C. A. J., "The Idea of Violence ", Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3 (1), 1986, pg. 10; Holmes, R. 
L., On War and Morality, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pg. 37. 
31 Mill, J.S., On Liberty [1859], edited by M. Warnock, Fontana Press, Glasgow, 1962, pg. 135. 
32 As David McCallum has suggested however, liberal discourse has also been characterised by a deep 
concerned over the " disordered and potentially dangerous individual." See McCallum, D., "Dangerous 
Individuals: Government and the Concept of Personality" in M. Dean and B. Hindess (eds.), Governing 
Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pg. 108 -124. 
33 Parekh, B., "A Critique of the Liberal Discourse on Violence" in D.McLellan and S.Sayers (eds.), 
Socialism and Morality, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990, pg. 124 -125. 
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world ".34 As John Keane put it, violence "bears down on and threatens embodied 
individuals, who are treated as mere objects, and whose bodies are deemed worthy of a 
kick and a punch , or a knife, a bullet or a bomb. "35 Parekh suggests that this limitation 
of definition is a deliberate liberal strategy allowing a distinction to be made between 
the actions of a mugger and those who employ less physical means of compulsion, such 
as "an employer who gives me the choice of facing starvation or accepting the barest 
subsistence wages ".36 The difference lies with the perception of freedom and choice 
available to the `victim'; the mugger leaves the victim with no choice, while the 
employer's actions leaves room for choice, even if only a purely formal choice to resign 
or look for work elsewhere.37 
Such freedom of choice receives formal and legal expression in the doctrine of rights 
which set the boundaries of permissible human action. Within liberal thought, rights 
mark out a preserve of possible action which no other person or authority is entitled to 
over -rule, so long as each person refrains from infringing the rights of others. Rights 
are the entitlements of rational individuals, they are the foundation for human 
fulfilment, and the expression of human dignity and worth. Consequently, for some 
liberals violence can be identified in action which "...constitutes a violation of a human 
right... or which prevents the fulfilment of a basic human need. "38 The basis of this 
definition is the `liberal' notion that "...for each fundamental human need, there should 
be a corresponding human right entitled to legal protection. "39 The corollary of this 
view is that any action which denies the fulfilment of such a need is an abrogation of 
human rights and therefore, a grave attack upon the person whether or not they are 
physically injured as a result. Thus, sexist and racist attitudes are violent, the tobacco 
industry which peddles cancer -causing substances, and banks which demand exorbitant 
loan repayments from poverty stricken countries are all examples of violence.40 
34 Ibid., pg. 119. 
35 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 68. 
36 Parekh, B., (1990), loc.cit., pg. 125. 
37 Ibid., pg. 125 -126. 
38 Salmi, J., Violence and Democratic Society; New Approaches to Human Rights, Zed Books, London, 
1993, pg. 17. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.,pg. 60, 66, 112 -113. 
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Now this conception of violence is much broader than the conception of direct physical 
assault in that it does not focus exclusively on direct physical harm, but on the denial of 
conditions in which one's rights can be fully exercised 41 On this view, one could 
construe violence to consist in poverty for instance, due to the consequent lack of 
access to adequate health care, housing, or education, compounded by the failure to 
alleviate the suffering by redistributing wealth.42 While proponents of this view would 
consider that cases of direct physical assault clearly deserve to be labelled violent, they 
refuse to stop there and argue for the inclusion of a whole series of other conditions. 
Johan Galtung for example distinguishes between "personal" and "structural" violence 
arguing that personal violence "shows" in the form of physical damage which the 
victim "perceives ", whereas structural violence "is silent... does not show" and victims 
"may be persuaded not to perceive" it as violence 43 This conception of violence differs 
from earlier transparent definitions in that violence often occurs not by the actions of an 
identifiable perpetrator but is the result of "...the summated and concerted action" of 
many individuals together.44 Such violence exerts a continual pressure upon its victims 
in the form of less direct, less sensational but no less damaging effects. This sort of 
violence is associated with social and economic structures which maintain economic 
inequalities, or cultural attitudes such as sexism which constrain the aspirations and 
opportunities of women, or even in linguistic conventions which `sanitise' violence and 
represent it as something less sinister, reducing the violence of poverty to mere 
`underprivilege' or the violence of sexism to bland `discrimination'45 All of these 
forms of suffering Galtung describes as violence because the central criterion is that 
violence consists in any action or event which prevents an individual from realising 
their potentials.46 
41 There is a heavy emphasis in liberal discourse for example, on the idea that violence is equivalent to 
deliberate coercion, and thus consists in cases where one person intentionally "takes action against... 
[another] which has the quality of power or force to induce them to do, or to submit to, something which they 
would rather not." If this is the relevant criterion however, almost any form of interaction from making a 
child take their medicine, to the threat of punishment for non -payment of taxes could be described as acts of 
violence. The quotations is taken from, Ritchie, J., and Ritchie, J., Violence in New Zealand, Allen and 
Unwin, Wellington, 1990, pg. 7. 
42 Lee, S., loc.cit. 
43 Galtung, J., " Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" , Journal of Peace Research, 3, 1969, 173. 
44 Ibid., pg. 178. 
45 Galtung, J., "Cultural Violence ", Journal of Peace Research, 27 (3), 1990, pg. 295. 
46 Galtung, J., loc.cit., 1969, pg. 168 -169. 
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Despite a broader scope, such conceptions of violence still rely upon the idea that 
violence constitutes an abrogation of the victim's rights. The importance of the notion 
of rights and the corresponding fear of the infraction of those rights is intimately 
associated with a liberal individualism which sees violence above all as a threat to 
individuals, their integrity, liberty, and well being. The conception of liberalism with 
which such an approach is often associated is one which sees the promotion of a system 
of laws which protects individual rights as the ultimate purpose of liberal society. Such 
a form of liberalism, its proponents argue "promotes no collective projects, expresses 
no group preferences, and privileges no particular individuals or individual interests" 
other than by upholding "the framework of law" which ensures that each person "can 
co -exist in peace. "47 This is an image of an essentially value -neutral liberalism which 
provides no recognition for the different groups and individuals in society but seeks 
only "to preserve the order within which such groups and individuals exist. "48 While it 
is recognised that even in an ideal liberal society individuals will still be subjected to 
oppressive "pressure to conform ", such pressures will not be built into the system 
which remains value- neutral and the degree of submission or resistance to such 
pressures will be determined by individuals themselves 49 
If violence is identified with the infraction of individual rights or interference with an 
individual's potential it is unlikely that the social and political environment in which 
individuals exist can fail to commit some violence on the individual. The implication 
of this view is that violence consists in the manifold restrictions, constraints, benign and 
malicious interference of social life. Such a view is based on the assumption that if 
individuals were unencumbered by any such interference from others they would be 
free to fulfil their potential in ways they currently cannot. This conception of the self 
raises a series of problems which lie beyond the scope of this present study. What is 
particularly relevant here is that the assumption of the priority of the individual in the 
conceptual analysis of violence leads to the conclusion identified in previous chapters, 
that violence is a problem haunting every individual from cradle to grave. It is an 
object of fear, and the proper response leads to the promotion of a `liberal' politics 
47 Kukathas, C., "Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Oppression" in A. Vincent (ed.), Political Theory: 
Tradition and Diversity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pg. 135. 
48 Kukathas, C., "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference ", Political Theory, 26 (5), 
1998, pg. 692. 
49 Kukathas, C., loc.cit., 1997, pg. 144. 
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premised on individual protection and the strict containment of the state by the 
requirements of a scrupulous neutrality. 
According to Kukathas for instance, from an individualist standpoint "domination and 
oppression" appear to be inescapable facts of the human condition because any form of 
social or political activity involves the subjection of individuals to group conflict and 
coercion.S° The central "presumption" is that, 
The human condition is one of conflict. ...and there is no plausible social 
theory that explains how it might ever be different in the future. ...the 
task of political institutions is to palliate a condition it cannot cure. And 
the political theorist concerned about oppression in human society 
should learn to set his sights a little lower, aiming at a theory not of 
liberation, but of peace.51 
The achievement of this peace however, required a politics of strict neutrality in which 
the state affords not opportunity for resentment or conflict by favouring a particular 
way of life over others. The question that Kukathas fails to ask is whether the very 
individualism he sees as a vital component of liberalism colours the way in which the 
problem of oppression (and violence) is framed. Once rights- bearing individuals are 
seen as the central components of social order, any infraction of rights can only be 
interpreted as oppressive and (at least potentially) violent because, 
...a person has certain rights which are undeniably, indissolubly, 
connected with his being a person. One of these is a right to his body, to 
determine what his body does and what is done to his body... Apart from 
a body, what is essential to one's being a person is dignity. The dignity 
of a person... [consists in] his ability to make his own decisions.52 
The conception of a rights -bearing self is here used as a rule or standard for determining 
what violence is, where and when it occurs, and who is harmed by it. But such a 
standard is incapable of distinguishing between minor and major infractions of rights. 
In seeing person -hood as `indissolubly' tied to the possession of rights, even minor 
infractions - witnessed in recent debates over restrictions on gun ownership for instance 
- are often construed as threats to the person and their liberty. Just as the problem of 
violence in liberal discourse is framed by its definition as a threat to the self and liberty, 
so the problem of political violence is framed by its definition as a threat to liberal civil 
order. Such definitions identify a problem to be solved, phenomena to be guarded 
50 Ibid., pg. 149. 
SI Ibid., pg. 152. 
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against, (potential or actual) perpetrators who must be controlled and most importantly, 
a set of values which must be protected. 
IL LIBERALISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
One of the problems with the term `political violence' is that it requires "...the prior 
identification of the specific political nature of action - a task which is itself 
problematic and about which little consensus exists. "53 But there is more to the 
confusion over political violence than a simple failure to acknowledge and specify 
one's own assumptions about politics. What an author describes as `political' may also 
just as heavily depend upon what he or she is trying to say about a particular act or the 
participants in that act. That is, by describing an act as `political' an author may be 
trying to impugn or to defend the motives or the integrity of the actors involved.54 Paul 
Wilkinson for example, makes a distinction between justifiable political or "civil" 
violence and unjustifiable violence or "terrorism ". Political or civil violence refers to 
acts such as just war, justifiable rebellion, and tyrannicide which may all be justified 
because the violence is limited and controlled, and innocents or non -combatants are 
unmolested.55 Terrorism on the other hand refers to unjustifiable acts of 
"indiscriminate" violence which aim to produce a state of terror in the target 
population.56 For Wilkinson then, the appellation `political' is clearly used to identify 
legitimate or justifiable acts of violence and to differentiate these from criminal acts of 
barbarism. 
`Political violence' therefore, may be used to cover a wide range of phenomena. For E. 
V. Walter violence or the causing of "destructive harm" to others acquires a 
distinctively political character when the violence is employed in the processes of 
control of society, resistance to that control, and/or the punishment of those who 
52 Garver, N., " What Violence Is ", in T.Rose (ed.), Violence in America; A Historical and Contemporary 
Reader, Random House, New York, 1969, pg. 6. 
53 Mars, P., "The Nature of Political Violence ", Social and Economic Studies, 24 (2), 1975, pg. 221; see 
also Apter, D., E., "Political Violence in Analytical Perspective" in D. E. Apter (ed.), The Legitimization of 
Violence, Macmillan, Houndnùlls, 1997, pg. 6 -10. 
54 Dufor- Gompers, R.Y., " Watching the Violence of Warfare in the `Theatre' of Operations ", International 
Social Science Journal, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 249. 
55 Wilkinson, P., Political Terrorism, Macmillan, London, 1974, pg. 20. 
56 Mid. Also note the manner in which Wilkinson constructs his definitions of terror and terrorism in such 
a way that justification of it (not to mention sympathy for it) is made all but impossible. See pg. 13 -17. 
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resist.57 Political violence he argues, is employed in "processes of terror" which may 
take either of two forms those being, a "siege of terror" which aims by the use of 
violence and fear to overthrow existing power structures, or a "regime of terror" in 
which the controllers of a society choose to exercise their power through the use of 
violence and fear.58 For others such as Ted Honderich, political violence consists 
solely in attacks upon the state. For him political violence is, 
...a considerable or destroying use of force against persons or things, a 
use of force prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, 
personnel or system of government, and hence also directed to changes 
in the existence of individuals in the society and perhaps other 
societies.59 
Honderich clearly believes however, that simply because political violence is exercised 
against the state does not mean that such violence is unjustified. The changes which 
such violence aims to achieve may itself be a powerful justification. 
Typically however, liberalism is premised on the view that the appearance of violence 
in politics denotes a crisis, something to be guarded against. Conservative critics of 
liberalism such as Carl Schmitt argued that liberalism weakly side -steps the issue of 
violence in politics by attempting to hide behind the myth of a value -neutral state 
peacefully enforcing a universal system of laws.69 Such an approach he argued was 
incapable of appreciating the use of violence which every healthy state must embrace 
when confronted by a foe or by the need to confront internal resistance. Liberalism by 
contrast shrank in the face of violence and tried to circumvent the need to decide by 
trial of strength. As Schmitt mockingly put it, liberalism can only "answer the question 
`Christ or Barabbas?' with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a commission of 
investigation. "61 From the liberal perspective violence and politics are intractably 
opposed, and while politics "marks the realm of rational persuasion through speech ", 
57 Walter, E.V., Terror and Resistance; A Study of Political Violence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1969, pg. 8 (italics in original), 15. Such destructive harm may involve the use of language and ritual in 
addition to the infliction of physical harm to create a state of terror or extreme fear. Ibid., pg. 156 -162. 
58 Ibid., pg. 5 -7. 
59 Honderich, T., Violence for Equality; Inquiries in Political Philosophy, Routledge, London, 1989, pg. 8. 
Honderich maintains this definition throughout the book, see for instance pg. 107, 151. 
60 See for instance Schmitt, C., Political Theology; Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [1922], 
translated by G. Schwab, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1985, pg. 36 -52. 
61 Schmitt, C., Political Theology, pg. 62. 
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violence "terminates the exchange of words ".62 For Hannah Arendt, it was precisely 
the capacity to talk and negotiate which constituted the essence of politics, 
Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concentration 
camps of totalitarian regimes, not only the laws... but everything and 
everybody must fall silent....violence itself is incapable of speech... 
Because of this speechlessness political theory has little to say about the 
phenomenon of violence... [f]or political thought can only follow the 
articulations of the political phenomena themselves, it remains bound to 
what appears in the domain of human affairs; and these appearances... 
need speech and articulation... 63 
The glorification of violence for its own sake, she argued is "antipolitical" and indeed, 
the violence of warfare or revolution occurs "outside the political realm" in the 
international `state of nature'.64 The appearance of violence thus heralds the decay of 
politics understood as an arena in which discussion and debate rather than violence 
reigns.65 In liberal discourse political violence signals some form of political crisis, 
corruption, or decay of standards of conduct or respect for law and order and is thus 
"...not constitutive of political order; rather, it comes to the fore when political order 
fails. ...[Political] violence involves indifference or even hostility to the common good 
in that it destroys the political community. "66 
Such conceptions of violence in politics equate violence with some form of attack upon 
the institutions and organs of political life. Such an approach can lead to a very wide 
inclusion of a variety of acts "...related to the body politic and its governance..." 
including, 
...everything from the most narrowly targeted assassination to random 
killings designed to intimidate opponents, while calling attention to a 
given cause. It comprises the effect of impersonal bombs, official and 
unofficial "death squads ", the work of the occasional killer with a 
private grievance - be he outraged husband, hard -pressed debtor, or 
irreconcilable family foe - whose act may be political only in the sense 
that its victim happens to be a public figure. It includes programs of 
62 Moss, D., "Politics, Violence, Writing: The Rituals of "Armed Struggle" in Italy ", in D.E.Apter (ed.), 
The Legitimisation of Violence, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1997, pg. 85 -86. 
63 Arendt, H., On Revolution, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1963, pg. 18 -19. 
64 Ibid., pg. 19. 
65 Arendt, H., "On Violence" in Crises of the Republic, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, pg. 111 -123. 
66 Wierzbicki, A.M., The Ethics of Struggle For Liberation; Towards a Personalistic Interpretation of the 
Principle of Non - Violence, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pg. 55. The contention that violence 
signals political decay plays a significant role in Huntington,S.P., Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1968, pg. 63; and Friedrich,C.J., The Pathology of Politics; Violence, Betrayal, 
Corruption, Secrecy, and Propaganda, Harper and Row, New York, 1972, pg. 13 
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genocide aimed at entire races or ethnic groups, attempts to decimate 
class enemies, and, in the eyes of some at least, formal warfare itself.67 
On this view, for violence to be deemed `political' it matters not whether the agent is an 
individual or a participant in mass action; nor does it matter if the agent was moved by 
expressly `political' aims or by `private' resentments. According to this definition, 
political violence may be quite incidental to the operation of the political system, as in 
the case of murder of someone who merely `happens to be' a person in authority. 
Within liberal discourse a more restrictive definition reduces political violence to 
"...deliberate and unambiguous attacks against the state, its agents, or specific 
policies. "68 This approach echoes Samuel Huntington's view that political violence 
can be distinguished "...from international (or, more correctly, inter -state) violence in 
that at least one participant is not a government and... from criminal violence in that it 
is designed to affect the make -up or functioning of the political system. "69 For 
Huntington then, violence takes on a political character when it influences the political 
system, and he associates the political system with the administration of society when 
he argues that in a politically violent situation the protagonists must be a government 
and its non - government opponent(s). There is a heavy implication here that political 
violence should be seen in the context of conflict between the state and its internal or 
domestic opponents, such as rebels and revolutionaries, although it is possible to 
imagine a government being fought by external non -government forces, as in the case 
of non -state sponsored international terrorism. In either case, the crucial assumption is 
that political violence involves conflict between representatives of the state and 
dissidents within society.7° This also implies that political violence is to be interpreted 
67 Ford, F.L., Political Murder; From Tyrannicide to Terrorism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1985, pg. 1 (my italics). 
68 Zimmerman, E., Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research, G.K.Hall, Boston, 
1983, pg. 6, 7. 
69 Huntington, S., "Civil Violence and the Process of Development", Adelphi Papers, 83, 1971, pg. 1 
(footnote 1). 
70 Sederberg, P. C., Fires Within; Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, Harper Collins, New York, 
1994, pg. 39 -40. See also, Quainton, A.C.E., "Terrorism and Political Violence: A Permanent Challenge to 
Governments" in M.Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power; The Consequences of Political 
Violence, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1983, pg. 54 -55; O'Sullivan, N., "Terrorism, Ideology 
and Democracy" , in N.O'Sullivan (ed.), Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution: The Origins of Modern 
Political Violence, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1986, pg. 4 -5; and Thackrah, R., "Terrorism: A Definitional 
Problem" in P.Wil dnson and A.M.Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, Aberdeen 
University Press, Aberdeen, 1989, pg. 32 -33, 36 -8. 
77 
as some form of attack on the sources of legitimate authority, indicating social disorder 
or "destabilisation" initiated by dissidents or rebels.71 
Ted Gun's three -fold classification of types of political violence in his classic study 
Why Men Rebel displays just this sort of assumption. The three types of political 
violence he analyses - turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war - are each types of 
domestic, non -state violence.72 Indeed, the relative deprivation model Gurr employed 
specifically identified societal sources of conflict and violence and equated political 
violence with domestic, non -state actors.73 Recently relative deprivation models have 
been superseded by rational actor models of political violence. Rational actor models 
eschew generalised theories about the causes of discontent in favour of cost/benefit 
analyses of participation in violence, asking not why people rebel, but under what 
conditions rational actors consider the benefits to outweigh the cost of participation in 
violence. Even here however, the focus of explanation for political violence is still 
placed on non -state actors.74 Such approaches are emblematic of a `unilateral' 
conception of political violence, according to which, violence is political if it concerns 
the state and specifically, if it is directed at or against the state by internal dissidents 
(usually groups or collectives). As Gurr put it, "...political violence refers to all 
collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - 
including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies. "75 The 
significance of such a definition of political violence is that it frames the problem of 
violence in politics in terms of the threat violence poses not just to the state or the 
government, but to the entire political framework. The responsibility for such violence 
is directly attributed to domestic opponents of the political system, those who wish to 
tear down the edifice of politics in a fury of destruction.76 
71 Clutterbuck, R., The Future of Political Violence; Destabilisation, Disorder and Terrorism, St. Martin's 
Press, New York, 1986, pg. 3 -7. 
72 Gun, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, pg. 11 
73 Ibid., pg. 45 -56. 
74 See for instance Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J.D., and Zorick, E.R., " Capabilities, Perception, and 
Escalation ", American Political Science Review, 91 (1), 1997, pg. 15 -27; Stephens, G., "Remodelling 
Collective Violence: James Tong's Rational Choice Model and the Great Strikes of 1877 ", Political Research 
Quarterly, 48 (2), 1995, pg. 350 -2; and Muller, E.N., and Weede, E., "Cross -National Variation in Political 
Violence: A Rational Action Approach ", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34 (4), 1990, pg. 625. 
75 Gun, T.R., op.cit., pg. 3 -4. {My italics} 
76 The illegitimacy of such violence is assumed to be self -evident where the political system in question is 
`democratic'. Miller, D., "The Use and Abuse of Political Violence ", Political Studies, XXXII (3), 1984, pg. 
406 -409. 
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In facing such a threat (real or imagined) states have relied upon their own violence 
administered by armies and police forces, and no liberal state has ever been able to 
survive without making use of such violence at some point in its history. Liberal 
writers have dealt with this problem in a number of ways, but the most common 
approach has been to redefine state violence as something other than violence. State 
violence is thus often represented not as violence but force, and the normative 
connotations of the two terms are quite distinct. As Macfarlane put it, 
Violence is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's will 
upon another, where the imposition is held to be illegitimate. Force is 
the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's will upon another, 
where the imposition is held to be legitimate.77 
The legitimacy of force as opposed to the illegitimacy of violence derives from its use 
by those invested with the right to use it (such as police or internal security forces). In 
the Westminster system of government for example, the right to use force is limited to 
particular, authorised bodies whose activities are (supposedly) under scrutiny, subject to 
the law, and whose functionaries are linked by well established chains of responsibility 
to government and the parliament. Consequently, it is expected that the use of force 
will itself be measured and kept to the barest minimum necessary to carry out police 
functions, and the victims of such force will have the right to seek redress through the 
courts for any perceived wrongs.78 
Violence by contrast is represented as a phenomenon which occurs outside the law, is 
spontaneous, unauthorised, unregulated, and excessive. If it is conceded that the state 
may engage in violence, it is often argued that it does so only in reaction to the 
violence of revolutionaries, rebels, insurgents, or terrorists; state violence is never pre - 
emptive.79 This approach to political violence is premised upon a conception of politics 
built around a simple binary opposition between the state and its domestic opponents. 
For violence to be called political it must occur in the context of this opposition, must 
be produced by the struggle between insurgents and the state to determine the nature of 
77 Macfarlane, L.J., Violence and the State, Nelson, London, 1974, pg. 46. 
78 Chalk, P., "The Response to Terrorism as aThreat to Liberal Democracy" , Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, 44 (3), 1998, pg. 375. 
79 See for example, von der Mehden, F. R., Comparative Political Violence, Prentice -Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, 1973, pg. 39 -47; Eckstein, H., "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence ", 
in T.R. Gurr (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict; Theory and Research, The Free Press, New York, 1980, 
pg. 137; and Zimmerman, E., op.cit., pg. 61 -2. 
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the state and its policies. `The political' is thereby equated with the affairs of state - 
who governs, who has access to state power, what policies are to be pursued - while 
political violence is identified only with struggles between the incumbents, 
representatives, functionaries, or defenders of state power and those who seek to 
reform, remove or replace them by riot, rebellion, or revolution.80 
In this way, political violence and those who engage in it, are theoretically and morally 
quarantined. Political violence is characterised as abnormal, an event for which 
responsibility is often laid at the feet of fanatical idealogues or deviants.81 Conversely, 
the state, government and political system they seek to destroy are represented as the 
repositories of legitimacy. A functional political system is a precondition for the 
existence of a peaceful liberal civil society, and violence renders the maintenance of 
this order impossible.82 The key to this opposition is the belief that liberalism cherishes 
diversity, while democratic procedures attempt to enshrine tolerance by suppressing 
violent conflict though public discussion and compromise.83 This conception of 
politics relies upon the notion that liberalism upholds the peaceful and public debate 
over the government of the community.84 Such a conception of politics has two 
important implications; first, it implies a dichotomy between the public political realm 
and a private non -political realm; and second, it implies a dichotomy between normal 
`orderly' politics and abnormal violence.85 When violence occurs in politics it denotes 
a collapse of normal political procedures and processes, which when functioning 
80 Elshtain forcefully argues that the very equation of politics with the state is inscribed with a kind of 
violence. For her, this conception of politics perpetuates the notion of a citizen's duty of sacrifice to the 
nation state which is fully realised in a time of war. Elshtain, J B , " Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice" , Social 
Research, 58 (3), 1991, pg. 548 -9. 
81 Ben -Yehuda, N., "Political Assassinations as Rhetorical Devices: Events and Interpretations ", Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 2 (3), 1990, pg. 325 and 333 -335. Taylor, M., The Fanatics; A Behavioural Approach 
to Political Violence, Brassey's, London, 1991, pg. 40 -41. See also Walt, S.M., "Revolution and War ", 
World Politics, 44, 1992, pg. 322 and 332. Walt's argument is that peace is maintained by a delicate 
"balance -of- threat" between states, but that domestic revolutionaries disrupt the state's ability to manufacture 
their own threats or respond to the threats of others thereby causing an increase in the likelihood of more 
domestic and international conflict. 
82 Kaase, M., "Political Violence and the Democratic State ", Scandinavian Political Studies, 13 (1), 1990, 
pg. 15 -16. 
83 Cohen -Almagor, R., "Liberalism, and the Limits of Pluralism ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7 (2), 
1995, pg. 39. 
84 Hindess, B. " "The Greeks Had a Word For It" : The Polis as Political Metaphor ", Thesis Eleven, 40, 
1995, pg. 122 -123. 
85 Ibid., pg. 124. 
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normally, maintain order peacefully through the mechanisms of the law.86 Political 
violence consists in climactic episodes of social breakdown or political instability 
resulting in violence which can only be seen as illegitimate because liberalism assumes 
"a harmony of interest between state and society ".87 The implications of associating 
violence with political crisis or collapse will be discussed in the next chapter, but what 
is important to note here is the way in which the definition of political violence sustains 
an important boundary around `the political' which is marked -out as a realm in which 
peaceful negotiation and public debate occur, where laws are promulgated, enacted and 
obeyed, where peace is maintained through regular and orderly processes. Violence on 
the other hand denotes the collapse of the political, its appearance within politics 
signals a crisis and a potential return to a pre -civil, pre -political condition. The 
inevitable result of such a view is that violence can only be seen as "episodes... [or] 
isolated and unreconciled `mounds' on the... `plains of peace'... ".88 In the following 
section attention will turn to the way in which such assumptions shape the current 
literature on terrorism. 
III. TERRORISM: A QUESTION OF INNOCENCE? 
The conceptualisation of violence and political violence is characterised by a limitation 
of scope, of boundaries drawn around concepts, and one of their effects is to identify 
and isolate `perpetrators'. Such boundaries frame the problem of violence by defining 
it as a threat to the liberal conception of the rights- bearing individual, the fundamental 
unit of civil society, and as a threat to the political conditions which make civil society 
possible. Violence and those who commit violence are thus consigned to a moral 
nether world of murderers, muggers, revolutionaries, and terrorists.89 The terrorist 
above all other perpetrators of violence is particularly prone to being seen as the 
deranged enemy of humankind as in Joseph Conrad's description of "the Professor" in 
The Secret Agent, or in the descriptions of Abimael Guzman and the Peruvian "Shining 
86 Cobb, S., " Violence Invaginated; The Semiotics of Mass Arrest in Chile ", Law and Critique, IV (2), 
1993, pg. 133 -135. 
87 Bartelson, J., "Making Exceptions: Some Remarks on the Concept of Coup d'etat and Its History", 
Political Theory, 25 (3), 1997, pg. 325; and Sampford,C., "Coups D'Etat and Law ", in E,Attwooll (ed.), 
Shaing Revolution, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1991, pg. 162 -4. 
88 Evans, R., "Blood Dries Quickly: Conflict Study and Australian Historiography ", Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, 41, 1995, pg. 92. 
89 Crelitsen, R.D., "The Discourse and Practice of Counter -Terrorism in Liberal -Democracies ", Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3), 1998, pg. 391 -399. 
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Path" movement.90 If the terrorist is not deranged, he or she is identified as a criminal 
who by engaging in terrorist activity renounces humanity and endorses criminality and 
barbarity.91 There is no doubt that much of this opprobrium arises from the very 
strategy of terrorism itself which not only renounces formal rules of engagement 
between identifiable combat forces, but seeks to carry its struggle right to the heart of 
civilian populations. In its rejection of conventional rules of engagement and desire to 
target civilian populations as well as military forces, terrorism is seen as a form of 
struggle to which democratic states and civil societies are particularly vulnerable.92 In 
such societies, terrorists are able to benefit from ease of movement and freedom of 
association while the democratic regimes they target are open to public pressure which 
terrorists seek to manipulate, and hamstrung in their efforts to suppress terrorism by the 
scrupulous restrictions of the law.93 As a consequence, terrorism is interpreted as a 
grave threat to the civil order, a "nihilistic rejection of all ethical and legal 
constraints... "94 The implication of such a position is obviously that terrorism 
represents an attempt to return society to a "Hobbesian state of nature... [in which] there 
is no civil order... ".95 The "fundamentally nihilistic..." nature of terrorism is thus 
"corrosive of political order ...[and] essentially contra -political" because it rejects the 
"restraints that divide civil society from the state of nature ...[and] lift[s]... a corner of 
the curtain screening us from the Hobbesian jungle. "96 
The literature on terrorism thus reveals in stark terms the boundary observed in 
previous sections between civil and uncivil conditions, between the peace established 
by politics and the violence which ensues when politics fails. This boundary is 
90 Strong, S., Shining Path; The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force, Fontana, London, 1993, Ch. 1 -2. 
91 Badey, T.J., "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach ", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 10 (1), 1998, pg. 96; Netanyahu, B., "Defining Terrorism" in B.Netanyahu (ed.), Terrorism: How 
the West Can Win, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986, pg. 10. See also Wilkinson, P., Terrorism and 
the Liberal State, second edition, Macmillan, London, 1986, pg. 52. Here he questions the terrorists ability to 
display "...rationality and humanity." 
92 Reinares, F., "Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism" , Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3), 1998, pg. 351 -352; Sandler, T., "On the Relationship Between 
Democracy and Terrorism ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7 (4), 1995, pg. 1 -9; and Chalk, P., "The 
Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7 (4), 1995, pg. 10 -44. 
93 Schmid, A. P., "Terrorism and Democracy ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4 (4), 1992, pg. 18 -23. 
94 Wilkinson, P., "The Laws of War and Terrorism" in D.C.Rapoport and Y.Alexander (eds.), The Morality 
of Terrorism; Religious and Secular Justifications, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, pg. 315. 
95 Phillips, R., "Terrorism: Historical Roots and Moral Justifications ", in M.Warner and R.Crisp (eds.), 
Terrorism, Protest and Power, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990, pg. 77. 
96 Lomasky, L.E., "The Political Significance of Terrorism" in R.G.Frey and C.W.Morris (eds.), Violence, 
Terrorism, and Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pg. 98 -99. 
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reinforced by the distinction between the terrorist and his or her targets.97 The terrorist 
deliberately chooses to break the bonds of civility, to throw a bomb toward those 
individuals who inhabit civil society, gain protection and pursue their rights therein. 
Terrorists as Ryan curiously puts it, set themselves apart from "ordinary politics" by 
accepting "no limits" to their "willingness to behave badly ".98 Terrorism thus 
represents an "unmitigated evil" and terrorists are by definition guilty of heinous moral 
outrages while their "victims" are automatically declared "innocent ".99 For Walzer, 
terrorism is characterised simply as "the random murder of innocent people... as a 
strategy of revolutionary struggle..." which necessarily implies that those `innocent 
people' bear no responsibility for the violence.100 While it is beyond question that most 
victims of terrorist violence did nothing to deserve their fate, it is not altogether clear 
that the innocence established by the boundary between `terrorist violence' and `civil 
peace' is all that secure. It may be agreed that the victims of the Omagh bombing or 
the Lockerbie disaster for example, had done nothing to warrant their deaths because 
they were targeted merely because they were members of a civil union the terrorist's 
wished to attack.101 As one terrorism expert put it, victims of terrorism are 
automatically innocent because as members of a civil union they are "noncombatants ", 
while terrorists who "do not engage in combat, as soldiers do" attack the "unarmed... 
[and] the undefended [as]... a deliberate strategy. "102 Similarly, in his comparison of 
terrorism with tyrannicide David George argues that the "personal identity of the victim 
is of no consequence to the terrorist" whose only concern is that his or her victims are 
chosen with the sole aim of communicating their message to others.103 Unlike the 
victims of terrorism, the victim of tyrannicide is killed because of he or she bears 
"personal guilt" and has a "unique combatant status" because the tyrant has in effect 
97 Le Vine, V.T., "On the Victims of Terrorism and Their Innocence ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 9 
(3), 1997, pg. 55 -57. 
98 Ryan, A., "State and Private; Red and White" in R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, 
and Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pg. 242. 
99 Wilkinson, P., "International Terrorism; New Risks to World Order" in J.Baylis and N.J.Rengger (eds.), 
Dilemmas of World Politics; International Issues in a Changing World, Clarendon, Oxford, 1992, pg. 235. 
100 Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars; A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1977, pg. 198. 
101 For some thought -provoking discussions of the concept of innocence see Holmes, R.L., op.cit., pg. 44 -5; 
and Held, V., "Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals" in R.G.Frey and C.W.Morris (eds.), op.cit., pg. 63 and 
passim. 
102 Schmid, A.P., "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4 
(4), 1992, pg. 12. 
103 George, D., "Distinguishing Classical Tyrannicide From Modern Terrorism ", Review of Politics, 50 (3), 
1988, pg. 401. 
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declared war on society.104 Tyrannicide therefore represents a form of limited, 
carefully targeted violence while terrorism is for all intents and purposes indiscriminate 
and insensitive to the non -combatant status of its victims. 
To be innocent then, is to pose no threat, to be "harmless ", to refrain from active 
engagement in the causing of direct harm to others.105 This view of innocence fits 
neatly into a familiar conventional moral framework which allows distinctions to be 
made between the unjustified killing of terrorism and the justified killing in war. 
Although common, this familiar distinction is also untenable for the simple reason that 
`conventional' warfare and `unconventional' terrorism are often simply 
indistinguishable in their ends, means, and choice of victims. The deliberate targeting 
of non -combatants in warfare has a long history, the bombing of Dresden, Coventry, 
Hiroshima, or the massacre at My Lai are just some of the more recent infamous 
examples. Almost all commentators agree however, that terrorism is a type of combat 
which "systematically breaches the internationally accepted rules of war" in rejecting 
any distinction between combatants and non -combatants or between a civil and an 
uncivil condition.106 In an age of total war however, responsibility for the rejection of 
this distinction cannot simply be blamed on terrorists.107 This distinction, never a 
strong one, is surely all the more flimsy in our own time in which administrators, 
technicians or scientists on defence contracts, and munitions workers outside the armed 
forces have become a vital part of every nation's military capacity. In World War Two, 
the Vietnam and Korean wars air power was heavily used for the explicit purpose of 
104 Ibid., pg. 402, 406. 
105 McMahan, J., "Innocence, Self -Defense and Killing in War ", The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2 (3), 
1994, pg. 193; see also Primoratz, I., "What is Terrorism ? ", Journal of Applied Philosophy, 7 (2), 1990, pg. 
131 -133; 
106 Merari, A. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5(4), 1993, pg. 
230; for a discussion of some of the complications here see Hannon, C.C, "Terrorism: A Matter for Moral 
Judgement ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4 (1), 1992, pg. 4 -6. 
107 Draper, K., "Self -Defence, Collective Obligation, and Noncombatant Liability", Social Theory and 
Practice, 24 (1), 1998, pg. 57 -81. Draper examines the obliteration of the distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants exemplified in the United States' military justification for killing Iraqi citizens during the 
Gulf War. This justification was premised on the assumption that they had " some control over their 
government" and should have exercised that control to oust Saddam Hussein or force their army to withdraw 
from Kuwait. Ibid., pg. 57. Draper contends that the U.S. military justified the death of Iraqi noncombatants 
on the grounds that their inaction meant -that they were "liable" for the "necessary and proportionate" 
violence directed against the Iraqi regime. Ibid., pg. 74. 
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crippling a nations' ability to wage total war, in large part by killing or demoralising 
non- combatants.'°8 
In contrast to such cases of indiscriminate violence, terrorism can often be highly 
discriminating in its choice of victims. Between 1969 and June 1989 for instance, 
terrorism in Northern Ireland claimed 2,761 lives, of whom 31 per cent were members 
of the security forces, 13% were members of paramilitary organisations and 55% were 
civilians.109 Further analysis of these figures reveals an even more narrowly targeted 
pattern of killing. Over the same period, loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 
623 deaths, of whom 73% were Catholic civilians, 18% were Protestants, 5% were 
members of other loyalist paramilitaries, 3% were members of republican 
paramilitaries, and 2% members of the security forces. Republican paramilitaries by 
contrast killed 1,593 people, of whom 53% were members of the security forces, 24% 
were Protestant civilians, 11% catholic civilians, 9% were members of other republican 
paramilitaries, and 1% members of loyalist paramilitaries. None of these figures 
mitigates the killing and murder committed by terrorists, indeed killing is still killing 
whether discriminate or not. The point however, is that terrorist violence can be as 
discriminate or indiscriminate as the violence of conventional warfare; and if a lack of 
discrimination in the targeting of ` innocent' victims is the key criterion of the definition 
of terrorism, then states as well as paramilitary cells can certainly be described as 
terrorists.11° 
From the perspective of military theory, Everett Wheeler argues that terrorism is indeed 
a form of war rather than criminality, albeit a reversion to "primitive war ".1 it Primitive 
warfare is defined as a kind of non -state conflict which takes place without pitched 
battles or professional military organisation, and thus terrorism is a form of warfare 
108 On state terrorism see Herman, E.S., and O'Sullivan, G., The Terrorism Industry; The Experts and 
Institutions That Shape our View of Terror, Pantheon, New York, 1989, pg. 50; Sproat,P.A., "Can the State 
be Terrorist ? ", Terrorism, 14 (1), 1991, pg. 19 -29; and Chaliand, G., Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to 
Media Spectacle, Saqui Books, London, 1987, pg. 83 -84. 
109 The source for the figures quoted in this paragraph is Hennessey, T., A History of Northern Ireland, 
1920 -1996, St Martin's Press, New York, 1997, pg. 250. 
110 Sproat, P.A., "Can the State Commit Acts of Terrorism ?: An Opinion and Some Qualitative Replies to a 
Questionnaire ", Terrorism and Political Violence, 9 (4), 1997, pg. 117 -150; also see the essays in M. Stohl 
and G.A. Lopez (eds.), The State as Terrorist; The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, 1984; and Perdue, W.D., Terrorism and the State; A Critique of Domination 
Through Fear, Praeger, New York, 1989. 
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which threatens the supremacy of the conventional military techniques of modern 
warfare. The assumption behind such a view is that states, even when resorting to the 
violence of warfare conduct themselves in a `civilised' manner which seeks at the least 
to limit or control the violence at their disposal. Similarly, it is assumed that terrorists 
have no respect for the formal rules of war, are not accountable for their actions, and 
show little willingness to direct their violence solely at other combatants. The claim 
that modern warfare can be distinguished from terrorism on the grounds that the former 
has been `civilised' and the latter remains `primitive' despite the use of modern arms 
technology belies a strongly normative assumption. That assumption is that the 
participants in modern warfare - states with disciplined, professional armies - are 
institutions of civilisation whereas terrorists are little better than savages or barbarians 
who are insensitive to the careful limitations which civilisation has placed on the use of 
violence. 
CONCLUSION 
The original idea with which this thesis began was that liberalism is guided by the 
assumption that a firm distinction can be made between barbarism and civilisation, and 
that violence is the preserve of the uncivilised. The very popularity of violence and 
terrorism in particular however, may have nothing to do with a reversion to a primitive 
state of warfare, but may be an indication of the very prevalence of modern civilisation. 
Throughout history violence has played an important role in the life of most (if not all) 
societies, and as Eric Hobsbawm has noted, in societies in which violence was a regular 
method of "regulating the everyday relations between peoples and groups" various rules 
were developed around the use of violence, determining how and against whom it could 
be used, and which aimed to protect those who had no involvement in the conflict.112 
Such violence was used only when other possibilities were not available, had a 
"specific and identifiable purpose" and was hence "proportionate to that purpose ".113 
The incidence of forms of violence which seem to deny any such distinction between 
combatants and non -combatants (such as terrorism or the massacre of civilians by 
aggrieved gunmen) Hobsbawm argues is itself a sign that violence has become divorced 
I n Wheeler, E.L., "Terrorism and Military Theory: An Historical Perspective ", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 3 (1), 1991, pg. 13. 
112 Hobsbawm, E.J., Revolutionaries.- Contemporary Essays, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973, pg. 
211. 
113 Ibid., pg. 212. 
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from any rules governing its use. In the process of civilisation which has rendered 
modem states overwhelmingly powerful, the violence of non -state actors has been 
transformed into an impotent protest against modem society. 
What Hobsbawm's analysis tends to ignore however, is that while modern states have 
sought to control who has access to violence, modem technology has made killing at a 
distance much easier, and has to some degree obliterated the possibility of 
distinguishing between combatant and non -combatant, belligerent and innocent. 
According to Konrad Lorenz, the invention by human beings of "shooting weapons" 
has increased the distance at which killing takes place, and this increasing distance 
"screens the killer ", as Bauman also argues, from having to acknowledge the 
consequences of their actions.114 "The same principle applies to an even greater 
degree" Lorenz suggests, 
...to the use of modern remote -control weapons. The man who presses 
the releasing button is so completely screened against... realising the 
consequences of his action, that he can commit it with impunity... Only 
thus can it be explained that perfectly good -natured men, who would not 
even smack a naughty child, proved to be perfectly able to release 
rockets or to lay carpets of incendiary bombs on sleeping cities, thereby 
committing hundreds and thousands of children to a horrible death in the 
flames The fact that it is good, normal men who did this is as eerie as 
any fiendish atrocity of war.115 
If Lorenz and Bauman are correct, the increasing distances over which modem 
technology can now deliver death makes it unlikely that human beings are going to be 
able to reduce their violence. If one is to sustain a principled and practical opposition 
to violence however, the persistence of violence cannot be attributed solely to the 
`screening' effect of modem technology, but may include other factors such as the 
highly selective approach taken to the identification of what constitutes violence. 
The understanding of violence and of specific phenomena such as terrorism, not to 
mention the efforts to promote less lethal dialogue between terrorists and their 
opponents, can not be broadened by the use of definitions which effectively thrust all 
terrorists into a moral nether world peopled by the insane or by `primitive' savages with 
114 Lorenz, K., On Aggression, translated by M.Latzke, Methuen, London, 1966, pg. 208. 
115 Ibid., pg. 208 -209. 
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whom no accommodation is possible.116 As Conor Cruise O'Brien points out, the 
development of "sentimental" or "hysterical" interpretations of terrorism may serve to 
reinforce one's own position, but also confuses the understanding of alternative 
positions.117 Perhaps as Martha Crenshaw has suggested we need to consider the 
conceptually awkward possibility that there are many different types of terrorism which 
cannot be adequately explained by the use of a single definition employing highly 
pejorative terms."$ Above all, perhaps the whole idea of a firm boundary between civil 
peace and uncivil violence which assigns blame for violence to those who represent a 
regression into primitive savagery is in need of questioning. In liberal discourse it is 
the value -neutral state which is thought best able to defend this boundary by upholding 
a framework of laws which make peaceful co- existence possible. The state is therefore 
invested with the dual task of maintaining the order necessary for the existence of civil 
society, and defending this order from the threat of violence. This conception of the 
relationship between the state and the maintenance of a peaceful civil order implies that 
the fulfilment of this task requires an effective management of the population because it 
is their conduct which represents the greatest threat to civil order. In the following 
chapter, attention will be turned to the implications of this assumption in the literature 
on collective violence against the state. 
116 Tilly, C., "Contentious Conversation ", Social Research, 65 (3), 1998, pg. 491 -510. Here, Tilly argues 
for such an accommodation: "If we regard conversation as continuously negotiated communication and 
contention as mutual claim- making that bears significantly on the parties interests... then the two social 
phenomena overlap extensively. They overlap in the zone we might call contentious conversation." (495) 
Contentious conversation includes a whole range of violent and non -violent conflictual exchanges. See also 
Aho, J. A., This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1994, 
pg. 108 -121. 
117 O.Brien, C.C., Passion and Cunning; Essays on Nationalism, Terrorism and Revolution, Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1988, pg. 227. 
118 Crenshaw, M., "Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective" , Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 15 (1), 1992, pg. 9. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISEASES OF STATE: 
IMAGES OF REVOLUTION AND CIVILISATION 
As civil society was instituted in order to maintain public tranquillity, the state forthwith 
acquires over us and our possessions a greater right, to the extent necessary to 
accomplish the end. The state, therefore, in the interest of public peace and order, can 
limit... [the] common right of resistance. That such was the purpose of the state we 
cannot doubt, since it could not in any other way achieve its end. If in fact, the right of 
resistance should remain without restraint, there will no longer be a state, only a non- 
social horde. 
- Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace [1625], translated by F.W. Kelsey, Bobbs -Merrill, 
Indianapolis, 1925, pg. 139. 
Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of 
reason they pretend to, their Common -wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing 
by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as 
long as Man- kind... Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall 
violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as 
they are the Makers, and orderers of them. 
... the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common- wealth; 
which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, 
by his departed (though immortall) Soule. 
- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], edited by C.B.Macpherson, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, 
pg. 363 and 375. 
In the last chapter it was argued that contemporary liberal discourse is characterised by a 
pervasive assumption that there is a boundary between civil peace and uncivil violence. 
The implication of this assumption is that `violence' threatens to transgress that 
boundary, to intrude upon the peace which reigns in civil society and disrupt the order 
built upon the rights of individuals. Violence is therefore seen as uncivil, savage and 
barbarous, while those who commit such violence are deemed uncivilised, dangerous 
individuals who show slight regard for the boundary which protects the civil order from 
iniquitous savagery. This view of violence and its perpetrators is central to liberal 
discourse, and in this chapter it will be suggested that the development of liberal 
theories of revolution was shaped by the concern to protect civil order from the unruly 
conduct of those who sought to disrupt it. Within liberal discourse the maintenance of a 
boundary between civil peace and uncivil violence is regarded as essential to the mutual 
felicity of rational individuals who have agreed to forebear from violence against one 
another and their state. Such forbearance is seen as rational because rational creatures 
cannot fail to see that their own self -interest lies in the maintenance of social order. The 
phenomenon of violence occasioned by civil unrest or revolution therefore represents a 
problem which has elicited the articulation of complex theories designed to explain why 
or how revolutionary violence occurs when the dangers of violence to the pursuit of 
rational self -interest are so evident. The resort to violence is therefore regarded as 
irrational or at least non -rational, and has been explained in terms of individual and 
social pathology conveyed by metaphors of disease or structural collapse, or by images 
of storm and earthquake. Violence is seen as discontinuous, an unusual, calamitous 
event analogous to a volcanic eruption or tidal wave of brief but epic destruction, and its 
prevention necessitates a careful management of the conduct of the domestic population. 
It has been argued in previous chapters that in liberal discourse reason and rational 
conduct leads not to violence but to peace. The corollary of this position, which will be 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, is that revolutionary activity is associated 
with non- rational behaviour occasioned by the breakdown of the fabric of civil society 
conveyed in metaphors of disease and storm. The association of revolutionary violence 
with irrationality however, is not unique to liberalism. What distinguishes liberal 
theories of revolution is the assumption that the development of market economies leads 
to the pacification of society. What requires explanation is the `outbreak' of 
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revolutionary violence which is traced to the tensions induced by the process of 
economic development. In the second section attention will be turned to the theory of 
relative- deprivation which traces revolutions to personal and social strain. Derived from 
Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of the French Revolution, relative- deprivation theory 
has provided the foundation for liberal analyses of revolution. In the third and final 
section the discussion will focus on the assumptions implicit in liberal theories of 
revolution, and specifically on the idea that revolutions indicate an abnormality or 
disequilibrium symptomatic of crises attendant upon rapid or uneven economic 
development or modernisation.' 
I. REVOLUTIONARY METAPHORS 
Revolutions have often been condemned, recommended, sensationalised, or explained 
away through the use of "organic metaphors" linking them to events in the biological, 
geological, or meteorological world.' As John Dunn put it, revolutions are like "facts of 
nature, analogous to physical processes, the release of enormous forces, moving vast 
masses through space.i' As if moved by this very sentiment one recent theorist has 
argued that, 
The causes of revolutions and major rebellions operate in ways that seem 
remarkably similar to the forces that build up to cause earthquakes. That 
is, in the years before such a revolution... social pressures for change 
build. Yet the existing social and political structures... resist change 
(even though pressures and deformations may be visible). Suddenly, 
however, some response to the mounting pressure... weakens that 
resistance (like a block breaking off along the fault). At that point, there 
is a sudden release of the pent -up forces and a crumbling of the old social 
structures - a revolution or major rebellion.' 
The imagery of natural disaster, of storm and disease is deeply embedded within the 
discourse on revolution.' The use of organic metaphors coloured Thomas Hobbes' 
analysis in Leviathan, in which he argued that the "infirmities" of commonwealths 
could be likened to "diseases of a naturall body" owing in large part to "Defectuous 
' See for example, Foran, J., "The Comparative- Historical Sociology of Third World Social 
Revolutions; Why a Few Succeed, Why Most Fail ", in J. Foran (ed.), Theorising Revolutions, Routledge, 
London, 1997, pg. 228 -230. 
2 Sederberg, P.C., Fires Within; Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, Harper Collins, New 
York, 1994, pg. 90 -100. 
3 Dunn, J., Modern Revolutions; An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon, second 
edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pg. 3. 
Goldstone, J.A., Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1991, pg. 35. 
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Procreation.s6 In the very act of creating a commonwealth human beings were unable to 
prevent their "...ignorance, and passions..." from sowing "...many seeds of a naturali 
mortality [of the state], by Intestine Discord. "' Secure commonwealths could not 
therefore be built "without the help of a very able Architect... ", and thus existing 
commonwealths come to resemble a ramshackle "crasie building" which needs little 
pressure exerted against it to fall. Addressing himself therefore to the inhabitants of 
such perillously fragile commonwealths, Hobbes argued that many of the infirmities to 
which commonwealths were prone proceeded from allowing insufficient power to the 
sovereign or too much to the subjects. Such a situation he argued, would merely incline 
"great numbers of men... to rebell" at the slightest inconvenience occasioned by the 
state. A weak sovereign power will also invite foreign competition and interference, 
will promote the development of factions, and will be unable to prevent the circulation 
of "seditious doctrines ", the chief of which according to Hobbes, was that each citizen 
should be the judge of right and wrong.' Among the other problems of commonwealths, 
Hobbes referred to conflict between political and religious authorities which he 
compared to "epilepsie... in the Body Naturall"; or the want of money which was 
likened to an "Ague" inhibiting proper circulation through the arteries of society; the 
accumulation of too much wealth in private hands was described as "Pleurisie" which 
lead to "fever "; and the liberty to dispute the sovereign's authority was analogous to the 
action of "little Wormes" in the body politic which weakened it from within. 
Such examples as these indicate the importance Hobbes attached to maintaining the 
supremacy of the sovereign over the subjects, laws, and other structures of government 
within the commonwealth. The purpose of Hobbes' argument here was to establish that 
sovereignty consisted in the ability to make and enforce the laws of the community 
without restraint or division, "for Powers divided mutually destroy each other." In a 
revealing passage Hobbes referred to the various branches of government as having 
specific organic functions which, when divided against each other caused disease, 
5 Wolin, S.S., "The Politics of the Study of Revolution ", Comparative Politics, 5 (3), 1973, pg. 349- 
352; and Oberschall, A., "Theories of Social Conflict ", Annual Review of Sociology, 4, 1978, pg. 298. 
6 Unless otherwise specified, all following quotes from Hobbes have been taken from: Hobbes, T., 
Leviathan [1651], Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pg. 363 -376. 
' Ibid., pg. 272. 
Hobbes referred to this doctrine as a poisonous "venime" that he compared to "the biting of a mad 
Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia ", which in the body -politic resulted in what 
he sneeringly referred to as "Tyrannophobia ", the fear and hatred of rule. Ibid., pg. 370. 
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Sometimes also in the meerly Civili government, there may be more than 
one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive 
faculty,) has depended on a generali Assembly; the Power of conduct and 
command, (which is the Motive faculty,) on one man; and the Power of 
making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidental 
consent, not onely of these two, but also of a third; This endangereth the 
Commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most 
often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion.' 
Such nourishment came from effective, unitary sovereignty which alone guaranteed 
order by raising sufficient funds, establishing unambiguous laws, and providing clear 
leadership. The danger in failing to provide sufficient nourishment was that the 
sovereign - "the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common -wealth" - 
would `expire' and subjects returned to the state of nature.10 Hobbes' use of organic 
metaphors suggested that the process of governance was concerned with the health not 
only of the state, but of the population over which it ruled. 
The health of both state and population were held to depend upon scientifically 
ascertainable qualities such as nourishment and circulation, and the science of 
government - like that of medicine - consisted in being able to make the right diagnosis 
of particular problems before they became incurable. The outbreak of revolution like 
the outbreak of biological epidemics, indicated a failure of those entrusted with the task 
of making the correct diagnosis. Consequently, the appearance of revolution indicated 
that a severe problem had afflicted the state, and unless it was treated correctly would 
destroy the fabric of civil society. Even for those who were prepared to countenance 
resistance to the state such as John Locke, took great pains to confine and limit their 
claims. Locke in fact used the term `revolution' in contending that his doctrine of 
legitimate resistance would not create "a ferment for frequent Rebellion ", and made it 
clear that his was a doctrine of legitimate but limited resistance solely to governments 
which had either abused their trust or were in a state of war with their citizens by 
endangering their lives, liberties, or estates." Locke firmly distinguished between 
legitimate resistance leading to "Dissolution of [a]... Government ", and illegitimate 
resistance resulting in the "Dissolution of the Society".1z Governments could be resisted 
he argued, on the grounds of an abuse of trust, by ruling arbitrarily, or by killing or 
9 Ibid., pg. 372. 
'o Ibid., pg. 373. 
" Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government [1690], edited by P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, pg. 414. 
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subjecting their citizens to slavery." Such forms of rule he claimed, constituted true 
rebellion, a rejection of the laws governments existed to maintain, and made resistance 
to it legitimate even though he feared its effects on the life of society.14 
Something of Locke's concerns were reflected in the debate between Edmund Burke 
(1729 -1797) and Tom Paine (1737 -1809) over the French Revolution.15 According to 
John Keane, Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France split the "official political 
spectrum" into supporters or opponents of the French Revolution or "...what would soon 
be called the Left and the Right. "16 Ted Gun also acknowledged Burke's importance as 
a "precursor" to modern liberal theories of revolution." The French Revolution Burke 
described as a "present confusion" and "palsy" the leaders of which sought to "pervert 
the natural order" of society.18 His antipathy to the `masses' and their violence was 
barely disguised, dismissing them as "...cruel ruffians and assassins..." whose vulgarity 
was unleashed in the "...horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and 
infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell... ".19 He 
re- iterated this theme with an unwavering conviction culminating in fervent 
denunciations of the Revolution's claims to justice, 
Humanity and compassion are ridiculed as the fruits of superstition and 
ignorance. Tenderness to individuals is considered as treason to the 
public. ... Amidst assassination, massacre, and confiscation... [the 
revolutionaries] are forming plans for the good order of future society. 
Embracing in their arms the carcases of base criminals... The Assembly, 
their organ, acts before them the farce of deliberation with as little 
decency as liberty. ... they act amidst the tumultuous cries of a mixed 
mob of ferocious men, and of women lost to shame, who, according to 
their insolent fancies, direct, control, applaud, explode them... with a 
strange mixture of servile petulance and proud, presumptuous authority.20 
12 Ibid., pg. 406. 
13 Sinunons, J., On the Edge of Anarchy; Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993, pg. 156. 
" 
4 Locke, J., op.cit., pg. 415 -416. 
15 Bridge, C., `Burke and the Conservative Tradition" in D.Close and C.Bridge (eds.), Revolution: A 
History of the Idea, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pg. 88. Bridge argues that Burke's analysis was to 
exert a powerful influence on later theorists in the liberal tradition (such as Brinton, Johnson, Gurr, and 
Huntington), especially by interpreting revolution as an "aberration" and "disease ". 
16 Keane, J., Tom Paine; A Political Life, Bloomsbury, London, 1996, pg. 290 
1' Gurr, T.R., "Burke and the Modem Theory of Revolution; A Reply to Freeman", Political Theory, 6 
(3), 1978, pg. 300. 
'$ Burke, E., Reflections on the Revolution in France [1790], edited by C.C. O'Brien, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1969, pg. 137 -138. 
19 Ibid., pg. 164 -165. 
20 Ibid., pg. 160 -161. 
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Burke insisted that revolutionary politics was premised upon a perversion of the human 
character designed to "...temper and harden the breast..." to the violence attendant upon 
the subversion of old institutions, leading to a renunciation of "...all the well -placed 
sympathies of the human breast.s21 
For Hobbes the metaphor of disease created an image of the sovereign as a physician 
who must observe and manage a population as a physician would observe and treat a 
patient. Signs of disease had to be noted and acted upon promptly in order to maintain 
the health of the body politic. Burke's organic metaphors however, conveyed a sense 
that the problem of revolution was in essence incurable and inexorable. Paine similarly 
spoke of the American War of Independence, in which he was a committed partisan, as 
"...the greatest and completest revolution the world ever knew..." which burst forth like 
a "...long and raging hurricane..." sundering all old institutions and ideas.22 For Paine, 
the American and French revolutions were symptomatic of a kind of (hopefully fatal) 
disease in the old order quite unlike the minor events "formerly called Revolutions, 
[which] were little more than a change of persons, or an alteration of local 
circumstances... ", and heralded "a renovation of the natural order of things, a system of 
principles as universal as truth... combining moral with political happiness and national 
prosperity.s23 As John Keane put it, "with astounding prescience... ", Paine realised that 
...modern revolutions can be likened to periods of fever and delirium, 
during which the body politic suffers convulsions caused by vicious 
power struggles and attempts by the best -organised, most ruthless 
revolutionists to crush their opponents and ...other "enemies of the 
revolution ".24 
Paine himself in a letter to Burke, described the reluctance the monarchies of Europe 
had to send their armies against France for fear that they catch "the Contagion" of 
revolution.25 Although he did not share Paine's enthusiasm for the Revolution, Burke's 
metaphors and imagery were similarly indicative of inevitable catastrophe, warning of 
"...a hollow murmuring under ground..." threatening an "...earthquake in the political 
world.s2ó When the earthquake broke in France he castigated the revolutionaries with 
2' Ibid., pg. 156. 
22 Paine, T., The Crisis, XIII [1783], Dolphin Books, New York, 1960, pg. 224. 
23 Paine, T., The Rights of Man [1791], in Thomas Paine: Collected Works, The Library of America, 
New York, 1995, pg. 537. 
24 Keane, J., op.cit., 122. 
25 Paine, T., quoted in ibid., pg. 287. 
26 Burke, E., quoted in ibid., pg. 291. 
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failing to repair the walls or build anew on the foundations of the "...noble and 
venerable castle" of the French state and constitution.27 
While Burke here used the metaphor of earthquake to convey the wanton 
destructiveness of the French Revolution, Paine used the metaphor of storm and 
hurricane to communicate the very same destructiveness which he thought was likely to 
sweep away the last vestiges of feudal monarchy. The metaphor of disease and storm 
however, conveyed another quality of revolution which liberal writers were clearly 
concerned about, and that was the capacity of revolution to overwhelm individual 
reason and volition. Revolutions swept across societies like forces of nature which 
could not be held at bay and would draw the inhabitants of those societies - the faceless 
masses - into its swirling vortex with irresistible power. For Burke this was clearly a 
matter for some alarm because revolutions brought to prominence the very worst, most 
unruly classes - the mob - whose fury and envy was beyond control. Tom Paine 
however, was more sympathetic to revolution and gleefully anticipated the prospect of 
liberation for the down -trodden masses. Nonetheless, he admitted that this liberation 
would inevitably be accompanied by the uncontrolled violence of those who had been 
degraded by the system they sought to overthrow. "In the tremendous breaking forth" 
of revolution Paine argued, 
...all degrees, tempers and characters are confounded, and delivering 
themselves, by a miracle of exertion, from the destruction meditated 
against them, is it to be expected that nothing will happen? When men 
are sore with the sense of oppressions, and menaced with the prospect of 
new ones, is the calmness of philosophy, or the palsy of insensibility to 
be looked for ?28 
Outrages committed by "the mob" were therefore to be expected in the heat of 
revolution, but these `outrages' were not blamed on the barbarity of the masses but on 
the inexorable oppressions of the system that degraded them. Those "vast classes of 
mankind as are distinguished by the appellation of the vulgar, or the ignorant mob" he 
argued arose "as an unavoidable consequence, out of the ill construction of all old 
governments in Europe" which exalted "the puppet -show of state and aristocracy" while 
the masses were "distortedly debased" and "degradedly thrown into the background of 
the human picture ".29 Mob violence was therefore to be explained as a consequence of 
27 Burke,E., op.cit., pg. 121. 
8 Paine, T,, Rights of Man, pg. 453. 
29 Ibid., pg. 455. 
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the desire for revenge of those who had been so degraded rather than a consequence of 
the desire for liberty which they had not yet been "instructed how to reverence.... ".30 
While Paine and Burke clearly differed in their attitude toward revolution, there was a 
remarkable consistency in their respective analyses of what constituted revolution. Both 
regarded revolutions as inexorable forces, both believed revolutions unleashed 
unprecedented destruction of existing social and political institutions, and both agreed 
that mob violence was inevitable. Such an image of revolution was immortalised by 
Charles Dickens in A Tale of Two Cities, 
The hour was come when Saint Antoine was to execute his horrible idea 
of hoisting up men for lamps to show what he could be and do. Saint 
Antoine's blood was up, and the blood of tyranny and domination by the 
iron hand was down - down on the steps of the Hotel de Ville, where the 
governor's body lay - down on the sole of the shoe of Madame Defarge, 
where she had trodden on the body to steady it for mutilation. ... The 
swinging sentinel was posted, and the sea rushed on. The sea of black 
and threatening waters, and of destructive upheaving of wave against 
wave, whose depths were yet unfathomed and whose forces were yet 
unknown. The remorseless sea of turbulently swaying shapes, voices of 
vengeance, and faces hardened in the furnaces of suffering until the touch 
of pity could make no mark on them." 
Thomas Carlyle in his The French Revolution spoke in similar terms of the "madness" 
and "Elemental Powers" of revolution, the "inflammable" and "combustible chaos" of 
pre -revolutionary France.'Z Carlyle also employed the metaphor of storm of a "[c]loud 
of Erebus blackness; betokening latent electricity without limit. "" Such images of 
revolution focus attention on the suddenness and unexpected nature of the assault, the 
unruly collective nature of the uprising and the accompanying fear of an unbridled, 
libertine mass, and of course the savage violence with which `the masses' expressed 
their hatred and resentment of the old order. 
Early liberal sociologists such as Gabriel Tarde for example, expressed this concern in 
his analysis of the revolutionary crowd. Such a crowd had "something animal about it" 
in which otherwise rational individuals were "completely taken over, irresistibly drawn 
30 Ibid. 
" Dickens, C., A Tale of Two Cities, Marshall Cavendish, London, 1987, pg. 160. 
32 Carlyle, T., The French Revolution; A History [ 1837], Random House, New York, pg. 140. 
" Ibid., pg. 165. See also his account of the September Massacres which occasion the repetition of the 
imagery of madness and frenzy. Ibid., pg. 493 -495. 
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along by a force with no counterbalance ".34 The actions of such crowds he argued, were 
characterised by irrational destructiveness, 
...can we cite a single house built by a crowd, any land cleared and 
worked by a crowd, or any industry created by a crowd? For a few trees 
of liberty that they planted, how many forests have been burned, homes 
pillaged, chateaux demolished by them... The danger for new 
democracies is the growing difficulty for thoughtful men to escape the 
obsession and fascination of turmoil 36 
The recent popularity of Elias Canetti's Crowds and Power is an indication of the 
currency of the view that, "[t]o the crowd" in Canetti's words "everything seems a 
Bastille" to be overwhelmed and tom down.36 More recently, Serge Muscovici has 
spoken of the deterioration of mental faculties, the sway of passion, and the absence of 
rational calculation in the minds of individuals who participate in crowd activity.37 The 
assumption behind much of this literature is that the violence of revolutions is not 
simply abnormal, but that it is irresistible. Revolutions threaten to engulf whole 
societies in a frenzy of destruction which unleashes the destructive power of the masses. 
At such times, the rational control of conduct upon which the order of society normally 
rests is suspended and the sub -rational impulses of the animal crowd hold sway. The 
fear that lies behind this view was perhaps best expressed by Tarde, 
Individuals can be liberal and tolerant when each is alone; but once 
assembled together they become authoritarian and tyrannical. This is 
because beliefs become heightened through mutual contact... Political 
crowds... are the most impassioned and the most furious... passing from 
execration to adoration, from excessive anger to excessive joy with 
extreme facility.'$ 
The crime and delinquency of the revolutionary mob was emphasised by associating it 
with the barbarity of nature which was sharply discontinuous with the civility of a social 
order of rational individuals. Among the early attempts to offer a comprehensive social - 
scientific theory of revolution Pitrim Sorokin's The Sociology of Revolution was based 
on just these assumptions. 
Tarde, G., On Communication and Social Influence; Selected Papers, T.N. Clark (ed.), University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969, pg. 278, 281. 
n Ibid., pg. 289, 293. 
36 Canetti, E., Crowds and Power, translated by C. Stewart, Viking Press, New York, 1963, pg. 20. See 
also the articles devoted to Canetti in Thesis Eleven, 45, 1496. 
Mu.scovici, S., "The Discovery of the Masses" in C.F.Graumann and S.Muscovici (eds.), Changing 
Conceptions of Crowd Mind and Behavior, Springer -Verlag, New York, 1986, pg. 11 -12. For criticism 
of the pioneering work of historians such as George Rude, Henri Lefebvre, and Eric Hobsbawm which 
sought to uncover rational bases of crowd activity, see Singer, B.C.J., "Violence in the French 
Revolution: Forms of Ingestion/Fbrms of Expulsion ", Social Research, 56 (1), 1989, pg. 263 -293. 
ss Tarde, G., op.car., pg. 289. 
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Written as a response to his own bitter personal experiences during the Russian 
Revolution, Sorokin's view was that revolution in general (and the Russian revolution 
in particular) occurred when "...the conditions of the environment are modified in such a 
way that they violate the fundamental instincts of the masses..." and drove them to 
commit violence to redress their grievances.39 Revolutions were thus associated with a 
degeneration of human behaviour, a devastating "biologization" or "transformation of 
man- socius into man- animal" in which "the biologic tendencies... manifest themselves 
in their most extreme and `sadistic' form" in the "feverish, agitated and furious 
character of behaviour of [the] multitudes ".40 Sorokin's analysis here relied on a 
distinction between the civilisation and peace of society, and the violence of nature. 
Revolutions wound -back the progress achieved by civilisation and destroyed "...all the 
religious, moral and legal habits which acted as a barrier against acts of murder... ".41 In 
revolutions individuals become, 
...drunk with blood, and with the brutal lust of inflicting pain. The 
bodies of the killed are torn asunder, their limbs and heads are carried 
through the town on pikes and thrust before the eyes of those nearest to 
them... The barbarity and sadistic cruelty of long -passed ages came back 
to life with its [the Russian revolution's] refined atrocities of torture.42 
The motor force of revolutionary activity was the supposed `deformation' of human 
character which released the `beast within' and wiped away all the barriers to the 
violence of instinct and nature in civil society. Sorokin's assumption, that violence was 
an attribute of uncontrolled nature, was here combined with the contention that 
revolutions transgressed the boundary between uncivil violence and civil peace. The 
defining characteristic of liberal approaches to revolution, which Sorokin's approach 
exemplified, was that the shattering of peace by violence was triggered by personal 
strain and irrationality of `the masses'. While Sorokin spoke of this strain in biological 
terms, his approach and those of his contemporaries owed much to Alexis de 
Tocqueville's socio- economic analysis of the French Revolution.43 
s9 Sorokin, P.A., The Sociology of Revolution [1925], Howard Fertig, New York, 1967, pg. 23 -25. 
40 Ibid., pg. 35 -36. 
4' Ibid., pg. 139. 
42 Ibid., pg. 140 -1. 
4s Kimmel, M., Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990, 
pg. 47 -48. 
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II. FROM DISEASE TO FRUSTRATION 
Unlike Burke and Paine, Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that the Old Regime in France 
was overthrown not by a sudden storm, nor by the intolerable oppressions and 
immiseration of `the masses', but by an unprecedented period of economic growth 
which resulted in the successful democratic challenge to and supplanting of outmoded 
monarchical government.' Increasing social wealth "far from tranquillising the 
population..." was in fact the catalyst of revolution, promoting "a spirit of unrest..." in 
which the general population "became more and more hostile to every ancient 
institution... ", in short "the nation was heading for a revolution.i45 Tocqueville's 
reasoning was that economic development caused `rising expectations' among the lower 
and middle classes which were unmatched by possibilities for their satisfaction. While 
economic improvements spurred governmental and administrative changes long overdue 
these merely heightened dissatisfaction, 
...it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that 
revolutions break out. On the contrary... when a people which has put up 
with oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds 
the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. Thus the 
social order overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than the 
one immediately preceding it... the most perilous time for a bad 
government is one when it seeks to mend its ways. ...Patiently endured so 
long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear 
intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. 
...[Remedying one abuse] draws attention to the others and they now 
appear more galling; people may suffer less, but their sensibility is 
exacerbated.46 
Tocqueville's analysis became the benchmark for later liberal theories which traced 
revolution to rapid economic development leading to improvements in the condition of 
the lower classes thereby sparking increasing, insistent, but unrealisable claims for more 
power, wealth, status or freedom.47 Revolutions were thus thought to occur when the 
sense of `relative' as opposed to `objective' deprivation induced by un -met expectations 
rose above sustainable levels resulting in widespread personal strain. 
44 Herr, R., Tocqueville and the Old Regime, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962, pg. 44. 
45 de Tocqueville, A., The Old Regime and the French Revolution [ 1856], translated by S.Gilbert, 
Doubleday, New York, 1955, pg. 175. 
46 Ibid., pg. 176 -177. 
47 Calvert, P., Revolution and Counter -Revolution, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1990, 
pg. 6 -8. 
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Early applications of this theory such as Lyford Edwards' The Natural History of 
Revolution (1927), George Pettee's The Process of Revolution (1938), and Crane 
Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution (1938), emphasised both the pathology and 
abnormality of revolutionary violence. Edwards for example explained revolution as 
the inevitable outcome of repression of one or more of four "elemental" human desires, 
which caused the downtrodden to feel that their "legitimate aspirations and ideals" were 
"repressed or perverted... hindered and thwarted..." resulting in widespread 
"disappointment and discouragement"." This situation developed because the 
"preliminary symptom" of revolution was the "marked increase of wealth, intelligence 
and power in the repressed portion of society" leading to an inflation of expectations.49 
For Pettee, revolutions occurred when the state became a "barrier to change" and found 
itself "out of adjustment" with society causing a widespread perception of "cramp".' 
On this view, the contagion of personal strain spread throughout society resulting in 
violence and abnormality, an increase "of hobos, tramps, and bums" who constituted "a 
considerable part of ...revolutionary mobs ".51 Such crowds, incapable of reason, swayed 
by exaggerated and sensational ideas, showed "only violent and extreme sentiments. "52 
The psycho -social axioms in these analyses such as rising expectations and relative - 
deprivation underscored the irrational or sub -rational nature of revolutionary violence. 
Crane Brinton's classic study The Anatomy of Revolution, achieved the same result by 
combining Tocquvillean `relative- deprivation' analysis with the sustained use of the 
metaphor of disease.53 Brinton's thesis was that revolutions denoted a kind of 
pathological condition or "fever" of the body politic exhibiting definite symptoms, 
beginning with the violence and terror of the radicals akin to a kind of "delirium ", 
followed by the recuperative "convalescence" of the inevitable conservative reaction, 
"s Edwards, L.P., The Natural History of Revolution [1927], Russell and Russell, New York, 1965, pg. 
2 -4, 30. The desires to which he refers are those for experience, security, recognition, and response from 
others. Edwards also refers to the spread of discontent throughout society as a "contagious" condition. 
49 Edwards, L.P., op.cit., pg. 33. 
so Pettee, G.S., The Process of Revolution [1938], Howard Fertig, New York, 1971, pg. 7. The concept 
of cramp is described as "basically subjective ", dependent "upon a consciousness of barriers to full self - 
expression" which implies "a maladjustment with accompanying strain" when "basic psychological 
drives" or "basic impulses" are altered or blocked. Ibid., pg. 11 -12, 32 -33. 
51 Edwards, L., op.cit., pg. 27 -28 
52 Ibid., pg. 99. 
s' Brinton, C., The Anatomy of Revolution [1938], Vintage Books, New York, 1952, pg. 264. 
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after which society emerged "immunised" against further attacks.S4 Tilly clearly 
believes that Brinton employed the metaphor of disease "with malice aforethought..." to 
equate revolution with undesirable social breakdown.' The use of the disease metaphor 
begs the question of what characterises `normal' and `healthy' societies. The health of a 
society was apparently measured by the degree to which `equilibrium' was maintained 
and denoted "a condition in which the varying and conflicting desires and habits of 
individuals and groups... are in complex mutual adjustment... ".56 Consequently, 
emphasis was placed on the abnormality of violence due to the perverted masses 
disrupting the normal mutuality and order of society. Revolutions therefore, appeared 
archetypically as `abnormal' events, outbursts, eruptions, or crises which occurred 
owing to some malfunction or breakdown in the normal social and political processes. 
Revolutions were made by individuals acting under strain; their patterns of behaviour 
were feverish and erratic, their wishes perverted, and they were inclined to acts of 
reprehensible criminality. Although often stated less stridently, these assumptions 
formed the bedrock of a widespread conception of revolution and civil strife which 
represented it as an aberration or "mutation ".57 Superficially, this literature has been 
divided by the relative emphasis accorded to either human agency or structural crisis.58 
There are however, strong continuities between these approaches in the assumptions 
they make about the nature of revolution and its causes.59 
Post -war social -scientific literature was decisively shaped by the dual employment of 
both relative- deprivation theory and clinical or psychological concepts, the most 
important of which was frustration-aggression theory. Frustration -aggression theory 
postulated that aggressive behaviour was stimulated by frustration in the attainment of a 
5' Ibid., pg. 17 -18. It is worth noting Brinton's observation that Trotsky wrote on the events of the 
Russian Revolution and its aftermath "almost clinically" (pg. 263). Edwards also spoke of revolution as a 
disease and suggested that a "country in revolution is like a person suffering from a deadly cancer" and 
that recovery from revolution requires "recuperation" (Edwards, op.cit., pg. 149, 202). 
ss Tilly, C., "Changing Forms of Revolution ", in E.E. Rice (ed.), Revolution and Counter -Revolution, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pg. 2. 
56 Brinton, C., op.cit., pg. 16. 
57 Eisenstadt, S.N., Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of 
Civilisations, The Free Press, New York, 1978, pg. 198. Eisenstadt argues that revolutions are explicable 
as part of modem European culture and history, but even so, as forms of change modem revolutions are 
"mutations ", a radical departure from previous forms of change. 
58 Gun, T.R., "The Revolution- Social Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses ", 
Comparative Politics, 5 (3), 1973, pg. 368. As Gun sees it, the two styles of theory differ only in 
"emphasis" on either "discontent" or "dysfunction ". 
s9 Selbin, E., "Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In" in J. Foran (ed.), Theorising 
Revolutions, Routledge, London, 1997, pg. 124 -130. 
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valued end or goal.60 In common with Hobbes, this literature tended to represent 
revolutions as a `clinical' problem, an aberration from the normal condition of society. 
Three assumptions informed these approaches first, that frustration lead to aggression; 
second, that widespread personal frustration resulted in outbursts of collective violence; 
third and most importantly, widespread frustration was induced by rapid economic 
development which inflated popular expectations. For early theorists such as Rosalind 
and No Feireabend, frustration- aggression theory was accepted as a scientific truth.ó1 
The normal order of society was thus equated with a balance between expectations and 
attainments, and therefore the absence of public acts of violence and conflict (riots or 
strikes), the relative absence of acts of government coercion, and the prevalence of 
"intergroup conciliation ".62 Political instability and revolution was therefore identified 
with a shared personal frustration which was most likely to occur in the process of 
economic modernisation due to the emergence in that process of an inevitable "gap 
between expectations and achievements. "63 
The explanation advanced for this proposition was based on what they described as a 
"...commonsense assumption... that revolution begin[s] in the minds of men..." and they 
attempted to demonstrate this by tracing a line from "political turmoil" back to "social 
discontent" caused by widespread frustration due to the tensions induced by 
modernisation, 
Change, especially extensive, rapid, and abrupt change, is an unsettling 
and bewildering human experience. It is likely to create strain in the 
psyche of the individual and crisis in the social order. Old ways, familiar 
bo Dollard, J., et.al., "Psychological Principles I and II ", in J.C.Davies (ed.), When Men Revolt and Why; 
A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution, The Free Press, New York, 1971, pg. 166; and Berkowitz, 
L., "The Study of Urban Violence: Some Implications of Laboratory Studies of Frustration and 
Aggression ", The American Behavioural Scientist, 11 (4), 1968, pg. 15. See also, Moshiri, F., 
"Revolutionary Conflict Theory in an Evolutionary Perspective ", in J.A.Goldstone, T.R.Gurr, and 
F.Moshiri (eds.), Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, Westview, Boulder, 1991, pg. 12 -13. 
Sheldon Wolin argues that another reason for the search for general theories of revolution was the desire 
of American foreign policy makers and military analysts to enlist social scientists in the development of 
reliable "forecasts" and "measures" of revolutions throughout Asia and Africa, known as "Project 
Camelot ". Wolin, S.S., loc.cit., pg. 357. 
6' Feirabend, I.K., and R.L., and Nesvold, B., "The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence ", 
Comparative Politics, 5 (3), 1973, pg. 404 -405. What the Feirabends called "systemic frustration" 
referred to a collective frustration fuelled by "...perceived, rather than actual" attainment of "the goals 
that people wish to attain as well as the desired values already in their possession." (My italics). 
62 Feirabend, LK., and R.L., "Violent Consequences of Violence ", in H.Hirsch and D.C.Perry (eds.), 
Violence as Politics, Harper and Row, New York, 1973, pg. 188 -189. 
63 See Feirabend, I.K., and R.L., (1969), loc.cit., pg. 250; and Feirabend, I.K., and R.L., and Nesvold, 
B.A., "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross -National Patterns ", in H.D.Graham and T.R.Gurr 
(eds.), The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, Frederick A. 
Praeger, New York, 1969, pg. 664. 
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environments, deep- seated habits, and social roles become obsolescent, 
while a new way of life... are not yet clearly established. ... [such change] 
moves people physically into new environments, exposes their minds to 
new ideas, and casts them in new and unfamiliar roles [and] is very likely 
to create collective bewilderment. This bewilderment may find 
expression in turmoil and social violence." 
As Rod Aya points out, this was not so much an argument as an inference drawn from 
the correlations they observed between the data on modernisation and revolutionary 
events.66 Despite their attempt at empirical rigour, the Feirabends' conclusions were 
astonishingly unsupported, buttressed by a set of assumptions which made it all but 
impossible to see revolution as anything other than personal and social pathology, an 
aberration explicable solely in terms of psycho -social strain induced by the failure to 
attain one's expectations, which as J.C. Davies observed was an elaboration of 
Tocquville's `liberal' interpretation of revolution.ó6 According to Davies, revolutions 
were produced when improving economic conditions caused personal expectations to 
rise, but when such expectations continued to rise after an economic decline 
expectations would exceed the capacity to fulfil them. As the gap between rising 
expectations and lowering fulfilments and satisfaction widened, frustration mounted to 
an intolerable level causing revolution.67 This model was premised upon the view that 
the stability of any given polity depended upon the "...state of mind, [or]... mood" in 
society.ó8 Davies admitted that there was no completely satisfactory way of measuring a 
society's `mood' short of obtaining data based on interviews and questionnaires, but this 
revealed yet another inference of frustration and discontent from the incidence of civil 
strife. Such inferences represent a leap of faith from a particular set of events or data to 
the individual state of mind assumed necessary for such events to take place ignoring 
the historic conditions which lead to revolutions.69 Frustration is inferred from the data, 
b4 Ibid., (1969), pg. 634. 
65 Aya, R., Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence; Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method, 
Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 1990, pg. 29. 
66 Davies, J.C., "Toward a Theory of Revolution ", in G.A.Kelly and C.W.Brown (eds.), Struggles in the 
State; Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1970, pg. 150 -151. 
Davies however, acknowledges that one can detect the elements of a relative -deprivation approach in 
Marx also. See also Janos, A.C., Politics and Paradigms; Changing Theories of Change in Social 
Science, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1986, pg, 14 -15. 
67 Davies, J.C, "The J -Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great 
Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion" in H.D. Graham and T.R. Gun (eds.), The History of Violence in 
America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, Frederick Praeger, New York, 1969, pg. 690 -691. 
68 Davies, J.C., "Toward a Theory of Revolution ", in G.A.Kelly and C.W.Brown (eds.), Struggles in the 
State; Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1970, pg. 152. 
69 See for instance, Tilly, C., "To Explain Political Processes ", American Journal of Sociology, 100 (6), 
1995, pg. 1601; Tilly, C., European Revolutions, 1492 -1992, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, pg. 36 -42; 
Zagorin, P., Rebels and Rulers, 1500 -1660: Volume I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pg. 
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and once the inference is made it is further assumed that frustration will lead to 
discontent, and discontent to public political acts of aggression.70 
III. ABNORMALITIES OF MODERNISATION 
By far the most sophisticated version of the combined frustration- aggression and 
relative- deprivation approach was Ted Gun's analysis of the motivation for engaging in 
political violence against established regimes which was based on the view that 
frustrations were "situationally determined ", that is, the degree of frustration and the 
response to it varied according to an actor's situation in time and place." An actor's 
situation would in turn shape their particular expectations, and their grievances at failing 
to reach those expectations would accordingly vary in regard to the ambition or 
circumspection of their expectations. Nonetheless, Gun's relative deprivation theory 
was premised upon the frustration- aggression hypothesis. Frustration -aggression he 
claimed, was "apparently a fundamental part of our psychobiological makeup" activated 
when "we feel thwarted in an attempt to get something we want" causing us "to get 
angry, and ...strike out at the source of frustration. "72 
According to Gun, relative deprivation consisted in a "perceived discrepancy" between 
an actor's expectations of security and property, social influence, and emotional 
fulfilment, and their perceived capability to realise those expectations.73 If individual 
expectations continued to rise beyond a society's capacity to offer sufficient satisfaction 
of those expectations, increasing numbers of individuals were likely to feel deprived." 
Characteristically, the theory offered little explanation of what constituted deprivation - 
relative or otherwise - or more precisely, what sort of deprivations would result in 
aggression against the state. What we are told is that because human beings are averse 
54 -57; Hobsbawm, E., "Revolution" in R.Porter and M.Teich (eds.), Revolution in History, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pg. 8 -10; and Taylor,S., Social Science and Revolutions, Macmillan, 
London, 1984, pg. 17. 
° Aya, R., Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method, 
Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 1990, pg. 25 -29. 
" Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, pg. 9. On Gurr's attitude to 
universal and general claims see, Gun, T.R., "Burke and the Modem Theory of Revolution: A Reply to 
Freeman ", Political Theory, 6 (3), 1978, pg. 303 -304. 
72 Gun, T.R., "Urban Disorder: Perspectives From the Comparative Study of Civil Strife ", The 
American Behavioural Scientist, 11 (4), 1968, pg. 51. 
Gun, T.R., op.cit., pg. 13 -25. 
74 Gun is quick to point out however, that the initiation of violent conflict will depend on other variables 
such as the perception of who is responsible for the deprivation, the prevalence of cultural norms 
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to relative- deprivation, individuals will exhibit a tendency to balance their expectations 
to their capabilities for satisfying such expectations. Consequently, "[s]ocietal 
conditions in which sought and attainable value positions are in approximate 
equilibrium... can be regarded as "normal "... and provide a base -line from which to 
evaluate patterns of change.s75 In what society however, has such an equilibrium been 
attained, and what would such an equilibrium look like? Gun's model requires an 
assessment of what constitutes an unsustainable level of satisfactions relative to, 
expectations which, given the multiplicity of expectations is simply impossible. 
Because the inference is made that incidents of revolutionary violence indicate 
intolerable levels of frustration, the absence of revolutionary violence must therefore 
indicate equilibrium, and the absence of revolutionary violence in any society is taken to 
mean that individual and collective expectations are adequately fulfilled. 
The chief assumption of frustration- aggression theory is that violent conflict ensues 
when individuals suffer frustration and strain induced by the perception of deprivation. 
Even if it is granted that a person feeling frustration is likely to become aggressive, is it 
certain that that aggression will necessarily be directed toward the origin of the 
frustration ?76 As Gun saw it, 
Aggressive responses tend to occur only when they are evoked by an 
external cue, that is, when the angered person sees an attackable object or 
person that he associates with the source of frustration. ...an angered 
person is not likely to strike out at any object in his environment, but 
only at the targets he thinks are responsible. ...such an attack is an 
inherently satisfying response to anger; if the attacker has done some 
harm to his frustrator, his anger is reduced, whether or not he succeeds in 
reducing the level of frustration per se.77 
According to Gun, the "frustration- aggression mechanism is... analogous to the law of 
gravity..." in that frustrated individuals have "an innate disposition to do violence to its 
source... ", and that this violence will be proportional to the intensity with which the 
frustrations are experienced.78 What these passages reveal is an assumption that those 
justifying violence, the history of violent conflict within a society, and the balance of power between the 
established authority and its opponents Ibid., pg. 13 -14. 
75 Ibid., pg. 46. 
16 This criticism has long been recognised. Peter Lupsha for instance noted several inconsistencies and 
ambiguities in the use of frustration- aggression theories and preferred instead the term `indignation' to 
`frustration'. Lupsha, P.A., "Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus 
Indignation ", Politics and Society, 2 (1), 1971, pg. 97 -98, 102 -104. 
n Gurr, T.R., op.cit., pg. 34. (My italics} 
78 Ibid., pg. 37. 
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who experience frustration will identify the source of frustration and would only attack 
that source.79 Gurr's explanation of this relied upon laboratory studies of the 
frustration- aggression mechanism according to which aggression would follow 
frustration when subjects recognised some stimulus or "cue" in their environment which 
identified "who or what" was responsible for the frustration.8° 
Gun did acknowledge however, that unlike laboratory tests in which a target for 
aggression was deliberately presented, sources of frustration in society were more 
difficult to discern. Why then, did political violence, defined as any armed `attack' 
"within a political community against the political regime" occur? Why should we 
accept that frustration should lead to deliberate acts of aggression directed at the 
government, regime or state? Gun's answer to this question was that in modern 
societies the state occupies a central position and is responsible for maintaining order. 
This position however, is a precarious one because it entails that, 
...ultimate responsibility for remedying economic deprivation, for 
resolving conflicts arising from competing goals and ideational systems, 
and for maintaining and reinforcing the dominant ideational system of a 
society and its supportive political myths rests with the political regime. 81 
Consequently, modern states take a broader responsibility for social wellbeing and in 
conditions in which the source of frustration may be difficult to identify, the state is held 
responsible.B2 The state is in effect caught by the need to remedy both objective and 
perceived deprivation, and a state which can accomplish neither is likely to face 
revolution. Exactly how a state is supposed to accomplish this two -fold alleviation is 
unexplained, for as Hobsbawm argues Gun does not specify the actual causes of 
discontent and his theory is insensitive to the varying reactions to causes of discontent 
across cultures and time.83 What is also not explained is a method for determining when 
unfulfilled expectations will ignite aggression.84 In other words, the unsustainable 
79 Brush, S.G., "Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and 
Collective Violence ", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40 (4), 1996, pg. 529, 535 -536. 
8° Gurr, T.R., op.cit., pg. 179. 
a Ibid., pg. 148. 
82 Ibid., pg. 180. 
" Hobsbawm, E., loc.cit., pg. 15; Rule, J.B., Theories of Civil Violence, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1988, pg. 255 -264; and Tilly, C., (1995), loc.cit., pg. 1596 -1601. 
84 In a subsequent paper, Gun and Goldstone argue that "state crises" which "weakens state authorities' 
grip on power" are essential in the development of revolutions. Such crises result in the erosion of the 
legitimacy of a regime or state and hence, its loss of mass support. This formula however, is no more 
able to resolve the problem of when revolutions occur and why, for the authors admit that because 
standards of legitimacy differ across cultures and through time, they can provide no account of "...which 
actions or failures by authorities will lead to crisis." Whether one talks of deprivation or legitimacy the 
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personal strain (frustration) which is supposed to spark aggression (and political 
violence) is inferred from incidents of political violence.85 This inference is based on 
the assumption that violence must be produced by aggression, and that aggression itself 
is produced by fustration.86 
Psycho -social theories rest on the contention that it is human volition, and hence the 
motivations of individual "...men and women... who `make' revolutions ", and yet even 
in structural theories of revolution this assumption remained crucial.B7 Smelser's Theory 
of Collective Behaviour for instance, although not primarily concerned with revolution, 
was chiefly designed to explain what he called "collective behaviour ", that is "episodes" 
of behaviour which attempt to redefine the elements of social action.88 Outbursts of 
collective behaviour such as revolutions, riots and mass hysteria, indicated significant 
"structural strain ", and broke out when significant groups in society "perceive[d]" that 
they did not have access to the means to alleviate their discontent causing a widespread 
perception of deprivation "relative to expectations.i89 Smelser's approach indicated that 
revolutions were an aberration, a deviation from the normal condition of society which 
he traced significantly to the perception of relative deprivation. This analysis shares 
much in common with Chalmers Johnson's definition of revolution as rapid change of 
the structure and nature of political authority within a society by the use of violence 
designed to cause mass `disorientation' by disrupting "the development of stable 
expectations... ".90 The supreme end of any social system Johnson argues, is self - 
preservation and this requires the avoidance of `disequilibrium' which is caused by 
"sudden, intense, or unprecedented" changes which overwhelm the "routine institutional 
procedures and arrangements of a system for self -maintenance. "91 Disequilibrium 
therefore denotes a severe structural crisis in the state's ability to manage and control 
problem is the same, a general theory of revolution cannot sensibly account for what constitutes either of 
them, and thereby, under what conditions the theory is supposed to apply. Gurr, T.R. and Goldstone, 
J.A., "Comparisons and Policy Implications" in J.A.Goldstone et.al. (eds.), op.cit., pg. 325 and 331. 
85 Taylor, S., op.cit., pg. 84. Taylor argues that this problem of `inference' is inherent within all 
psycho -social theories. A similar claim is made by Rod Aya (see above). 
86 Wickham- Crowley, T.P., "Structural Theories of Revolution ", in J. Foran (ed.), Theorising 
Revolutions, Routledge, London, 1997, pg. 48 [38 -72]. 
87 Hagopian, M., op.cit., pg. 168. 
88 Smelser, N.J., Theory of Collective Behaviour, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, pg. 23. The 
elements of social action consisted in the norms and values which regulated social action, and the roles 
and means which structured social action. Collective behaviour was opposed to "conventional 
behaviour" which did not attempt to redefine the elements of social action. 
89 Ibid., pg. 325, 340. 
90 Johnson, C., Revolutionary Change [1966], second edition, Longman, London, 1983, pg. 7, 8 -9. 
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internal or external threats and the "single, most generalised characteristic of the 
disequilibrated system is that values no longer provide an acceptable explanation of 
existence. "92 As a consequence, previously accepted definitions of proscribed behaviour 
- criminality and deviance - are thrown into doubt, and this doubt causes widespread 
"personal tension" and an increasing tendency for individuals to test the boundaries of 
officially proscribed behaviour.93 
The key assumption here is that where value consensus prevails, the definition of 
normal behaviour is not questioned and those who do engage in abnormal behaviour are 
few and easily controlled. In conditions of disequilibrium or social "dysfunction" 
however, 
...it becomes increasingly difficult... to differentiate between behaviour 
that represents a dysfunction- inspired protest and behaviour that 
represents the now disguised deviancy of a formerly eccentric 
personality... [who will be] controlled as deviants after equilibrium is 
restored...94 
The revolutionary potential of deviant behaviour is that a range of groups with different 
particular concerns and protests will join together "...with each other and with deviants 
generally to form a deviant subcultural group or movement.i95 Echoing the admonitions 
of Burke, Carlyle, and Dickens, Johnson describes the members of such movements as 
"outcasts, fools, and experts" who could be ambitious politicians, frustrated taxpayers, 
religious fanatics, and others from the "anarchic left".96 When the value structure of 
society is called into question and deviant behaviour is on the rise, confidence in the 
state is eroded and this condition is described as a "power deflation" which is 
precipitated by "imperfect socialisation" in the value structure of society, "role strain" 
or failed integration of individuals into society causing mental illness, and "normative 
discord" between competing values 97 The structural problem of power deflation is 
brought about by the tendency toward deviance, and the seriousness of a power 
deflation depends upon the ability of the state to maintain non -deviant support. "The 
crucial question..." Johnson tells us "is whether or not nondeviant actors - persons 
91 Ibid., pg. 73. 
9z Ibid., pg. 75. 
93 Ibid., pg. 77-78. 
ea Ibid., pg. 78. 
9s Ibid., pg. 84. 
9a Ibid. 
97 Ibid., pg. 31-34, 93. 
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managing their disequilibrium- induced tensions in some private manner - continue to 
believe in the willingness and competence of the elite to resynchronise the system.s98 
The assumption here is that non -revolutionary conditions exhibit a stable, and normally 
invariant balance. This conception of order, or of "social inertia" as Barrington Moore 
once called it, is accompanied by the assumption that "social continuity requires no 
explanation. ... Change is what requires explanation. "99 The social -scientific literature 
on revolution can be interpreted as Sheldon Wolin has remarked (borrowing the phrase 
from Comte) as a "science of order" in which revolution and political violence in 
general are considered pathological abnormalities.100 Notions of disequilibrium, 
deviance, personal strain, frustration and aggression draw attention to the abnormality of 
revolution and civil disturbance. It also implies that those who engage in such activity 
act under the influence of sub -rational impulses such as involuntary symptoms of 
disease, repressed animal instincts, deviant tendencies, or merely the urge to break 
criminal laws. The very idea of an equilibrated system is as Stan Taylor has put it "the 
stuff of Utopian ideologies ".101 For theorists such as Johnson and Gurr however, 
equilibrium is associated with the capacity of a society to survive, but just as clearly as 
Zagorin noted, the survival of societies often entails "imperfect integration, numerous 
dysfunctions, and frequent failures in elite and governmental performance.s102 A society 
in equilibrium is one in which revolutionary violence does not occur, and it does not 
occur because the system is in equilibrium. Equilibrium is upset when significant 
personal strain brought on by the perception of relative- deprivation leads to the outbreak 
of conflict and therefore, liberal theorists have tended to agree that those societies in 
which revolutions are most likely to occur are those which are under strain due to the 
process but not the goal of modernisation, the development of liberal market economies 
with democratic states. 
Modernisation theory is based on the assumption that stable liberal- democratic states are 
both peaceful and "effective ", rather than "debile ", that is, prone to civil unrest and 
instability. Effective political systems are those characterised by the presence of the 
98 Ibid., pg. 95. 
99 Moore, B., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966, pg. 485 -486. 
ioo Wolin, S.S., loc.cit., pg. 349 -352. 
101 Taylor, S., op.cit., pg. 17. 
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basic features of Western liberal- democratic civilisation namely, efficient, professional 
bureaucracies, organised political parties, high rates of public participation, civilian 
control of the military, mixed economies, and most important of all, the effective 
control of conflict.103 Modernisation is the historic process of transition from 
"traditional" to modern, effective systems, and while traditional and modern societies 
are each capable of stability, the debility of political systems is caused by rapid 
transition from traditional to modern societies.104 The problem is that rapid economic 
modernisation causes increasing mobilisation of the population, the creation of new 
classes, increasing literacy, and rising urbanisation which cannot be adequately 
controlled or accommodated by new and unstable political institutions resulting in 
turmoil.105 The main problem then, is not modernisation itself but "the lag in the 
development of political institutions behind social and economic change ".106 The 
transition to modern societies raises popular expectations which are unmatched by 
institutional development and the emergence of a value consensus.107 Huntington is 
clear however, that the primary responsibility for the development of such a consensus 
lies in the ability of the state to govern effectively, and the significant distinction 
between polities lies not in the type but the "degree of government ".108 Debile political 
systems are those in which instability is endemic and the state is incapable of 
accommodating the demands of newly mobilised social groups.109 
Revolutions are caused by the strains induced by mobilisation and are thereby 
associated with `decay', `instability' and `disorder'. Importantly, the process of 
modernisation is essential for societies to achieve the status of `effective', stable 
systems, "...modernity breeds stability, but modernisation breeds instability.... It is not 
the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political 
102 Zagorin, P., op.cit., pg. 50. 
103 Huntington, S.P., Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, 
pg. 1. 
104 Taylor, S., op.cit., pg. 116. 
os Huntington, S.P., "The Change to Change; Modernisation, Development, and Politics ", Comparative 
Politics, 3 (3), 1971, pg. 314 -315. 
106 Huntington, S., op.cit., pg. 5. 
107 Ibid., pg. 10 -24. 
Ios Ibid., pg. 1. 
Io9 Goldstone, J.A., "Populations Growth and Revolutionary Crises ", in J. Foran (ed.), Theorising 
Revolutions, Routledge, London, 1997, pg. 116 -117. Here Goldstone attributes `revolutionary crises" to 
rapid and unsustainable population growth leading to mass mobilisations caused by the problems of 
"uneven" economic development. 
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disorder.s10 The process of modernisation is associated not only with economic and 
political but cognitive development also, 
The contrast between modern man and traditional man is the source of 
the contrast between modern society and traditional society. Traditional 
man is passive and acquiescent; he expects continuity... Modern man, in 
contrast, believes in both the possibility and desirability of change, and 
has confidence in the ability of man to control change..." 
The process of modernisation however, subjects individuals to manifold sources of 
strain which "break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and 
promote new levels of aspirations and wants" which cannot readily be met by "a 
transitional society" creating "a gap... between aspiration and expectation, want 
formation and want satisfaction... ".12 For Huntington, civil unrest and revolution is not 
merely a sign of social pathology but of a problem caused by transition to modern, 
liberal systems. 
Modernisation theory provides a historical narrative of western civilisation by 
interpreting the phenomenon of revolution as a problem experienced in the process of 
transition to modern, western societies, states, and economies. The development of a 
global market economy in which each individual society functions as both a market and 
a site of production has played an important role in the development of a liberal theory 
of civilisation, the aim of which is the creation of internally and externally pacified 
societies. "3 The assumption underlying this theory of civilisation - of which 
modernisation theory is one expression - is that Western values, Western institutions, 
and the Western experience provides the template whose impression will be stamped 
upon the face of all non -Western societies. The violence of revolution is separated from 
any inherent association with the goals of modernisation by attributing it to the 
problems caused in the process of attaining them. 
10 Huntington, S.P., op.cit., pg. 41, and 264 -266. 
"' Huntington, S.P., loc.cit., pg. 287. 
12 Huntington, S.P., op.cit., pg. 53 -54. Other structural theorists borrow from psycho -social theory, 
which merely underlines Gurr's contention that these are two styles of theory which differ in degree and 
not in kind. See for example, Oberschall, A., Social Conflict and Social Movements, Prentice -Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, 1973, pg. 83. 
"' As John Gray suggests however, globalisation has also resulted in the weakening of state 
sovereignty, "the globalisation of organised crime and an unregulated world market in the technologies of 
war." Gray, J., "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present ", International 
Affairs, 74 (1), 1998, pg. 155. 
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CONCLUSION 
Samuel Huntington has recently argued that the predominance of liberal civilisation is 
now in question, and in his Clash of Civilisations he conveys a sense of growing anxiety 
over its future.14 Instead of issuing in an era of global peace and prosperity on the 
Western model, modernisation has created powerful non -Western states aligned in non- 
western "civilisational blocs" which threaten the cultural hegemony of the west.15 
While the rise of non -western powers is described as "potentially threatening" to 
Western civilisation, more problematic still is the "gradual and irregular decline of the 
West" itself, resulting in a general decay of the values and structures upon which 
Western civil societies are based, the family, voluntary associations, a work ethic, 
intellectual advancement, and most important of all the elimination of "antisocial 
behaviour, such as crime, drug use, and violence ".16 "The central issue for the West" 
Huntington contends, is whether Western countries and especially the United States can 
reaffirm and revive the values of Western civilisation, best expressed in the "American 
Creed" of "liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, 
[and] private property. "17 The "concentrated and sustained onslaught" on these values 
in the United States is being lead by "a small but influential number of intellectuals and 
publicists" who seek to encourage "multiculturalism" and thereby the collapse of the 
hegemony of Western values. "8 
The Clash of Civilisations strips bare the assumption behind modernisation theory that 
Western civilisation - the goal of modernisation - is defined in terms of the values and 
goals of liberalism. It is a civilisation which promises individual and social productivity 
through the elimination of violence and pursuit of mutual felicity based on the mutual 
acceptance of individual rights. This discourse of civilisation represents particular 
forms of violence as problems requiring solution, and as the discussion of analyses of 
revolution indicate, the solution requires the management and control of the conduct of 
`the masses'. What stands out in the liberal literature on revolution is the generalised 
fear of the irrationality, deviance, and violence of large collectives. Much of this 
literature has therefore concerned itself with the development of complex theories 
114 Huntinton, S.P., The Clash of Civilisation and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, 
New York, 1996. 
"5 Ibid., pg. 125. 
16 Ibid., pg. 302, 304. 
117 Ibid., pg. 303, 305. 
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designed to predict when and why revolutions will occur, and by implication how they 
may be avoided. Such fears reflect the concern inherent in liberalism that the creation 
and maintenance of civil societies, market economies and democratic states requires the 
`exclusion' of violence. This `exclusion' involves the management of populations and 
their conduct, the prevention of disorder and unruly, irrational violence. The remaining 
chapters of this thesis will be devoted to discussion of the emergence of this discourse 
of civilisation, in which individual and social pacification was to be achieved through 
the government of opinion, that is, the careful management of individual (and 
collective) conscience and conduct. The following chapter will begin this discussion by 
examining two influential early -modern conceptions of civil society and the role within 
them of the government of opinion. 
"B Ibid., pg. 305-307. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PILLARS OF CIVILITY: 
PROTECTION PROPERTY, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF OPINION 
It is much more expedient to lead men by means which imperceptibly win their wills 
than, as is more the practice, by those which coerce them. 
-Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Richelieu, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu 116881, 
translated by H.B. Hill, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1965, pg. 72. 
For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of 
Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their peace, and 
Concord. 
- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], edited by C. B. MacPherson, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, 
pg. 233. 
The core of rebellion... are the Universities; which nevertheless are not to be cast away, 
but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there taught be made to be (as 
true politics should be) such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all 
laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of the King be enacted... to make men 
understand, that the civil laws are God's laws... that the people and the Church are one 
thing, and have but one head, the King; and that no man has title to govern under him, 
that has it not from him and in the mean time a resolution to obey the King's laws... to 
live soberly and free from scandal; without mingling our religion with points of natural 
philosophy, as freedom of will, incorporeal substance, everlasting nows, ubiquities, 
hypostases, which the people understand not, nor will ever care for. 
- Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament 116821, edited by F. Tonnies, Frank Cass, 
London, 2nd Edition, 1969, pg. 58. 
When Stefano Guazzo asked "[w]hat meane you by that woord Civile?" in his Civil 
Conversation of 1574, he highlighted an increased interest in the term and its 
connotations in Renaissance thought.' Guazzo's answer was that civility was a matter 
of disciplining the mind, or as Johann Althusen put it in his Two Books of Civil 
Conversation in 1611, "[c]ivil conversation may be defined as the art of applying 
appropriate behaviour, or as the art of making behaviour conform to propriety and right 
reasons' Althusen's use of the word `propriety' may here have had a double meaning. 
While `propriety' referred to what was considered proper or acceptable conduct, it was 
also used interchangeably with the word property. The pairing of civil conduct and 
property was intimately related to the historical shifts taking place in Europe during the 
Renaissance, and the emerging discourse of civility embodied these in its emphasis on 
the need for well -ordered urban life conducive to commerce and trade, incorporating 
laws to which all citizens were subjected, an unambiguous mode of expression and 
address and most importantly, an absolute need for the careful management of human 
conduct.' These requirements may be referred to as the `pillars of civility' for, the 
maintenance of a civil society free from the taint of violence was held to depend upon 
the provision of protection of life and property and this was to be secured, as both 
Guazzo and Althussen averred, by the government of opinion. 
The previous four chapters have examined some of the chief assumptions behind liberal 
discussions of violence. It has been argued in these chapters that liberal approaches to 
violence are informed by an image of a pacified civil society from which violence has 
been excluded by a series of enforced boundaries. This is an image of a fragile society, 
a protected realm of freedoms and privileges constantly under threat from within and 
without. This threat appears in the form of violence, the willful, irrational desire to 
harm or destroy others. In the previous chapter it was suggested that the preservation of 
civil society against corrosive violence required management of the conduct of the 
masses. The problem of violence in liberal discourse is intimately related to the 
problem of how to manage the conduct of the populace. This was the problem with 
' Quoted in Hale, J., The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance, Harper Collins, London, 1993, pg. 
366. There has also been a recent revival of interest in the term, see for example, Carter, S.L., Civility: 
Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy, Basic Books, New York, 1998; and Margalit, A., The 
Decent Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1996. 
2 Hale, J., op.cit., pg. 366. 
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which the discourse of civilisation was concerned, the elimination of violence from the 
realm of civil society by governing the conduct of the population and this required the 
development of a discourse of civility, not simply concerned with the softening of habits 
and customs, but chiefly with the problem of how best to govern the inhabitants of civil 
society. This chapter will examine the attempts made by Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke in particular to confront this problem and the rather different answers they 
proposed. It will be argued that the conceptions of civil society both developed were 
premised on the identification of what and whose conduct presented most danger to the 
security of civil society and how this danger was to be averted. In doing so, this chapter 
will lay the foundations for subsequent investigation of the problem of conduct and its 
government in the development of liberal thought. 
Liberal thought was shaped by the emergence of a discourse of civility in the urbanising 
centres of Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emphasising the 
need for cultivating a range of virtues and practices associated with urban life, and 
especially the growing merchant and commercial classes.' Commerce and trade were 
increasingly seen as essential foundations for a virtuous life of careful judgement, 
probity, thrift and self -discipline.' They were also seen as essential foundations for a 
secure and stable state and society, and it was in the emergence of the discourse of 
civility that we can detect the shift toward what Foucault has called a modern `art of 
government'. Replacing older notions of personal sovereignty within a princely 
territory, a modern art of government locates the strength of the state in the health and 
well -being of the population. Government therefore has come to be seen as an activity 
of structuring social and economic arrangements in order that these ends could be 
achieved. Such activity was not merely the province of the executive of the state, but of 
every citizen governing themselves, their families, households or dependents in a 
prescribed manner. The discourse of civility therefore aimed to avert violence, in part 
by taming the aristocracy whose warrior ethos was viewed wasteful, extravagant, and 
above all a dangerous anachronism.' In doing so, treatises on education and manners 
marked the emergence of a discourse aimed at the creation of a social order based on the 
3 Ibid., pg. 362. 
Ibid., pg. 364 -365. 
5 Becker, M. B., Civility and Society in Western Europe, 1300 -1600, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1988, pg. 12 -21. 
6 Ibid., pg. 28. 
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self -management of conduct and the re- evaluation of the medieval language of nobility 
with its concomitant image of an immutable social structure. In the absence of older 
notions of a divinely sanctioned social order, the discourse of civility also aimed to 
inculcate good manners and productive habits in the lower orders of society through 
education and discipline. This discipline was not solely envisaged as a bulwark to the 
excesses of the aristocracy, but to the `rude' and `vulgar' behaviour of the labouring 
masses.' Civility was thus a quality one learned, a certain style of comportment, dress, 
and speech which was opposed to the rudeness of the uncultivated and unlearned. By 
the seventeenth -century, this opposition had been entrenched within what John Hale has 
called the "...`us' and `them' strand in European self -awareness. "' In other words, it 
was not simply a matter of couth as opposed to uncouth conduct, but of civilised 
behaviour opposed to barbarism. The discourse of civility thus represented civil society 
as a fragile construct. Civility had to be drummed into the human mind to stifle 
rowdiness and violence, but even when this could be achieved, civil society was still 
threatened by unrestrained barbarity outside its borders. 
Within the discourse of civility then, there was a dual division between both civil and 
uncivil conduct within society, and between civilised and uncivilised societies. This 
duality became an integral feature of liberal thought in which the prospect of a world 
without civil conduct threatened social order from within and without. Civility was held 
to depend therefore upon the defence of a delicate boundary between the civil realm and 
the realm of violence and barbarism, a boundary constantly under threat. The defence 
of that boundary required constant vigilance against threats from both within and 
without the realm of civility. On one level, the boundary could be seen in terms of the 
geographic boundaries and borders of the state, but there was also a deeper awareness of 
the threat to the boundary separating civil from uncivil conduct. As a consequence, 
there was an imperative to specify how conduct was to be managed and more 
importantly, to identify whose conduct was most in need of government and what sort of 
government it required. The identification of human conduct, modes of behaviour and 
interaction with others as an object of vigilance entailed that the boundary separating the 
civil from the uncivil permeated the self and its conduct in addition to defining the 
territorial state and its imperatives. 
Ibid., pg. 115. 
a Hale, J., op.cit., pg. 360. 
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In this chapter it will be argued that the discourse of civility in the work of both Hobbes 
and Locke represented civil society as an object of government and discipline. It was 
not merely the terrain in which government and discipline operated, but was in effect an 
artefact of government and discipline. The most important function of government 
within civil society was to obtain control of the opinions and thereby the conduct of the 
inhabitants of civil society, and this chapter will examine two rather different accounts 
of civil society and the solution to the problem of government within civil society. The 
chapter will begin with discussion of a `supervisory model' of civil society in the work 
of Thomas Hobbes. It will be argued that Hobbes' conception of civil society placed a 
premium on private property secured by the authorisation of conduct through the 
supervision of opinion by the sovereign. This account of civil society will be contrasted 
to John Locke's `self -governing model' of civil society in the second section. Locke's 
conception of civil society can be distinguished from Hobbes insofar as Locke sought a 
more comprehensive means of protecting property through less intrusive methods of 
managing conduct. In the third section it will be argued that the apparent difference 
between Hobbes' and Locke's accounts masked their shared concern to find a suitable 
form of governing the conduct of populations, of civilising not only those within but 
more importantly the property-less masses outside civil society. 
I PROTECTION AND CIVILITY: THOMAS HOBBES 
Thomas Hobbes' (1588 -1679) political thought has come to be most closely associated 
with the imperative of protection, animated by what he believed was the natural equality 
between individual human beings. This equality meant that no person could be assured 
of such physical strength or superior intelligence that they could avoid being undone by 
another's cunning or by their "confederacy with others ".9 Such views were shared by 
other political theorists who lived in an age ravaged by war and who feared that the state 
of nature beckoned wherever the armies of the day set foot. Samuel Pufendorf (1632- 
1694) for instance, argued that the chief characteristic of human beings in the state of 
nature was their vulnerability, and mirroring Hobbes conclusions, argued that the 
natural weakness of human beings would incline them to use any and all means to 
preserve themselves against others leading inevitably to "a lively and all but perpetual 
9 Hobbes, T., Leviathan [1651], C.B.Macpherson (ed.), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pg. 183. 
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play of suspicion, distrust, eagerness to subvert the strength of others, and desire to get 
ahead of them or to augment one's own strength by their ruin.s10 In the state of nature 
then, where no effective common authority existed to curb the actions of individuals, the 
only certainty was the uncertainty of one's own security and tenure of property. While 
natural laws suggested that human beings should act to preserve themselves, Benedict 
Spinoza (1634 -1677) pointed out that they did not of themselves "...forbid strife, nor 
hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested by desire. "l' Even 
John Locke (1632- 1704), whose conception of life in the state of nature was generally 
more benign than either of these thinkers believed possible, thought physical insecurity 
endemic in that condition where nothing existed to "...restrain the partiality and 
Violence of Men. "12 The solution each of these thinkers proposed to these sorts of 
problems was civil association. 
Mere association by itself did not guarantee escape from the terrors of the state of 
nature. As Hobbes argued, groups would always find themselves outnumbered and 
invaded by bigger groups, and unless they were directed by one will, multitudes would 
be prone to internal disagreement, disorganisation and conflict." Indeed although 
Pufendorf argued that human sociality would incline those in a state of nature to some 
form of association, they would be unable to alleviate the inconveniences of the natural 
condition." The form of association Hobbes and his contemporaries had in mind was a 
civil association in the sense that it conferred upon citizens various benefits denied them 
in the state of nature. Foremost among these benefits of civil association was the 
security of life and property and the ability to pursue wealth and material gain. For 
Hobbes, the term `civil' denoted a structure of government of the community as in his 
reference to " Civill Government" as that arrangement established when individuals have 
contracted to live in a commonwealth.15 This condition was reached when a collection 
of citizens placed themselves under the authority and laws of a sovereign, and Hobbes 
10 Pufendorf, S., On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law [1673], edited by J. Tully, 
translated by M.Silverthorne, Cambridge Uni Press, Cambridge, 1991, pg Ibid., pg. 115, 119. 
11 Spinoza, B., A Theologico- Political Treatise [1670], translated by R.H.M. Elwes, Dover publications, 
New York, 1951, pg. 200, 202. 
12 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government [ 1690], edited by P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1960, pg. 276. 
13 Hobbes, T., op.cit., pg. 224 -225. 
14 Hont, I., "The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical 
Foundations of the `Four -Stages' Theory", in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in 
Early -Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pg. 263 -264. 
15 Hobbes, T., op.cit., pg. 225. 
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described this as "a COMMON - WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.s16 But `civil' also 
denoted more than just government, for Hobbes also spoke of "Civili Laws" as those 
regulations to which all citizens of a state were to be subjected.' Such laws Hobbes 
argued were the chief mechanism by which individual citizens may be controlled, and 
the benefits of civil association secured. Laws were for Hobbes the ties which bound 
the pillars of civility, and in order to understand their role it is necessary to turn to one 
of the chief motivations for entering civil association namely, the protection of life and 
property. 
That material gain was a primary motivation for civil association was made plain in 
Chapter 11 of Leviathan where Hobbes wrote, "Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, 
disposeth men to obey a common Power... Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, 
enclineth men to obey a common Power: for such Desire, containeth a desire of 
leasure...s18 Elsewhere he listed the fear of death alongside "Desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them" as the 
chief motivations individuals have for quitting the state of nature.19 Here Hobbes 
considered ease, physical gratification, knowledge, and leisure as some of the chief 
benefits of civil association, but the other benefit also listed - `the arts of peace' - is less 
obviously defined. He gave some indication of what he meant by this in his infamous 
description in Chapter 13 of the state of nature. In such a state he argued, 
...there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of 
commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no 
Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force, 
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts, no 
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short.2° 
16 Ibid., pg. 227. 
]' Ibid., pg. 311. Sir John Davies described the conquest of Ireland as a process whereby the Irish may 
be "subdued and reduced to Civility" indicating that civility could just as easily mean conformity to 
English laws. Subsequently, he he suggested that such conquest would `reduce" the Irish to "Peace, 
Plenty, and Civility, which are the effect of Laws and good Government... ". Interestingly, he argued that 
English law was more civilised that Irish or Brehon law in that while Brehon law punished murder, 
manslaughter and robbery with fines, English law punished them with death! Sir John Davies, Historical 
Relations: Or a Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued nor Brought 
Under Obedience to the Crown of England [1664], second edition, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 
1983, pg. 3, 108, 150. 
s Hobbes, T., op.cit., pg. 161 -162. 
19 Ibid., pg. 188. 
20 Ibid., pg. 186. 
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While Hobbes appeared to be emphasising the incompatibility of violence with the 
pursuit of material gain, the incompatibility in fact extended beyond that one activity to 
include a complex of activities and institutions bound up together including the 
ownership of property, and an order based on the rule of law incorporating the 
predictability and transparency of contract. 
Hobbes referred to the sovereign state as an institution which aimed to secure "...private 
men in the exercise of... [their] Trades, and Callings" through the agency of law.21 
Hobbes was clear that in the state of nature no laws applied and this exacerbated 
violence, "[w]here there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no 
Injustice... It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no 
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can 
get... "22 Consequently, in a state of nature unlike the civil condition, individuals lacked 
any protection of themselves or their property save that which they could provide 
themselves. Violence was thus the inevitable recourse of individuals who sought to 
control "other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell" or of those who wished to 
defend them, or of those who responded to any "trifles... [or] signe of undervalue ".23 
Hobbes reiterated this theme when he spoke of the `dissolution' of commonwealths in 
which "there is no farther protection of Subjects... and every man [is] at liberty to 
protect himselfe" and his goods by any means available and "when he hath it, is 
obliged... to protect his Protection as long as he is able.i20. 
The chief benefit of protection within a sovereign commonwealth was that a system of 
laws which all obeyed secured individuals in the ownership of property, and thereby 
prevented the outbreak of violence. It was in this sense that Hobbes wrote of the liberty 
of subjects who had such protection as consisting in those things on which the laws 
were silent and which the sovereign permitted, of which he made special mention of 
"the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another... ".25 Amid the 
insecurity of the state of nature by contrast, property and goods were vulnerable and 
there could be "no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the father; no 
21 Ibid., pg. 386. 
22 Ibid., pg. 188. 
23 Ibid., pg. 185. 
24 Ibid., pg. 375-376. 
25 Ibid., pg. 264. 
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propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every 
Particular man".26 In his Dialogue on the Common Laws of England Hobbes made the 
further claim that laws of private property ensured peace through protection, and that 
without such laws, 
...every thing is in such sort every Mans, as he may take, possess and 
enjoy without wrong to any Man.. Seeing then without Humane Law all 
things would be Common, and this Community a cause of Incroachment, 
Envy, Slaughter, and continual War of one upon another... [reason] 
Dictates to Mankind (for their own preservation) a distribution of Lands, 
and Goods, that each Man may know what is proper to him, so as none 
other might pretend a right thereunto, or disturb him in the use of the 
same.27 
A system of laws allowed security of possession by establishing distinctions to be made 
between what belonged to one person and what to another. Such a system of laws 
however, had also to enforce "contracts ", which Hobbes described as the means by 
which these distinctions were negotiated to allow for the transferral, exchange, or trade 
of property. 28 
Contracts were the bargains by which individuals agreed to an immediate exchange of 
their rights to something, while covenants referred to agreements in which individuals 
committed themselves to the future performance of some action upon which firm 
expectations were based. Covenants and contracts lay at the heart of Hobbes' 
conception of civil society, embodying regularity, predictability and transparency of 
interaction, the foundation for a pattern of predictable behaviour and reasonable 
expectations of how parties to contracts were to act.29 The validity of contracts Hobbes 
argued, consisted in the fact that contracting parties understood one another through the 
use of clear and unambiguous language.30 But the guarantee that contracts would be 
honoured however, depended on the institution of a sovereign power with the power to 
compel by threat of punishment for non -observance. Without such compulsion, Hobbes 
thought it reasonable to assume that no contracts would be kept "[f]or he that 
performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of 
26 Ibid., pg. 266. 
27 Hobbes, T., A Dialogue on the Common Laws of England [1681], edited by J. Cropsey, Uni of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971, pg. 58. 
25 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 192 -193. 
29 Bobbio, N., Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, translated by D. Gobetti, The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pg. 46 -60. 
° Peters, R., Hobbes, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1956, pg. 17, 115 -119. 
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words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions... ".31 
Because Hobbes believed that the nature of human beings was such that "[c]ovenants, 
without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all ", he argued 
that enforcement of them was a chief end of the civil condition.32 The principal aim of 
enforcing contracts was to secure private ownership by guaranteeing the method by 
which that property may be transferred. Contracts therefore "make good that Propriety, 
which by mutuall Contract men acquire... and such power there is none before the 
erection of a Commonwealth.s33 Hobbes therefore provided a picture of civil society in 
which private property was paramount. But security of ownership also required 
provision for the exchange of goods, and this provision was a crucial element in the 
constitution of civil life, 
Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own. And therefore 
where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no injustice; and 
where there is no coercive Power erected, that is, where there is no 
Common- wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all 
things... So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid 
Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the 
Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: 
And then it is also that Propriety begins.34 
For Hobbes then, civil association involved a system of laws effectively enforced, a 
social order based on the reliability of contract and covenant, and protection of private 
property, freedom of exchange and trade, all of which were to be guaranteed by an 
unchallenged sovereign?' 
This image of civil society was premised on the provision of protection from the 
violence and poverty of the natural state. The contrast between the realm of nature and 
the civil realm of protection was the central feature of the seventeenth -century discourse 
of civility. As Hobbes' near contemporary Samuel Pufendorf put it, 
...in the state of nature each is protected only by his own strength; in the 
state by the strength of all. There no one may be sure of the fruit of his 
industry; here all may be. There is the reign of the passions, there there 
is war, fear, poverty, nastiness, solitude, barbarity, ignorance, savagery; 
31 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 196. 
2 Ibid., pg. 223. 
" Ibid., pg. 202. 
sa Ibid., pg. 202 -203. 
35 Baumgold, D., Hobbes 's Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 106- 
108. 
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here is the reign of reason, here there is peace, security, wealth, 
splendour, society, taste, knowledge, benevolence.36 
According to Pufendorf "[n]o animal is fiercer than man, none more savage and prone to 
more vices disruptive of the peace of society. For... man is driven by many vices... 
[and] has such a furious pleasure in savaging his own kind... ".37 In order to gain 
protection from the constant and unrestrained rivalry and violence of others in the 
natural state, human beings had to seek a civil association of which the most important 
feature was its provision of a body of laws. It was only by means of the law that 
individuals were enabled to own property by making distinctions between "...what each 
must regard as his own and what as anther's... ".38 As the ownership of property was 
considered to be necessary to self -preservation and thus guaranteed by natural law, its 
defence by violence in the state of nature was considered legitimate.39 "Since civil life 
is too fragile..." to allow private justice or "violent self -help" Pufendorf argued that 
"...civil laws come to the aid of natural law... [and] enable a man to exact his due in civil 
courts with the help of a magistrate.40 Laws therefore provided for the existence of 
society by diverting violent conflict over property and securing the fulfilment of 
contracts. 
For both Hobbes and Pufendorf the institution of private property was not only a 
corollary of the natural law of self -preservation, it was a means of dividing goods in 
order to avoid continual conflicts over claims of joint ownership. " It followed then, that 
because any one person could not completely provide for their own needs, agreements 
or contracts between individuals had to be regarded as sacrosanct "[f]or without this, we 
would lose most of the possible advantage of mutual exchange of services and things. "42 
This was particularly the case since the value of goods was determined Pufendorf 
suggested, by agreement between parties. Such agreements in the state of nature were 
unregulated and therefore uncertain, but within the civil state were buttressed by law 
and authority and embodied in a currency.43 In this way Pufendorf stipulated that one of 
the chief benefits of civil association was the framework of laws which protected the 
36 Pufendorf, S., op.cit., pg. 118. 
Ibid., pg. 133. 
3s Ibid., pg. 139. 
Ibid., pg. 52. 
4o Ibid., pg. 156. 
41 Ibid., pg. 84. 
42 Ibid., pg. 69. 
43 Ibid., pg. 93-96. 
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ownership of property, and facilitated the exchange of goods at an agreed value by 
means of currency. All of this implied a civil order in which agreements and contracts 
were clear and unambiguous and most importantly, rigorously enforced by means of 
laws.44 
The emphasis placed on the provision of laws guaranteeing security of contracts 
indicated that both Hobbes and Pufendorf were particularly concerned to exclude from 
their conceptions of civil society those whose conduct was unregulated. In emphasising 
the centrality of contract to civil society both writers, and especially Hobbes, implicitly 
acknowledged the need for conduct to be authorised.45 In other words, contracts 
ensured that the conduct of those within civil society would be regulated by legally 
binding arrangements and all agreements between citizens submitted to the sovereignty 
of the law. The virtue of such arrangements as both Hobbes and Pufendorf saw it, was 
that a premium would be placed on the identification of the threat posed to civil society 
by those whose conduct was unauthorised, and thus contrary to the stipulations of law. 
Hobbes drew particular attention to the various groups or "bodies" within society which 
were either lawful, such as trading corporations and families, or unlawful. Of this latter 
category of bodies which lacked "any publique Authority at all" he made special 
mention of "the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies" who united to better 
"order their trade of begging, and stealing ", and cells of provocateurs under foreign 
influence organised for "the easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, 
against the Power of the Common- wealth.i4G 
The problem with such associations Hobbes argued, was that each represented a 
`faction' or `conspiracy' insofar as their existence was unauthorised. For an association 
to obtain authorisation not only must its activities be regulated by law, but the intent of 
the association must be known to and approved by the sovereign, "[f]or all uniting of 
strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to 
" Hont, I., "The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical 
Foundations of the `Four -Stages Theory"', in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in 
Early- Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pg. 270 -276. Hont argues that 
Pufendorf developed a theory of social progress based on the development of commerce from simple 
agriculture to barter and direct exchange, culminating in the extension of market economies based on 
manufacture and foreign trade. 
45 Preston King for instance spoke of the centrality of `command' in Hobbes thought. King, P., The 
Ideology of Order, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974, pg. 186. 
46 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 285. 
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the Publique, and unjustly concealed. "" Hobbes' clear concern here was that 
unauthorised associations smacked of the private armies retained by great lords and 
magnates. For any person to employ a large number of retainers beyond the minimum 
required for "lawfull employment" Hobbes wrote, "is Faction, and unlawful!" because, 
...having the protection of the Common- wealth, he needeth not the 
defence of private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly 
civilised, several! numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, 
and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that 
they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common- wealth 48 
Here Hobbes gave voice to the concern that unauthorised conduct would give rise to 
violence. This concern however, was far from a Hobbesian idiosyncrasy; it was one of 
the defining concerns of the age, and in common with many contemporaries Hobbes 
here identified the pacification of society with the advance of `civilisation'. 
For some two centuries prior to Hobbes' birth English society had witnessed a steadily 
"increasing pressure" from successive governments on the control of "private violence" 
by the great magnates49 This civilising pressure was eventually to result in the contrast 
which Stone neatly described "between a Duke of Buckingham in the early sixteenth 
century, with his castles, his armouries, and his hundreds of armed retainers, and a Duke 
of Newcastle in the mid -eighteenth century, with his Palladian houses, his handful of 
pocket boroughs, and his spreading political connexion ".50 This contrast highlights the 
changing nature of power and violence which, from the vantage -point of the late 
twentieth century tends to appear as a steady and inexorable decline in the private 
control of violence matched by a steady and inexorable increase in the public or state 
control of violence.51 At the time however, this process was less clear and seemed a 
perilous, haphazard development. While the technology of early -modern weaponry was 
undergoing a quantum -leap in lethality, the massive increase in nominally state - 
controlled armies masked the reliance of such armies on colonels who acted as private 
contractors raising and equipping their own regiments. The gradual disappearance of 
Medieval retinues of armed retainers was therefore being replaced by the rise of armies 
47 Ibid., pg. 286. 
48 Ibid., pg. 287. 
49 Stone, L., The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558 -1641, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pg. 118. 
5o Ibid., pg. 97. 
5I One historian has written for example that "The Venetian republic's most worthy claim to political 
success... came from replacing the feuds of its own magnate clans with a system of elections and the 
distribution of preferments... ". Muir, E., Mad Blood Stirring: Vendetta and Factions in Friuli During the 
Renaissance, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993, pg. 51. 
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consisting of sub -contracted regiments whose colonels raised, equipped, clothed, 
supplied, paid and commanded them as they pleased. The result was often that such 
regiments and the armies which they formed acted as little more than profit- making 
ventures for their commanders who recruited from the lowest and most desperate 
classes, paid them irregularly, lead them indifferently, and loosed them upon the towns, 
villages, cities and countryside of Europe regularly to take what they liked in order to 
make up for usually non -existent supplies of food, clothing, shelter, and pay. Such 
armies were often no better than loose collections of privately organised associations of 
armed criminals, and many of the great generals and officers of the age were first and 
foremost military entrepreneurs.' 
Samuel Pufendorf obviously had the depredations of these soldiers in mind when he 
warned of the dangers to civil society of the unauthorised violence of armies. Military 
officers he wrote, 
...should take care to train the soldier... and inure him to the rigours of 
military life; to keep military discipline in good order; not rashly expose 
their soldiers to be massacred; and promptly supply pay and provisions... 
embezzling nothing. They must also ensure that the troops always 
support their country and never conspire with them against it.53 
Soldiers by contrast must "...refrain from pillage and harassment of the population... and 
choose rather to die with honour than to save their lives by running away.s54 Such 
advice showed a concern for the fragility of civil peace and the ease with which it could 
be undone by violence. It also suggests that Pufendorf was well aware of the 
destruction caused by the various armies in Germany during the Thirty Years War, and 
the legacy of famine and pestilence which continued long after hostilities ceased. 
Pufendorf and Hobbes envisaged civil society as a fragile creation which required the 
direct supervision and authorisation of conduct by the state. Above all, Pufendorf s 
concern for military discipline belied a fear that the ravages of armies on the hunt for 
supplies and booty presented the greatest threat to the property of those within civil 
sz There is a substantial body of literature on the development of early -modem armies, the most useful 
of which for my purposes were, Hale, J., War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450 -1620, Fontana, 
London, 1985; Anderson, M.S., War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618 -1789, Fontana, 
London, 1988; Parker, G., The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500- 
1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988. Still one of the most revealing accounts of the 
impact of the Thirty Years War remains Dame Veronica Wedgewood's Classic The Thirty Years War 
[1938], Pimlico, London, 1992. 
53 Pufendorf, S., op.cit., pg. 176. 
54 Ibid., pg. 177. 
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society. Such concerns foreshadowed the anxiety which was to characterise the 
subsequent development of liberal discourse over the relationship between the state with 
its military instruments and expenditures and the security of property within civil 
society. In A Letter From a Person of Quality to His Friend in the Country, which was 
probably written by Locke under the direction of his patron the Earl of Shaftesbury, the 
chief concern was that states with standing armies threatened a "government more 
absolute and arbitrary" than could be borne by those within civil society.ss But who 
were these inhabitants of civil society, and why could they not bear an `arbitrary' 
government? 
II. PROPERTY AND CIVILITY. JOHN LOCKE 
For John Locke, the right to own property was one of the three most important natural 
rights pertaining to human beings, the other two being the right to life and liberty. The 
pursuit of these rights were enshrined in the precepts of Natural Law which prescribed 
that all individuals should act to preserve themselves and to endeavour to preserve the 
species as a whole." While Locke believed that individuals could achieve these rights 
in the state of nature, there could be no security in their enjoyment. As we saw in an 
earlier chapter, individuals in the state of nature were effectively their own judges, and 
hence would act with extreme partiality in the pursuit of their interests and particularly 
in retribution for perceived wrongs. Therefore an individual's tenure of natural rights 
was uncertain where violence threatened and Locke tied the rights to life, liberty, and 
estate to membership of civil associations which rested upon exclusive claims of 
ownership' As with Hobbes, civil association had particular features, but Locke 
emphatically rejected the authoritarian implications of Hobbes' civil society. If as 
Locke wrote, "Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the 
State of Nature" it could not be a government of an `Absolute Monarch" who would 
possess "the Liberty to be Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects 
whatever he pleases ".58 In contrast to the state of nature and association under an 
absolute ruler, Locke suggested that association in what he called political or civil 
ss Locke, J., A Letter From a Person of Quality to His Friend in the Country [1675], in The Works of 
John Locke, Vol. X, [1823], Reprint, Scientia Verlag Aalen, Darmstadt, 1963, pg. 243. Ashcraft argues 
that while Locke may indeed have written the Letter, he was probably writing "under Shaftesbury's 
supervision, employing the language he used in his speeches." Ashcraft, R., Revolutionary Politics and 
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986, pg. 122. 
sc Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 271. 
57 Ibid., pg. 282. 
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society was the only condition in which individuals could achieve any security from the 
violence of rulers and other subjects. In Chapter VII of the Second Treatise Locke 
stipulated that the "chief end" of political or civil society was the "preservation of 
Property ", but exactly what he meant by the terms `civil' and `political' society 
remained unclear.59 
In Chapter VII of the Second Treatise Locke appeared to use the term `political' society 
to refer to the governmental arrangements by which laws were made and controversies 
between citizens decided, while `civil' society appeared to denote the union of 
individuals who had agreed to renounce their natural liberty (of being their own judge) 
and to establish an authority which was to act as the judge of controversies.60 In some 
other writings, he appeared to use the rubric of civility to describe the distinctly private, 
non -public and non -political considerations of individuals. This is the implication for 
instance of his reference to the "private civil concernments" of individuals in the Essay 
Concerning Toleration.ó1 In his later Letter Concerning Toleration of 1685, Locke 
expounded on the notion of the civil as coextensive with the private interests of 
individuals, "[c]ivil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the 
possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.só2 
But Locke's use of the term was not entirely consistent, for he also used the term `civil' 
to describe the considerations of the public magistrate with the maintenance of public 
peace. In this sense, Locke clearly signalled that the true vocation of political authority 
was law and order, in contrast to the private realm of individual freedom governed 
solely by conscience, 
sa Ibid., pg. 276. 
59 Ibid., pg. 323. 
6' Ibid., pg. 324. The distinction does not seem to be very clear, but resides, I take it, in the rather 
different connotations of the descriptions provided here, to wit, that `political' society consisted in the 
institutional, legal and penal arrangements of society, but `civil' society consisted in the union of 
individuals who had such arrangements to appeal to. Thus, Locke wrote, "because no Political Society 
can be or subsist without having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in order thereunto 
punish the Offences of all those of that Society; there, and there only is Political Society, where every one 
of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, resign'd it up into the hands of the Community... And 
thus... the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules... ". Civil society however, is 
described slightly differently, not in terms of the institutional, legal, or penal arrangements of the union, 
but as the very substance of union itself, "Those who are united into one Body, and have a common 
establish'd Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies... and punish 
Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another... ". 
6' Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Toleration [1667], in D. Wootton (ed.), Political Writings of John 
Locke, Mentor, New York, 1993, pg. 188. 
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Moral actions belong therefore to the jurisdiction of both the outward and 
inward court; both of the civil and domestic governor; I mean, both of 
the magistrate and conscience. Here, therefore, is great danger, lest one 
of these jurisdictions entrench upon the other, and discord arise between 
the keeper of the public peace and the overseers of souls.ó3 
In an age dominated by vicious religious struggles in his own and neighbouring 
countries, part of Locke's concern was to confine the claims of religion to private 
conscience, thereby identifying the boundary protecting the integrity of civil society 
from the untoward intrusion of essentially private, religious concerns. 
Clearly however, Locke thought the provision of a system of laws was an essential 
ingredient in the establishment of a civil society. Throughout Chapter VII of the Second 
Treatise Locke proceeded to demonstrate that his conception of civil and political 
society was incompatible with the notion of absolute monarchy or despotic power. 
Under such arrangements as these he contended, there was no impartial umpire making 
the ruler their own judge and placing him or her in a state of nature in relation to his or 
her subjects.' Moreover, Locke argued that under such a regime subjects and their 
property would be exposed to the ruler's absolute and arbitrary power, thus placing 
themselves in a state of slavery. In a condition of slavery individuals were "not capable 
of any Property, [and] cannot in that state be considered as any part of Civil Society; the 
chief end whereof is the preservation of Property.só5 It was thus property that lay at the 
heart of Locke's argument for civil association, and for political arrangements which 
reflected the wishes of the community in limited and constitutional government. As he 
put it, subjects, 
...could never be safe or at rest, nor think themselves in Civil Society, till 
the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, 
Parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person 
became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, 
which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established... No Man in 
Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it.66 
For an association to be described as `civil' then, it had to be one in which there were 
settled laws to which all consented (at least tacitly), a constitutionally limited assembly, 
an impartial means of judgement, and effective enforcement of both laws and 
judgements. Only in this `civil' state he argued, could individuals be secure in the 
6s Ibid., pg. 421. 
64 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 326 -327. 
65 Ibid., pg. 323, see also pg. 283 -284. 
66 Ibid., pg. 329 -330 
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"...mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general 
Name, Property.i67 
The interesting connotation of this last line is the conflation of the three natural rights 
(of life, liberty, and estate) with personal property, and the implication that the 
enjoyment of one's natural rights to life and liberty were dependent upon the protection 
and preservation of the right to estate or property. Locke made this clear in his 
discussion of the limitations he believed should be placed on government. The 
government Locke had in mind was a government of laws "...bound to dispense Justice, 
and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known 
Authoris'd Judges.i68 It was therefore a limited government, and one of the chief 
limitations on it was that it could not invade the property of its subjects, 
...the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for 
which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that 
the People should have Property, without which they must be suppos'd 
to lose that by entering Society, which was the end for which they 
entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. Men therefore 
in Society having Property, they have such a right to the goods, which by 
the Law of the Community are theirs, that no Body hath a right to take 
their substance, or any part of it from them, without their own consent; 
without this, they have no Property at all. ... Hence it is a mistake to 
think, that the Supream or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, can 
do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrarily, or 
take any part of them at pleasure.69 
In this passage, Locke employed the term `property' in a dual sense, both to describe the 
natural rights belonging to individuals, and in the more restrictive sense of the goods or 
estate that belong to owners. This emphasises the degree to which Locke's conception 
of natural rights was based on the notion of exclusive ownership and entitlements that 
could only be described as belonging to individuals.70 
Importantly, this passage also referred to the danger of the `arbitrary' power of a 
government acting at its own pleasure without due regard to the property of citizens. 
The concern over arbitrary government has been a defining concern of liberal thought, 
and for liberals such as Hayek referred to the fear that power became arbitrary when it 
67 Ibid., pg. 350. 
ea Ibid., pg. 358. 
69 Ibid., pg. 360 -361. 
0 Dunn, J., The Political Thought of John Locke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, pg. 
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was "determined by a particular will unrestrained by a general rule.... ".7' Hayek's fear 
was that modern democracies have given rise to an "omnipotent sovereign parliament" 
which acts as "arbitrarily as it pleases" by which he did not mean that it acted simply as 
it pleased but showed partiality such as in the provision of funds for groups of 
disadvantaged citizens, thereby opening the "floodgates to arbitrariness."' Carl Schmitt 
seized upon this aspect of liberalism in his criticism of its inability to conceive a state 
capable of making an exception, of reserving to itself special powers not constrained by 
the law." As Pasquino suggests however, this particular criticism fails to appreciate 
Locke's provision for the powers of "prudential government" or a power "to act 
according to discretion" in the public interest outside the limits of the law.74 Such a 
prerogative however, Locke clearly thought necessary to the "publick good ", even 
though in most ordinary cases the sovereignty of the law determined the legitimacy of 
state and governmental power.75 
According to Hindess `arbitrary' power within liberal discourse refers to the extent to 
which power is "not specifically constrained by law" and is thus exercised beyond the 
confines of law.76 Locke did argue that the exercise of power beyond the stipulations of 
law, where prerogative powers could not be justified by exceptional circumstances, 
constituted arbitrary power. Arbitrary government consisted in the abrogation of a 
specific feature of the law of civil society which made power arbitrary, and that was the 
consent upon which Locke argued civil laws rested. In Locke's view civil societies 
were created in order to protect the life and property of its members, and the laws of 
civil society were to reflect the imperatives of this creation, the consent of the members 
of civil society and the protection of their property. Locke argued that in the state of 
nature, the extent of one person's property would be set by natural limits such as the 
extent of their labour power, the limits of their immediate needs, and the perishability of 
natural items. Therefore, it was impossible for anyone to "intrench upon the right of 
n von Hayek, F., Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. III, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pg. 
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74 Pasquino, P., "Locke on King's Prerogative ", Political Theory, 26 (2), 1998, pg. 201. 
Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 375. 
6 Hindess, B., "Neo- Liberal Government and the Institutionalisation of Arbitrary Power ", Proceedings 
of the Joint Conference of the Australasian Political Science Association and the European Union Studies 
Association of New Zealand, Christchurch, 1998, pg. 333. 
133 
another, or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the Prejudice of his Neighbour, who would 
still have room... ".77 Locke constructed a natural law justification for money on the 
basis that allowing goods to perish without having made use of them to preserve one's 
own life or the life of others constituted an offence, thus requiring an imperishable 
means of preserving the value of goods which also happened to allow individual 
acquisitions of more property than could be consumed.78 The accrual of more property 
thus required other mechanisms of differentiation and protection of people's property, 
and this was provided by law. But Locke's conception of law, tied as it was to the 
invention of money and protection of property was also dependent upon actual or tacit 
consent. In other words, as, 
...several Communities settled the Bounds of their distinct Territories, 
and by Laws within themselves, regulated the Properties of the private 
Men of their Society, and so, by Compact and agreement, settled the 
Property which Labour and Industry began... [individuals] have, by 
common Consent, given up their Pretences to their natural common 
Right... and so have, by positive agreement, settled the Property, 
amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the Earth...79 
Locke argued that all these arrangements were "...made practicable out of the bounds of 
Societie..." by the tacit agreement implied by the continued adherence to such financial 
and legal arrangements.80 Within the security of civil society however, these 
arrangements took on an altogether more formal hue. 
Hobbes and Pufendorf s conceptions of civil society placed a premium on the 
authorisation of conduct by an overarching sovereign authority which spoke through the 
law. In other words, conduct in civil society was to be regulated by the stipulations of 
the sovereign embodied in the laws the sovereign promulgated. Consent played very 
little role in either conception of civil society outside of the original contract by which 
the sovereign was instituted. Once this consent was given, the consent of subjects to the 
sovereign's commands became all but irrelevant because by the terms of the original 
consent subjects renounced their right to withhold consent from the sovereign. Locke's 
conception of civil society however, placed a premium on the on -going consent of 
citizens to the laws made by the sovereign. For Locke as for Hobbes, government was 
still concerned with the task of managing the conduct of citizens by governing their 
Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 292. 
78 Ibid., pg. 295. 
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opinions, but unlike Hobbes who thought this task best accomplished by the supervision 
of the opinions of the inhabitants of civil society by the sovereign, Locke believed that 
the most suitable and effective form of government of civil society was self-government 
disciplined by the "law of opinion ".81 
For Locke the government of civil society was conceived as a government of laws rather 
than arbitrary will, and what separated the arbitrary will of the tyrant from the laws of 
civil society was the agreement such laws obtained from citizens. In arguing so, Locke 
indicated that his conception of civil society was one in which the conduct of citizens 
was to be self -regulated, whose effective self -government would in turn act as a limit on 
state power. The private conscience and opinion of citizens in civil society was 
governed without a need for intrusive state supervision. The key to this argument lay in 
Locke's conception of property and its essential role in determining what sort of people 
constituted civil society. Locke argued that individuals held exclusive claims of 
ownership (whether it be to their bodies, rights, or goods) and therefore, were only 
capable of alienating any part of themselves or their property by agreement or consents' 
Such consent was crucial for individuals to agree to divest themselves of their right to 
be their own judge, and enter civil society. Locke did argue however, that agreement 
and consent may be reached in the state of nature as in his account of the invention of 
money.83 Consent was not as it was for Hobbes, the mark of a willingness to enter civil 
society, but a prior value which made civil association itself valuable. Civil society did 
not exist in order to make consent possible, but consent made civil association truly 
civil. In order to understand this more clearly, it is necessary to recall the way in which 
Locke described the opposite of consent, arbitrary power and violence. 
Throughout the Treatises, Locke argued that civil or political society was opposed to 
both the state of nature and to submission to an absolute ruler. Though different, the 
state of nature and absolute rule had one feature in common, and that was violence. 
While individuals were able to act as their own judge in the state of nature, conflict 
81 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690], edited by J. Yolton, J.M Dent and 
Sons, London, 1977, pg 175. More detailed discussion of Locke's `law of opinion' and Tully's 
interpretation of it follows in the third section of this chapter. 
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between individuals who judged their own cases with partiality was inevitable.84 Locke 
was clear that in such a condition, individuals could not be restrained from making 
incursions upon the rights of others, nor that those who suffered wrongs would seek a 
disproportionate redress. Individuals in the state of nature then, were perpetually on 
guard against others, treating them as potential aggressors who sought to reduce or 
remove the freedom of others. This Locke argued was the ultimate insult, for without 
freedom an individual was no better than a slave, unsure of their physical security and 
unable to hold property. In such a condition the individual was subjected to the will of 
another person, and this will Locke described as "arbitrary ".S5 Arbitrary here did not 
mean that it was random, but that it was opposed to consent, 
...Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and 
closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it, but 
by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together. For a Man, not 
having Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, 
enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary 
Power of another...86 
It followed then, that the only rightful manner in which individuals could consent to 
renounce their rights was by free and unforced consent, and it was this consent upon 
which civil society was founded. Now, although Locke wrote of consent by open 
declaration of agreement between independent selves to establish a civil or political 
society, he was not so naive as to suppose that this was actually how societies, 
governments and states were established. The consent Locke believed sufficient for an 
individual to be considered the subject of a civil or political society was tacit. 
Tacit consent was held to consist in the ownership and enjoyment of property under the 
jurisdiction of a particular civil or political authority.87 It must be recalled that the chief 
end of civil government was the protection and preservation of property. For a person 
to hold property under the protection of such a government therefore, meant that they 
may be considered to have given their tacit consent to the political arrangements of that 
government, and thus be considered a subject of civil government. But tacit consent 
was not perpetually binding upon subjects; it ceased to hold when the subject renounced 
their property. Consent which was "expressly given" by open declaration however, was 
perpetually binding upon subjects for as long as the civil government consented to itself 
aa Ibid., pg. 275-276. 
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lasted.88 It was only by individual consent, either tacit or expressly declared but free and 
unforced that subjects could enter the civil state, and it was by the means of such 
consent that entry into the civil state could be distinguished from the violence and 
arbitrary power of the state of nature or of absolute rule. 
Locke's conception of civil society thus rested upon the idea that the citizens of civil 
society consented to the arrangements by which they were governed. Ingeniously, the 
very ownership of property - the chief criterion entitling and enabling membership of 
civil society - required the creation of government, and the continuation of the 
enjoyment of that property implied consent to that government. This was in effect a 
theory of consent to the state, a theory which sought to show that it would be reasonable 
to expect property- owning citizens in civil society to consent to having a government 
and a state. But Locke made another and more subtle use of the notion of consent to 
outline a rather different but complimentary notion of government. Here Locke sought 
not to elicit the consent of self -interested citizens to a government or state, but to ensure 
that the members of civil society would in effect govern themselves by consent without 
the need for intrusion from either government or state. This was a theory of consent 
premised upon the need to govern the opinions and conduct of those within civil society 
not through the actions of a government, but through the achievement of self -
government. For those outside civil society however, such as the idle poor and 
vagabonds (who owned no substantial property at all) self -government was to be 
buttressed by the coercion of the government, to which consent was not required. 
III. GOVERNING CIVILITY 
The problem of human conduct lay at the heart of both Hobbes and Locke's conceptions 
of civil society, and the danger posed to civil society from violence was in Hobbes view 
an irrefutable "...Inference, made from the Passions..." of human beings.89 Both Hobbes 
and Locke suggested that the social life of the native inhabitants of North America 
exhibited many of the characteristics of the state of nature, but the veracity of their 
portrayal of the natural condition of humanity lay closer to home.90 Of course Hobbes' 
own experience in and antipathy toward the civil war in England provided potent 
87 /bid., pg. 348. 
88 Ibid., pg. 349. 
89 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 186. 
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examples of the violence and destruction which awaited societies where central 
authority dissipated. Indeed, the political thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries was overshadowed by the fear that in the absence of an overarching political 
authority such as a divinely sanctioned monarchical state ruling in the name of a 
universally accepted cosmological plan, society itself would fracture and fall into 
violence.91 
It has even been suggested that Hobbes' state of nature represented one half of an 
anthropological dichotomy between civilisation and barbarism, and thus performed the 
function of an implicit theory of history, but without any final teleological resolution.92 
According to Kraynak, Hobbes associated civilisation with societies which had achieved 
the required level of political centralisation and consequent material and intellectual 
advancement, and barbarism with the lack of such achievements. According to this 
view, Hobbes thought the native inhabitants of North America, the Saxon colonisers of 
Britain, and the pre -classical inhabitants of Greece each existed in a state of barbarism, 
characterised by the continual struggle and meagre material existence of the state of 
nature.93 For Hobbes then, the state of nature was not purely an abstraction but "an ever - 
present possibility" which was 
...inherent in any organised political society, a ubiquitous threat which, 
like some macabre companion, accompanied society in every stage of its 
journey. It was present each night, as men sealed themselves in their 
homes and succeeded only in locking in fear. And even when wise 
policy had secured the internal life of a commonwealth, there remained 
the state of nature in international politics, constantly pressing in on 
societies...94 
The roots of conflict and violence, the dreadful certainties of the state of nature, were 
qualities which persisted in the civil state.95 Why else, Hobbes asked his readers, would 
we need to take precautions to guard our possessions or our life if the nature of human 
beings was not so contrary? What Hobbes made clear here was that civil association 
was a vulnerable creation, its endurance relying upon a boundary encasing civility by 
excluding the chaos of violence and war. This boundary, perpetually under threat from 
9° See for instance, Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 187;and Locke, J., op.cit., pg. 296 -297, 339 -340. 
91 Tester, K., Civil Society, Routledge, London, 1992, pg. 51. 
92 Kraynak, R. P., "Hobbes on Barbarism and Civilisation ", in P King (ed ), Thomas Hobbes: Critical 
Assessments, Vol. III, Routledge, London, 1993, pg. 690. 
93 Ibid., pg. 690 -691. 
9n Wolin, S. S., Politics and Vision, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, pg. 264. 
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within and without, required in Hobbes view the direct supervision by the sovereign of 
the opinions and thereby the outward conduct of the members of civil society.96 In his 
words, 
...the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel [sic] 
governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of men's Actions, 
in order to their Peace, and Concord.97 
Hobbes concluded Leviathan with a reflection upon the problem of how to ensure "a 
constant Civili Amity" between individuals who exhibited a "contrariety" of "Opinions, 
and Manners ", and suggested that "by Education, and Discipline" of the population this 
end may be achieved.98 It was for this reason that Hobbes was most concerned that the 
sovereign take great care to determine what doctrines were to be taught and by what 
means the populace was to be disciplined. In his Behemoth or the Long Parliament, a 
dialogue on the causes of the civil war, Hobbes argued that the chief cause of rebellion 
against the king lay in the teaching in the universities of the seditious doctrines of 
ancient "Rome and Greece" and maintained that these institutions "be better 
disciplined" in the matter of what is taught 99 This claim was made even more 
forcefully in Leviathan where he emphasised that the content and style of education be 
directly administered by the sovereign.100 In this way, subjects may be instructed in 
their duty to obey the laws of the sovereign instead of their own conscience or other 
false doctrines. `01 
According to Locke however, civil society was the product of voluntary agreement 
which separated civil authority from the paternal power of parents over their children, 
which lasted only so long as the children's minority, or the "despotical" power of an 
absolute ruler, 
Voluntary Agreement gives... Political power to Governours for the 
benefit of their Subjects, to secure them in the Possession and Use of 
their Properties. [whereas]... Forfeiture gives... Despotical power to 
95 Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; Hobbes to Locke, Oxford Uni 
Press, Oxford, 1962, pg. 21 -23. 
96 Ivison, D., "The Disciplinary Moment: Foucault, Law and the Reinscription of Rights" in J.Moss 
(ed.), The Later Foucault, Sage, London, 1998, pg. 133. 
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 233. See also Pufendorf, S., op.cit., pg. 152, 154. 
98 Hobbes, T., pg. 717, 718. 
99 Hobbes, T., Behemoth or the Long Parliament [ 1682], second edition, edited by F. Tonnies, Frank 
Cass, London, 1969, pg. 56, 58. 
10° Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 233, 291. One should also note the importance Hobbes placed on the 
need for subjects to be instructed in the laws; see pp. 311 -353. 
10' Hobbes, T., Leviathan, pg. 364, 370. 
139 
Lords for their own Benefit, over those who are stripp'd of all 
property.102 
To be subject to despotic power was, Locke told us, to be in a state of slavery subject to 
the "arbitrary" power of an absolute ruler who must be regarded as existing in a state of 
war with those who are subjected to her or him. By recollecting Locke's discussion of 
consent and the implications attached to the notion of arbitrary power, it can be 
appreciated that for him politics and political power was the preserve of a society based 
on agreement and property ownership. But this was not merely the agreement described 
in the original compact to establish a civil society, but real and ongoing agreements 
between the members of civil society to the political, social, and economic arrangements 
therein. For Locke, the independence of the members of civil society from one another 
and from arbitrary power was based on the possession of property and indeed, the 
agreements so central to civil society could only take place between individuals who 
had possessions and hence rights to cede to another by contract.1o3 Arbitrary, despotic 
power was the preserve of those who existed outside civil society, did not own or 
respect private property, and threatened the very existence of civil society. 
Consequently, Locke endorsed two different but complimentary types of government 
appropriate to those within and to those without civil society.104 
Though different in style and form, the two types of government nevertheless aimed to 
create individuals who were capable of governing their own conduct. The difference lay 
in the requirements Locke thought necessary for those who were born into the society of 
property -owning citizens, namely civil society, and those who were born into the much 
larger, less sophisticated and more threatening society of property-less beggars, 
vagabonds and labourers.105 As Tully points out, Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding was an attempt to outline the mechanisms by which individuals were to 
102 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, pg. 383 -384. 
03 Goldsmith, M.M., "Liberty, Luxury and the Pursuit of Happiness" in A. Pagden (ed.), The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early- Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, 
pg. 226; also Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, 284. 
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"regulate" their "assent" and "moderate" their "persuasions ".106 But Locke's discussion 
here indicated that such mechanisms were not necessarily general stipulations on the 
governing of conduct, but were specific to the inhabitants of civil society. Tully locates 
three complimentary modes or strategies of governing opinion in Locke's thought, 
which he refers to as providential, penal, and humanist modes.107 While the providential 
mode was concerned with the conformity of conduct to the stipulations of divine 
commandments, both the penal and humanist modes were concerned with the 
conformity of conduct to the laws and expectations of state and society respectively, and 
it is these two to which attention will be devoted here. Penal governance refers to the 
activities of the state in determining the conduct of its subjects through the enforcement 
of laws and regulations, the distribution of rewards and punishments. Humanist 
governance however, refers to the shaping of individual conduct through the exposure 
of the citizen to the expectations and evaluations of other citizens. 
According to Tully, Locke believed this last form of governance was "the most 
effective" of the three in that it operated through the internalisation of social mores. As 
Locke himself put it, 
The principal spring from which the actions of men take their rise, the 
rule they conduct them by, and the end to which they direct them, seems 
to be credit and reputation, and that which at any rate they avoid, is in the 
greatest part shame and disgrace... the shame of being disesteemed by 
those with whom one hath lived, and to whom one would recommend 
oneself, is the great source and director of most of the actions of men... 
He therefore that would govern the world well, had need consider rather 
what fashions he makes, than what laws; and to bring anything into use 
he need only give it reputation.108 
While Locke clearly believed that this form of governance was the most effective, the 
implication of his arguments was that he also thought this form of governance operated 
most effectively within civil society. Locke described the mechanism of this form of 
governance as "a secret and tacit consent" among citizens whose right of private 
violence had been surrendered to a state but who nonetheless retained "the power of 
thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live 
106 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690], edited by J. Yolton, J.M Dent and 
Sons, London, 1977, pg. 3. See also, Tully, J., loc.cit., pg. 17. 
107 Tully, J., loc.cit., pg. 40 -43. 
los Locke, J., "Credit,Disgrace" in D. Wootton (ed.), Political Writings of John Locke, Mentor, New 
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amongst and converse with... ".109 This passage clearly implied that the people Locke 
had in mind when he spoke of the government of opinion by reputation were the 
property- owning citizens of civil society. These were the individuals he had in mind 
when he spoke of the contractual agreement to establish political society, and it was 
individuals such as these who valued their reputation and standing in the community 
and would conduct themselves in ways that brought further credit upon themselves. 
Because civil society was conceived as a realm of economic and social interaction free 
from arbitrary government, Locke's problem was how to ensure that the conduct of 
those within civil society could be governed without relying upon intrusive state 
interference. His solution was to rely upon a form of government which obviated the 
need for arbitrary government. That such a form of governance could be effective at all 
was measured by the nature of the mores, habits, and fashions inscribed upon each 
citizen's mind.10 It was in this sense that Locke suggested that the education of young 
gentlemen take care to instil the practical arts of interaction with others of quality such 
as the art of conversation which provide a "fence to his virtue, when he goes into the 
world, under his own conduct. "' The objective of such education was to inculcate in 
the mind of the pupil a variety of habits which were made pleasurable by the judicious 
use of praise or blame by the educator, and hence were designed to be used "to educate 
by habituation... through love of reputation, [which] reproduces itself, governing even 
the new elites it trains and legitimates.i12 Through the governance of opinion and by 
ensuring the formation of productive habits, Locke argued that civil society could thrive 
at arms length from the state. 
The situation was rather different for those who existed outside civil society, namely, 
the vast numbers of property-less labourers, poor, vagabonds and master -less men who 
haunted the seventeenth and eighteenth century mind. For the governance of this class 
of people, Locke favoured the full and direct use of the legal and police powers of the 
state. As Tully suggests, the contrast between the former `humanist' strategy of 
governance and this penal strategy was posed most starkly in Locke's Report to the 
109 Locke, J., Essay, pg. 175. 
110 Ibid., pg. 124. 
Ill Locke, J., Some Thoughts Concerning Education [1693] in The Locke Reader, edited by J. Yolton, 
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Board of Trade... Respecting the Relief and Employment of the Poor which is a fine 
example of a whole genre of such documents addressed to the problem of poverty and 
master- lessness throughout the Tudor and Stuart period. "' In common with most of 
these documents, and in sentiment with other reports preceding and following his own, 
Locke's own report shared the fear of a "multiplying of the poor" who threatened to 
become a "growing burden" on society.14 The reason for this sudden increase in the 
numbers of poor he argued, could "be nothing else but the relaxation of discipline, and 
corruption of manners" for which he recommended several remedies aimed at tightening 
the "restraint of their debauchery".15 Locke suggested that the Elizabethan poor laws if 
properly enforced were still sufficient for this purpose, but a "more effectual 
restraining" was required for those "idle vagabonds" who made a living by wandering 
and were tied to no parish poor- house.16 Locke's recommendations on this `problem' 
were indicative of a form of government very different to that which operated within 
civil society. In effect, the restraint of the idle poor and wandering vagabonds could 
only be achieved through the strict enforcement of discipline by the coercive arms of the 
state. 
To this end, Locke suggested a variety of measures such as the graduated use of 
corporal punishment, the use of passes to monitor offenders, the improvement of poor 
house management and discipline, the use of transportation, and the impressment of 
boys or men between fourteen and fifty years of age into the navy "where they shall 
serve three years under strict discipline ". "' Locke's express motivation in making such 
recommendations was that an industrious nation could not afford to support so many 
people in `idleness', whose labour was unharnessed and who thereby failed to contribute 
to social wealth. He therefore extended the principle to include "the children of 
labouring people" who should be placed in "working schools" where they would be 
"kept in much better order... and from their infancy be inured to work, which is of no 
small consequence to the making of them sober and industrious all their lives after ". "8 
The rationale for such stern measures was thus that habits of self -discipline and self- 
Ibid., pg. 65 -70. 
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government could be imposed - by force if necessary - on the members of uncivil 
society. The distinction between civil and what has here been called `uncivil' society 
served as a form of identification not simply of those whose conduct was self -governed, 
but of those who required government by stricter methods. 
According to Tully, Locke's Report is significant because it "displays the objectives of 
the new mode of governing... to fabricate an individual who is habituated to docility and 
to useful labour" integrating the production of such individuals into the "collective 
welfare- warfare policy of increasing the strength of the mercantile state ".19 In the early 
modern period the strength of the state came to be associated with the health and wealth 
of populations, and this dual concern characterised the writings of a whole genre of 
reports and recommendations on the poor laws. Henry Fielding's own Proposal for 
Making Effectual Provision for the Poor of 1753 began with the observation that "the 
Strength and Riches of a Society consist in the Numbers of the People..." and this 
required that the poor who withheld their labour - which was all they have to give - were 
a burden to society and "On this Labour the Public hath a Right to insist... ".120 The 
overall tone of the piece however, displayed the characteristic fear of the poor who had 
to be watched, restrained, monitored, and at all costs prevented from wandering freely, 
begging, and thieving. His suggestions on the use of corporal punishment echoed 
Locke's but added to it the later interest in solitary incarceration which prevented any 
opportunity for an offender to "reinfect those who may possibly have made some 
Advancement in their Cure" while "Solitude and Fasting" were recommended as useful 
mechanisms by which to "persuade" the inmate that `correction' was "for his own 
Good.s121 Characteristic of such proposals was not simply that they did indeed aim to 
fabricate docile and productive individuals capable of playing their part within a 
productive society, but that they were specific recommendations for governing those 
who could not be governed by more subtle means. Coercive state powers were required 
to manage and control the conduct of these subjects, who if left to themselves would be 
a permanent burden and threat to the more productive and self -governed individuals 
within civil society. The conduct of the citizens in civil society required less direct state 
19 Tully, J., loc.cit., pg. 68. 
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intrusion and could be governed `at arms length' because they had absorbed through 
education, religion, and the subtle disciplines of property ownership, the mores and 
manners appropriate to membership of a self -governed society. 
CONCLUSION 
Locke's political thought was shaped by his involvement with the Earl of Shaftesbury's 
opposition to the Tory establishment and reign of James II. While the chief protagonists 
on either side of the divide in British politics at the time were men of title, property, 
wealth and power, they were divided in their opinions on the best form of protection of 
that property and the future development of their wealth and power. While Tories 
defended the institution of the crown and were worried by the growing eminence of 
financiers and merchants, Whigs were worried by the potential of the crown to encroach 
upon their rights and property, and the power it had to buy favour through court 
patronage. As a consequence Whigs (of whom Locke's patron, the Earl of Shaftesbury 
was a prominent leader) were more willing to consider the supremacy of an active, 
independent, and assertive parliament buttressed by financial and political support from 
the growing financial classes. While Tories struggled to maintain royal ascendancy, 
Whigs were prepared to entertain the prospect of active opposition to the regime of 
James II which culminated in the Glorious Revolution in 1688.122 It was in this context 
that Locke's thought took shape and in which the Two Treatises appeared, not as the 
manifesto that guided the rebellion (for Locke's views were thought too radical by 
most), but as a manifestation of the climate of opposition by "men of property" to the 
rule of a king whose desire for independent power was perceived as a threat to their own 
wealth and status.123 
Locke's account of `civil' and `political society' befitted an association of independent, 
self -assured, and property -owning citizens such as these men of title and property, who 
conducted their affairs in such a manner as to respect the property of other members of 
society, in other words by agreement. In this, as Hume was later to put it, self -interest 
played some part but "even interest itself, and all human affairs, [we]re entirely 
122 Dickinson, H. T., Liberty and Property; Political Ideology in Eighteenth -Century Britain, Holmes 
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governed by opinion. "124 This picture of civil society was premised upon the idea of 
self -governing individuals whose conduct was regulated by a shared interest in the 
preservation of property, while those without property, the idle, wandering poor were to 
be governed by an altogether different form of intrusive state control. The two forms of 
government, although different, were complimentary in that the security of civil society 
was guaranteed by the strict government of those outside it. Both Hobbes and Locke 
shared the concern that the management of conduct was the prime task confronting the 
maintenance of civil society, and their thought incorporated a central dichotomy 
between two mutually exclusive, but equally possible realms. The realm of civility on 
the one hand encompassed civil society and the interaction of self -governing 
individuals, while the realm of incivility outside it threatened to engulf civil society in 
disorder and violence if inadequately governed. The discourse of civility sought to 
identify the boundaries and limits of civil society, and thereby exclude from it the 
corrosive potential of violence which was shifted to the realm of incivility. A major 
element in the political thought of early contractarianism was thus centred on the 
identification of the boundary separating civility and violence, and its representation as 
a defensible barrier against the corrosive threat of violence from within and without. 
Traditionally this boundary has been identified with the state and its territorial borders, a 
discrete physical entity with geographic limits. Indeed, rulers throughout Europe in the 
seventeenth century were engaged in desperate and violent struggles to consolidate their 
states, and this often involved the attempt to define and defend firm territories. 
Nowhere was this trend more in evidence than in Louis XIV's efforts to enforce the 'ne 
plus ultra' line of defensive and offensive fortifications along France's northern 
marches with the Spanish Netherlands, Holland and the Empire. The concerns 
identified in this chapter however, relate to an altogether more amorphous ne plus ultra. 
The boundary to which thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke drew their attention was not 
simply the borders of states - though they clearly were aware of the importance of them 
- but the boundaries of human conduct. What they were worried about was not only the 
provision of sufficient military strength to defend geographical borders, but the 
successful management of human conduct. This management was conceived as an 
expressly political issue; it went straight to the heart of the question of how to construct 
124 Hume, D., Political Essays, edited by K. Haakonssen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
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a truly civil society. For both Hobbes and Locke, the ownership of property was the 
vital element in the construction of civil society, and differentiated it from the wider 
uncivil society of property-less poor. The ownership of property was vital not only in 
determining who were members of civil society, but in regulating the conduct of those 
members. Throughout the early -modern period however, the nature of property- 
ownership changed considerably, and in the next and following chapters, attention will 
be turned to the problems such changes created for the management of conduct and the 
control of violence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PEACEFUL INTERESTS OR PACIFYING DISCIPLINES: 
WAR, STATES, AND CIVILISATION 
...if the liberty of a man consist in the empire of his reason, the absence whereof would 
betray him unto the bondage of his passions; then the liberty of a commonwealth 
consisteth in the empire of her laws, the absence whereof would betray her unto the lusts 
of tyrants. 
- James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana [1656], in The Political Works of James 
Harrington, edited by J. G. A. Pocock, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pg. 170. 
New interests beget new maxims of government, and new methods of conduct. These, 
in their turns, beget new manners, new habits, new customs. ... The end of the fifteenth 
century seems to be just such a period [of change]... for those who live in the eighteenth, 
and who inhabit the western parts of Europe. A little before, or a little after this point of 
time... all those revolutions began, that have produced so vast a change in the manners, 
customs, and interests of particular nations, and in the whole policy, ecclesiastical and 
civil, of these parts of the world. 
- Lord Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study and Use of History [1752], in Lord Bolingbroke, Historical 
Writings, edited by I. Kramnick, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972, pg. 82 -83. 
Lord Bolingbroke's reflections on the emergence of "new maxims of government, and 
new methods of conduct" in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries draw 
attention to some of the transformations which this thesis has attempted to trace. 
Bolingbroke's identification of `manners, customs and interests' indicates an awareness 
that the conduct of individuals as well as the conduct of nations was being transformed 
by an emergent process of civilisation. A central theme in the discourse of civilisation 
was that the conduct of both citizens and states had to be liberated as Harrington 
suggested, from the tyranny of passion. Passion, as we saw in the previous chapter, was 
identified as a source of violence requiring strict regulation. For Hobbes this took the 
form of the government of opinion by the sovereign, whereas Locke favoured a 
government of civil society by opinion. Both of these alternatives were strategies for 
disciplining the conduct of those within civil society. It will be the contention of this 
chapter that the perception of violence and the response to it within early -modern 
thought was shaped by concerns that new forms of discipline were required to suit the 
changing nature of property ownership. These concerns it will be argued, lead toward 
the development of a liberal discourse of civilisation based on the idea that the 
development of a commercial economy provided the means for a thoroughgoing 
discipline of individuals, societies, and states.' 
This view however, must be distinguished from those of contemporary liberals such as 
Albert Hirschman and Steven Holmes who each argued that the pacification of society 
was achieved by the personal employment of enlightened self -interest as a counter- 
balance to the dangerous passions. Albert O. Hirschman's The Passions and the 
Interests charted the gradual displacement of religious and aristocratic conceptions of 
the ends of human existence by a new emphasis on the benefits of self -interest. 
Hirschman identified the Renaissance as the crucial phase in the emergence of this new 
outlook, and traced its beginnings to the post -Machiavellian literature of advice to 
princes on how to govern their states. This literature blossomed at a time when a 
divinely sanctioned ethics began to lose sway, and rulers faced the problem of how to 
govern their states without the aid of a cosmological scheme of exhortations and 
The development of this discourse in British thought and culture has been masterfully discussed in 
Spadafora, D., The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth -Century Britain, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
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prohibitions. In this environment new methods of controlling the dangerous passions to 
which human beings were subject had to be found. The defining problem identified in 
this literature was how to avert the violent consequences of allowing free sway to the 
passions, particularly the aristocratic obsession with glory won in battle.' This 
conceptual transition was explored in sixteenth -century Huguenot political literature 
which sought a politics based on self -interest rather than religious conviction. Self - 
interest was equated with cool, calm calculation of the best method of attaining one's 
ambition, as opposed to passions which pointed solely to immediate gratification. 
According to Gunn, the notion of a politics of self -interest was eagerly adopted by those 
in England who wished to make the interests of state the sole determinant of 
government action, as opposed to considerations of faith which had been so divisive in 
France.' Gunn argued that it was not until the second half of the seventeenth -century 
that the term came to be associated with the private interest of individuals and became a 
"social force ".4 
According to Hirschman, the emergence of self -interest as an organising principle of 
human conduct marked a transition from the realm of statecraft to that of the ordinary 
conduct of individuals in pursuit of private wealth. This in itself represented something 
of a radical innovation succeeding as it did the Church's teachings on the dubious 
morality of seeking wealth. In the wake of the collapse of the church's monopoly on 
public morality however, the pursuit of gain through the cultivation of self -interest in 
the context of an emerging market economy came to be seen as a reliable means of 
ensuring civil peace.' That it did so Hirschman argued, owed much to the wide -spread 
perception at the time that the virtues of trade and commerce were thought "peaceful 
and inoffensive" compared to the "looting armies and murderous pirates" ravaging 
Europe at the time, not to mention the "passionate pastimes and savage exploits of the 
aristocracy.s6 Hirschman was clear however, that the principal benefits thought to flow 
from the transposition of self -interest for passions were not economic, but political in 
the sense that it enabled the construction of a peaceful social order. In other words, 
2 Hirschman, A. O., The Passions and the Interests; Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its 
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commercial activity and the requirements of the market would encourage the 
development virtues such as "industriousness and assiduity... frugality, punctuality, 
and... probity" which helped to pacify and moderate conduct.' 
Hirschman's analysis of the rise of self -interest as an organising principle of social order 
has recently been revisited by Stephen Holmes in his Passions and Constraint. 
According to Holmes, self -interest came to be seen by eighteenth century thinkers, and 
particularly those of the Scottish Enlightenment, as an antidote not simply to glory but 
cruelty itself. What these thinkers were worried about Holmes asserted, was the self and 
socially destructive potential of "violent and subrational emotions" such as fear and 
anxiety.' Doubting the viability of an ethics based on eliminating emotional motivation 
the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers aimed to deploy the more constructive motivation 
of self -interest against the sway of passions. Passion was thought to be a form of 
motivation tied to the physical world, and thus inclined to express itself in various 
impulses which physical beings were thought incapable of resisting. While 
seventeenth -century philosophy was marked by the Cartesian effort to reduce the impact 
of passion by emphasising the deliberative use of reason, the Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers sought an altogether more `physical' solution to the problem of passionate 
motivation. 
Their recommendation to control destructive passions was to deploy considerations of 
self -interest based on instrumental or "strategic rationality" in ways that would check, 
place a brake upon, or simply counter -balance those passions.' Holmes argued that such 
calculation involved being able to foresee the consequences of one's actions in the 
pursuit of a "sweet life ", which he also described as a consequence of our "natural" 
"self- love ".10 Holmes traced the rise of self -interest as a principle for social organisation 
to classical Republicanism and argued thereby that self -interest was "a profoundly 
egalitarian and democratic idea" deployed as a universalisable foundation for human 
action opposed to older elitist notions of privilege and responsibility inherent within 
Hirschman, A. O., `Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilising, Destructive, or Feeble ? ", 
Journal of Economic Literature, XX, 1982, pg. 1464. 
Holmes, S., Passions and Constraint; on the Theory of Liberal Democracy, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1995, pg. 47. 
9 Ibid., pg. 56. 
10 Ibid., pg. 62. 
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one's social class» For Holmes then, the promotion of self -interest went hand in hand 
with the emergence of capitalist societies characterised by democratic political 
structures and practices and in arguing so, he affirmed along with Hirschman the 
pacifying role of self -interested commercial activity.' 
Both Hirschman and Holmes correctly identify a major theme in the development of 
liberal political thought, but fail to link the rise of self -interest to the articulation of 
broader schemes of government and discipline aimed at "restraining and moderating 
men for the purpose of protecting them from their own excesses. ' Furthermore, 
neither Hirschman nor Holmes give much impression of the profound anxieties and 
ambivalence with which early -modern thinkers greeted the emergence of what have 
come to be called capitalist economies, paying scant attention to the debates engendered 
by this development and the questions raised over the purpose of the state and its role in 
either reducing or encouraging violence. It will not be possible to adequately review all 
of these debates in detail in this chapter, so attention will focus on two important themes 
which were to exert an important influence over the subsequent development of the 
liberal discourse of civilisation. The first of these themes was the concern over the 
morally elevating or morally enervating influence of the transition from landed to 
mobile property. The second theme eloquently articulated by Montesquieu, was the 
reinterpretation of commerce as the means by which moral corruption and violence 
could be overcome. 
The first section of the chapter will examine the first of these themes by focussing on 
the problems posed within Republican thought by the rise of commerce and the impact 
this was to have on the control and use of violence within commercial societies. It will 
be argued here that Republican thinkers viewed commerce as an encouragement to vice 
and a threat to virtue, and feared that the remedial use of violence could no longer be 
effectively controlled and administered. The problem of commerce then, was in some 
measure also a problem of violence. Attempts to resolve this difficulty will be 
discussed in the work of Bernard Mandeville and Daniel Defoe in the second section. 
While neither writer held much hope that commerce would lead to peace, both 
" Ibid., pg. 63. 
Ibid., pg. 67. 
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contributed to the development of a liberal discourse of civilisation by representing 
social order as the product of the active self -government of citizens accomplished 
through the medium of commercial activity. In the third section attention will turn to 
the articulation of a more complete theory of civilisation in the work of Montesquieu. 
His theory it will be argued, emphasised the disciplined and virtuous self - government of 
individuals in commercial societies accomplishing thereby a pacification of the conduct 
of both individuals and states. 
I. COMMERCE AND VIOLENCE 
According to John Pocock the emergence of commerce as the dominant form of 
property in the early eighteenth century was greeted with great anxiety by political 
thinkers who feared that it would fail to cultivate the necessary virtues of self -control 
and independence, which lead many to suspect that the central problem of government 
was how to control "human passions ".14 While Hirschman and Holmes correctly 
identified the control of passion by interest and the consequent pacification of society as 
an important theme in early -modern thought, they tended to overlook the emphasis 
placed in this literature on the linkage between pacification and the disciplinary 
inculcation of virtue.15 Early -modern thinkers were preoccupied by the problem of how 
to govern the conduct of subjects whose standards of judgment were increasingly 
internalised, divorced from overarching, theologically derived standards.16 According to 
Pocock this problem characterised the classical Republican tradition. Derived in large 
part from Machiavelli's political thought, this tradition marked the transition from 
feudal to modern forms of government. Machiavelli himself spoke of a complex of new 
problems confronted by rulers who had to govern without the aid of established feudal 
structures and practices. 
" Viroli, M., From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of 
Politics, 1250 -1600, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pg. 23. 
14 Pocock, J. G. A., The Machiavellian Moment; Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, pg. 459 -460. (Hereafter referred to as 
The Mahiavellian Moment). See also Burchell, G., "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing `The 
System of Natural Liberty' " in G. Burchell et.al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, pg. 128 -130, 139. 
15 See for example Richard Bellamy's interesting discussion of the role of passion, interest and 
commerce in, " `Da Metafisico a Mercatante' - Antonio Genovesi and the Development of a New 
Language of Commerce in Eighteenth Century Naples ", in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political 
Theory in Early- Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 277 -299. 
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The focus of Machiavelli's (1469 -1527) thought was the means by which the stability 
and longevity of the republic (both the Florentine and other republics) may be ensured 
in a rapidly changing domestic and international environment. This environment was 
characterised by the collapse of the received medieval formulas of government based on 
divinely sanctioned schemes of authority encompassing a rigid social hierarchy linking 
the possession of power to the ownership of land and the use and control of violence." 
The ruler was now conceived as an individual who faced the uncertainties (fortuna) of 
the new environment, and had to manufacture opportunities by bold and innovative 
action (virtu) to preserve their states.'S This raised a new series of problems relating to 
the organisation, control and use of violence by rulers who governed, 
...by art... in a world which is not to be perfectly known, which is 
therefore mutable and prey to secondary causes. ...part of the [ruler's]... 
problems... lies in the decay of the private military power formerly 
possessed by great nobles. The maintenance of arms and soldiers is now 
a matter for the public authority, and the public purse.19 
For Machiavelli therefore, the effective control and judicious use of violence by the 
Prince was of capital importance. In the celebrated passage from The Prince for 
example, on whether it was better for a ruler to be loved or feared by his subjects, 
Machiavelli reflected on Cesare Borgia's reputed cruelty in the Romagna by which he 
nonetheless "brought it to unity, and restored order and obedience.s20 Replete though it 
was with exhortations to use violence wisely in the pursuit of strengthening the state, 
The Prince arguably had less to say on the nature and use of violence by rulers than The 
Discourses on Livy. In this work, Machiavelli reflected on the causes and remedies for 
the debilities to which constitutions and states were prone, and admitted that a corrupted 
state may require "reordering" through "extraordinary" measures "such as violence and 
arms ".21 He praised the ancient Romans in particular for achieving a mastery of fortune 
through the decisiveness and valour with which they waged war and conquered, and for 
16 Tuck, R., Philosophy and Government, 1572 -1651, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, 
pg. 176 -197. 
" Viroli, M., op.cit., pg. 160. 
is Pocock, J. G. A., The Machiavellian Moment, pg. 161. 
15 Ibid., pg. 356. 
2° Machivelli, N., The Prince [1515], translated by G. Bull, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961, pg. 95. 
21 Machiavelli, N., The Discourses on Livy [1531], translated by H.C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, Book I, Chapter 18, pg. 51. 
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their religious practices which encouraged the pursuit of glory under arms.22 From these 
reflections he drew the important lesson that, 
...it is impossible for a republic to succeed in staying quiet and enjoying 
its freedom and little borders. For if it will not molest others, it will be 
molested, and from being molested will arise the wish and the necessity 
to acquire; and if it does not have an enemy outside, it will find one at 
home...23 
The solution to this problem, as he made clear in his Art of War, was that "a well 
organised city" must devote its citizens in times of peace to the study of war, and ensure 
that "only its citizens" be allowed to serve in a well drilled, devoted, well lead citizen 
militia.24 Whether it was the governance of a republic or a principality however, the 
purpose of Machiavelli's advice was to pursue reason of state by mastering fickle 
fortune. As he put it in The Discourses, there are, 
...miraculous losses and miraculous acquisitions every day. For where 
men have little virtue, fortune shows its power very much; and because it 
is variable, republics and states often vary and will always vary until 
someone emerges who is so much a lover of antiquity that he regulates it 
in such a mode that it does not have to show at every turning of the sun 
how much it can do.25 
The problems Machiavelli identified were taken up by a range of thinkers who rejected 
older notions of the self as the subject of divine and temporal hierarchies, and pictured 
the self as a citizen whose ends were tied indissolubly to this world, but as a 
consequence were thought more vulnerable to physical motivation from emotion and 
passion.26 The problem these thinkers set themselves to overcome was how to ensure 
that citizens could be governed and states made secure in the absence of a divinely 
sanctioned system of authority and obedience.27 
Pocock argued that such concerns were amplified by the English Civil War and the 
ensuing contest for sovereignty between Parliament and the Army, which was only 
22 Ibid., Book II, Chapter I and II, pg. 126 and 131 -132. Here Machiavelli disparagingly refers to 
Christianity as a religion of meekness. 
23 Ibid., Book II, Chapter 19, pg. 173. 
24 Machiavelli, N., The Art of War [1521], translated by P. Bondanella and M. Musa, Penguin, London, 
1979, Book 1, pg. 18. 
25 Machiavelli, N., The Discourses on Livy, Book II, Chapter 30, pg. 202. 
26 Pocock, J.G.A., The Machiavellian Moment, pg. 102; and Hanson, D. W., From Kingdom to 
Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1970, pg. 27. 
27 On this issue see Tuck, R., Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1979; and Tuck, R., Philosophy and Government 1572 -1651, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
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resolved by making the claim that Parliament and the Army stood for the interests of 
those with "freehold tenure" of land, which had long been identified in custom as the 
prerequisite for the exercise of political power.28 This view was forcefully put by James 
Harrington who attempted to trace a "civil history of the sword" which "depicted the 
possession of arms as crucial to both the distribution of power and the exercise of civic 
virtue ".29 According to Harrington, the ownership of property (and by this he meant 
land) gave the owner a permanent stake in the nation, and an interest in its future and 
well- being. To own land also entailed that the owner would have the leisure to 
contemplate the virtues and apply those virtues to their daily activities.30 Most 
importantly however, it was the free ownership of land which, 
...determined whether a man's sword was his lord's or his own and the 
commonwealth's; and the function of free proprietorship became the 
liberation of arms, and consequently of the personality, for free public 
action and civic virtue.31 
The problem created by the decay of the feudal order which had tied the control of 
violence to the interests of the major land holding lords who kept their own private 
armies of retainers was that the great lords "no longer nourished veins that would bleed 
for them ".32 This development allowed the emergence of a free "yeomanry, or middle 
people" who owned their own property and "living not in a servile or indigent fashion, 
were much unlinked from dependence upon their lords ", were able to determine for 
themselves when and for whom they would fight, becoming "a more excellent infantry, 
but such an one upon which the lords had so little power ".33 
The emergence of freehold property ownership coupled with the decline in the 
importance of the nobility therefore posed the problem of tyrannous rule. As Harrington 
put it, "a monarchy divested of her nobility hath no refuge under heaven but an army" 
which "must extirpate out of dominion all other roots of power, and plant her army upon 
that ground.i34 Harrington's solution propounded at length in his Commonwealth of 
Oceana, was to argue that a commonwealth of freeholding citizens should place its trust 
in a rotational system of government by its own citizens defended by an active citizen's 
28 Pocock, J. G. A., The Machiavellian Moment, pg. 376. 
29 Ibid., pg. 385. 
° Ibid., pg. 390 -391. 
31 Ibid., pg. 386. 
Harrington, J., The Commonwealth of Oceana [1656] in The Political Works of James Harrington, 
edited by J.G.A. Pocock, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1977, pg. 198. 
" Ibid., pg. 197. 
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militia. Harrington's theme was that the control of violence, the conditions under which 
arms are used and who controlled them, held the key to the health of a state or 
commonwealth. The idea of a citizen's militia was to exert an enduring influence on 
British political thought throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.36 
Harrington urged his contemporaries to recognise the danger in professional armies 
filled with the lowest orders of society and the corresponding neglect of arms by those 
with a greater stake in society.36 Contrasting what he thought to be the wisdom of the 
ancient Romans with what he thought to be the complacent drift toward arbitrary 
government based on a professional army, he argued that by "excusing the rich" from 
military service "and arming the poor" the landed elite would "become the vassals" of 
their "servants ".37 Moreover, it was not "for four shillings a week, but to be capable of 
being the best man in the field or in the city" that the citizen -soldier fought, and this 
would be sufficient to make "the common soldier in this a better man than the general of 
any monarchical army.s38 
The property held by Harrington's freeholding citizen -soldiers was tangible, it was solid 
and identifiable, consisting in goods exchangeable for other goods or amounts of money 
and above all in land. It was the possession of land by which one was enabled to enjoy 
the virtues of the yeoman farmer, such as patience and diligence, and it was agriculture 
that Harrington described as "the bread of the nation" and "a mighty nursery of 
strength... managed with the least turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands 
of all other arts.s39 The possession of land and engagement in agriculture indicated that 
through labour or judicious management one also possessed the virtues of a respectable, 
dependable and above all independent member of civil society. As Harrington put it 
34 Ibid., pg. 198 -199. 
3s Western, J. R., The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political Issue, 1660- 
1802, Routledge, London, 1965, pg. 3 -29, 77 -103. 
36 Kubik, T.R.W., "How Far the Sword? Militia Tactics and Politics in the Commonwealth of Oceana", 
History of Political Thought, XIX (2), 1998, pg. 199 -204 [186 -212]. Kubik writes of the political 
background to the publication of the Commonwealth that, "...in October 1655 the Protector [Cromwell] 
created a `select militia' commanded by... eleven Major -Generals... the role of the Major -Generals had 
been increased beyond that of a simple militia to a form of military police. In addition, a call to levy a 
Decimation Tax... upon the land and property of wealthy Royalist sympathisers was advanced... The end 
result was apparent to all: a militia at the whim of officers by commission; and a financing system which 
would split military obligation into those who paid, and those who were either unfortunate enough, or 
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37 Harrington, J., Commonwealth of Oceana, pg. 312. The passage continues, "they [the Romans], by 
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such individuals had "nothing else but their education and their leisure for the public, 
furnished by their ease and competent riches, and their intrinsic value" which was "their 
only way unto honour and preferment ".40 While agriculture entailed a sedate and settled 
cultivation of the virtues, manufacture and commerce in foreign goods Harrington 
argued lead to an insecure wealth which, in "the long run" would be found to consist 
solely in "the carriage of other men's goods.i41 
This conception of property was challenged by the "financial revolution" of the late 
seventeenth century which catapulted commerce, financial speculation, and above all 
credit to a prominence it had hitherto not enjoyed.42 This transformation and the `new' 
forms of mobile, financial wealth it generated kindled a "traumatic fear" in the minds of 
many.43 The ascent to the English throne of William III, formerly the Prince of Orange 
and leader of the Protestant military struggle against France, precipitated England's 
involvement in major European conflicts which it had until then been judiciously 
avoiding. This involvement was to create grave problems in English political thought 
on the question of the role and powers of a standing army, which had not been faced 
since the creation of the New Model Army in the 1640's.44 Furthermore, engagement in 
European struggles stimulated the financial revolution which swept commerce and 
speculation, national debt and credit to a highly problematic prominence.45 
According to John Brewer English participation in the War of the League of Augsburg 
(1689- 1697), followed by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702- 1713), and the 
subsequent War of the Austrian Succession (1739- 1748), Seven Years War (1756- 
1763), and the War of Independence in America (1775- 1783), precipitated a trebling of 
40 Ibid., pg. 261 -262. 
41 Ibid., pg. 305. Here Harrington is speaking of the commercial wealth of the Dutch, which he thinks 
is far less secure than the potential wealth to gained by the English in the pursuit of agriculture. 
42 Fernand Braudel shows some awareness of the deeply problematic nature this transition had for 
contemporaries when he writes "The new form of interchange jumbles things up, favours a few rare 
individuals and rejects the others. Every society has to turn over a new leaf under the impact." Braudel, 
F., Capitalism and Material Life 1400 -1800, translated by M. Kochan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London, 1973, pg. 326 
43 Braudel, F., Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th -18th Century; The Wheels of Commerce, Vol. II, 
translated by S. Reynolds, Collins, London, 1982, pg. 136. 
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the size of the army and navy and the costs associated with maintaining them.46 This 
growth in the size of military and naval forces, lead to the development of a standing 
army of professional soldiers paid by the state and serviced by a bureaucracy whose 
own powers, especially in the collection of taxes and excise were also extended. Brewer 
argues that in recent scholarship the English financial revolution has been interpreted as 
a consequence of the invention of public debt, credit and borrowing, but he argues that 
this has resulted in a tendency to overlook the reliance of the English "fiscal- military 
state" on the increasingly efficient collection of taxation and excise duties." 
Nonetheless new methods of finance, adopted largely from the Dutch advisers who 
accompanied William III, were increasingly seen as essential methods for raising 
revenue quickly.48 
Within Parliament however, continual attempts were made to curb the financial 
independence of the Crown, to remove the ability of the crown to raise new taxes, or 
engage in long -term borrowing. It was in this context that what has come to be called 
"Country ideology" developed as a bulwark to defend traditional liberties against the 
"excesses" of the state, but which resulted in a kind of trade -off between the desire to 
maintain the traditional liberties of the land- holding elite, and the need to fund the 
military on credit 49 As a consequence, Parliament accepted the need for more stringent 
control of public finance, while the practice of war was increasingly "...judged... by the 
criteria of economic advancement and national prosperity. ...The object of [which 
was]... to create a prosperous nation, a rich polity based on commerce.s50 Nevertheless, 
the decline of the landed interest, the rise of a financial interest of bankers and 
speculators, the deleterious effects of increased taxation, and the growth of Court 
a6 Brewer, L, The Sinews of Power; War, Money and the English State, 1688 -1763, Unwin Hyman, 
London, 1989, 29 -33. 
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officer, but in every small town and hamlet where beer and ale were brewed or tea sold over the counter. 
He was a state official... working under a system of statutory administrative law. As such, he was the 
symbol of a new form of government. He was also a sign of the state's determination to extract sufficient 
revenues from the public to ensure that England secured its place as a major international power." Ibid., 
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48 As Brewer describes it, Dutch finance "...used a public bank to handle the loans, based the debt on 
long -term redeemable annuities, and spread the debt amongst a substantial number of borrowers.... the 
obsession of English ministers with Dutch methods [were] so well known, and the arrival of William III 
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described the new fiscal arrangements as `Dutch finance'." Ibid., pg. 133. 
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patronage funded by credit were all seen as sources of a sneaking corruption of public 
life provoked by the rise of commerce.s' This was accompanied by the persistent fear 
that a standing army would become an instrument of tyranny with which the Crown 
could remove the traditional liberties of the landed elite. Linked to this fear was the 
concern that those who controlled the circulation of money exercised a dangerous 
influence over the state and its army; as Daniel Defoe put it, "...he that manages your 
treasure is the general of your generals, and the soul of war. "52 
The Republican alternative to the threat of a monarch backed by a professional, standing 
army was an alliance of the armed "yeomanry" of freeholding tenants "embodied in a 
militia" and "the landed aristocracy in Parliament" who, 
...were the natural leaders of the landed yeomanry... In other words, the 
glorification of the yeoman farmer... functioned as an expression of 
solidarity among landowners, large and small, against the changing but 
continuous threats to the security of their property.53 
The `standing army debate' of the 1690's revealed such concerns in the repeated 
warnings that a standing army would establish the "Arbitrary Power" of an "Aspiring 
Monarch ".54 As Walter Moyle (1672 -1721) put it, the attempt to limit the power of the 
crown with laws when the crown controlled a standing army was like trying to "bind 
Sampson with his locks on.s55 Moyle thought the attempt to set up and maintain a 
standing army - especially in time of peace - was a "Breach of Trust" and answered 
objections that a standing army was essential to stave off invasion with a call to 
strengthen the navy.5ó Andrew Fletcher drew particular attention to the implications of 
the decay of the feudal balance of power between monarchs and nobles in which the 
latter had once possessed control over the means of violence.57 The "Arbitrary Power" 
of rulers could therefore only be limited by placing "the Sword in the hands of the 
Subject" which would prove difficult because "most Princes of Europe are in possession 
51 Ibid., pg. 199 -217. 
52 Defoe, D., The Review, VI (33), 1709, in The Best Of Defoe's Review: an Anthology, edited by W.L. 
Payne, Books for Libraries Press, Freeport, 1951, pg. 117. (Hereafter referred to as The Review) 
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54 Trenchard, J., The Argument Against a Standing Army Discussed [1698], University Microfilms, Ann 
Arbor, 1983, pg. 12, 24. 
55 Moyle, W., The Second Part of an Argument, Shewing That a Standing Army is Inconsistent With a 
Free Government [1697], University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 9. 
56 Ibid., pg. 17, 20. 
57 Fletcher, A., A Discourse Concerning Militias [1697], University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983, pg. 
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of the Sword, by Standing Mercenary Forces kept up in time of Peace, and absolutely 
depending upon them ".58 That difficulty notwithstanding, Fletcher proposed that a 
"well- regulated Militia" would be the most practicable solution not least because it 
would provide a useful source of popular discipline.59 This view was soundly rejected 
by Daniel Defoe who argued in the Court's interest that the nature and scale of modem 
warfare had made militias obsolete and challenged Fletcher's `civil history of the 
sword'.60 According to Defoe the rise of commerce had made the innumerable 
exactions and local tyrannies of the nobility intolerable, and by many hard- fought 
battles "the People... oblig'd the King and the Barons to accept of an Equilibrium" 
embodied in parliament.ó1 Under parliamentary rule the sword was "indeed trusted in 
the hands of the King" but the moneys that paid for it lay "in the Hands of the People" 
in parliament, and this he called the "True Ballance" of the English constitution.62 
Nevertheless he concluded, the rise of commerce had altered forever the nature of war 
and the overriding consideration of modem war was that whosoever possessed "...the 
longest Sword has yielded to them who had the longest Purse. "63 
The financial revolution of the late seventeenth -century enabled military expenditure to 
be funded by investment in states which thereby "felt able to accept more credit, and 
conduct greater activities, than could be paid for by the existing volume of capital..." 
thus creating a spiralling national debt.64 Credit became in Defoe's words, the new 
"machine" of war, entailing that the state and its army became increasingly dependent 
upon its creditors and their particular interests.65 These creditors, the people with the 
means to invest in the state, constituted a financial class of bankers and speculators 
whose fortunes were tied to the repayment of the national debt. Amongst this class, the 
possession of land no longer held the status it once had as those who engaged in 
speculation in the market were able to amass considerable fortunes in the business of 
58 Ibid., pg. 7, 6. 
59 Ibid., pg. 22 -23. See also, Morgan, E.S., op.cit., pg. 169. 
6° Defoe, D., An Argument Shewing, That a Standing Army, With Consent of Parliament is not 
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poet Matthew Prior claimed to see in the fine arguments against a standing army no more than banal 
political posturing when, for instance, he wrote, "Would they leave England unprotected, /To shew how 
well they are affected,/ And get themselves next Bout Elected ? / This is the Time" Prior, M., A New 
Answer to an Argument Against A Standing Army [ 1697], University microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1983. 
61 Defoe, D., An Argument..., pg. 15. 
b2 Ibid., pg. 16. 
63 Ibid., pg. 20 (italics in original). 
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financing war while escaping its deleterious effects, such as the payment of spiralling 
land taxes.66 Importantly, the very mobility of financial wealth implied that speculators 
had little or no attachment to the well -being of their country for, if conditions were 
unpropitious at home the funds could be re- invested elsewhere. Those with property in 
land however, had no way of escaping the financial burden of supporting the war effort 
and as a consequence were thought to have a greater attachment to the nation. This 
divergence of attitudes toward the two different conceptions of property exercised an 
important influence over public debate, and played no small role in the development of 
liberal discourse 67 Republican thinkers in particular, argued that commercial or 
"mobile" property exercised no elevation of the mind and was thought on the contrary to 
create "artificial beings, whose appetites and powers... must be regulated by a 
sovereign ", raising the prospect of an invasive government.68 According to Pocock the 
landed elites were concerned therefore not simply at the rise of a new class of financial 
speculators, but at the emergence of "a system of parliamentary patronage ", 
The mode of property which they now began to attack, and to denounce 
as a new force in history, transforming and corrupting society, was not 
property in exchange commodities - they called this "trade" and greeted 
it as a means to independence and virtue - but property in government 
office, government stock, and government expectations to which the 
National Debt had mortgaged futurity... a mode of property which 
rendered government dependent on its creditors and creditors dependent 
on government, in a relation incompatible with classical or agrarian 
virtue.69 
From a classical republican position, the problem of commerce was that it encouraged 
vice while also destabilising the established institutions controlling the use of violence. 
In the following section, attention will turn to two prominent though divergent 
responses to this problem. 
II. VIRTUES, VICES AND THE DISCIPLINE OF TRADE 
Pocock argued that Daniel Defoe articulated a conception of property which escaped 
Republican notions of virtue residing exclusively in landed property while avoiding 
bs Defoe, D., The Review, VI (31), 1709, pg. 118. 
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wholesale endorsement of financial speculation.70 Defoe turned to `trade' as a form of 
property which was truly productive, as opposed to risky speculative ventures which 
produced nothing, and land which without trade of the goods produced on it amounted 
to nothing. Trade was productive in two senses stimulating both the production of 
goods and thereby social development. "It is trade..." he wrote, 
...has made your commons rich, your merchants numerous, your poor 
able to maintain themselves. It is trade has made you great, strong, 
terrible abroad, and busy at home. It is trade has kept your people from 
wandering like vagabonds on the face of the earth." 
Defoe's interest in trade manifested itself in the compilation of a compendium of 
practical advice to `tradesmen' on matters ranging from book -keeping to personal 
conduct entitled The Complete English Tradesman. The Tradesman was concerned that 
those engaged in trade be properly governed by those with the responsibility for 
regulating the economic affairs of the nation, and that tradesmen govern themselves 
appropriately taking great pains to be honest, diligent, and prudent.72 Trade, Defoe 
argued, provided employment and wages for the poor and thus provided a "public 
benefit" by sustaining an increasing population." Importantly, Defoe argued that the 
wealth of trade was tied to wealth gained from agriculture, and that "...if trade and land, 
which are the wealth of this nation, are divided and differ, the whole body will soon 
stand still. And this, like the circulation in the body, will throw the whole into 
apoplexies, dead palsies, and every mortal disease:'" For republicans however, 
financial wealth encouraged a wasteful luxury which undermined the muscular virtues 
of independence and self- sacrifice.75 The problem was that a commercial economy 
pandered to the meanest and most profligate appetites of the idle rich who indulged their 
passions for luxury goods, and diverted themselves from more productive pursuits in 
public service.76 Defoe however, argued against this view by reflecting upon the 
70 Pocock, J. G. A., Machiavellian Moment..., pg. 446 -450. 
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industries and manufactures and the "many families [and]... multitudes of hands they 
employ" given over to the production of luxury goods." 
Defoe's defence however, was cautious and it was left to more strident critics such as 
Bernard Mandeville to argue that pandering to private vices would deliver public 
benefits. Mandeville's argument was that vices such as greed or avarice were an 
inseparable part of any commercial society.78 In his infamous Fable of the Bees, a thinly 
disguised allegory of British society, Mandeville wrote of a hive of bees whose 
ceaseless industry was driven by the pursuit of vices such as luxury, gluttony, and 
avarice. As Mandeville himself put it in his dubious doggerel, "Thus every Part was full 
of Vice, / Yet the whole Mass a Paradice ".79 The indulgence of vices produced public 
benefits, and nowhere was his reasoning more succinctly put than in the Fable, 
The Root of evil Avarice, 
That damn'd ill -natur'd baneful Vice, 
Was slave to Prodigality, 
That Noble Sin; whilst Luxury 
Employ'd a Million of the Poor, 
And odious Pride a Million More. 
Envy it self, and Vanity 
Were Ministers of Industry; 
Their darling Folly, Fickleness 
In Diet, Furniture, and Dress, 
That strange ridic'lous Vice, was made 
The very Wheel, that turn'd the Trade. 
... Thus Vice nursed Ingenuity, 
Which join'd with Time, and Industry 
Had carry'd Life's Conveniences, 
... To such a Height, the very Poor 
Lived better than the Rich before; 
The Fable went on to suggest that a revolution in manners within the hive resulting in 
the sudden practice of virtue instead of vice, the pursuit of self -restraint, abstinence, and 
77 Defoe, D., The Review, IX (43), 1713, pg. 128. 
78 Goldsmith, M. M., op.cit., pg. 137. 
164 
honesty would result in mass unemployment and the weakening of commerce. 
Goldsmith argues that Mandeville's position was not - as his critics tended to represent 
it - a panegyric to vice, but a subtler recognition that pandering to the whims and desires 
of the feckless rich produced socially beneficial effects.80 Indeed Mandeville concluded 
the Fable with the suggestion that vice only produced socially beneficial effects when 
"it's by Justice lopt, and bound" although he gloomily observed that "Fraud, Luxury, 
and Pride must live / Whilst we the Benefits receive. / Hunger's a dreadful Plague, no 
doubt, / Yet who digests or thrives without ?i81 Mandeville's image of social order was 
here based on the notion of society as a spontaneous order, functioning as a self - 
governing entity operating through the manifold, diverse and individual choices of self - 
interested consumers. 
Conscious as they both were of the implication of personal vice or the indulgence of 
passions in the pursuit of commerce, both Mandeville and Defoe nonetheless stood 
poles apart in their respective attitudes to this problem. Rather than seeing trade as a 
means of harnessing the passions to socially useful ends, Defoe's position was that trade 
offered the means of disciplining individuals and society itself. Mandeville however, 
decried the impact of discipline and sought a balance between socially useful and 
harmful passions based on the recognition that "strong Habits and Inclinations can only 
be subdued by Passions of greater Violence.s82 Defoe's Tradesman concluded with 
earnest reflections on the very question of the role of personal vice in fostering trade by 
considering the ubiquitous eighteenth century dilemma of what to do about luxury. 
Defoe did not dispute that the indulgence of vice and especially the consumption of 
luxury items stimulated trade, but argued that consumption required regulation "by 
some wholesome sumptuary law ".83 Such a law would regulate the production of luxury 
items by restricting their consumption, thereby freeing workers currently engaged in the 
production of wasteful luxuries to be employed in more serviceable tasks. The purpose 
79 All following quotations from the Fable of the Bees is taken from Mandeville, B., The Fable of the 
Bees [1714], edited by P. Harth, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970, pg. 67 -76. 
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of Defoe's discussion of luxury and trade however, was to propose that the error of vice 
did not inhere in trade but in the "minds of the people" and that the effective regulation 
of trade would not simply discipline commerce but the people who depended upon it.84 
Defoe held up the figure of the industrious, assiduous, honest trader as a social ideal for 
emulation. The key to his argument was the concept of credit and the role it played in 
commercial activity, a role which could be both negative and positive. Credit for 
example, had provided the state with the means to pursue military aggrandisement, but 
continual warfare harmed trade.85 Credit moreover was almost impossible to control 
and defied the legislative power of national parliaments.86 The operations of credit were 
also blind to human virtue, and echoing Machiavelli's feminisation of Fortuna Defoe 
feminised credit, "she blesses and blasts just as she pleases; she tyrannises over youth, 
beauty, virtue, estate... if she forsake the honestest [sic] woman in the world, nobody 
will touch her; if she covers the most scandalous behaviours, it passes for virtue... ".87 
Credit therefore was an instrument of human passions beyond the reach of law; its 
operations were open to the least influence from the hopes and fears, whims and 
feelings of individuals caught up in the fury of the market. 
Defoe however, also attempted to re -cast the role of credit as a means of fostering 
productive self- discipline.88 In other words credit - which was indispensable for trade - 
would only be granted to those who met the requirements of a virtuous trader, and this 
itself required that society and thereby credit itself would be subject to a universal social 
discipline to prevent it from being totally subjected to the passions.ß9 On this view the 
chief task of government lay in the correct management of credit by governing and 
disciplining the passions of individuals, enabling each to "...get on with his social life, 
practice its virtues, and make his contribution to the credit and confidence which men 
repose in one another.s90 The task of government was thus to administer the needs of the 
economy, making sure that it functioned as smoothly as possible with as little 
interference as practicable, 
84 Ibid., pg. 234. 
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Money is now the business: raising money is the affair, ways and means 
is the word. The answer is ready: where money is legally obtained, it 
must be legally obtained again. Subjects honestly labouring, honestly 
possessing, ought to be left quietly, enjoying what they are masters of; 
and this is the foundation of what we call law, liberty, and property... 
This is the end of parliaments, constitutions, government, and obedience; 
and this is the true foundation of order in the world, and long may it be 
our privilege to maintain it...91 
Mandeville's position, developed in his elaborations of the themes from the Fable 
entitled An Enquiry Into the Origin of Moral Virtue denounced the hypocrisy of the 
disciplines Defoe had praised. The purpose of discipline Mandeville argued, was to 
instil a "dextrous Management of ourselves, a stifling of our Appetites" which consisted 
in "hiding the real Sentiments of our Hearts before others" in order to avoid the sanction 
of shame or embarrassment.92 He argued that all animals were "Sollicitous of pleasing 
themselves" and possessed a natural inclination to pursue their own private advantage 
over that of others, while the guardians of society - politicians, priests and lawyers - 
sought to instil the belief in "the People they were to govern" that "it was more 
beneficial for every body to conquer than indulge his Appetites, and much better to 
mind the Publick than what seem'd his private Interest. "93 Far from seeing any violence 
in the indulgence of passions, Mandeville decried the violence we have been invited to 
commit upon ourselves.94 Society he believed, was founded upon manifold acts of 
private violence designed to curb natural inclinations at the behest of "skilfull 
Politicians" who used "flattery", praised our "sagacity ", "understanding" and 
"rationality", and employed "Notions of Honour and Shame" to promote this ceaseless 
violence, rendering individuals "useful to each other as well as tractable... [to] govern 
vast Numbers of... [us] with greater Ease and Security" 95 
Mandeville saw the disciplinary inculcation of virtue as a cynical quest to conquer the 
natural passions of human beings, a ploy of those who desired power over others. The 
politeness and manners of polished society were no more than a sham, an effect 
cultivated in the gullible through education by those who have succeeded not in 
91 Defoe, D., The Review, IV (106), 1707, pg. 133. 
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conquering but hiding their animal passions.9ó In his later A Search into the Nature of 
Society of 1723, Mandeville heaped scorn on the idea of public virtue which he 
considered was "good for nothing but to breed Drones" fit only for "the stupid 
Enjoyments of a Monastick Life, or at best a Country Justice of the Peace ", totally 
unsuited to a rigorous life of "Labour and Assiduity... great Atchievements and perilous 
Undertakings.s97 Such a view Hundert suggests, reveals the faith Mandeville placed in 
the "civilising" effect of commerce 98 Hundert may have overstated his case; 
Mandeville's faith in `civilisation' was not as great as his faith in the unreformed human 
character, 
Hunger, Thirst and Nakedness are the first Tyrants that force us to stir: 
afterwards our Pride, Sloth, Sensuality and Fickleness are the great 
Patrons that promote all Arts and Sciences, Trades, Handicrafts and 
Callings; whilst the great Task -masters, Necessity, Avarice, Envy and 
Ambition, each in the Class that belongs to him, keep the Members of 
the Society to their Labour, and make them all submit, most of them 
chearfully, to the Drudgery of their Station; Kings and Princes not 
excepted99 
While virtues of perseverance and patience had their uses, the vast accomplishments of 
industry and human ingenuity were inspired not by the calm virtues, but by the desire to 
gratify the ubiquitous vices of sloth, avarice, or greed. If such vices were eradicated 
from the human mind the whole fabric of society would disintegrate, whole professions 
would cease, unemployment would become uncontrollable, industry would decline, and 
the very purpose of social life - to indulge our vices with greater ease - would lose its 
utility. 
For his critics Mandeville's conception of society was a frightful image of indulgence of 
every vice, an undisciplined community in which every sort of wickedness was avowed 
and government derided.10° For Defoe however, government had a positive role to play 
in providing necessary infrastructure to facilitate the circulation of goods and money 
thereby fostering the correct "management" and "regulation" of populations.101 It would 
9s Ibid., pg. 82 -85. Goldsmith argues that in Mandeville's view, government should ideally function as 
a "machine" providing conditions in which the economy could flourish. Goldsmith, M. M., loc.cit., pg. 
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also result in the creation of disciplined, upright citizens who by engaging in 
commercial activity participated in what he called the "most noble, most instructive, and 
improving of any way of life.s102 Here we see the rudiments of a notion of commerce as 
a civilising activity rather different from Mandeville's. According to Defoe, trade 
presented those who engaged in it with manifold opportunities for being disciplined in 
the virtues of the trader, "the support and improver of power, learning and fortunes ", 
who must be part scholar, part traveller, able to master different languages and 
understand different cultures, qualified in short "for all sorts of employment in the state 
by a general knowledge of things and men... ".103 The disciplined trader would display 
"probity and punctual payment" and foster the "confidence" of fellow traders. 100. In turn, 
the state would benefit from the merchant who alone could generate the means to 
transform "a wet bog" into "a populous state ", and who in the process would "enrich... 
beggars, ennoble... mechanics, raise... not families only, but towns, cities, provinces, 
and kingdoms.s105 Close as they came to the view that commerce was a civilising 
activity Defoe and Mandeville did not argue that it also exerted a pacifying influence. 
Indeed they could hardly do so having documented the linkage between commerce and 
warmaking in Defoe's case, and the inevitable privations and crimes Mandeville thought 
attendant upon commerce. Within liberal discourse however, commerce came to be 
seen not only as a source of discipline, but of pacifying discipline. The problem that 
had to be overcome here was that as Defoe recognised, commerce actually extended the 
state's capacity for violence. The resolution of this problem was tied to the 
development of a liberal discourse of civilisation in which violence was excluded by 
attributing it to the persistence of uncivilised peoples and states. The foundations of this 
discourse of civilisation were laid by one of its most articulate proponents, Charles 
Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689 -1755). 
III. COMMERCE AND PACIFICATION 
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws was addressed to the nature of the relationship 
between the laws of a community and its political structure. The nature of this 
relationship depended he argued, on such variables as the style of rule, the geographical 
102 Defoe, D., The Review, III (2), 1706, pg. 124. 
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and climatic conditions, and most importantly the spirit, customs and mores within the 
community itself. The problem as Montesquieu saw it, was that any form of social life 
required the establishment of laws, but whether a community or polity was to be 
enriched or impoverished by their laws depended upon how they were to be enforced, 
and this in turn was dependent upon the mores and manners of the people themselves. It 
was this problem that the Spirit of the Laws set out to clarify and resolve while drawing 
upon some of the arguments previously elaborated in his Persian Letters. According to 
Richard Sher, the mythical history of the Troglodytes described in the Persian Letters 
reflected Montesquieu's fear that the development of commerce eroded the practice of 
virtue, and it was this problem that he hoped to resolve in the Spirit.106 
Montesquieu assumed that society originated in the natural "weakness ", "timidity ", and 
"mutual fear" of human beings driven to seek refuge from the rigours of the wild in 
company with others.107 Once in society however, individual weakness was replaced by 
the growing awareness of collective strength, and from this recognition proceeded a 
dual "state of war" between individual nations, and between individual citizens who 
sought domination over others.108 In order to avert this state of war laws were required 
to regulate the behaviour of states and of citizens within polities. The nature of these 
laws depended to a large degree on the nature of the polity in question, and the nature of 
the polity was dependent largely upon the conduct of its citizens or subjects. 
Montesquieu's subsequent discussion focussed largely on the distinction between 
republics and monarchic or despotic polities. Republics, which could be either 
democratic or aristocratic, were `liberal' polities in that sovereignty resided in the 
people with laws made on their behalf to protect their lives, liberties, and property. In 
monarchic and despotic states by contrast, sovereignty resided in the person of the 
monarch or despot. For Montesquieu, despotic states (and to a lesser degree 
monarchies) represented an extreme form of undisciplined, uncivilised polity whereas 
republics embodied all the virtues of thoroughgoing discipline, efficient regulation, and 
civilisation. 
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The model for the despotic states described in the Spirit was provided by the 
descriptions of the seraglio in the Persian Letters. Here one person ruled over all others 
in a ruthless tyranny, and all who were under their power were enslaved.'09 The image 
of the seraglio however, was also used to convey the idea that despotic rulership 
involved an abandonment to the passions while those who were so ruled served only to 
gratify the ruler's passions. Montesquieu's description of the nature of despotic rule 
was redolent with the imagery of undisciplined indulgence. The despot's senses 
"constantly tell him that he is everything and that others are nothing" and was therefore 
"lazy, ignorant, and voluptuous ", "drunk with pleasures ", and inclined to "abandon the 
public business" to his chief slave or "vizir" to follow his "most brutal passions ".10 
True discipline consisted in the practice of what Montesquieu called virtue, and virtue 
sprang from the knowledge that each citizen was equally subjected to and prospered 
under the same laws, and thereby controlled their passions in the interest of furthering 
the public good. "' "The less we can satisfy our particular passions..." Montesquieu 
suggested "the more we give ourselves up to passions for the general order... The more 
austere [this order]... the more it curtails... [our] inclinations, the more force it gives to 
those that remain."' 
The effective control of passions however, did not only apply to individual citizens but 
to the very exercise of sovereignty itself. In liberal republican states the people were 
sovereign and the law was not enforced through terror or majesty, but obeyed because 
each citizen recognised that the law embodied their own interests. In such a state the 
equality of citizens was reflected in the making of laws, and thereby private passions 
and inclinations as well as the power of the state were regulated by popularly accepted 
laws. "3 In despotic and monarchical states by contrast, no such discipline reigned and 
sovereignty was abased by the passions and inclinations of the prince or despot. 
'8 Ibid., pg. 7. 
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Monarchies in particular were characterised by the fawning of courtiers, their "flattery, 
treachery, perfidy... abandonment of all... engagements... [and] scorn of the duties of 
citizens... ".14 In despotic states sovereignty bore the taint of fear and violence which 
were the chief instruments of rule over "timid, ignorant, beaten -down people ", and the 
severity of the law embodied nothing more than the "anger and vengeance" of the 
despot who ruled by "chastisement.i15 
States such as these were undisciplined polities, waging war "in all their natural fury" 
unabated by the "right of nations ", where the despot's private interest and the "domestic 
government" of the "seraglio" was substituted for "political and civil government ".16 
In such a state religion served only foster fear, and no enticement was offered to 
commerce. But despotic polities were also numerous simply because they did not 
require the rigorous discipline of republics, 
...despite men's love of liberty, despite their hatred of violence, most 
peoples are subject to this type of government [despotism]. This is easy 
to understand. In order to form a moderate government, one must 
combine powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must 
give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist 
another; this is a masterpiece of legislation that chance rarely produces 
and prudence is rarely allowed to produce. By contrast, a despotic 
government... is uniform throughout; as only passions are needed to 
establish it... "7 
Consequently, while it was in the nature of despotic governments to rule by force and 
violence, and monarchical governments sought "war and expansion ", liberal republics 
were characterised by "peace and moderation. "18 The peacefulness of republics 
extended to both the conduct of citizens in society and to the conduct of the state itself, 
providing thereby the most efficacious solution to the dual state of war - between 
citizens and nations. The peacefulness of republics was attributable to commerce 
insofar as it introduced a form of discipline first to the individuals engaged in it; and 
second, by subjecting trading nations to powerful incentives inclining them toward 
Carrithers, D.W., "Montesquieu's Philosphy of Punishment ", History of Political Thought, XIX (2), 
1998, pg. 222. 
14 Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 25 -26. 
15 Ibid., pg. 59 and 29. Similarly, David Hume wrote that a "...man possessed of usurped power, can set 
no bounds to his pretensions..." while the power of a "...legal authority, though great, has always some 
bounds, which terminate both the hopes and pretensions of the person possessed of it... ". Hume, D., 
Political Essays, edited by K. Haakonssen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pg. 30. 
"6 Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 59 -60. 
"' Ibid., pg. 63. 
18 /bid., pg. 132. 
172 
peace. In despotic states as both Hume and Montesquieu averred, all material wealth 
was subjected to the despot and this acted as a deterrent to trade and agriculture, while 
in monarchical states commerce served only to fulfil the taste of the prince and his court 
for luxury.19 In republics however, commerce fulfilled an altogether different purpose 
because in these polities commerce was an encouragement not to luxury and vice but 
discipline and virtue. Montesquieu's general rule here was that "in a nation that is in 
servitude, one works more to preserve than to acquire; in a free nation, one works more 
to acquire than to preserve ", and thus in republics acquisition was tempered by 
"economy" while in monarchies it served wasteful "luxury ".120 Republican states were 
therefore most suited to benefit from commerce and thereby commerce itself was 
identified as the agent of civilisation. In this way, Montesquieu managed to exclude 
violence from the life of civilised societies by identifying it as an attribute of 
undisciplined, uncivilised states, societies, and individuals. 
Consequently, Montesquieu believed that commerce cured "destructive prejudices, and 
it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle [doux] mores, there is 
commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores.st21 
Montesquieu claimed that commerce "polishes and softens barbarous mores" replacing 
them with "knowledge" gained through careful "comparison" of alternatives, which lead 
to social "peace" and a `reciprocal' union based on recognition of "mutual needs" and a 
"feeling for exact justice ".122 Barbarous nations by contrast exhibited "fierce" manners 
and had no conception of "exact justice ", merely "banditry".123 Montesquieu was clear 
that the chief benefit of commerce was felt in republics where the disciplinary effects of 
economy would work upon the populace. A population engaged in commerce he 
argued, would be more able to cultivate virtue; they would be "hardworking ", `just ", 
"moderate ", and "frugal ", and in republics such virtues would be esteemed by both 
citizens and rulers alike.124 Montesquieu here hinted at the disciplinary effect of 
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commerce on both individuals and states, and that its effectiveness hinged on the fact 
that it was voluntary. 
That commerce was able to develop at all within feudal states and societies was, 
Montesquieu argued, due to the recognition by rulers of their self -interest in fostering it. 
The historical example Montesquieu used to illustrate the point was the recognition by 
medieval European monarchs that the persecution of the Jews, who themselves were a 
major source of revenue from their commercial activity, was not in their interest. Thus, 
"...princes have had to govern themselves more wisely than they themselves would have 
thought, for it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience 
itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity.s125 The 
notion of interest as a productive impulse therefore made its appearance as an alternative 
to the destructiveness of passion, "...happily, men are in a situation such that, though 
their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an 
interest in not being so.s126 Indeed, Montesquieu's language seems to confirm 
Hirschman's analysis, "let one not speak of the prince's glory; his glory is his 
arrogance; it is a passion and not a legitimate right.s127 
Montesquieu however, did not argue that the pacification of society was accomplished 
solely or even largely through the supplanting of passion, nor by the rise of self -interest. 
The process of pacification was a consequence of the discipline which only republican 
regimes were able to fully achieve. Significantly, Montesquieu argued that polities 
which had been civilised were able to amass greater strength than uncivilised polities, 
and in doing so laid the foundation for the argument that became a central feature of a 
liberal discourse of civilisation, that civilisation made liberal states more economically 
and militarily powerful. As David Hume put it, "as private men receive greater security, 
in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public 
becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private 
men. "128 Because despotic and monarchical states were based on the use of violence 
either internally or externally Montesquieu argued that princes and despots were trapped 
by the perpetual fear of conquest by other states. Despots and monarchs thus put all 
izs Ibid., pg. 389. 
1zc Ibid., pg. 389-390. 
12' Ibid., pg. 139. 
174 
their efforts into trying to seal -off their state from other neighbouring states. Republics 
on the other hand neither sought nor feared conquest and thus were able to join with 
other republics to form larger "federal republics" to provide greater stability and 
security.129 In his remarks on Britain, which was far from being a truly popular or 
republican state, Montesquieu nonetheless praised Britain's subordination of "political 
interests" to "the interests of its commerce ".130 What he appeared to mean here was that 
the British realised that their state would benefit from vibrant commerce and that the 
task of politics was to ensure that the economy remained free and unobstructed. The 
implication was clearly that states subjected to the disciplines of the market were less 
likely to engage in the wasteful wars or vicious tyrannies of despots and monarchs and 
would restrict themselves to the strengthening but pacific activities of commerce. It 
also implied that the superior strength of civilised states was effectively controlled; such 
states were not inherently violent, but preferred to deal with other states in trade and 
commerce rather than war. In tandem with the view that commerce had banished 
violence to the world of uncivilised peoples and polities, the contention that civilised 
states possessed superior strength effectively excluded this increased potential for 
violence from any inherent connection with the civilising process by seeing it as a 
defensive measure against the inherent violence of uncivilised states. 
This argument was reinforced by Montesquieu's discussion of Christianity which he 
believed was a source of pacifying and civilising discipline comparable in influence to 
commerce.1' "The Christian religion..." Montesquieu argued was "remote from pure 
despotism; the gentleness so recommended in the gospel stands opposed to the despotic 
fury with which a prince would mete out his own justice and exercise his cruelties.s132 
In contrast to the teachings of Christianity however, Islam was represented as vicious 
and cruel, speaking "only with a sword" with "the destructive spirit that founded it. "133 
The people of Europe, he contended "...owe to Christianity both a certain political right 
128 Hume, D., op.cit., pg. 94. 
129 Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 131. 
130 Ibid., pg. 343 -346. 
u1 Hsia, R.P. -C., argues that the two confessional faiths of the German Reformation, Calvinism and 
Lutheranism, as well as Counter -Reformation Catholicism were each used by territorial rulers in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a means of social discipline and pacification. Hsia, R. P. -C., 
op.cit., pg. 11 -52, 146, 164 -165. 
132 Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 461. 
133 Ibid., pg. 462. Interestingly, this is a contention with which Ernest Gellner concurs in his Conditions 
of Liberty; Civil Society and its Rivals, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1994. 
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in government and a certain right of nations in war... [which] leaves to the vanquished... 
life, liberty, laws, goods... ".14 Montesquieu's words here reflect the highly formalised 
`rules of engagement' governing the conduct of war which had emerged from the chaos 
and destructiveness of the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War.15 They also 
indicated a desire to extend this formalised structure of interaction to the sphere of 
domestic social interaction, replacing action determined by private conviction with rule - 
governed, regulated and disciplined conduct.16 
In reflecting on the French Wars of Religion in the sixteenth -century Montesquieu 
observed that "every religion which is repressed becomes repressive itself' and "attacks 
the religion which repressed it, not as a religion, but as a tyranny.s137 Montesquieu's 
chief aim therefore was to envisage a purely secular politics based on the mutual 
disinterest of self -governing citizens, 
...it is useful for the laws to require of these various religions not only 
that they do not disturb the state, but also that they not disturb each other. 
A citizen does not satisfy the laws by contenting himself with not 
agitating the body of the state; he must also not disturb any citizen 
whatsoever.1' 
Montesquieu was clear therefore that social pacification could only be accomplished by 
encouraging an attitude of polite indifference between citizens. Such indifference 
subsumed both passion and religious or other private conviction, preventing them from 
becoming an ever renewable casus belli. This attitude of indifferent toleration was 
clearly tied to the rise of commerce and the personal skills and virtues which both Defoe 
and Montesquieu thought necessary to its practice. On one level, this process could be 
conceptualised in terms of the control of passion by the cool calculation of interest, but 
neither Defoe nor Montesquieu took so crude a view. For them the rise of commerce 
and the pacification it achieved was intimately tied to broader processes of discipline 
which suffused whole societies. Self- interested commercial activity was therefore tied 
to a broader historical account of the march of `civilisation'. As both Defoe and 
X34 Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 461 -462. 
15 The emergence of this style of warfare is explored at length by Russell Weigley in The Age of 
Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare From Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Pimlico, London, 1993, pg. 45- 
194; see also John Keegan's thought provoking study of modem warfare in A History of Warfare, 
Pimlico, London, 1993, pg. 3 -24, 340 -392. 
"6 Bauman identifies this tendency as a crucial element in the "thoroughgoing militarisation of inter - 
societal exchange and inner- societal production of order ", which I shall discuss in the next chapter. 
Bauman, Z., Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity, Cambridge, 1989, pg. 97. 
"' Montesquieu, Spirit, pg. 487. 
°' Ibid., pg. 488. 
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Montesquieu indicated the extension of commerce was not simply the result of private 
decisions to pursue self -interest, but was actively encouraged by states and governments 
who stood to benefit from the resulting discipline. For Montesquieu in particular 
violence was excluded from the process of civilisation by attributing it to the uncivilised 
world of barbarian personalities and barbaric states. The assumptions that violence was 
an attribute of barbarism, that commerce was a source of pacifying discipline, and that 
the violence of civilised states could be explained simply as a reaction to uncivilised 
states were each to exert a powerful influence on subsequent liberal thought. 
CONCLUSION 
The distinction between the earlier discourse of a fragile civility upheld by the judicious 
government of opinion within civil society, and the emergent discourse of civilisation 
lay in the identification of a universal disciplinary mechanism which could drive 
pacification beyond the limited confines of civil society to encompass a much wider 
span. The ambiguity inspired by the transition from a predominantly land -based 
economy to one increasingly dominated by trade and commerce reflected the need to 
find such a mechanism in order to avert the dual fears of rampant vice among the 
masses and its control by arbitrary government. Republican thinkers approached this 
problem on the basis that moral corruption and arbitrary rule were dangers which could 
be averted by the wise and judicious use of violence. As Walter Moyle put it, violence 
could be "a remedy instead of a ruin" and observed as had "Machiavel" before him that 
"great dangers and violent extremities often rectify and recover a constitution of 
government tending toward corruption... [thereby restoring] virtue and discipline ".139 
Within the emerging liberal discourse of civilisation however, violence was seen as a 
danger to civil society even though the commerce which drove the civilising process 
extended the state's capacity for violence. It therefore became necessary to isolate 
violence from civilisation, and Montesquieu attempted to do just that by associating 
violence with uncivilised and undisciplined personalities and polities. 
In doing so Montesquieu was able to defend commerce by excluding violence from any 
inherent connection with the process of civilisation. While commerce may have 
intensified the state's capacity to use violence, civilised states would show little interest 
19 Moyle, W., An Essay Upon the Constitution of the Roman Government [1699], in Two English 
Republican Tracts, edited by C. Robbins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, pg. 259. 
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in using it. Their conduct would be as restrained, regulated, and disciplined as the 
conduct of its politely indifferent citizens. The superior strength of civilised states thus 
provided a powerful incentive for rulers and citizens to pursue commerce; it would lead 
to greater security from the violence of uncivilised peoples and polities. The 
achievement of greater security was tied to the extension of processes of discipline and 
regulation within society. Civil society was thus assured of a brighter prospect, of 
greater and more effective government of conduct within society, and a stronger but 
non -aggressive protection from the state. The notion of a fragile civility however, did 
not entirely recede from liberal discourse. The civil order was still hedged about by 
boundaries which confined the operations of executive power, but a new and durable 
boundary had now been drawn between civilisation and barbarism, and subsequent 
chapters will explore the continuing influence of this boundary within liberal discourse. 
This task will begin with a discussion in the next chapter of the problem of civilisation 
and the violence of warfare in the work of some early liberal and other Enlightenment 
thinkers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE DISCIPLINE OF AUTONOMY: 
COMMERCIAL CIVILISATION AND PEACE 
We may, with good reason, congratulate our species on their having escaped from a 
state of barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of domestic peace and regular 
policy. 
- Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767], Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 1966, pg. 225. 
I open my books about rights and morals, I listen to scholars and legal experts, and 
inspired by their suggestive discourses, I deplore the miseries of nature, admire the 
peace and justice established by the civil order, bless the wisdom of public institutions, 
and find consolation for being a man by seeing myself as a citizen. Well instructed as to 
my duties and my happiness, I close the books, leave the lecture room, and look around 
me. There I see a miserable people groaning under an iron yoke, the whole human race 
crushed by a handful of oppressors, and an enraged mob overwhelmed by pain and 
hunger whose blood and tears the rich drink in peace. And everywhere the strong are 
armed against the weak with the formidable power of law. All of this happens 
peacefully and without resistance. ... Before me is a panorama of murder - ten thousand 
slaughtered men, the dead piled up in heaps, the dying trampled by horses - and 
everywhere the sight of death and agony. And yet all of this is the fruit of peaceful 
institutions. Pity and indignation rise up from the depths of my heart. Barbarous 
philosopher, come read us your book on a battlefield! 
- Jean -Jacques Rousseau, "The State of War" [1755], in G. G. Roosevelt, Reading Rousseau in the 
Nuclear Age, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990, pg. 185. 
This chapter will explore the relationship identified by a range of thinkers during the 
eighteenth -century between the domestic disciplines of civilisation which operated 
largely within societies, and the external or international behaviour of the states that 
shielded and protected them. The opening quotations introduce the paradox this 
relationship represented to two thinkers in particular, Adam Ferguson and Jean- Jacques 
Rousseau, respectively the leading critic and the leading defender of civilisation in their 
age. The contrast between them however, masks an important continuity. Both 
Ferguson and Rousseau were convinced that the processes of civilisation operating 
within Western Europe were creating civil societies inhabited by independent, self - 
governed individuals. Such societies however, depended on disciplines which went 
beyond the restricted circle of Locke's civil society and grasped at a more inclusive 
totality of disciplinary mechanisms. In the process violence was increasingly seen as an 
attribute of barbarism, excluded from the realm of civilisation. The problem to which 
the thinkers discussed in this chapter were attuned however, was that as both Defoe and 
Montesquieu had observed, civilisation was driving a vastly increased capacity for state 
violence. 
This chapter will be concerned with the way in which some early liberal and other 
eighteenth -century thinkers approached this problem. The solution to the problem 
favoured by early liberal thinkers involved the conceptualisation of civil society as a 
realm protected by boundaries separating the peace of domestic relations from the 
violence of the international realm, between states which were conceived as inhabiting 
an international state of nature in which violence was still an accepted course of action. 
This sort of solution was indicative of a central assumption within the emerging 
discourse of civilisation, that peace was a condition secured within the domestic realm 
of relations within states. While Ferguson accepted the inevitability of violence on the 
international realm of relations between states, concerted efforts were made (as we shall 
also see in the following chapter) throughout the eighteenth -century to envisage an end 
to warfare. Rousseau's treatment of this issue in a selection of writings from the mid - 
century posed the most serious questions to the discourse of civilisation. Rousseau's 
critique exerted a most profound influence over the development of Immanuel Kant's 
argument that mutual antagonism in civil society lead to domestic peace, and that 
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mutual antagonism between states would lead to the creation of an international pacific 
union and put an end to war. 
The chapter will begin by examining the work of Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson and 
the importance they laid upon the development within civil societies of commercial 
relations. Commerce they argued, was a source of discipline within society which 
combined the pursuit of productivity with the achievement of peace. The problem to 
which they drew attention however, was that domestic peace was underwritten by the 
concentration of violence in the hands of the state which it used in its relations with 
other states. For Ferguson in particular, the concentration of violence in the hands of 
the state represented a potential threat to the security and peace of commercial society 
itself. Rousseau's critique of the discourse of civilisation, which will be discussed in 
the following section, drew attention to a deeper problem in that the very independence 
created by the civilising process was fuelling mutual antagonism and violence between 
individuals within society and between states in the international realm. Toward the end 
of the century Immanuel Kant responded to this critique by identifying mutual 
antagonism as the engine of peace both domestically within states and internationally 
between them. In the third section of this chapter it will be argued that Kant's 
reconciliation of mutual antagonism with peace reflected a belief that commercial 
societies were those in which the most effective forms of pacifying discipline operated. 
This in turn reflected a fundamental assumption of liberal thought, to be explored in the 
following chapter, that violence had been excluded from civilised societies and polities 
and consigned to the realm of the uncivilised. 
I COMMERCE AND CIVILISATION IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 
The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were preoccupied with the question of how 
dangerous and violent passions could be controlled by the pacifying considerations of 
self -interest, which they saw as the product of discipline and civilisation. The discipline 
to which they turned in particular was commerce, and one of the more important 
arguments they used to recommend it was that it promised an end to violence. In this 
respect several Scottish Enlightenment thinkers paid homage to Montesquieu.' William 
This link is explored in Sher, R.B., "From Troglodytes to Americans: Montesquieu and the Scottish 
Enlightenment on Liberty, Virtue, and Commerce" in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, Liberty, and 
Commercial Society, 1649 -1776, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, pg. 368 -401. 
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Robertson's account of the civilising process in sixteenth -century Europe for instance 
resonated with Montesquieu's description of the pacifying influence of commerce, 
Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinction 
and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of 
men. It unites them, by... the desire of supplying their mutual wants. It 
disposes them to peace, by establishing in every state an order of citizens 
bound by their interest to be the guardian of publick tranquility.' 
The pacifying and self -controlling influence of commerce marked an important phase in 
the development of modern liberalism, which separated the political thought of the 
Scottish Enlightenment from both Republicanism and the discourse of `police'.' Both 
Republicanism and the discourse of police received impetus from the decay of the 
feudal order in Europe and the consequent need to find new ways of conceptualising 
social order. While Republican thought was based on notions of virtue inculcated in the 
elite by virtue of their possession of land, the discourse of police centred on a host of 
supervisory mechanisms aimed at subjecting populations to centrally directed 
administration in "an attempt to regulate not only public, but also private life. ' 
Kalyvas and Katznelson see Adam Ferguson in particular as a thinker who tried to 
incorporate the values of classical Republicanism which stressed the need for virtue and 
public spiritedness and those of an emergent liberalism based on the primacy of 
"economic self -interest ".5 The contention of this chapter however, is that Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson were more concerned 
with the problem of how to discipline self -government and ensure thereby the self - 
regulation of civil society and the avoidance of tyranny. As their contemporary David 
Hume put it, "industry and arts and trade encrease the power of the sovereign as well as 
the happiness of the subjects; and that policy is violent, which aggrandises the public by 
2 Robertson, W., The Progress of Society in Europe [1769], edited by F. Gilbert, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1972, pg. 67. 
3 See for example, Pocock, J.G.A., "Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the 
Relations Between the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth -Century 
Social Thought ", in I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds), Wealth and Virtue; The Shaping of Political Economy 
in the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pg. 241 -5; and Dean, M. 
and Hindess, B., "Introduction: Government, Liberalism and Society" in M. Dean and B. Hindess (eds.), 
Governing Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pg. 1 -4. 
Oestreich, G., Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, translated by D. McLintock, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pg. 157. 
Kalyvas, A, and Katznelson, I., "Adam Ferguson Returns; Liberalism Through a Glass, Darkly ", 
Political Theory, 26 (2), 1988, pg. 176. 
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the poverty of individuals.s' In order to avoid this problem it became vital to establish 
that self -regulation and self -government could be relied upon to maintain public 
tranquillity.' The primacy of this concern can be identified for instance, in Adam 
Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments in which he aimed to demonstrate how to "restrain 
our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections... [which] can alone produce among 
mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace 
and propriety.i' Throughout the early parts of the work he wrote of the "violence of the 
passions ", how "loathsome and disagreeable" surrender to them rendered us, how the 
"brutal" and "violent effects" of passions reduced us to slavery.9 Surrender to the 
passions was described as something shared "in common with the brutes ", and 
reflecting the overt sexism of his day women were described as particularly vulnerable 
to "natural" passions which must be restrained by the "laws of society"." 
Nonetheless, Smith contrasted `social' passions such as generosity and compassion with 
`unsocial' passions such as hatred and anger, and sought to regulate those passions by 
appealing to self -interest as a way of keeping them "within the bounds of prudence and 
justice "» Lurking behind such prescriptions was a conception of the self and a way of 
life that Smith wished to recommend above all others, the essential elements of which 
were the "reason" and "self- command" by which individuals were enabled to foresee 
the consequences of their actions, and thereby to chart a course toward the greatest 
pleasure even if it meant enduring a present pain.12 It was of course the figure of the 
merchant that Smith had in mind here, one who practiced "frugality, industry, and 
application" in the "acquisition of fortune ", pursued "remote advantage" by giving up 
"all present pleasures ", and enduring "the greatest labour both of mind and body" to win 
a general "approbation "." Elsewhere Smith described the virtues of this "prudent" self 
as consisting in a constant care for the self -preservation of health, fortune, rank, and 
6 Hume, D., Political Essays, edited by K. Haakonssen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, 
pg. 98. 
Hill, L., "Ferguson and Smith on `Human Nature', `Interest' and the Role of Beneficence in Market 
Society ", History of Economic Ideas, 4 (1 -2), 1996, pg. 353 -399. Here Hill explores some of the tensions 
between Smith and Ferguson's approaches, and concludes that Ferguson's thought may be described as 
an uneasy "civic- liberalism ", ibid., pg. 394. 
s Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759], edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, pg. 25. 
9 Ibid., pg. 26, 28 -30. 
19 Ibid., pg. 28, 33. 
" Ibid., pg. 173, also 34 -39. 
'Z Ibid., pg. 189. 
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reputation; such a self was always earnest and "perfectly genuine ", sincere, "very 
capable of friendship" while not inclined to meddle in the affairs of others, was 
"perfectly inoffensive ", industrious, frugal and most importantly lived "within his 
income... by continual, though small accumulations ".14 Such passages remind us of 
Montesquieu's and Defoe's recommendation of commerce and the virtues of the trader, 
and like them Smith placed these virtues within a broader scheme of socio- historical 
development, a process of civilisation. It was in this vein that he warned "[t]oo violent 
a propensity to those detestable passions, renders a person the object of universal dread 
and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought, we think, to be hunted out of all civil 
society.i15 The condition of civility presupposed an intimate concern for the well -being 
of others making it possible for individuals to share "an animated and passionate 
behaviour" tempered by their innate sense of propriety and prudence.16 In contrast to 
such "polished" people, "barbarians" possessed little sense of the humanity of others, 
and unaccustomed to sharing their thoughts and feelings with others were more prone to 
savage and "furious" displays of anti -social passions." 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a sort of handbook on the ways in which 
the governing of conduct may be achieved without the need for state regulation!' This 
self -regulation of conduct was a prerequisite for civil society, and its realisation was the 
chief distinction of a civilised people, an argument he stated more plainly in his 
Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms of 1763.19 Here Smith argued that the 
self -government of conduct was not to be achieved by encouraging calculations of self - 
interest, but that this sort of self -government was itself produced by discipline. One of 
Smith's chief concerns in the lectures was the concept of `police' which as Pasquino 
points out, was not so narrowly defined as it is today and concerned the manifold ways 
in which the social body could be shaped through the administration of goods and 
services and the management of conduct.20 In his discussion of the duties of police 
13 Ibid., pg. 190. 
14 Ibid., pg. 212 -215. 
15 Ibid., pg. 40. 
16 Ibid., pg. 207. 
17 Ibid., pg. 208 -209. 
18 See for example the last section in ibid., pg. 327 -342. 
19 Smith, A., Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms [1763], edited by E. Canaan [1896], 
Augustus M. Kelley, New York, 1964. (Hereafter referred to as Justice, Police, Revenue) 
20 Pasquino, P., "Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State of Prosperity" in 
G. Burchell et. al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
London, 1991, pg. 108 -111. On the emergence of the concept of `police' in early -modem thought see 
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Smith included the management of public cleanliness and security and the provision of 
goods, but he also displayed a concern for encouraging the self -regulation of conduct. 
Reflecting on the success with which self -government had been achieved in England, he 
argued that it was the central role played by commerce there since Elizabethan times 
that provided an occupation for the footloose former retainers of the great magnates.21 
The transition to a commercial economy provided the means by which such individuals 
could be subjected to the new mastery of a firm and unforgiving yet also voluntary 
discipline of labour. Above all else this new discipline afforded to former retainers an 
independence which was the most effective form of protection from crime and 
vagabondage, a point he tried to drum home to his fellow Scots, 
In Glasgow, where almost nobody has more than one servant, there are 
fewer capital crimes than in Edinburgh. ...Upon this principle, therefore, 
it not so much the police that prevents the commission of crimes as the 
having as few persons as possible to live upon others. Nothing tends so 
much to corrupt mankind as dependency, while independency still 
increases the honesty of the people. The establishment of commerce and 
manufactures, which brings about this independency, is the best police 
for preventing crimes.22 
The discipline of labour therefore created "a general probity of manners" and inculcated 
"an honest and industrious manner" in those who had to work for an honest living.23 
Elsewhere he noted that wherever the disciplines of commerce emerged "probity and 
punctuality" were always produced and self -interest would "regulate... the actions of 
every man".24 
In the Wealth of Nations Smith attributed such improvements to the division of labour 
which subjected each individual worker to a precise regimen of disciplined labour 
also Oestreich, G., op.cit., pg. 155 -165; and Hsia, R.P. -C., Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central 
Europe, 1550 -1750, Routledge, London, 1989, pg. 122 -142. 
2' Smith, A., Justice, Police, Revenue, pg. 155. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., pg. 156. One fmds similar sentiments expressed by contemporaries, such as Sir James Stuart, 
"The great alteration in the affairs of Europe... by the discovery of America and the Indies, the springing 
up of industry and learning, the introduction of trade and the luxurious arts, the establishment of public 
credit, and a general system of taxation, have entirely altered the plan of government everywhere. From 
feudal and military, it is become free and commercial. I oppose freedom in government to the feudal 
system, to mark only that there is not found now that chain of subordination among the subjects, which 
made the essential part of the feudal form. The head there had little power, and the lower classes of the 
people little liberty. Now every industrious man, who lives with oeconomy, is free and independent 
under most forms of government." Stuart, J., An Enquiry Into the Principles of Political Oeconomy, Vol 
I [1767], edited by A. S. Skinner, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966, pg. 24. By `commercial' he 
apprently means that military organisation and activity are entirely subordinate to the availability and 
management of finance. 
24 Smith, A., Justice, Police, Revenue, pg. 253. 
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dependent upon the mastery of "distinct operations" which increased the "quantity of 
work" and the "dexterity" of the "workman", but did so by employing time -saving 
machines to "facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of 
many.s25 The advantages to be gained by these processes were that they subjected 
individual workers to an inescapable discipline, enforcing the development of 
productive habits and the elimination of rustic inefficiencies, 
A man commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of 
employment to another. When he first begins the new work he is seldom 
very keen and hearty... and for some time he rather trifles than applies to 
good purpose. The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless 
application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily acquired by every 
country workman... render him almost always slothful and lazy, and 
incapable of any vigorous application... 26 
It was the division of labour which put a stop to such indolence by scheduling labour to 
the impersonal tempo of agricultural and industrial machines. This new form of 
discipline enhanced individual and social productivity and created the "universal 
oppulence" of "well- governed" societies.27 For Smith the development of the division 
of labour and increases in agricultural and industrial production were the driving forces 
of civilisation which facilitated "order and good government, and with them, the liberty 
and security of individuals... who had before lived in a continual state of war with their 
neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors.s28 Smith also argued that 
before the division of labour was able to develop, individual workers were dependent 
upon the largesse of the great magnates whom they served as armed retainers. Such a 
situation entailed frequent violence in the absence of effective central authority. With 
the development of commerce however, and especially trade between urban 
manufacturing centres, the great lords were willing to surrender their power to enhance 
their incomes by leasing their land and living from the rents, thereby releasing large 
numbers of former peasants from their `servile dependency'. As a consequence a 
"regular government" was introduced, and by slow and imperceptible advances driven 
by the autonomous and self -interested decisions of "merchants and artificers ", an 
25 Smith, A., An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [ 1776], edited by E. 
Cannan, Methuen, London, 1961, Volume I, pg. 8, 11. 
26 Ibid., pg. 12. 
27 Ibid., pg. 15. 
28 Ibid., pg. 433. The following information has been taken from ibid., pg. 433 -443. 
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economy based on manufactures, foreign trade, and an advanced division of labour was 
able to develop 29 
Despite such enthusiasm, Smith did concede that the division of labour had not always 
resulted in beneficial effects, and he drew particular attention to the tendency in 
commercial nations to undervalue education and "extinguish martial spirit ".30 Smith 
was also aware of the dangers posed by an advancing division of labour which made 
war itself a "trade ", one which offered but poor returns for its practitioners, occasioning 
the employment only of "the meanest to defend the state ".31 What lay behind Smith's 
concerns here was an awareness many other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers shared of 
the dangers posed by the advance of civilisation which, while promising a new regime 
of pacifying self -discipline also gave rise to an increased capacity for the state to use 
violence.32 William Robertson for instance, spoke of the rise of commerce in sixteenth - 
century Europe as the trigger for "greater refinements in manners, and... a more regular 
species of government and police... ", but also noted that the division of labour had 
resulted in the professionalisation of modern warfare and the concentration in the hands 
of the state of the means of waging war.33 
Concern over the effects that the division of labour was having on domestic and 
international peace were shared by Smith's contemporary Adam Ferguson, but despite 
their shared concern each held rather different views about the most suitable military 
structure for commercial societies. In accord with contemporaries such as Smith and 
Robertson, Ferguson was convinced that Western European history revealed a 
progression of the human species from a state of "rudeness" to that of "civilisation" or 
from "barbarism to refinement ".34 Echoing Smith, Ferguson argued that a concern for 
"our external condition" including safety and comfort had driven a progression from a 
25 Ibid., pg. 439, 440. 
30 Smith, A., Justice, Police, Revenue, pg. 257. 
31 Ibid., pg. 257, 262. 
32 Sher, R.B., "Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the Problem of National Defence ", Journal of Modern 
History, 61 (2), 1989, pg. 245 -246. Sher notes that Smith favoured nonetheless the establishment of 
"well regulated" standing armies, which he thought superior to the militias favoured by Ferguson. This 
issue will be discussed further below. 
33 Robertson, W., The Progress of Society in Europe [1769], edited by F. Gilbert, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1972, pg. 32 and 56. He noted in this regard the lack of military discipline among the 
nobility of Europe. 
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natural state outside "the laws of civil society", which he described as "a scene of 
violence or meaness ".35 For Ferguson however, social life required a preponderance of 
productive over destructive passions and a rigorous constraint of the latter. Ferguson 
described the passions in terms that equated them with the most unruly and 
"ungovernable feelings ", "sentiments of great force... produced on frivolous 
occasions ".36 The effects of such passions however, could only be "worn off... by 
degrees" by deploying one passion to offset another.37 Productive passions Ferguson 
argued, were those which inclined individuals toward friendship and affection, the 
pursuit of private wealth as the surest means to the public good, and the advance of 
civilisation. Whereas uncivilised peoples lived in "lawless confusion" characterised by 
"mutiny and revenge... murder and desolation... wild disorder and tumult ", the civilised 
condition was characterised by the pursuit of "[w]ealth, commerce, extent of territory, 
and the knowledge of arts... ".38 
The first step on the ladder of civilisation was the establishment of political power 
within communities between ruler and ruled which he traced to the prior emergence of 
property relations.39 Property relations created social stratification and thereby such 
societies developed "relations of patron and client, of servant and master ".40 Property 
was also important because it implied a system of law or "some method of defining 
possession ", and this involved a regime of discipline.41 In rude or barbarous states 
equality of possession and power prevailed, and consequently "the titles of magistrate 
and subject, of noble and mean, are as little known as those of rich and poor ", all of 
which served to reinforce the central point that on the unequal distribution of property 
"the ground of a permanent and palpable subordination is laid.i42 Just as civilised and 
34 The first quotation is taken from Ferguson, A., An Essay on the History of Civil Society [ 1767], 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1966, pg. 1. (Hereafter referred to as Essay). The second 
quotation is taken from Robertson, W., op.cit., pg. 97. 
35 Ibid., pg. 12, see also pg. 18. 
36 Ferguson, A., Principles of Moral and Political Science [1792], Volume I, Georg Olms Verlag, 
Hildesheim, 1975, pg. 143. (Hereafter referred to as Principles) 
37 Ibid., pg. 151. 
38 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 58 and 73. 
n Hill, L., "Anticipations of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Social Thought in the Work of Adam 
Ferguson ", Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, 37 (1), 1996, pg. 217 [203 -228] 
4° Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 81. Elsewhere Ferguson suggested that the "primary object of government" 
consisted in securing the "property of its subjects ", protecting "the industrious in reaping the fruits of his 
labour, in recovering the debts which are justly due to him, and in providing for the fair decision of 
questions that may arise in the intercourse of trade." Ferguson, Principles, Volume II, pg. 426. 
41 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 82. 
42 Ibid., pg. 84, 98. 
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uncivilised societies could be distinguished, so too could civilised from uncivilised 
selves (invariably described as masculine). The civilised self was motivated by 
"considerations of interest" and acted "with a view to futurity" and thereby "restrained" 
themselves, avoided violence, and applied themselves to "lucrative arts" involving 
concentration and the patience to "wait... for the distant returns of... labour.s43 The 
barbarian by contrast, was still the subject of "great passions ", caught between "the 
prospects of ruin or conquest" unable to accept the dull requirements of commerce and 
inclined to "sloth ", the barbarian nevertheless was "bold, impetuous, artful and 
rapacious ", and in pursuit of a "quarry" would employ irresistible "violence ".44 
In his later Principles of Moral and Political Science Ferguson illustrated his point by 
suggesting that a barbarian made "suddenly rich" and endowed with all the refinements 
of civilised society would still "exhibit [all the] effects of gross and ungovernable 
passion, and a brutality of nature" because he or she had not been subject to the 
disciplines "of industry, sobriety, and frugality" and the constant "study of justice, 
sobriety, and good order" that the civilised individual had experienced by participating 
in commerce.45 Control of the passions by self -interest was vital to the advance from 
barbarity to civilisation, but it was but one source of motivation, 
Mankind, in very early ages of society, learn to covet riches, and to 
admire distinction: they have avarice and ambition, and are occasionally 
led by them to depredation and conquest: but in their ordinary conduct, 
these motives are balanced or restrained by other habits and other 
pursuits; by sloth, or intemperance; by personal attachments, or personal 
animosities; which mislead from the attention to interest 46 
In order to regulate interest and direct it to a more productive end it must be guided, and 
an important means of guiding it was through the law which Ferguson suggestively 
described as the "treaty to which members of the same community have agreed..." to 
maintain public tranquillity by restraining incursions upon one another's property." 
Echoing Montesquieu, Ferguson also argued that in civilised societies law set "limits... 
4s Ibid., pg. 97. 
44 Ibid., pg. 101, see also pg. 107. 
45 Ferguson, A, Principles, pg. 254. 
46 Ferguson, Essay, pg. 125. Indeed, Ferguson argues that self -interest on its own was at least 
potentially destructive where, for example, it inclined a ruler to "turn his people into a property, and to 
command their possessions for his profit or pleasure." Ibid., pg. 102. 
4' Ibid., pg. 156. 
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to the powers of the magistrate" thus identifying civilisation with limited and 
constitutional rule.48 
As important as law was in Ferguson's scheme it did not play as important a role as 
commerce and the disciplines of a market economy. In this context it was not at all 
surprising that Ferguson identified labour as crucial to the disciplining of the great 
majority of society, the lower classes, 
The strength of animals, and that of man in particular, depends on his 
feeding, and the kind of labour to which he is used. Wholesome food, 
and hard labour, the portion of many in every polished and commercial 
nation, secure to the public a number of men endued with bodily 
strength, and inured to hardship and toil.49 
In an unpublished paper on the effects of the advancing division of labour Ferguson 
argued that the physical and mental disciplines of labour were essential remedies not 
only to the "envy and rapacity" of the poor but the "arrogance and licentiousness" of the 
rich.50 Ferguson went on to suggest that labour was a vital means in the development 
and maintenance of personal independence and self -discipline. In addition to labour 
however, commerce was identified as an invaluable mechanism with which to discipline 
and regulate society. Ferguson clearly thought commerce was an agent of civilisation 
not simply because it resulted in material advances in production, but because it was a 
mechanism for creating self -disciplined individuals.' Those who through hard work or 
good fortune accumulated wealth, would be guided by the desire and the need to keep 
and add to it. Those who had to work for a living would be guided by the need to labour 
long and hard. Either way, the conduct of those in society would be governed not so 
much by state regulation, repression, or supervision, but by the requirements of 
surviving in a market economy which gave the disciplines a voluntary nature.52 
Ferguson recognised however, that the self -discipline he commended was linked with 
broader processes of discipline throughout society which paradoxically enhanced the 
prospect of violence between states as it had reduced it within states. Ferguson's claim 
48 Ibid., pg. 161, see also pg. 205. 
as Ibid., pg. 228. 
5° Ferguson, A., "Of the Separation of Departments, Professions, and Tasks Resulting From the 
Progress of Arts in Society" in W. M. Philip (ed.), The Unpublished Essays of Adam Ferguson, Volume 
II, Weeks and Son, London, 1986, pg. 94. 
51 Hamowy, R., "Progress and Commerce in Anglo- American Thought: The Social Philosophy of 
Adam Ferguson ", Interpretation, 14 (1), 1986, pg. 83. 
52 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 143. 
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was that a society based on commerce in which each individual was responsible for 
managing their own conduct in the pursuit of private gain was the true foundation of 
mighty states whose power would increase with national prosperity and the revenues it 
drew in taxation.53 Ferguson also saw that commerce itself had altered the very nature 
of warfare making it subservient to financial rather than dynastic interests, 
...what mighty armies may be put in motion from behind the counter; 
how often human blood is, without any national animosity, bought and 
sold for bills of exchange; and how often the prince, the nobles, and the 
statesmen, in many a polished nation, might... be considered as 
merchants.54 
Ferguson's point was not simply a repetition of Defoe's that commerce had provided the 
financial means for raising and requisitioning larger armies, but that commerce itself 
had become a kind of warfare between nations competing for access to resources and 
markets in the scramble for imperial expansion. Indeed Ferguson went further in 
arguing that the very development of a commercial society had intensified the capacity 
of the state to make war.55 The state's increased capacity to make war was attributed to 
the division of labour which enabled "the practitioner in every profession..." including 
that of warfare, to specialise their skills and practice them at an ever higher level of 
sophistication.56 While vital to the development of commerce, Ferguson suspected the 
division of labour also had deleterious effects on the military. He noted in particular 
that the division of labour had contributed to a greater technical efficiency of modern 
armies, but argued that it did nothing to improve the character of soldiers or the wisdom 
of those in command.57 He was also suspicious of the separation which had occurred 
between civil and military jurisdictions, and lamented the lack of opportunities this 
separation afforded for the practice of bold virtues and the development of vigorous 
character.58 
Ferguson's interest in military affairs was not merely academic; he served between 1745 
and 1754 in the capacity of regimental chaplain to the 43rd Highland Regiment, the 
Black Watch, during which time the regiment saw active service in France and fought at 
ss Ferguson, A., Principles, Volume II, pg. 433. 
sa Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 150. 
ss Sher, R.B., loc.cit., 1989, pg. 254. 
56 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 155, 189; see also Principles, Volume I, pg. 250. 
s' Ferguson, A., "Of the Separation of Departments ", in W.M. Philip (ed.), op.cit., Volume II, pg. 98. 
58 Ferguson, A., "Of Statesman and Warriours" in W. M. Philip (ed.), op.cit., Volume III, pg. 4 -22. He 
concludes the paper by calling for a variety of reforms to the British military, inspired to some extent by 
his observations of the reform of the French army after the Revolution. 
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the battle of Fontenoy in 1745. His barely disguised admiration for the `modem' laws 
of war was premised upon the highly disciplined manner with which the nations of 
Western Europe were then attempting to "carry the civilities of peace into the practice of 
war..." enabling them to "mingle... politeness with the use of the sword... ".59 Elsewhere 
he argued that warfare was now waged "with little national animosity" and combatants 
were "almost in the very heat of a contest, ready to listen to the dictates of humanity or 
reason... ".60 Echoing Montesquieu's desire to see this mode of discipline and conduct 
extended to the rest of society, Ferguson argued that ordered and rule -bound warfare 
was the hallmark of civilisation, 
Glory is more successfully obtained by saving and protecting, than by 
destroying the vanquished... the employing of force, only for the 
obtaining of justice, and for the preservation of national rights. This is, 
perhaps, the principal characteristic, on which, among modern nations, 
we bestow the epithets of civilised or of polished.6' 
Ferguson may well have personally witnessed the apogee of modern warfare at 
Fontenoy, where its unrivalled master at the time - Marshall de Saxe of France - 
defeated the English under the Duke of Cumberland."Z This style of warfare however, 
pertained to conflicts between opponents of equal strength, who offered battle in serried 
ranks and shared a sense of the mles of battle. Neither he nor his regiment were present 
to witness how easily the rules could be discarded as at the Battle of Culloden in 1746 
where the Duke of Cumberland's victorious men were ordered to put all survivors of the 
battle, and a good many others in the near vicinity to the sword.' 
s9 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 198, 199. 
6o Ferguson, A., Principles, Volume II, pg. 295. 
61 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 200. For a similar and more recent use of this notion of `civilised' conflict 
see Dubiel, H., "Cultivated Conflicts ", Political Theory, 26 (2), 1998, pg. 209 -220. 
62 Hamowy, R. loc.cit., pg. 62. Here Hamowy writes: "He [Ferguson] joined the regiment in Flanders 
and accompanied it at the Battle of Fontenoy." Kettler however, does not mention Fontenoy in his 
account of Ferguson's service, "Ferguson had accordingly just been ordained and promoted to the rank of 
chaplain of a Highlands regiment of the British Army when Charles Stuart's return to Scotland touched 
off the '45 Rebellion. He was with them [the Black Watch] for a year or two in Ireland and served in the 
diasterous expedition to Brittany under genral St. Clair..." He applied for release after the signing of the 
Treaty of Aix -la- Chapelle in 1748, and resigned his commission when the regiment was ordered to 
America in 1754. Kettler, D., The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson, Ohio State University 
Press, 1965, pg. 45 -47. 
63 Weigley suggests that much of the bloodshed of this latter conflict was owing to the taint of civil war; 
nonetheless, he writes "...the aftermath of Colinden is yet another indication of of the fragility of the 
limits upon warlike violence that had grown up since the Thirty Years War... [and] the denouement of the 
Forty-Five [Jacobite rebellion] blurs the conception of the eighteenth century as an age of limited war." 
Weigley, R., The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Battle From Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Pimlico, 
London, 1993, pg. 211. 
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Ferguson's admiration of modern mles of war however, was balanced with his 
awareness that the division of labour which separated the function of warfare from that 
of ordinary life created at the heart of every civilised society a military structure which 
threatened "usurpation" and "military government ".64 Indeed, these concerns prompted 
his participation in the public controversy over the desirability of a Scots militia 
prompted in no small measure by the unexpected success of the Jacobite rising in 
1745.65 Echoing earlier controversies over William III's standing army, Ferguson 
appealed to the "valour of freemen armed in defence of their country".66 His position 
however, was shaped by more than the exigencies of national defence, and derived in 
large measure from his concern that self -interested commerce and the division of labour 
- despite their advantages - tended to undermine "public spirit ".67 For Adam Smith 
however, who shared some of Ferguson's concerns on this matter, the division of labour 
had simply made professional, standing armies necessary because once the worker left 
the workhouse for war the "revenue" produced by his labour was lost and he had 
therefore to "be maintained by the public.só6 Furthermore, modern warfare had become 
in Smith's view "a very intricate and complicated science ", the duration of campaigns 
had lengthened, and it was necessary that warfare "become the sole or principal 
occupation of a particular class of citizens ", and concluded that the division of labour 
was "as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art."' 
For Ferguson a citizen's militia was the best means of ensuring the practice of vigorous, 
martial virtues, introducing the citizen to the disciplines, salutary hardships, obedience, 
b4 Ibid., pg. 230. 
65 Robertson, J., The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue, John Donald Publishers, Edinburgh, 
1985, pg. 7. 
66 Ferguson, A., "Of Stateman and Warriours ", in W.M. Philip (ed.), Volume III, op.cit., pg. 9. 
67 Ferguson, A., Principles, Volume II, pg. 415, 425. In his Reflections Previous to the Establishment 
of a Militia of 1756 he wrote, "The happy form of our Government; the sacred Authority with which our 
laws execute themselves; the Perfection to which Arts are arrived; the Extent of our Commerce, and 
increase of our People; the Degrees of Taste and Literature which we possess; the Probity and Humanity 
which prevail in our manners; are circumstances of which a Nation may be allowed to boast of. Such is 
the height to which every improving Nation aspires... We are, however, to blame for having suffered 
these halcyon days to lull us so entirely asleep. ...the Attention required to furnish what is demanded in 
every branch of Business, have led away from the military profession great Numbers of our People... But 
self -defence is the Business of all: and we have already gone too far, in the opinion that Trade and 
Manufacture are the only Requisites in our Country. In Pursuit of such an Idea, we labour to acquire 
Wealth; but neglect the means of defending it; We would turn this Nation into a Company of 
Manufacturers, which each is confined to a particular branch and sunk into the Habits and Peculiarities of 
his Trade." Quoted in Kettler, D., op.cit., footnote 11, pg. 100 -101. 
68 Smith, A., Wealth of Nations, Volume II, pg. 217. 
69 Ibid., pg. 217, 219. 
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fortitude, and courage of military life.70 For Smith however, the nature of modern 
industrial production meant that individual workers simply had no leisure time to devote 
to militia exercises, and unless "by means of a very rigorous police" such exercises 
could be enforced on an unwilling populace, the best alternative was the provision of a 
professional standing army.71 Smith also argued that the invention of firearms meant 
that the individual skill of the warrior was no longer as necessary to modern warfare as 
the discipline of large bodies of troops, and such discipline was better accomplished in 
standing armies than in militias.72 For Smith indeed, standing armies were necessary to 
civilisation itself because without them a civilised nation would lie open to "the 
invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour ", while it was only by means of standing 
armies that "a barbarous country" could by "suddenly and tolerably civilised. "73 
While Ferguson believed standing armies had increased the capacity for civilised states 
to wage war, he conceded that at the same time relations within those states had become 
ever more pacified, 
We may, with good reason, congratulate our species on their having 
escaped from a state of barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of 
domestic peace and regular policy; when they have sheathed the dagger, 
and disarmed the animosities of civil contention; when the weapons with 
which they contend are the reasonings of the wise, and the tongue of the 
eloquent.74 
Ferguson was concerned however, that civilisation may degenerate, that polished 
manners and good government may become corrupted.75 The prevention of corruption 
and degeneration was the task of government, and the problem that governments had to 
resolve was how to maintain alongside the market and its regime of discipline other 
salutary disciplines (such as that of a vigorous militia).76 Such disciplines ensured that 
the state could minimise its intrusion into society, avoiding the spectre of military 
dictatorship and allowing society to function through the autonomous processes of self - 
discipline and self -government. Ferguson was concerned that these disciplines should 
ensure the independent exercise of healthy virtues and prevent dependence upon base 
70 Robertson, J., op.cit., pg. 88 -90. 
71 Smith, A., Wealth of Nations, Volume II, pg. 220. 
72 Ibid., pg. 222. 
Ibid., pg. 228 
Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 225. 
75 Hill, L., "Adam Ferguson and the Paradox of Progress and Decline ", History of Political Thought, 18 
(4), 1997, pg. 677 -706. 
76 Ferguson, A., Essay, pg. 225, 228. 
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appetites and "the maxims of an animal destined to preserve his separate existence... at 
the expense of his species. "77 Such dependence merely encouraged "men [to] become 
either rapacious, deceitful, and violent, ready to trespass on the rights of others; or 
servile, mercenary, and base, prepared to relinquish their own.i78 It was the task of 
good government and wise policy to maintain forms of discipline such as the militia 
system, which would encourage all, "to act on maxims of probity... give a general 
appearance of integrity, and of innocence ", promote social harmony and "confidence ", 
and uphold the rule of law.79 Echoing Montesquieu, Ferguson argued that an uncivilised 
society was one in which no such pacific relations and institutions held and the state 
relied on terror and fear, 
...where the manners of a people are considerably changed for the worse, 
every subject must stand on his guard, and government itself must act on 
suitable maxims of fear and distrust. The individual... must be taught, by 
external force, and from motives of fear, to counterfeit those effects of 
innocence, and of duty, to which he is not disposed: he must be referred 
to the whip, or the gibbet... on a supposition that he is insensible to the 
motives which recommend the practice of virtue.80 
The description we are provided with here was of a society in which the disciplines 
which should govern conduct no longer had any effect, resulting not only in violence 
but tyranny. "The rules of despotism..." Ferguson warned "are made for the 
government of corrupted men ", and corruption meant not merely the loss of virtue but 
the loss of discipline.81 
Hill has pointed out that Ferguson's theory of civilisation although premised on the 
upward progress of humanity, nonetheless admitted the possibility of corruption and 
decay.82 The possibility of corruption however, was somewhat at odds with the 
overwhelmingly optimistic view he took of the prospects for civilisation. The 
possibility of decay and corruption though real enough were - like troubling clouds on 
the horizon - far enough distant for evasive measures to be taken. The advance from 
rudeness and barbarity to polished civilisation was an achievement which he believed 
had bestowed upon humanity (and especially those in the Western part of Europe) the 
Ibid., pg. 238 -239. 
78 Ibid., pg. 239. It is worth noting here Ferguson's ambivalence in relation to the question of luxury; 
ibid. pg. 248. 
Ibid., pg. 240. 
B0 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Hill, L., "The Paradox of Progress and Decline ", pg. 681 -3. 
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benefits of material wealth, settled and humane laws, intellectual accomplishment, and 
the elimination of violence from the sphere of civil society. The civilised individual 
was the beneficiary of these accomplishments and the careful manners, refined 
sensibilities, and polished mores characterising the conduct of such individuals were the 
outcome of the pacifying disciplines which drove the advance of civilisation. Although 
Ferguson's image of civilisation was clouded by the problem of violence in relations 
between states, he accepted as axiomatic that peace was forged and its benefits enjoyed 
within the confines of civil society. It was precisely this fundamental assumption 
however, that Ferguson's near contemporary, Jean- Jacques Rousseau challenged. 
II. BARBARISM AND CIVILISATION: JEAN - JACQUES ROUSSEAU 
Rousseau's intellectual reputation was won largely on the basis of his early essay A 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality published in 1755, which established him as one 
the most incisive and eloquent critics of the Enlightenment. The Discourse was in fact a 
thoroughgoing critique of the guiding assumptions of the faith in progress and 
civilisation, and among these assumptions Rousseau subjected the notion of civilisation 
as a process of pacification to vigorous attack. As Grace Roosevelt has suggested 
however, the Discourse was written during a period in which Rousseau was preoccupied 
with the question of the relationship between civil society and war.83 The fruits of this 
preoccupation consisted largely in sketches and notes which, though often fruitful were 
more suggestive than systematic. Rousseau's most celebrated piece on the subject was 
published in 1760 under the title A Project of Perpetual Peace. It was occasioned by his 
engagement as editor of the voluminous and largely unpublished manuscripts of the 
Abbe de Saint -Pierre. The Abbe's prose proved an unsympathetic medium on which to 
work, and the resulting short volume consisted of an abridgment of the Abbe's Project 
to which Rousseau appended his own substantial critique entitled Judgement on 
Perpetual Peace. 
Saint -Pierre's concern was that the "embarrassments and hinderances" to human 
happiness arose less from the "internal constitution" of states than from their "foreign 
relations ", and that while "we are each of us in the civil state with our fellow citizens ", 
83 Roosevelt, G. G., Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1990, pg. 14 -16. 
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our governments and states were yet in a "state of nature" with one another.B4 What was 
meant by this was that states existed in a perpetual readiness for war in which peace was 
merely the result of "passing truces rather than true peace ".85 War, the Abbe argued, 
was wasteful of a state's resources in population and wealth and even in victory a state 
suffered, 
...much graver and more irreparable loss than that of the men who die, by 
reason of those men who will never be born, by the increase of taxation, 
by the interruption of commerce, by deserted countrysides and 
abandoned agriculture. This evil, unperceived at first, makes itself 
cruelly felt later on, and it is then that a country is astonished to find 
itself so weak as the result of having made itself so powerful.86 
The true power of states was to be measured not by their ability to triumph in war, but in 
the health and wealth of its population. With the certainty of a universal law the Abbe 
stipulated, 
...men alone make the strength of kings... [and it is] by good laws, by a 
wise policy, by broad economic views that a judicious sovereign is sure 
of adding to his strength... The real conquests he makes over his 
neighbours are the public improvements he institutes in his domains, and 
all the additional subjects born to him are worth so many more enemies 
slain.87 
The Abbe's solution to the problem of war was the institution of a global federation of 
states which possessed coercive powers to resolve disputes and compel member states to 
behave pacifically.ss By this means it was argued, the disadvantages of war would be 
replaced by the advantages of increased savings and lower taxes enabling rulers to 
"encourage commerce, agriculture and the Arts" to "further increase the wealth" of the 
population.89 
Rousseau's reply to the Abbe's Project, the Judgement on Perpetual Peace consisted in 
the main of a rebuttal of the Abbe's contention that peace could be achieved by a 
European federation of states. The rulers of European states Rousseau observed, obeyed 
two primary objectives "to extend their rule abroad or to make it more absolute at 
home ", neither of which were conducive to perpetual peace 9° The very sovereignty of 
84 Abbe de Saint -Pierre, A Project of Perpetual Peace [1760], translated by E. Nuttall, Richard Cobden - 
Sanderson, London, 1927, pg. 5 -7. 
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89 Ibid., pg. 79 -81. 
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states the Abbe thought compatible with an international federation, would prevent any 
state's ruler deferring to the decision of another authority.91 As writers such as Holsti 
and Chanteur have suggested, Rousseau's arguments were based on the realist's 
conviction that the determining interest of states consisted in the maintenance of their 
own sovereignty, and that the creation of a federation would require the voluntary 
infringement of that interest.92 Ultimately however, Rousseau's objections were shaped 
by his conviction that violence and warfare were endemic not only to a world of 
sovereign states, but to modern civilisation itself and the civil societies created by it. 
Rousseau's arguments in this respect had been shaped prior to his engagement with the 
Abbe's Project and can be traced in the Discourse on Inequality and his subsequent 
unfinished manuscript known as "The State of War ".93 
For Rousseau, as with his near contemporaries Smith and Ferguson, human motivation 
could be traced to the passions, but unlike them he contended that the passions were 
neither good nor evil in themselves. Rather, the passionate nature of human beings 
merely provided a wellspring for the attainment of satisfaction, and in the simplest 
condition of existence - the state of nature - humans were motivated by the simplest 
passions (for such things as food, sleep, shelter, and sex) and these were "so readily 
supplied" that no -one thought to want more.94 Only in the more advanced state of 
civilisation were human wants and desires multiplied. Human beings in the state of 
nature would not be inclined to violence because their simple wants would be easily 
satisfied. Life in civil society however, involved continual conflict with others in the 
incessant desire to satisfy ceaseless manufactured wants. 
According to Rousseau, during the civilising process the purely natural love of self was 
transformed into "amour-propre" or the desire to place ourselves above and before 
others.93 Amour-propre was therefore directly opposed to the compassion which 
91 Ibid., pg. 105. 
9z Holsti, K.J., The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 
7; Chanteur, J., From War to Peace, translated by S. A. Weisz, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, pg. 133. 
93 Roosevelt, op.cit., pg. 92. Roosevelt points out that Rousseau was engaged to work on the Abbe's 
material in 1754, immediately following the completion of The Discourse on... Inequality. 
94 Rousseau, J. -J., Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, translated by G. D. H. Cole, Dent, London, 
1973, pg. 61 -62. (Hereafter referred to as Discourse). 
9s Ibid., pg. 73. 
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Rousseau believed natural to selves in the state of nature.96 Natural selves, although 
concerned above all to preserve themselves nonetheless felt a direct connection to 
others. Arguing in similar vein to Mandeville, Rousseau contended that in civilised 
society humans were taught to pride themselves on their self -control, their elegance, 
education, or manners, and therefore to see themselves as superior to others. The 
institution of laws, purportedly created to control the "violent passions" of human 
beings, merely internalised those passions which instead of being released became pent - 
up sources of frustration and tension.97 Consequently, the over -blown self estimation of 
amour-propre lead to inevitable conflict as a natural love of self was replaced by an 
artificial pride and arrogant selfishness.98 The desire for recognition from others to 
sustain one's own self -estimation was therefore unlikely to be received because every 
other person desired the same recognition, 
Thus, as every man punished the contempt shown him by others, in 
proportion to his opinion of himself, revenge became terrible, and men 
bloody and cruel. ...nothing is more gentle than man in his primitive 
state, as he is placed at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes, and 
the fatal ingenuity of civilised man.99 
Among the most destructive of the contrivances of civilisation was the acquisition of 
wealth which required the possessor to protect that wealth by force. As Rousseau put it 
in his unfinished manuscript "The State of War ", "...surplus awakens greed: The more 
one accumulates, the more one desires.s10° This greed created a domestic state of war 
requiring the formation of states armed to protect the property of the rich from threats 
within and without their borders.101 Such states Rousseau argued, confronted each other 
as threatening rivals and soon gave rise to an international state of war and ceaseless 
slaughter committed under the banners of duty and honour. 
96 Cooper, L.D., "Rousseau on Self -Love: What We've Learned, What we Might Have Learned ", The 
Review of Politics, 60 (4), 1998, pg. 661 -683. Cooper suggests that there was more complexity to 
Rousseau's notion of amour-propre than I have indicated, arguing that at times it provided beneficial 
qualities. Nonetheless, it remains the case that amour-propre was generated by life in civil society and 
usually manifested itself in destructive ways. 
97 Rousseau, J. -J., Discourse, pg. 77 -80, 120 -121. 
9a Viroli, M., Jean -Jacques Rousseau and the `Well Ordered Society', translated by D, Hanson, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 89 -90. 
n /bid., pg. 90 -91. 
'u° Rousseau, J. -J., "The State of War" in G. Roosevelt, op.cit., pg. 187. 
701 Rousseau, Discourse, pg. 97 -98. 
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For Rousseau the civilising process was one of intensifying violence, and civil societies 
were the crucibles in which this violence occurred.'02 Only in civilised societies were 
human beings subjected to the requirements of laws and compulsions of states, driven 
by their own desire to aggrandise themselves at the expense of other states. Like 
amour propre, the desire of states to aggrandise themselves was a consequence of their 
artificiality separating them from the simple and easily satisfied wants of human beings 
in the state of nature. The violence that resulted from self- and state -aggrandisement 
was a consequence of the artificiality produced by the conventions of civilisation under 
the rubric of self -control, reason, law, civil society, and the state. In "The State of War" 
Rousseau appeared to suggest that the solution to this problem required the dissolution 
of civil society allowing a return of more peaceful natural instincts.103 In the Discourse 
however, Rousseau was more circumspect and recognised the irreversibility of 
civilisation, restricting himself to a strategy of obedience to the laws and continual 
exertion to reduce the incidence of violence.100. Michael Howard suggests that Rousseau 
himself was well aware that this position did "not bear close examination ", but 
Rousseau's thought was nonetheless to influence Immanuel Kant and his theory of 
perpetual peace - which sought to preserve a commitment to civilisation with 
Rousseau's emphasis on personal independence.'os 
Kant had scarce any more faith in the practicability of the Abbe de Saint -Pierre's 
proposal of a world federation than did Rousseau, though he did concede that the idea of 
a `pacific union' among European states was possible.106 This concession is belies a 
partial continuity between Saint -Pierre and Kant on the identification of Europe as the 
crucible of peace. Once incorporated into a theory of progress or civilisation the 
argument that Europe (or at least one or another of the European nations) was an agent 
102 Rousseau, J. -J., "The State of War ", in G. Roosevelt, op.cit., pg. 189. 
l03 /bid, pg. 197. 
04 Rousseau, J. -J., Discourse, pg. 125 -126. 
los Howard, M., War and the Liberal Conscience, Temple Smith, London, 1978, pg. 23. On Rousseau's 
influence on Kant see Ellenberg, S., "Rousseau and Kant: Principles of Political Right" in R. A. Leigh 
(ed.), Rousseau After Two Hundred Years: Proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pg. 3 -22; Levine, A., The Politics of Autonomy, A 
Kantian Reading of Rousseau 's Social Contract, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1976, pg. 
199 -202; and Ernst Cassirer's classic The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated by P. Gay, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1963, pg. 73 -77. 
00 In making explicit reference to the Abbe's arguments, Kant both doubts the practicability of his 
proposals in Theory and Practice, but concedes the possibility of perpetual peace in his Universal 
History. See the relevant passages in Kant's Political Writings, H. Reiss (ed.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1970, pg. 92 and 47 -48 respectively. 
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of global civilisation became a recurrent feature of Western liberal thought. According 
to Saint -Pierre, a pacific federation of European nations would consign violence to its 
boundaries and its dealings with the less advanced and decidedly less peaceful "...Turks, 
...Corsairs of Africa, ...[and] Tartars.s107 Europeans would have to travel "to the frontier 
to learn about war; peace would reign in the heart of Europes108 Though critical of the 
notion of a coercive federation of European states, Kant accepted the idea that in Europe 
a process was at work which promised not only to end war and violence, but to do so in 
a far more thorough and effective way than by relying upon the auspices of an 
international federation. What Kant saw at work in European states was a process of 
`enlightenment', of gradual pacification and discipline which was premised on the 
mutual antagonism consequent upon self -interest. Ferguson's ambivalence toward and 
Rousseau's castigation of self -interest were matched by Kant's transformation of it into 
the vehicle for autonomy and peace. 
III MUTUAL ANTAGONISM AND AUTONOMY 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century Kant suggested in his now famous essay `An 
Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment ?" that although he did not live in an 
"enlightened" age it was nonetheless an age of "enlightenment ".109 Although he did not 
speak as his Scots contemporaries Ferguson and Robertson did of `civilisation', what 
Kant meant by `enlightenment' was in some ways very similar. What Kant detected at 
work in his age was a grand historical movement toward the betterment of the human 
condition, toward the liberation of individuals from dependence and the creation of a 
society of autonomous selves. It was he said, an age in which the maturity of 
individuals was being encouraged, leading toward an era not only of greater liberty but 
of greater peace as well. The `mature' person was in effect an autonomous agent, one 
who was capable of shaping their conduct in accord with universal a priori principles 
without regard to their temporal and physical situation.11' As Kant put it, 
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself 
independently of any property of objects of volition. Hence the principle 
107 Abbe de Saint -Pierre, op.cit., pg. 81. 
08 Ibid., pg. 85. 
109 Kant, I., An Answer to the Question: `What is Enlightenment ?' [1784], in H. Reiss (ed), Kant's 
Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pg. 58. (Hereafter referred to as 
Enlightenment). 
10 Ibid., pg. 135 -136. 
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of autonomy is: Never choose except in such a way that the maxims of 
the choice are comprehended in the same volition as a universal law. "' 
The categorical imperative of the autonomous individual was that they had a supreme 
duty to act from and in accord with self -imposed, rationally derived maxims of 
universal law. "' Autonomy was therefore the key to moral conduct and freedom, for by 
being capable of moral action human beings demonstrated not simply their 
independence from nature, but their capacity to direct themselves rationally, 
The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the 
duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not 
only does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of 
duty and to the morality of the will. The sole principle of morality 
consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e. a desired 
object) and in the accompanying determination of choice by the mere 
universal legislating form which a maxim must be capable of having. 
That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, while this 
intrinsic Iegislation... is freedom in the positive sense. "' 
It was precisely this sort of freedom, the freedom of the autonomous self, that Kant 
thought was gradually beginning to emerge when he wrote in What is Enlightenment? 
that "...the obstacles to universal enlightenment, to man's emergence from his self - 
incurred immaturity, are gradually becoming fewer.i14 In this and other essays Kant 
attempted to place his conception of autonomy within a broader theory of progress or 
civilisation which made the realisation of autonomy possible. 
According to Kant human "progress" could be charted from a state of "...barbarism..." 
toward "enlightenment" and "maturity".15 Such progress required the emergence from 
`self -incurred immaturity' which Kant attributed to a singular "lack of resolution and 
courage" to use one's own understanding without guidance from others.1' 
Enlightenment involved the willingness to "make public use of one's reason" but this 
`public use' had some important restrictions. "' What Kant did not mean was that 
individuals should feel free to decide when and if they would obey the laws, but could 
merely engage in informed debate about the legitimacy of such laws. As he put it, 
"' Kant, I., Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, R. P. Wolff (ed.), Foundations of the Metaphysic 
of Morals: Text and Critical Essays, Macmillan, New York, 1969, pg. 67. 
"2 Ibid., pg. 63. 
"' Kant, I., Critique of Practical Reason, translated and edited by L. W. Beck University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1949, pg. 144. 
14 Kant, I., Enlightenment, loc.cit., pg. 58. 
15 Ibid., pg. 57 and 59. 
16 Ibid., pg. 54. 
"' Ibid., pg. 55. 
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The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him; 
presumptuous criticisms of such taxes, where someone is called upon to 
pay them, may be punished as an outrage which could lead to general 
insubordination. Nonetheless, the same citizen does not contravene his 
civil obligations if, as a learned individual, he publicly voices his 
thoughts on the impropriety or even injustice of such fiscal measures.' 
The maturity of which he spoke then, was limited to public discussion between educated 
persons who were each capable of the independent use of reason. In other words, 
maturity and autonomy were compatible with obedience to the authoritarian rule of 
Frederick II. Only a strong ruler such as Frederick Kant argued, who possessed "a well - 
disciplined and numerous army to guarantee public security" could provide the 
conditions within which enlightenment may proceed, because restrictions "of civil 
freedom" gave "intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent.s19 In 
this way Kant attempted to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the imperative 
of autonomous selves to act in accord with universal laws derived from independent 
thought, with the stricture to obey the laws of sovereign authority. In effect, Kant 
argued that the realisation of autonomy required the external discipline of laws and 
political authority, and as a characteristic of the inner, intellectual life of individuals 
autonomy was considered entirely compatible with political obedience. Kant explored 
this compatibility in his Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose in 
which he argued that a society of autonomous selves would be a law- abiding and 
peaceful society in which each individual would be radically self -determining within the 
law. He clearly saw this lawful self -government as the crowning glory of individual 
progress from "the uttermost barbarism to the highest degree of skill, to inner 
perfection".'2° 
Civilisation however, was not a purely individual quality but a collective endeavour, 
and Kant was aware that the individual capacity for reason required "practice and 
instruction" which could only be achieved within society.121 The society of which he 
wrote however, did not threaten to overwhelm the individual's autonomous reason, but 
rather forced its development. Kant attributed this to humanity's "unsocial sociability" 
similar in some ways to Rousseau's amour propre, a desire to live among others but 
1 s Ibid., pg. 56. 
19 Ibid., pg. 59. 
120 Kant, I., Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose [1784], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., 
pg. 43. (Hereafter referred to as Universal History). 
121 Ibid., pg. 42 and 44. Italics in original. 
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also to want control over one's own destiny coupled with the fear that the proximity of 
others threatened that control.122 Kant's debt to Rousseau was that like him Kant argued 
that life among those one "cannot bear, yet cannot bear to leave" was the necessary 
precondition for progress "from barbarism to culture... ", and that without "asocial 
qualities ", 
...man would live an Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, 
self -sufficiency and mutual love. But all human talents would remain 
hidden forever in a dormant state, and men... would scarcely render their 
existence more valuable than that of their animals. ... Nature should thus 
be thanked for fostering social incompatibility, enviously competitive 
vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or even power. Without 
these desires, all man's excellent natural capacities would never be 
roused to develop.'23 
While Kant and Rousseau held very similar views of the effects that the disciplines of 
civilisation had, they diverged sharply in their estimations of the value of those effects. 
The end toward which Kant felt ceaseless competition headed was a "civil society" in 
which the ceaseless competition between individuals prevented "idleness" and 
stimulated the invention of the means to alleviate "labour and hardships ".124 Within 
civil society the individual was forced by the fact of mutual antagonism and competition 
to "discipline itself', to refine the skills and qualities of `civilised' beings and live 
peaceably together under the auspices of law.'25 
Kant's notion of progress was closely associated with the elimination of violence from 
the sphere of human interaction, and hence conceived peace as a condition secured at 
first within civil societies. The "irresistible veto" revealed by reason was that "[t]here 
shall be no war, either between individual human beings... or between separate states... 
For the condition of peace is the only state in which the property of a large number of 
people living together... can be guaranteed by laws.s126 Voicing similar sentiments to 
those expressed by Ferguson, Kant argued that civilised peoples were distinguished by 
the peaceful manner in which they resolved disputes, while savages and barbarians 
merely resorted to violence.127 In the state of nature he argued, individuals engaged in 
"incessant strife" to protect their "lawless freedom ", and such a condition he described 
122 Ibid., pg. 44. Italics in original. 
123 Ibid., pg. 44 -45. Italics in original. 
124 Ibid., pg. 45. 
125 Ibid., pg. 46. 
126 Kant, I., The Metaphysics of Morals [1797], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 174. Italics in original. 
(Hereafter referred to as Metaphysics). 
204 
as "barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debasement of humanity.s128 Consequently, the 
elimination of violence and particularly warfare, was one of the central virtues of 
civilisation. Indeed Kant referred to the "aim" and "duty" of human beings to submit 
"to those conditions by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, could be 
prevented. ...[allowing] the human race... [to] progressively improve... ".129 The 
imperative to avoid violence lay behind Kant's arguments against rebellion. In resisting 
authority, the laws of civil society dissolved and citizens were thrown back into a "state 
of complete lawlessness (status naturalis) where all rights cease... ".130 
The certainty and security that Kant believed were ensured by discipline and law meant 
that individuals "should at all costs enter into a state of civil society.s131 Within civil 
society, each individual would be protected from attack and laws would guarantee that 
each person's freedom would harmonise with that of all other citizens.132 For this to 
occur Kant argued, civil society must reflect the a priori principles of political right, 
and by this he signalled some of the defining characteristics of modem liberalism, 
namely, that individual freedom and property should be protected by the law, alongside 
formal legal equality for each citizen, accompanied by personal autonomy or self - 
determination.133 Echoing Montesquieu, Kant suggested that the form of state best 
suited to the realisation of these principles was `republican', by which he meant a 
disciplined, `liberal' polity founded on the idea of contract embodied in a framework of 
constitutional and civil laws ensuring equal rights and some form of popular consent. '34 
The civil societies which were able to emerge in such polities were conceived as 
communities of mutually interdependent people who were also mutually independent. 
Such selves interacted with one another to be sure, received instruction and discipline, 
but their actions were not allowed to infringe upon another's independence and 
autonomy. In Kant's civil society the mutual awareness of hostility drove each 
individual to autonomy, but also ensured peace through a kind of mutual stand -off 
12' ibid., pg. 171. 
128 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch [1795], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 102 -103. 
(Hereafter referred to as Perpetual Peace). 
129 Kant, I., The Contest of Faculties [1798], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit, pg. 182 -3. (Hereafter referred to 
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130 Kant, I., On the Common Saying: `This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice' 
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embodied in the laws and rights of a republican constitution. Instead of conceiving it as 
a community, Kant's civil society should properly be conceived as a kind of framework 
within which individual human beings were ensured the maximum possible 
independence compatible with that of others. Within this framework of interactions 
individual citizens were guaranteed a set of freedoms and rights by law which buttressed 
the autonomy of each individual. 
As the principles of civil society were a priori principles, their validity was guaranteed 
by reason alone. Civil society therefore reflected the principles of right rather than the 
fickle dictates of human emotion or sentiment. Kant was quite clear that life in civil 
society was one of continual exertion, effort, and trial, and would create less happiness 
than the state of nature or even a benign "despotic" state.15 Indeed for a constitution to 
be based on the promotion of human happiness was a recipe for violence for happiness 
could never be constantly ensured or evenly shared, unlike the solid principles of 
right.136 Life in civil society therefore required that each citizen submit themselves to 
political authority, renounce their pre -civil freedoms in favour of firm discipline, and a 
mature obedience to an authority upholding the principles of right through the enaction 
and enforcement of laws. In this context and with specific reference to the private 
property rights which were essential to civil society, Kant referred to the need for a 
"police force" to oversee public security and especially propriety, requiring the 
suppression of "begging, uproar in the streets, offensive smells and public 
prostitution." 137 
CONCLUSION 
Kant's endorsement of a system of `police' should be read in conjunction with Adam 
Smith's own earlier endorsement. Each conceived the role of police as a useful 
supplement to the growing independence and self -governance of citizens. The system 
of police of which they spoke was not an overarching entity responsible for managing 
the conduct of the population, but was a pervasive system of discipline aimed at making 
the social environment more conducive to the pursuit of self -government by removing 
obstacles, suppressing rowdiness, and enforcing standards of cleanliness and hygiene. 
135 Kant, I., Metaphysics, pg. 142 -143. 
16 Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 80 -83. 
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What took precedence in the work of Smith, Ferguson, and Kant (and even to some 
extent Rousseau as well) was not a system of police but the disciplines of civilisation by 
which individuals were enabled to control their emotions and passions and thereby 
govern themselves rationally. Civilisation was thus conceived as a process by which 
peace was to be secured by the disciplining of individuals to become rationally self - 
governing citizens, capable of controlling their emotional reactions, meeting the 
expectations of others, fulfilling obligations, and participating in the production of 
wealth. Rousseau forcefully challenged this view by arguing that the independence 
fostered by civilisation would actually lead to mutual antagonism rather than concord. 
Rousseau was far from alone in arguing that the civilising process had lead to an 
enhancement rather than a reduction of violence. Ferguson also acknowledged that the 
domestic disciplines of civilisation made states stronger and increased the potential for 
violence between them. Kant's resolution of this dilemma turned Rousseau's arguments 
in upon themselves and bestowed on the mutual antagonism of citizens and states the 
mantle of peace. 
Rousseau had been an avowed critic of the effects of civilisation on the character of 
individuals, and had compared the placid interactions of `savages' to the mutual 
antagonism, distrust, and violence of citizens. Ferguson held an altogether more 
ambivalent position, concerned on the one hand with the predominance in civilised 
societies of self -interest, but inclined on the other to see its merits. Kant however, 
argued that the very mutual antagonism that Rousseau had denounced and had worried 
Ferguson, drove the civilising process. It was the `unsocial sociability' of human 
beings, which, in Kant's view encouraged the development of personal autonomy, and 
thereby pointed ultimately to the triumph of domestic peace between citizens in civil 
society. As Ferguson and Kant realised however, the commercial relations so vital to 
the civilising process pacified internal relations within states, as it intensified the 
capacity for violence in relations between states. The following chapter will turn to the 
treatment of this issue in late eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism in which 
warfare was conceived as `external' to the life of civil societies by associating it with 
the uncivilised world of barbarians who lived in iniquitous savagery on the fringes of 
the civilised world, or with rogue states that defied the peace between civilised states. 
"' Kant, I., Metaphysics, pg. 149. One should note that Kant was willing to countenance violence in 
defence of one's property, see pg. 167 -168. 
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In the process, liberal thinkers claimed that while violence had been `purged' from civil 
society, the commercial relations which had purged it had also made liberal states 
powerful. In this way, the use of violence `outside' civil society against the uncivilised 
could be tolerated because this violence ensured the triumph of civilisation and peace. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TRADING BLOWS: 
COMMERCE, WAR, AND LIBERAL IMPERIALISM 
The colony of a civilised nation which takes possession either of a waste country, or of 
one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances 
more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society. 
- Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [17761, edited by E. 
Cannan, Methuen, London, Volume I, pg. 75. 
Imperialism... is atavistic in character. It falls into that large group of surviving features 
from earlier ages... It is an atavism in the social structure, in individual, psychological 
habits of emotional reaction. Since the vital needs that created it have passed away for 
good, it too must gradually disappear... because of the progressive rationalisation of life 
and mind, a process in which old functional needs are absorbed by new tasks, in which 
heretofore military energies are functionally modified. ...A purely capitalist world 
therefore can offer no fertile soil to imperialist impulses. ...Hence we must expect that 
anti -imperialist tendencies will show themselves wherever capitalism penetrates the 
economy and, through the economy, the mind of modern nations - most strongly, of 
course, where capitalism itself is strongest, where it has advanced furthest, encountered 
the least resistance, and preeminently where its types and hence democracy - in the 
"bourgeois" sense - come closest to political dominion. 
- Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes 119191, translated by Ii. Norden, Augustus M. 
Kelley Inc., New York, 1951, pg. 84 -85, 90 -91. 
It has been argued in this thesis that the theory of civilisation has occupied an important, 
though often unrecognised place in liberal political thought. Civilisation was conceived 
as a process of pacification, of the elimination of violence from the sphere of human 
relations. Joseph Schumpeter's contrast between the war -like atavism of imperialism 
and the rationality and peacefulness of capitalism and democracy is a singular 
expression of this notion of civilisation. In this chapter however, it will be argued that 
Schumpeter's claim that imperialism was opposed to the spirit of capitalism and liberal - 
democracy cannot account for the succession of liberals who grappled with the issue, 
and for those liberals such as Adam Smith who actually supported imperial expansion in 
the name civilisation. This chapter will be concerned with the impact of the discourse 
of civilisation on liberal approaches to the question of war and imperialism. Despite 
renewed interest in liberalism as a rationality of government, the theory of civilisation 
and the processes of pacification liberal thinkers considered to be at work in advanced 
societies have remained Iargely unacknowledged in the recent literature. Foucault has 
argued that early liberal thinkers were actively engaged in the task of trying to re -think 
the nature of society and reconceive its relationship to the state in such a way that 
individuals themselves could be entrusted with responsibility for disciplining their own 
conduct. A crucial part of this task which is only addressed obliquely in Foucauldian 
literature were the efforts made by a variety of liberal thinkers to argue not only that 
such self -discipline was possible, but that it was also effective in preventing the 
incessant violence that characterised early -modern Europe. It is precisely here that the 
liberal discourse of civilisation played such an important role. 
It was argued in the previous chapter that the discourse of civilisation, conceived as a 
process of pacification through the inculcation of self -discipline, was linked with the 
rise of strong states. As Hindess has suggested, liberal discourse promoted the self - 
government of individuals because a self -governing society came to be seen as the most 
secure foundation of state power.' The liberal opposition to war was not necessarily 
based on the view that war was evil in itself - though this argument was at times used - 
but because war was counter productive. Warfare was deemed costly and expensive in 
Hindess, B., "Neo- Liberal Government and the Institutionalisation of Arbitrary Power" in 
Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the Australasian Political Science Association and European 
Union Studies Association of New Zealand, Volume I, Christchurch, 1998, pg. 330 -337. 
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material and human terms, and was therefore wasteful of the state's most precious 
resources, wealth and a healthy population. The concern of liberal literature therefore 
was that states forge a perpetual peace among civilised nations on the basis of a shared 
pursuit of the advantages of free trade. The liberal discourse of civilisation, which 
linked the creation of productive societies of independent selves at home with the 
maintenance of productive and peaceful relations between independent states abroad, 
reflected the concern to promote the conditions most conducive not simply to peace but 
to domestic and world trade. 
This chapter will explore liberal attitudes to warfare between states by tracing them to 
the development of the discourse of civilisation. While it will be argued that not all 
liberals maintained the same opposition to war, there developed a kind of `liberal 
orthodoxy' based on the view that the interests of world trade and commerce stood 
opposed to the interests of war. The persistence of warfare was therefore traced to those 
uncivilised nations yet to appreciate the advantages of commerce, and it was against 
these peoples, nations, and states that civilised, liberal states could legitimately wage 
war in the interests of advancing civilisation. The sources of this argument can be 
traced in part to Montesquieu's opposition between the discipline and peace of 
`republican' states on the one hand, and the unrestrained violence of `despotic' and 
`monarchic' states on the other. In large part however, the liberal orthodoxy was shaped 
by a Kantian teleology in which liberal `republican' states were destined to triumph over 
other states not because of any inherent moral superiority, but because they would be 
able to marshal superior financial and military strength. In effect, the triumph of 
civilisation was identified with the creation of an externally pacified federation of 
internally pacified civilised states based on commerce and free trade. 
It will be argued in the first section of this chapter that for Immanuel Kant, the 
achievement of a global peace between civilised states would be driven by the very 
same antagonism which, as was shown in the previous chapter, had lead to the creation 
of internal peace within states. Nonetheless, while liberal thinkers envisaged a peace 
between civilised states, they were often prepared to accept the use of violence against 
the uncivilised to create and sustain that peace. The achievement of peace and the 
global advance of civilisation therefore incorporated an exclusion of violence from 
dealings between civilised states. In the second section this exclusion of violence will 
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be traced in the work of a selection of liberals who each attributed the persistence of 
violence to uncivilised peoples and states. The major implication of this exclusion was 
that liberals accepted a division between the civilised and the uncivilised, which lead to 
an acceptance of violence in the service of a liberal imperial civilisation. The third 
section of the chapter will explore the fatal consequences of the exclusion of violence in 
the work of John Stuart Mill who defined civilisation as a process of pacification 
through self -government which nonetheless required the use of violence against those 
who were neither `peaceful' nor `civilised'. 
I. KANT'S PACIFIC FEDERATION 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the very mutual antagonism which Rousseau 
had felt was heightened by the civilising process had been identified by Kant as the 
engine of peace. Far from seeing the self -interest of citizens as opposed to the pursuit of 
right, he attempted to demonstrate that civilised self -interest would be fully compatible 
with it and could be peacefully balanced within the framework of civil society. In this 
section discussion will focus on Kant's parallel argument that the mutually antagonistic 
relations between states in the international state of nature would thrust the civilising 
process onto the global stage as individual states realised that warfare was contrary to 
their interests. The thrust of his argument once again rested on the notion of progress or 
civilisation, or in Kant's terminology `enlightenment' which "must gradually spread 
upwards towards the thrones and even influence... principles of government. "Z The 
spread of enlightenment was inexorable; merely obstructed by the "vain and violent 
schemes" of states which could never prevent "the slow and laborious efforts of their 
citizens to cultivate their minds ".3 As enlightenment spread, warfare would increasingly 
be seen as injurious to "all trades and industries, and especially to commerce" and it was 
mainly on this argument that Kant's opposition to war rested.4 Warfare was a costly 
activity in which "interminable" repayments to a "constantly increasing national debt" 
would so affect the whole society ( "so closely linked by trade" to other societies) that 
every civilised state would sooner or later come to see that it had an interest in 
promoting peace thereby avoiding the constant expenditure on standing armies, 
2 Kant, I., Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose [ 1784], in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's 
Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pg. 51. (Hereafter referred to as 
Universal History) 
3 Ibid., pg. 49. 
' Ibid., pg. 50. 
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armaments and supplies, and diminishing the hard won savings of peace.' Reflecting 
Montesquieu's conception of commerce as an essentially peaceful activity, Kant 
suggested that the "spirit of commerce... [could] not exist side by side with war" and 
that states must realise that their own "financial power" depended upon preventing war.° 
In the international sphere individual states occupied a similar position to individual 
human beings in the state of nature.' Just as the "universal violence and ...distress" of 
the state of nature inclined human beings to enter civil society where the principles of 
right could be enforced, so "the distress produced by the constant wars in which states 
try to subjugate or engulf each other" would promote a transnational union "under a 
commonly accepted international right. ' 5 In effect Kant argued that individual states 
would create an `international civil society' and that the transition from a state of war to 
a state of peace at the international level was directly analogous to the transition from a 
state of nature to civil society at the individual level .° States in other words, would be 
compelled through brute necessity and naked self -interest to "make exactly the same 
decision... as that which man was forced to make, equally unwillingly, in his savage 
state - the decision to renounce his brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a 
law- governed constitution ".10 But Kant's argument was not simply that states and their 
rulers would be motivated by the idea of peace, but that the process of competition 
between them was weighted in favour of the triumph of civilised over uncivilised states. 
This teleological argument rested on the assumption that individuals were driven to 
form states for protection and would unite by a curious process of mutual antagonism, to 
form civil societies characterised by commerce and domestic peace. Conflict between 
states however, was unrestrained and only strong states were capable of survival. Of all 
the sources of state power Kant referred to "financial power" as the most reliable, hence 
commercial states were most likely to survive international conflict and competition, 
5 Ibid., pg. 51; and Kant, I., On the Common Saying: `This may be True in Theory, But it Does Not 
Apply in Practice [ 1792], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 90. (Hereafter referred to as Theory and Practice). 
6 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch [1795], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 114. He also 
concluded that even wars of colonial conquest, supposedly in the interest of trade, have failed to deliver 
material rewards; ibid., pg. 106 -107. (Hereafter referred to as Perpetual Peace). 
' Ibid., pg. 103. 
Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 90. Italics in original. 
9 Ibid., pg. 92. 
° Kant, I., Universal History, pg. 48. 
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and it was these states, linked by a mutual self -interest in trade that were inclined to 
peace." 
Kant's near contemporary Adam Smith similarly argued that the division of labour had 
made modern warfare a much more expensive activity than it had previously been 
owing to the fact that modern standing armies had to be clothed, armed, fed, and paid at 
public expense. This situation tipped the balance in favour of those civilised nations 
with market economies, not simply because of their greater wealth, but their greater 
capability to invest that wealth in modern military technology. As Smith put it, "the 
great expence of fire -arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best 
afford that expence; and consequently, to an opulent and civilized, over a poor and 
barbarous nation. "12 Kant however, took an overtly teleological view that the goal 
toward which history was inexorably moving was a global peace embodied in an 
international civil society, a kind of framework within which the individual liberty of its 
members (in this case states) was preserved. Kant explicitly rejected the idea of a world 
government or "cosmopolitan constitution" because he thought it "the most fearful 
despotism "." An international civil society by contrast, was conceived as a "kind of 
league" or `pacific federation" which, unlike a world government did not possess 
coercive powers, and unlike a mere treaty which "terminate[d] one war..." the pacific 
federation sought "to end all wars for good.i14 The pacific federation would gradually 
expand "to encompass all states" through a process of mutual alliance, and it was in this 
vein that he denounced the "inhospitable" conquest of weak states by the strong.15 
It must be asked however, how such a federation would establish itself without the aid 
of coercive powers. According to Macmillan, Kant's pacific federation was conceived 
as a union of all states brought together by their mutual self -interest in avoiding war.16 
For Michael Doyle however, the pacific federation was only meant to include like- 
" Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 114. 
12 Smith, A., An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [ 1776], edited by E. 
Carman, Methuen, London, 1961, Volume II, pg. 230 -231. 
" Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 90. 
14 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 104. 
' Ibid., pg. 104 -107. 
t6 Macmillan, J., "A Kantian Protest Against the Peculiar Discourse of Inter- Liberal State Peace ", 
Millenium, 24 (3), 1994, pg. 549 -562; for a less theorietical critique of the `democratic peace' thesis see, 
Macmillan, J., "Democracies Don't Fight: A Case of the Wrong Research Agenda ", Review of 
International Studies, 22 (3), 1996, pg. 275 -299. 
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minded liberal or republican states." This latter interpretation of Kant's argument has 
provided a theoretical foundation for a variety of recent commentaries on the apparent 
lack of hostility between democratic states. It is difficult to see Kant as a proponent of 
either the `world peace' or the `democratic peace' alternatives because his arguments 
fall somewhere between them. While clearly a proponent of the pacific nature of 
republican states, Kant's position was informed by an implicit teleology in which the 
federation was conceived as an evolving or expanding union of self -interested states 
which were, or were in the process of becoming republican. Just as enlightenment was 
gradually emerging within civilised societies, Kant argued that there was a detectable 
shift toward more civilised political forms also. Indeed, the eighth proposition of his 
Universal History stipulated that human history "as a whole can be regarded as the 
realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose 
also externally - perfect political constitution... ".18 Elsewhere in his writings Kant made 
it clear that the constitution toward which this progression was leading was a republican 
one, which he thought was most suited to the requirements of peace.19 Here Kant was 
clearly following Montesquieu's lead, which would be echoed by later liberals such as 
Thomas Paine and Jeremy Bentham. Unlike monarchical governments, republican 
polities were disciplined and governed by an interest in peace and commerce. Kant's 
position however, was more complex for he saw republican constitutions as a means of 
establishing peace through a combination of the principles of right and the expedience 
of self -interest. 
Republican constitutions embodied the principles of right by which the will of the 
citizen body was given some consideration in the deliberations of government. By 
means of this popular consent Kant argued, the individual self -interest of citizens would 
incline the nation toward peace, 
...each state must be organised internally in such a way that the head of 
state, for whom the war actually costs nothing (for he wages it at the 
expense of others, i.e. the people) must no longer have the deciding vote 
on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it 
" One of the chief spokespersons of this view, whose arguments will be discussed in the next chapter, 
is Michael Doyle. See his two early papers, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part One ", 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (3), 1983, pg. 205 -235; "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 
Part Two ", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (4), 1983, pg. 323 -353; and his more recent "Liberalism 
and International Relations" in R. Reiner and W.J. Booth (eds.), Kant and Political Philosophy; The 
Contemporay Legacy, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, pg. 173 -203. 
18 Kant, I., Universal History, pg. 50. Italics in original. 
19 See for instance Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 99 -100. 
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must decide. ... For the people will not readily place itself in danger of 
personal want...20 
In his later Perpetual Peace, Kant provided more substance to the claim that enshrining 
the will of the people in the constitution would promote peace. In doing so he argued 
that citizens need not be morally inclined to peace, and that even a "nation of devils" 
motivated by pure self -interest could promote peace by creating a republican 
constitution.21 If popular consent were required, 
...to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that 
they [the populace] will have great hesitation in embarking on so 
dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on 
themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, 
supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully 
making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having 
to take upon themselves a burden of debt which will embitter peace itself 
and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new 
wars.22 
Unlike the constraints upon executive power within a republican constitution, a despotic 
ruler could declare war without the "slightest sacrifice" to his or her wealth and 
luxuries.23 Within a republican state therefore, the separation of legislative and 
executive powers, the representation of the people in elected assemblies, and the 
limitation of executive power each pointed toward domestic and international peace, and 
the prevention of "despotism and violence".' 
Thus civilisation, which was characterised by the gradual elimination of violence from 
relations between individuals, must be advanced by preventing violence between states 
through the establishment of political structures which were "incapable of bellicosity"." 
Republican constitutions functioned by allowing each of its members an equal say in 
decision -making (at least on the question of warfare) thus counter- balancing the private 
interest of rulers with the private interests of citizens. A republican constitution was 
thus a kind of framework which aimed for a balance between competing interests in 
20 Kant, I., Theory and Practice, pg. 90 -91. 
21 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 112. 
22 Ibid., pg. 100. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., pg. 102. One should note here that this sort of `domestic' limitation on the executive ability to 
declare war was a chief concern of the founders of the US Constitution. See for example, Deudney, D., 
"Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems" in T. J. 
Biersteker and C. Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996, pg. 203 -4. 
25 Kant, I., The Contest of the Faculties [1798], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 184. (Hereafter referred to 
as Contest). 
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order to prevent the dominance of one despotic, militaristic will. Kant was in no doubt 
that life within civil society under a republican constitution would best preserve 
individual liberty and advance the cause of civilisation, 
Violence will gradually become less on the part of those in power, and 
obedience towards the laws will increase. There will no doubt be more 
charity, less quarrels in legal action, more reliability in keeping one's 
word... partly from a love of honour, and partly from a lively awareness 
of where one's own advantage lies; and this will ultimately extend to the 
external relations between the various peoples, until a cosmopolitan 
society is created.26 
Civilisation was thus conceived as a state of affairs in which each autonomous 
individual, assured of their rights and protected in their liberties, functioned within a 
legal network stipulating the rightful sphere of action for each citizen within civil 
society. Civil society was itself contained and protected by a republican constitution, a 
framework of limits on political power which preserved the freedom and security of 
citizens. On the global level, each republican state was itself an independent unit within 
an overarching legal structure which assured each state of its rightful liberty and 
regulated the interactions between them. The whole scheme from citizen to state, 
functioned in accord with the invisible and infallible logic of reason or self -interest 
until, "partly by an optimal internal arrangement of the civil constitution, and partly by 
common external agreement and legislation, a state of affairs is created which, like a 
civil commonwealth, can maintain itself automatically. ' 27
The `automatic' functioning of the pacific federation meant that there would be no need 
of coercive powers because its member states would each share republican constitutions 
and have a shared interest in perpetual peace. It does not follow however, that this 
`pacific' state of affairs itself developed through peaceful means.28 Kant was aware that 
not all states and not every nation were comparably advanced along the scale of 
civilisation, and it was on this basis that his teleological argument asserted itself. In 
effect, just as antagonism within society lead to peace, so in conflict between states only 
civilised republican states would prevail. In the second of two influential papers on 
Kant's legacy for the conduct of liberal foreign policy Michael Doyle suggested that 
Kant saw "conquest or imperial intervention" as inappropriate activities for liberal 
26 Ibid., pg. 188. 
27 Kant, I., Universal History, pg. 48. Italics in original. 
28 I am indebted to Barry Hindess for making this very point so forcefully. 
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states.29 The strength of this argument rested on Kant's stipulation that foreigners be 
treated hospitably and not subjected to violence.30 The "natural right of hospitality" 
Kant argued was the principle by which contact between peoples could be encouraged 
and by which the uncivilised could be brought within the civilising influence of more 
advanced nations.31 While Kant clearly acknowledged the "litany of evils" which 
accompanied the inhospitable conquest of uncivilised nations by civilised `commercial' 
states, his argument once again made heavy use of self -interest, for the "worst" aspect of 
it was "that the commercial states do not even benefit by their violence, for all their 
trading companies are on the point of collapse. "32 
Doyle's interpretation of Kant's anti -imperialism is however, incomplete and overlooks 
those of Kant's arguments which, if not absolutely favourable to imperialism did not 
discount the possibility of it 33 In a revealing footnote to the second section of Perpetual 
Peace Kant argued that peaceful coexistence between two individuals or communities, 
one of which adhered to the requirements of civil union and the other of which existed 
in a state of nature, was not possible. "It is usually assumed..." Kant wrote, 
...that one cannot take hostile action against anyone unless one has 
already been actively injured by them. This is perfectly correct if both 
parties are living in a legal civil state.... But man (or an individual 
people) in a mere state of nature robs me of any such security and injures 
me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me. He may not 
have injured me actively... but he does injure me by the very lawlessness 
of his state... for he is a permanent threat to me, and I can require him 
either to enter into a common lawful state along with me or to move 
away from my vicinity.34 
This rather abstract, philosophical consideration was far from an argument for 
imperialism, but it did establish the requirement that the security of civil union required 
protection from the destabilising influences of those whose conduct was less civilised. 
Kant provided more substance to this claim in The Metaphysics of Morals in which he 
zs Doyle, M. W., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2 ", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
12 (4), 1983, pg. 325. 
3° Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 105 -6. 
3' Ibid., pg. 106 -108. 
32 Ibid., pg. 107. 
" My interpretation also runs counter to Macmillan's argument that it was solely `right' and justice 
rather than violence and conquest which determined the foreign policies of republican states toward other 
republican and non -republican states. Macmillan, J., "A Kantian Protest Against the Peculiar Discourse 
of Inter- Liberal State Peace ", Millenium, 24 (3), 1994, pg. 553. 
34 Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, pg. 98. Italics in original. 
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conceded that colonial or trading "settlements" may be established alongside native 
inhabitants by treaty, but that there were "plausible enough arguments" in favour of, 
...the use of violence on the grounds that it is in the best interests of the 
world as a whole. For on the one hand, it may bring culture to 
uncivilised peoples... and on the other, it may help us to purge our 
country of depraved characters... affording the hope that they or their 
offspring will become reformed in another continent..." 
Kant however, seemed undecided on the question of imperialism in the name of 
civilisation. He accepted that noble intentions "cannot wash away the stain of injustice" 
committed on the uncivilised, but acknowledged that violence had been used to advance 
the cause of civilisation.36 Kant's attitude to violence committed in the name of 
civilisation was at least ambiguous, and highlights the importance of imperialism in 
liberal thought. 
At the heart of the matter was the corollary of the idea of civilisation, namely, that the 
vast bulk of humanity were uncivilised beings living by savage violence and in 
desperate need of the virtues of European civilisation, virtues which were apparently to 
be secured by innumerable acts of `civilised' violence." For Adam Smith in particular 
the "invention of firearms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, 
is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilisation.i38 
Because commercial nations were best able to invest in firearms, they were best 
equipped to extend the reach of civilisation by establishing colonies in `uncivilised' 
lands. Such colonies - and especially those of England - would import the habits of 
civilisation, "subordination ", "regular government" and a "system of laws which 
supports it ".39 While Smith acknowledged the need to treat the uncivilised with 
"generosity and humanity", he clearly did not think this meant recognition of any 
meaningful land rights for he also thought, "[w]aste lands of the greatest natural 
35 Kant, I., The Metaphysics of Morals [1797], in H. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., pg. 173. 
se Ibid., and see also pg. 162 where he concedes that political association originated in violence. 
This has lead Michael Mann to conclude that liberal imperialism was in fact "civil society 
militarism ", a form of "state- supported but not state -led" aggression "directed against peoples who were 
often stateless ". At this kind of warfare, he argues, "the citizens of liberal regimes were the undisputed 
world leaders for two centuries." Mann, M., "Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: a Contribution From 
Comparative and Historical Sociology" in S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalewski (eds.), International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 235. 
8 Smith, A., op.cit., Volume II, pg. 231. 
s9 Ibid., Volume I, pg. 76. Smith's position here was that the government of the colonies of the various 
European nations were prone to the same characteristics as their `home' governments. Consequently, 
while the English colonies were characterised by good government and a regular administration of 
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fertility" were available in the colonies "for a trifle."' The settlement of Australia by 
Europeans for instance was justified on the grounds that it would `civilise' the natives 
and `reform' deported convicts. In reality it did little of either, but founded a nation 
upon the largely unrecognised genocide of a race of people whose prior occupation 
entitled them to neither land, liberty, respect, nor - for a great many - life itself.41 In the 
following sections discussion will turn to the development of a liberal orthodoxy on the 
relationship between commerce and world peace, an orthodoxy which was nonetheless 
troubled by the spectre of imperialism. 
H. PEACE, COMMERCE, AND INDEPENDENCE: THE LIBERAL ORTHODOXY 
While Kant first gave substance to the idea of internal and external pacification tied to 
an explicit teleology of progress which was represented in the rise of constitutional 
republican government, he was not the only liberal thinker to do so. Indeed, much of 
the subsequent development of liberal thought incorporated a kind of `liberal 
orthodoxy', in which civilisation was conceived as a gradual process of pacification 
beginning and being secured at first within liberal states before radiating out to relations 
between them. The agency of pacification and hence the vehicle of civilisation, was 
identified in commerce and the institutions and practices of a free market. Through this 
agency, so the argument ran, individuals disciplined themselves to behave in non- 
violent ways, and eventually states were also subjected to similar disciplines. In this 
way, commerce was thought to create a civil society of autonomous beings within states 
before creating an international civil society of independent states. Thus world peace 
and not just domestic peace was identified as a `liberal' achievement, a manifestation of 
the pacific will of those nations driving the extension of market relations across the 
globe. Importantly, this view was based on the distinction first identified by 
Montesquieu that the persistence of violence could be attributed to uncivilised (despotic 
and monarchic) states which, in the hands of later liberal thinkers was extended to 
include uncivilised peoples as well. 
justice, the colonies of the absolutist French, Spanish, and Portugese governments (especially the latter 
two) were prone to tyranny and "more than ordinary violence"; ibid., pg. 97 -99. 
40 Ibid., pg. 76 -77. 
n See for instance Brantlinger, P., "`Dying Races': Rationalising Genocide in the Nineteenth Century' 
in J.N. Pieterse and B. Parekh (eds.), The Decolonisation of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and 
Power, Zed Books, London, 1995, pg. 43 -56; and Reynolds, H., Frontier: Aborigines, Settlers and Land, 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987, 1996. 
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In his little read Principles of International Law, Jeremy Bentham argued for world 
peace on the grounds that peace was most conducive to the interests of states. Warfare 
between states he argued, was "mischief upon the largest scale" and resulted in the 
"most enormous expense" because "no expedition of plunder could ever pay itself. "42 
The avoidance of war however, required that the activities of government be subjected 
to the discipline of self -interest in advancing free trade, 
All trade is in its essence advantageous, - even to that party to whom it is 
least so. All war is in its essence ruinous, - and yet the great 
employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war, and to 
put fetters upon trade 43 
This was clearly the case he thought in feudal Europe when monarchies were 
susceptible to constant warfare over religious division, the desire for conquest, or 
disputes over succession. In modern France and England however, these causes of war 
had been largely if not completely eliminated, and but for the needlessly expensive 
struggles of colonial extension warfare between civilised nations might be expected to 
cease.44 Implicit in Bentham's argument was a theory of civilisation or progress which 
he thought was leading toward the gradual elimination of warfare. Bentham made this 
clearer in his discussion of the faults of monarchical institutions compared to more 
modern representative practices. 
Following Montesquieu Bentham argued that monarchic states were undisciplined, 
hostile to the regulation of economy, and therefore prone to the triumph of the 
sovereign's own personal, aggressive self -interest over the collective interest of 
society.45 Monarchical regimes were prone to violence in two areas, not simply 
externally in the international realm of conflict between states, but internally also. 
Monarchs Bentham argued, were perpetually subject to jealousy of the prestige of other 
monarchs, but were also fearful of their own subjects.46 In a representative system by 
contrast, no single interest prevailed amid the conflicting and counter- balancing 
interests which competed in the representative chamber, and as each of the delegates 
Bentham, J., Principles of International Law [1789], in J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, Vol. II, Russell and Russell, New York, 1962, pg. 544, 551 -552. 
4a Ibid., pg. 552. 
a4 Ibid., pg. 557 -558. 
Bentham, J., First Principles Preparatory to Constitutional Code [1822], P. Schofield (ed.), 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pg. 129. 
46 Ibid., pg. 165 -166. 
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were elected by the citizens whose taxes paid for war, peace was more likely than war." 
Conquest was a `logical' pursuit for a monarch because all conquered territory, subjects, 
goods, or other booty "went into the pocket" of the conqueror.48 For civilised nations 
however, wars of conquest served no purpose, for each successful conquest was paid for 
"by taxes" or by accruing a debilitating debt 49 Consequently Bentham contended that 
modern, civilised nations adhering to their economic self -interest would forge, 
...a plan of general and permanent pacification for all Europe. ... [and] 
That the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably 
facilitated by the establishment of a common court of judicature for the 
decision of differences between the several nations, although such court 
were not to be armed with any coercive powers.' 
Bentham's international court sounded similar to Kant's, for both lacked coercive 
might, and each were suggested as an `external' accompaniment to various `internal' 
pressures on governments to keep the peace. For Bentham, the institutions of 
representation and especially freedom of speech and public consultation on diplomatic 
matters, were essential in limiting the state's capacity to wage war' Civilised states 
were bound in their capacity to wage war by two complimentary pressures, almost 
identical to those identified by Kant. The very expense of modern war coupled with the 
representative nature of modern regimes and the increased capacity for free speech were 
the keys to perpetual peace. As the French economic theorist Jean Baptist Say wrote, 
...the vast increase of expense attending national warfare has made it 
impossible for governments henceforth to engage in it, without the public 
assent, express or implied; and that assent will be obtained with the more 
difficulty, in proportion as the public shall become generally acquainted 
with their real interest. The national military establishment will be 
reduced to what is barely sufficient to repel external attack...52 
Michael Howard dismissed Bentham's arguments as "smug, parochial and simplistic" 
incorporating "sweeping generalisations on the basis of minimal knowledge.s53 Howard 
takes Bentham to task in particular for claiming that imperial nations would renounce 
their colonies and adhere to an international court without coercive powers.54 Such 
Ibid., pg. 212 -217. 
48 Bentham, J., International Law, pg. 557. 
" Ibid. 
50 Ibid., pg. 547. 
51 Ibid., pg. 556, 558 -559. 
52 Say, J. -B., A Treatise on Political Economy [1803], translated by C. R. Prinsep, Sentry Press, New 
York, reprint of 1880 edition, pg. 432. 
53 Howard, M., op.cit., pg. 33. 
sa Ibid., pg. 33 -34. 
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problems stemmed he maintained, from Bentham's "purely utilitarian" opposition to 
war which assumed an identity of interests between states thereby failing to take 
account of the diversity of ways in which states may define and pursue their own 
interest.55 While no doubt framed in the familiar terms of utilitarian argument 
Bentham's position was representative of a broader liberal orthodoxy on the role of 
commerce as the agent of global pacification. This pacification moreover, was driven 
by a fundamental opposition between the interests of trade or commerce, and the 
requirements of warfare. Bentham's opposition to war was not a purely utilitarian 
position; rather, his utilitarianism buttressed deeper assumptions about the fundamental 
opposition between the nature of war and the nature of trade and commerce, 
assumptions which reinforced the fundamental boundary separating the civilised from 
the uncivilised. 
Writing shortly after Bentham completed his Principles of International Law, Thomas 
Paine's Rights of Man incorporated many of the same assumptions. Paine argued that 
Europe and the world itself, stood on the verge of a sweeping revolution which 
promised to end outmoded, tyrannical forms of monarchical government and replace 
them with republican forms. Large parts of this broader argument rested on 
Montesquieu's (and Kant's and Bentham's) association of monarchy with war, and 
peace with republicanism. Warfare Paine believed, was the chief principle of 
"[g]overnment on the old construction" but the American and French revolutions 
brought to the fore "republican principles of peace and domestic prosperity and 
economy ".56 Paine's view that republican systems were more peaceful than monarchies 
rested on the assumption that republics were more conducive to the pursuit of the 
"tranquil arts" of agriculture, commerce and industry.57 Though his views were no 
doubt shaped by his familiarity with Montesquieu, they had probably also been shaped 
by his own unhappy experiences as an exciseman in England and subsequently as a 
defender of the interests of the American revolutionaries against the British Crown.58 
55 Ibid., pg. 35. 
se Paine, T., Rights of Man [1791 -2], in Thomas Paine, Collected Writings, The Library of America, 
New York, 1995, pg. 539. 
n Ibid., pg. 539. 
58 Keane, J., Tom Paine: A Political Life, Bloomsbury, London, 1995, pg. 231 -232. Here Keane argues 
that Paine believed the American Revolution stood for "representative government and an international 
civil society ". Paine had obviously read Montesquieu and in the Rights of Man attributed to his writings 
"the spirit of liberty ", saying that he "went as far as a writer under a despotic government could well 
proceed ". Paine, T., Rights of Man, pg. 490. 
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For Paine, monarchy stood condemned for the "embarrassments they throw in the way 
of universal civilisation and commerce ".59 In arguing so he expressed the need for 
modern governments to concern themselves less with their own well- being, and more 
for the interests of their population, especially its wealth. If "systems of government" 
could be introduced that were "less expensive, and more productive ", 
...than those which have existed... Reason, like time, will make its own 
way, and prejudice will fall in a combat with interest. If universal peace, 
civilisation, and commerce, are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannot 
be accomplished but by a revolution in the system of governments. All 
monarchical governments are military. War is their trade, plunder and 
revenue their objects. While such governments continue, peace has not 
the absolute security of a day.6o 
Monarchies in effect were undisciplined and therefore more prone to violence and war 
because of the problems created by hereditary succession, which when disputed lead to 
civil conflict, and when not resulted in the dominance of a select familial or dynastic 
interest over the broader interest of society.61 Nonetheless he argued, progress and 
civilisation were at work and the days of monarchical sovereignty were limited. 
Paine's conception of civilisation was remarkably close to that of Kant's in that each 
saw it as a process of domestic pacification driven by the increasing independence of 
individuals requiring less supervision of their activities. In Paine's words, "[t]he more 
perfect civilisation is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it 
regulate its own affairs, and govern itself'.62 Law and commerce he contended, were 
the twin agencies of civilisation and he spoke in this vein of the "civilisation of laws" 
and of civil government as "the government of laws ".63 Such government relied on the 
self -regulation of conduct and was "not productive of pretences for many taxes" leaving 
the civilised "to the enjoyment of that abundance" produced by unfettered commerce.64 
Commerce itself he said was a "pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind, by 
rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each other.s65 By making use of the 
59 Paine, T. Rights of Man, pg. 549. 
6° Ibid., pg. 549-550. 
61 Ibid., pg. 562. 
62 Ibid., pg. 553. 
63 Ibid., pg. 597. 
64 Ibid., pg. 597 and 598. 
bs Ibid., pg. 598. 
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rational self -interest of individuals commerce "would extirpate the system of war" 
because commerce required concord between contracting parties.66 In other words, 
There can be no such thing as a nation flourishing alone in commerce; 
she can only participate; and the destruction of it [commerce] in any part 
must necessarily affect all. When, therefore, governments are at war, the 
attack is made upon the common stock of commerce... The present 
increase of commerce is not to be attributed to ministers, or to any 
political contrivances, but to its own natural operations in consequence of 
peace.67 
The challenge Paine thought lay before his contemporaries was to drive the process of 
civilisation onward, and to ensure that the pacific principles of commerce would be 
applied to the "barbarism of government ".68 In this way external relations between 
states would be pacified just as relations between individuals within society had already 
become pacified through the process of civilisation. 
Although Paine himself was regarded by contemporaries as a radical, his faith in the 
pacific tendencies of commerce was far from extraordinary. James Mill's (1773 -1836) 
Commerce Defended, an early work written while he was still under the thrall of his 
mentor Bentham, ascribed to commerce the pivotal role in the progress of civilisation. 
Indeed it was the "slow and imperceptible insinuation of commerce" he wrote, that 
"burst asunder the bands of feudal tyranny, and instead of the sloth and poverty of 
servitude introduced the industry and opulence of liberty.só9 It is worth noting the 
opposition that Mill established here between the indolence and poverty he thought 
incumbent upon relations of `servitude' in the feudal system, and the increased 
productivity and industry he attributed to the `liberty' and independence of individuals 
in market society. Warfare, which was "almost always nourished by puerile prejudices 
and blind passions ", was the great bane of society exhibiting the "most fatal tendency to 
turn the balance against reproduction and prosperity.s70 Indeed Mill argued that 
employing soldiers and sailors was unproductive because it removed them from the 
labour force, and involved them in the service of perpetual consumption without any 
productive return." 
66 Ibid., pg. 598 -599. 
67 Ibid., pg. 600. 
68 Ibid., pg. 597. 
69 Mill, J., Commerce Defended [1805], in James Mill; Selected Economic Writings, edited by D. 
Winch, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966, pg. 120. 
70 Ibid., pg. 131. 
71 Ibid., pg. 142. 
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Mill's strongest invective however, was saved for the notion that wars may be waged 
for the sake of commerce. The national interest was poorly served by such logic for 
"[t]he truth is, that nothing creates wealth but the hands of our industrious countrymen, 
set to work by the means, and regulated by the skill and judgement of others. "'Z Mill 
however, did not seem to share his mentor's faith in the possibility of perpetual peace, 
but he did argue that warfare was antithetical to the interests of commerce. With a 
doctrinaire confidence Mill asserted that warfare was the sole cause of the miseries of 
humankind, 
There is no other cause. This is the pestilential wind which blasts the 
prosperity of nations. This is the devouring fiend which eats up the 
precious treasure of national economy, the foundation of national 
improvement, and of national happiness. ...[In war] is the progression of 
the country stopped, and all the miseries of the stationary condition are 
experienced, ...[and] inroads are almost always made upon that part of 
the annual produce which has been previously devoted to reproduction. 
The condition of the country therefore goes backwards... When the 
blessing of peace is restored... hardly has it gained its former prosperity 
when it is generally restruck by the calamity of war, and compelled to 
measure back its steps.73 
Mill therefore was somewhat less inclined than Kant or Bentham to see a steady and 
inevitable progression of pacification across the globe. Rather, he argued that the 
progress of humanity was driven by the advance of commerce, but that advance was 
susceptible to stagnation or reversals due to warfare. The best defence against war lay 
in the self -interested industry of citizens in societies with a genuinely free market. "In 
every country... where industry is free and where men are secure in the enjoyment of 
what they acquire..." he concluded, 
...the greatest improvement which the government can possibly receive is 
a steady and enlightened aversion to war. While such a nation remains at 
peace, the faults of the government can hardly ever be so great, that the 
merits of the nation will not more than compensate them, and that society 
from its own beneficent tendency will not improve. Nothing however 
can compensate the destruction of war. The creative efforts of 
individuals can never equal its gigantic consumption, and the seeds of 
prosperity are eaten up.74 
72 Ibid., pg. 151. 
73 Ibid., pg. 158. 
74 Ibid. 
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The opposition to war outlined by writers such as Kant and Bentham, Paine and Mill 
was based on the view that it was destructive to commerce and national savings. This 
was the cornerstone of the `liberal orthodoxy', that war was antithetical to the interest of 
society in pursuing the maximisation of wealth. But these considerations were couched 
within the parameters of a theory of civilisation which made a distinction between 
civilised, commercial nations and uncivilised, primitive nations. This dichotomy lead to 
an ambiguous position in regard to the question of imperialism. For Paine imperialism 
was a product of outmoded monarchical government, while Bentham held a similar 
view, emphasising the economic inefficiency of imperialism. As Eileen Sullivan notes 
however, James Mill - who worked as a functionary of the British East India Company - 
articulated "a consistent case" for imperialism, or at least for British control of India.75 
In the eyes of some however, the question of liberal imperialism has a more ancient 
pedigree. 
Barbara Arneil for instance, has written that John Locke incorporated within his "theory 
of property and conquest... a vigorous defense of England's colonial activities in the 
new world.s76 In the Two Treatises Locke argued that the native indians of America did 
not have an exclusive title of ownership to their land because they had failed to exploit 
it by commercial agriculture or industry, had not consented to the use of money and 
therefore could not be said to own any property, the prerequisite for achieving a civil 
society.77 Such arguments provided a convenient justification for the expansion of 
England's colonial activities at the expense of native populations.78 Jim Tully argues for 
example that Locke's position was premised on an implicit theory of economic 
imperialism in which the native inhabitants of America were considered to possess only 
the foods they hunted and gathered but not the land itself79 The superiority of 
`civilised' agriculture and manufacture and the complex legal arrangement of property 
75 Sullivan, E.P., "Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill's Defence of the British Empire ", Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 44 (4), 1983, pg. 605. 
6 Arneil, B., "Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of 
Colonialism ", Journal of the History of Ideas, 55 (4), 1994, pg. 592. 
Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government [1690], edited by P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, pg. 299. 
78 Michael, M.A., "Locke's Second Treatise and the Literature of Colonisation ", Interpretation, 25 (3), 
1998, pg. 407. Michael writes for example, "Locke offered a theory in which land is unowned until 
someone cultivates it; once that occurs, the land belongs to the person who developed it, and he gives his 
readers a picture of America in which land was in the state of nature and undeveloped." Ibid., pg. 422. 
79 Tully, J., Strange Multiplicity; Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995, pg. 72. 
227 
rights which accompanied it were thought to confer on Europeans the right to 
appropriate the lands and determine the fate of the uncivilised. The clearest liberal 
arguments for this kind of imperialism were articulated by John Stuart Mill who thought 
that peace and prosperity would spread under the auspices of the British Empire 
HI. PEACE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND EMPIRE: I.S. MILL 
For Mill the progress of civilisation was tied to the growth of industrial capitalism and 
more precisely to the ever expanding volume of production. As his father before him 
had done, Mill identified the growth of capitalism as the best means of satisfying the 
needs of society thereby fuelling the growth of population. "In the leading countries of 
the world" he wrote, a global process of civilisation was at work driven by, 
...at least one progressive movement which continues with little 
interruption from year to year... a progress in wealth; an advancement of 
what is called material prosperity. All the nations which we are 
accustomed to call civilised, increase gradually in production and in 
population: and there is no reason to doubt, that not only these nations 
will for some time continue so to increase, but that most of the other 
nations of the world... will successively enter upon the same careers' 
This was the happy prospect which lay before the advanced nations of the world, but its 
realisation required a two -fold elimination of violence. Within civilised societies 
individuals and their property had been afforded a more thorough protection from "the 
violence and rapacity" of others by means of an "efficient judicature and police ", and 
the elimination of aristocratic control of the means of violence." The advance of 
civilisation had also resulted in the elimination of warfare between civilised nations. 
These two accomplishments of the civilising process were by no means independent of 
one another, and his conception of violence and its elimination was connected to a 
broader conception of the `governmental' needs of liberal society, the creation of a 
society of independent selves whose self -discipline was so thoroughly implanted that 
intrusive state supervision was circumvented. 
Mill's position was that the modern industrialised societies of his day exhibited a greater 
sophistication both in manners and production than more `primitive' societies. The key 
to the transition from primitive to civilised society was the inculcation in the individual 
so Mill, J.S., Principles of Political Economy, Books IV and V [1848], edited by D. Winch, Penguin, 
London, 1985, pg. 56. 
81 Ibid., pg. 56. 
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of habits of independence and self -government which were stifled in primitive societies 
because of the savagery and violence which encompassed them, 
...in an age of lawless violence and insecurity, and general hardness and 
roughness of manners, in which life is beset with dangers and 
sufferings... to those who have neither a commanding position... nor a 
claim on the protection of someone who has - a generous giving of 
protection, and a grateful receiving of it, are the strongest ties which 
connect human beings... [but these] sentiments, like the clanship and the 
hospitality of the wandering Arab, belong emphatically to a rude and 
imperfect state of the social union...82 
Mill's reference to `Arab' clans here denotes an assumption that violence and the related 
dependence on others for protection were characteristics of the uncivilised world. 
Within uncivilised societies individuals could only hope to escape endemic violence and 
satisfy their needs under the protection of another. Importantly therefore, Mill was not 
only concerned about the violence of uncivilised societies but in common with Smith, 
the dependence those societies unfailingly engendered. Dependence upon another (or 
upon the state) for protection stifled freedom and reduced those who sought protection 
to slavery.ó3 
The advanced state of the civilised societies of his day Mill argued, was to be measured 
by the degree to which individuals were able to take responsibility for themselves and to 
conduct a calm self -government of their affairs. Civilised individuals could be 
identified by their degree of self -government, an accomplishment he attributed not to 
freedom but discipline. Civilised societies made individuals, 
...amenable to discipline; capable of adhering to plans concerted 
beforehand, and about which they may not have been consulted; of 
subordinating their individual caprice to a preconceived determination, 
and performing severally the parts allotted to them in a combined 
undertaking.84 
In this way civilised societies were capable of a complex and interdependent division of 
labour well beyond the capacity of "the savage or the half -civilised ".85 The discipline of 
education and especially of labour were the necessary foundation upon which self - 
government and freedom were to be achieved, and it was for those who had been so 
disciplined - these "better minds" as Mill called them - to "succeed in educating the 
ez Ibid., pg. 120-121. 
8J Ibid., pg. 121. 
84 Ibid., pg. 58. 
85 Ibid. 
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others into better things... ".66 Mill clearly believed that disciplined and self -governing 
individuals constituted a privileged minority even within the civilised societies of his 
day. But he was also emphatic that the major challenge facing modern industrial 
societies was to inculcate such patterns of productive self -government into the minds of 
the great majority, the labouring masses. Mill rather patronisingly thought that the 
progress toward universal independence depended on the workers being "taught to read" 
and "allowed access to newspapers ", and he dutifully considered that they would "not 
much longer accept morals and religion of other people's prescribing. "87 
Genuine independence however, was still unrealised by the majority of workers and 
although Mill spoke of them as "equals" he quite clearly saw them in need of "advice, 
exhortation, or guidance" in order that "they can be made rational beings. "S8 If this was 
to be accomplished, the happy result would be that the "increase of intelligence, of 
education, and of the love of independence among the working classes, must be 
attended with a corresponding growth of the good sense which manifests itself in 
provident habits of conduct... ".89 These `provident' habits were those central to the 
liberal discourse of civilisation and entailed a capacity for foresight and thrift, self - 
control and obedience. Mill however, did not restrict his hopes only to the capacity of 
the working class to enter upon civilised conduct but women also. Indeed, in writing on 
women Mill made it clear that it was by active participation in the discipline of labour 
that the love of independence and the need for foresight and rational self -control were to 
be instilled.90 By this means the "reckless abandonment to brute instincts" could be 
replaced by "prudential foresight and self -government" enabling disciplined individuals 
to work together on complex tasks in productive associations.' 
Mill's position was that individual and social well being would best be achieved when 
individuals themselves were able to act in their own interest. The process of civilisation 
was the means by which individuals were disciplined to recognise what constituted their 
interest and to act upon it without need for supervision. Therefore in the "more 
86 Ibid., pg. 114. 
87 Ibid., pg. 122. 
as Ibid., pg. 123. Interestingly, as is mentioned below, Mill was willing to accept the use of violence to 
promote these same ends in peoples even less amenable to discipline than the European working class. 
89 Ibid., pg. 125. 
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advanced communities ", individuals could be relied upon to act for themselves on most 
matters which would be "worse done" if left to the "intervention of government ".92 
State or government supervision was derided because individuals themselves took "a 
juster and more intelligent view of their own interest, and of the means of promoting 
it..." than any other person.93 Consequently, the triumph of civilisation was to ensure 
that individuals were so disciplined that they were able to pursue their interest while 
conforming to the general interest of society itself. Civilised individuals were those 
who had an interest in becoming industrious members of the productive associations 
which advanced the cause of civilisation itself. The "proper end of government" Mill 
observed was to end "wretched waste" by the needless expenditure of "energies now 
spent by mankind in injuring one another, or in protecting themselves against injury ", 
thereby allowing the disciplined talents of individuals to be employed in "...compelling 
the powers of nature to be more and more subservient to physical and moral good. "94 
Violence was contrary to the productive ends of civilised society, and Mill urged an end 
not only to violence within states but between them also.95 Indeed, Mill's position was 
that industrial capitalism and the trade between industrialised nations would put an end 
to war. Among such civilised nations the acquisition of wealth would be the "principal 
occupation" just "as war was that of the ancient and medieval world"." Mill's logic 
here, similar to that of his father before him, was that commerce had awakened the 
pursuit of interest, and that the interest in gaining wealth would overwhelm tendencies 
toward war, 
It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening 
and multiplying the personal interests which act in natural opposition to 
it. And it may be said without exaggeration that the great extent and 
rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of 
the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the 
uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of 
the human race.' 
92 Ibid., pg. 310 -311. 
93 Ibid., pg. 322. 
Ibid., pg. 346. 
95 Ibid., pg. 239 -240. 
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As a result violence and warfare played no part in the life of civilised nations; such 
destruction was unconducive to the material interests of civilised human beings. For 
Mill the boundary between the civilised and the uncivilised world entailed that violence 
could be consigned to the realms of savages and barbarians, who subsisted in fitful 
conflict on the fringes of the civilised world. "Wars, and the destruction they 
cause[d]..." he wrote, were "confined, in almost every country, to those distant and 
outlying possessions" where civilised nations came into "contact with savages.s98 The 
`possessions' he referred to here were unquestionably the possessions of empire that 
Mill himself helped to administer for thirty years from a desk in the British East India 
Company. 
In the concluding section to his Considerations on Representative Government, Mill 
expressed the belief that where imperial possessions were populated by people of 
European descent political independence and self -determination was feasible, but that 
the inhabitants of other places were "still at a great distance from that state. "99 Mill's 
position here was based on the distinction between the qualities of civilised and 
uncivilised peoples which were set forth as early as 1836 in a paper simply entitled 
"Civilisation ". Here he argued that civilisation consisted in highly complex, 
commercial and industrial societies in which systems of law afforded protection to 
individuals and allowed them to co- operate as independent individuals in productive 
endeavours to create wealth.10° By means of regular discipline he argued, members of 
civilised societies were able to learn to work together on complex tasks and to 
accomplish a division of labour which fuelled the industrial economy.101 In contrast to 
the mild mannered and peaceable activities of the civilised, the uncivilised lived in 
societies inured to violence and suffering, and each individual or each family was 
perpetually on guard against others.102 
April Carter has suggested that in the years after the publication of the Principles of 
Political Economy in 1848, Mill came to see that violence and war could not be so 
98 Ibid., pg. 57. My italics. 
99 Mill, J. S., Representative Government [1861], in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative 
Government, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1951, pg. 508. (Hereafter referred to as Representative 
Government). 
mo Mill, J. S., "Civilisation" [ 1836] in Essays on Politics and Culture, edited by G. Himmelfarb, Anchor 
Books, New York, 1962, pg. 46 -47. 
101 Ibid., pg. 49 -52. 
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easily eradicated by commerce, and that it could indeed serve useful purposes.103 In a 
short essay written in 1859 on the question of intervention in the affairs of other nations 
Mill argued that civilised nations, such as England and France, were likely to need to 
use violence against the "aggressions of barbarians ".104 Mill's position here was but a 
reflection of the liberal discourse of civilisation which had informed his arguments in 
earlier work. As in the work of Montesquieu and Kant, Mill restricted the realm of 
peace to civilised peoples and nations, and while he mounted the argument that civilised 
nations had no right to intervene in the affairs of other civilised nations, in their dealings 
with barbarous nations there was no such restriction. Barbarians, Mill asserted, had "no 
rights as a nation" and it was in their best interest that they be "conquered and held in 
subjection" by a civilised people. 105 Indeed Mill argued that the best prospect for the 
uncivilised masses of India and elsewhere, was "a vigorous despotism" of the civilised, 
which he described as "the best mode of government for training the people... to render 
them capable of a higher civilisation.i106 Mill did concede that European imperialism 
had been responsible for inflicting violence upon indigenous peoples, but as his writings 
on India show he also believed civilised rulers had an obligation to prevent the worse 
violence of savagery and barbarism, even if need be by the use of violence.107 
In his Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India During the Last 
Thirty Years, written during 1857 and 1858, Mill was in no doubt that the severity of 
British administration was required "for improving the internal government of the 
country, and the physical and mental condition of its inhabitants... ".108 Interestingly 
Mill compiled this report during the time that the infamous Indian Mutiny of 1857 was 
being suppressed by British troops with a ferocity at least equal to that of the mutineers 
themselves.109 Although Mill had little to say on the Mutiny in general, he clearly 
102 Ibid., pg. 57 -58. 
103 Carter, A., "Liberalism and the Obligation to Military Service ", Political Studies, 46 (1), 1998, pg. 
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believed that stringent measures were needed to administer the "passive and slavish 
character" of the Indians.15 To this end he suggested a more rigorous prison discipline 
involving harder work within prison factories, and the extension of the police system.'" 
The problem that such measures were designed to overcome was that Indian society was 
riddled with violence in the form of "gangs of professional banditti ", piracy, infanticide, 
and traditional practices such as suttee and tragga."2 Mill saw British rule therefore as 
a means of putting an end to this violence and "raising and civilising" the native 
inhabitants. "' Indeed Mill considered British rule in India one of the greatest 
achievements of civilisation, 
...few governments, even under far more favourable circumstances, have 
attempted so much for the good of their subjects... A Government of 
foreigners, over a people most difficult to be understood, and still more 
difficult to be improved... has a right to take pride to itself for having 
accomplished so much; and most certainly cannot be justly reproached, 
by any existing Government or people, with not having effected more.' 
Mill's liberal imperialism was not exceptional for an age accustomed to think of its own 
interest as coextensive with the interest of humanity as a whole.1' Imperial possessions 
and colonisation were the means by which the "permanent interests of civilisation itself' 
were to be advanced.16 Mill accepted then, that while violence between civilised 
nations was all but ended, violence still had a useful role to play in subjecting the 
"barbarous nations" to "such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them 
for becoming..." civilised. "' 
CONCLUSION 
Michael Mann has suggested that nineteenth- century liberal (and Marxist) social theory 
was founded on the idea that war had become obsolescent.18 As this chapter has 
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demonstrated however, there remained more than a trace in the work of J. S. Mill that 
war may serve the interest of civilisation itself. Michael Howard has argued that in the 
wake of the rise of nationalism in Europe, a succession of liberal writers came to accept 
war as necessary for the pursuit of national self -determination. Mill argued for 
example, that armed intervention could be justified where a people were being 
tyrannised by a regime supported from without, and although this could be said of 
colonial regimes, he noted that the same rules of international morality which restrained 
relations between civilised nations did not apply to their dealings with less civilised 
nations.19 Some liberals were also keen to defend the use of violent intervention in the 
service of oppressed majorities fighting for liberal rights and freedoms denied by 
domestic tyranny. The English liberal philosopher T. H. Green argued that "the 
imperfect realisation of civil equality" was a cause of war because it implied the 
existence of both a superior or "prerogatived class" which employed foreign conquest to 
control internal dissatisfaction, and an oppressed class which invited foreign 
intervention to alleviate their plight.120 In a passage reminiscent of Kant, Green 
proposed that the "source of war between states" lay in the "incomplete fulfilment of 
their function" or in "some defect in the maintenance or reconciliation of rights among 
their subjects.s121 Green's position here was a restatement of the liberal conviction that 
an international peace based on free trade required each state to enshrine individual 
freedom, understood as "the capacity of every man" to make a "free contribution to 
social good ".122 Liberals such as Green could only explain war by reference to `some 
defect' in the organisation of the state; in other words, to the existence of illiberal states 
which did not allow individual freedom to flourish. Consequently it was not the liberal 
state "but this or that particular state" which restricted both freedom and trade and bore 
responsibility for war.123 
In the early years of this century, the great English liberal L. T. Hobhouse ominously 
argued that liberalism itself arose in struggles of national liberation. In doing so, he 
unwittingly expressed an argument which has subsequently been used by avowedly 
`liberal' states to justify the use of violence against a host of less powerful states, from 
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armed intervention in Russia in 1918 to the Gulf War in 1991 and the NATO bombing 
of Serbia in 1999, 
A great part of the inspiration of Liberalism... has been drawn from the 
struggles of the nations against Napoleon, of the Eastern Christians 
against Turkey, of the Poles against Russia, of the Italians against 
Austria, of the Irish against England. ... The safeguards of liberty cannot 
be maintained when one class or one nationality is being held in bondage 
by another, even though that other holds power nominally in virtue of 
majority votes.'24 
The litany of complaint that such arguments have been used to silence is that liberals 
have been just as willing to pursue war and to justify it in glowing terms, as have the 
most brazen apologists of realpolitik. For contemporary liberal writers such as Michael 
Doyle, the validity of this complaint cannot be denied; liberal states have a record of 
violence against non- liberal states.125 But this last qualification is crucial; the central 
element linking the writings of Kant with those of Mill and contemporary liberals is that 
wars between civilised, liberal states would cease, and that warfare still exists because 
not all states have become liberal and democratic.126 This remains an enduring 
conviction of contemporary liberalism and is manifested in the repeated emphasis 
placed upon the triumph of peace within and between liberal -democratic states.12' A 
critical eye will be cast in the two remaining chapters of this thesis over the implications 
of this view within contemporary liberal thought, first in relation to the boundary 
between (civilised) liberal- democratic and (uncivilised) illiberal and undemocratic 
states; and second, in relation to the boundary between (uncivil) violence and (civil) 
peace within civil society. 
1' Ibid., pg. 132. 
124 Hobhouse, L. T., Democracy and Reaction [1904], Harvester Press, Brighton, 1972. pg. 157 and 
165. 
125 See for example Doyle, M. W., loc.cit., pg. 337; and Doyle, M. W., "Liberalism and International 
Relations" in R. Beiner and W. J. Booth (eds.), Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary 
Legacy, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, pg. 173 -203. 
126 Carter, A., "Nonviolence and Democratic Theory", Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the 
Australasian Political Science Association and European Union Studies Association of New Zealand, 
Volume 1, Christchurch, 1998, pg. 153. 
127 Porter, B. D., War and the Rise of the State, The Free Press, New York, 1994, pg. 298 -299. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE BOUNDARIES OF PEACE: 
`TROUBLEMAKERS' AND THE INTER -LIBERAL STATE PEACE 
Beginning with the origins of Liberalism in the late eighteenth century, Liberal states 
have with great success avoided getting into wars with one another. They are as warlike 
in their relations with non -Liberals as any other state is - perhaps even more prone to 
getting into imprudent crusades. But among themselves Liberals have established the 
separate peace Immanuel Kant described. This lack of war seems to be based on the 
features Kant identified: the restraint that representative institutions impose upon 
sometimes wayward governments, the respect that Liberal societies have for the 
freedom that each embodies, and the transnational ties of commerce, investment, and 
tourism that help create mutual understandings. But these very same ties - 
representation, a concern for individual rights, and trade - are the forces that make for 
sometimes imprudent aggression, suspicion, and a confused foreign policy in dealing 
with non -Liberals. 
- Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, W. W. Norton, New York, 1997, pg. 474. 
It has been argued in this thesis that within the liberal discourse of civilisation the liberal 
state is represented as a powerful entity which, when properly disciplined by 
constitutional separations of power, the limitations of law, and the institutionalisation of 
popular consent, will manifest only a desire for peace and prosperity. Previous chapters 
have argued that liberal discourse is premised on the view that peace is a quality 
achieved by communities within states, while the external world of relations between 
states remains an arena of conflict.' David Boucher has recently argued that a "growing 
acknowledgment" of the "need for reconciliation" between political theory and 
international relations is evinced by the appearance within each discipline of questions 
of identity which cut across the divide between the domestic and international realms.' 
Liberal discourse on violence however, has been shaped by the centrality of the 
boundary between "inside" and "outside ", of an exclusive community of citizens within 
and a potentially threatening world of hostile states without.' What this division implies 
is that while communities within states practice a politics of universal principles, of 
peace, rights, and citizenship, relations outside the state are shaped by "contingency... 
barbarism... violence and war.i4 This chapter will explore the implications of this 
division with a particular focus on the assumption that peace is secured and emanates 
from within liberal- democratic states. 
The quotation used on the title page of this chapter is drawn from the recent work of one 
of the leading theorists of the inter -liberal state peace, and illustrates the foundational 
assumption of liberal international relations theory, that peace is secured and emanates 
from within liberal- democratic states. For earlier liberals this assumption manifested 
itself in the attribution of violence to `uncivilised' peoples and states. In common with 
more recent thinkers however, Doyle questions this view but maintains nonetheless that 
liberal states are as Kenneth Waltz put it "inherently peaceful ", and only engage in 
' For discussion of this issue see, Walker, R. B. J., Inside /Outside: International Relations as Political 
Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pg. 1 -25. 
2 Boucher, D., "Political Theory, International Theory, and the Political Theory of International 
Relations" in A. Vincent (ed.), Political Theory; Tradition and Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997, pg. 195. 
Walker, R. B. J., op.cit., pg. 62 -63; and Little, R., "Liberal Hegemony and the Realist Assault: 
Competing Ideological Theories of the State' in M. Banks and M. Shaw (eds.), State and Society in 
International Relations, St Martin's Press, New York, 1991, pg. 28 -29. 
Walker, R. B. J., op.cit., pg. 177. 
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warfare with illiberal and undemocratic states.' Particular schools of liberal 
international relations theorists differ in the extent to which this assumption shapes the 
analysis of the likelihood of war or the prospects for peace. For realists such as Waltz, 
the notion that the internal democratic structure of states will lead to peace is "an 
extremely doubtful propositions' For a variety of liberal theorists however, the implicit 
acceptance of this `proposition' can be detected in the consistent ascription of violent 
motives to illiberal and non -democratic states to which liberal states must be prepared to 
respond in kind. It will be argued in this chapter that a consistent set of assumptions on 
the nature of international peace and war can be detected in the work of a variety of 
liberal international relations theorists. The first section of this chapter will examine the 
chief assumption made by many liberal theorists, that only liberal- democratic states are 
capable of achieving a secure internal peace. The second section will discuss the impact 
of this assumption on contemporary liberal explanations of the inter -liberal state peace. 
The full breadth and scope of this substantial body of work cannot of course be 
adequately surveyed in one chapter, but an attempt will be made here to assess the 
implications of the view that only liberal- democratic states are capable of peaceful 
external relations. In the third section it will be argued that this assumption 
underestimates the significance of the fact that all states, even liberal and democratic 
ones, are organised in ways which maximise rather than minimise the capacity to use 
violence. 
I. THE INHERENT PEACE OF LIBERAL STATES 
It has been argued in earlier chapters that the rights, freedoms and legal protections of 
life and property central to liberal political discourse were guaranteed to citizens of 
internally pacified liberal states. Such states were to be characterised by the presence of 
democratic institutions and practices such as constitutional restrictions on the exercise 
of power, a formal separation of powers, regular elections and the rule of law. The 
conviction that only liberal societies with limited states were capable of eliminating 
violence was matched by the not entirely unproblematic presumption (explored in the 
previous chapter) that similarly liberal and democratic states would conduct their affairs 
with one another in peaceful ways. What is interesting about this view is the 
identification of the state as the agent of an expanding zone of pacification. The 
5 Waltz, K., Man the State and War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954, pg. 101 
Ibid., pg. 122. 
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important assumption behind this view is that international peace is a function of 
domestic state structure.' The domestic determination of international state action 
constitutes one of the "core assumptions" of liberal international relations theory.8 The 
assumption within liberal discourse is that peace can only be securely achieved within a 
liberal -democratic state, and that as Kant argued, only after this has been achieved can 
an international peace be created. The achievement of peace is therefore tied to an 
explicitly teleological assumption that inter -state competition between states will assure 
the eventual global victory of `republican' or liberal- democratic states which allow 
some measure of public representation, provide legal protection for personal rights, and 
foster strong and healthy market economies.' 
This teleology was founded on the presumption that liberal republican states fostered 
the development of civilisation. As Kant put it, "profound contempt" was reserved for 
"the way in which savages" persisted in "their lawless freedom" and "incessant strife ", 
rather than submitting "to a legal constraint which they might impose upon themselves" 
preferring to live in "barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debasement ".10 As Margaret 
Canovan has observed however, such views tended to "take peace and order for 
granted" within states and ignored the often violent process by which that peace was 
achieved." From the perspective of contemporary democratic peace theory, the 
conflicts consequent upon the division of humanity into a multiplicity of states can be 
circumvented so long as each state conforms to liberal and democratic norms. The 
implication here is that only liberal or republican states are internally pacified and 
thereby inclined to peace in their external relations. Consequently, the argument is that 
non -republican or illiberal states are unrestrained in their actions while liberal polities 
respect popular opinion, seek compromise, negotiation, or mediation because of their 
Kegley, C., "The Neo- Idealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New 
International Realities ", International Studies Quarterly, 37, 1993, pg. 137. 
$ Moravcsik, A., "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics ", 
International Organisation, 51 (4), 1997, pg. 516 -521. In fact of the three "core assumptions" Moravcsik 
identifies, domestic determination is central to the first two. See also, Russett, B., Controlling the Sword; 
the Democratic Governance of National Security, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1990, 
pg. 50; and Russett,B., Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post -Cold War World, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993, pg. 130. 
9 This view is questioned by Zacher and Matthew, who argue that liberal international relations theory is 
"not teleological ". Zacher, M.W., and Matthew, R.A., "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, 
Divergent Strands" in C.W. Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory; Realism and 
the Neoliberal Challenge, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pg. 109. 
1Ó Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch [1795], in H. Reiss (ed.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1970 pg. 102 -103. 
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domestic arrangements which determine the range of options governments can choose 
from in pursuing foreign policy. As one writer has put it, "[u]nlike their authoritarian 
counterparts, democratic states lack the large conscript armies, flexibility, decisiveness, 
and cold logic required to act solely out of considerations of realpolitik. "'Z 
According to Francis Fukuyama for instance, violence can only be averted to the degree 
to which human rights are entrenched and respected providing recognition (from other 
selves and from the state) while allowing the fulfilment of rational self -interest. Bruce 
Russett has drawn attention to the "powerful norms against the use of lethal force" 
within liberal- democratic states.13 Such constraints emanate from the shared acceptance 
that democratic procedures providing a legitimate and effective means of resolving 
disputes peacefully. Such normative constraints do not operate in nondemocratic or 
"authoritarian" states.'" The equation of violence with `authoritarian' politics reinforces 
the assumption that violence is alien to the liberal order. Fukuyama for example, argues 
that violence can be traced to the desire to seek domination over others and is most 
obviously associated with illiberal movements such as religious fundamentalism and 
xenophobic nationalism.15 The exclusive and violent tendencies of nationalism in 
particular, "like religion before it ", have been moderated "in the most advanced liberal 
democracies" by making them "tolerant ".16 In other words "national identity has to be 
pushed off into the realm of private life and culture..." and thereby restricted from 
contaminating the public, political realm of universal rights and peaceful coexistence." 
Stanley Hoffmann has recently written of nationalism that its recent revival has 
"threatened both the liberal program at home and the cosmopolitan vision abroad" thus 
11 Canovan, M., Nationhood and Political Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1996, pg. 11. 
12 Schweller, R.L., "Domestic Structure and Preventive War; Are Democracies More Pacific ", World 
Politics, 44 (2), 1992, pg. 248. 
" Russett, B., Controlling the Sword; the Democratic Governance of National Security, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1990, pg. 124. 
14 Ibid., pg. 129. 
15 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London, 1992, pg. 214. 
76 Ibid., pg. 271. This is a version of the standard liberal critique of nationalism which opposes the 
exclusivity of nationalist feeling to the internationalism and respect for universal human rights of 
liberalism. See for instance the discussion of the issue in Pfaff, W., The Wrath of Nations: Civilisation 
and the Furies of Nationalism, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1993, pg. 196 -231 
" Fukuyama, F., "Comments on Nationalism and Democracy" in L.Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds), 
Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994, pg. 
26. 
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"weakening the two transnational pillars of the liberal international order: a 
transnational economy and world public opinion.s18 
According to Fukuyama however, the liberal state is able to avert the problem of 
internal violence by recognising and respecting human rights. Anglo- American liberal - 
democracy's historic victory, indeed its historic mission he argues, was to subdue the 
desires of would -be masters and establish the possibility of a truly peaceful society, 
The bourgeois revolution of which Hobbes and Locke were the prophets 
sought to morally elevate the slave's fear of death over the aristocratic 
virtue of the master, and thereby to sublimate... princely ambition and 
religious fanaticism into the accumulation of property. Where once there 
had been civil conflict over dynastic and religious issues, there were now 
new zones of peace constituted by the modern liberal European nation - 
state.19 
Fukuyama affirms the on -going liberal- democratic creation of peace in what is termed 
"...the spread of compassion, and steadily decreasing tolerance for violence, death, and 
suffering. ...the gradual disappearance of capital punishment...s20 As Rummel puts it, 
the democratic state is the "least violence -prone" of any regime while a non -democratic, 
totalitarian regime is most likely to engage in violence and hence, is "more likely [to]... 
kill its own citizens in cold blood. "21 Rummel produces a variety of statistical analyses 
designed to show that authoritarian regimes have engaged in more genocidal activity 
than democracies, claiming in explanation that "democratic freedom promotes 
nonviolence" and that the best policy for avoiding "collective violence and eliminating 
war" is to "enhance and foster democratic institutions - civil liberties and political rights 
- here and abroad."' 
Rummel in fact coins the term "democide" to denote all the kinds of violence which 
liberal -democratic regimes have successfully avoided.23 Democide covers all cases of 
"intentional killing" of citizens by their governments, ranging from finely targeted 
assassination to wholesale genocide.24 What seems most important about these sorts of 
violence however, is that they are all intimately associated with the institution of the 
e Hoffmann, S., "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism ", Foreign Policy, 98, 1995, pg. 164. 
19 Fukuyama, F., op.cit., pg. 259 -260. 
20 Ibid., pg. 261. 
21 Rummel, R J , "The Politics of Cold Blood ", Society, 27 (1), 1989, pg. 32, 33. 
22 Ibid., pg. 33. 
23 Rummel, R. J., "Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder ", Journal or Conflict Resolution, 
39 (1), 1995, pg. 4. 
242 
state. Genocide in particular would appear to be inconceivable without the state, and 
indeed the very term itself was coined in the twentieth- century to describe the activities 
of modern states 25 What democratic peace theorists do not question is the association 
between the state and various forms of `exclusionary' violence premised on the 
distinction between `insiders' and `outsiders'. The violence of warfare, of imperialism, 
and genocide are three prominent examples of such violence which have all been carried 
to an unprecedented scale of killing in the last two centuries under the auspices of both 
liberal -democratic and other states. While this is an oversight to which democratic 
peace theorists seem particularly susceptible, Margaret Canovan has recently argued that 
liberal international relations theory in general is prone to neglecting the degree to 
which liberal and democratic institutions derive their legitimacy from the values and 
norms of exclusive, geographically bounded, national communities.' Canovan claims 
that liberal theorists are often unwilling to acknowledge the exclusionary violence used 
to develop and sustain these nations and the states that enclose them. These forms of 
violence, such as the elimination of large proportions of the indigenous populations of 
`liberal' and `democratic' states such as Australia, the United States of America and 
Canada, are "embarrassing dissonances" between liberal pretensions to peace and the 
internal and external violence of state -formation 27 
The relationship between the state and violence however, is at best a secondary problem 
for liberals who believe that violence inheres not in the state itself but in a particular 
kind of state or state structure. Thus as Rummel contends, the absence of violence 
within democratic societies and states can be explained by the fact that citizens of 
democracies are "spontaneous, diverse, pluralistic" and belong to different social, 
cultural, ethnic, or occupational groups creating a need for flexibility, cooperation and 
compromise.28 Within authoritarian regimes the argument runs, spontaneity and 
pluralism are discouraged, and society is rigidly organised. Indeed, the whole social 
structure is built upon a tension or "fault line" between rulers and subjects.29 "There is 
thus a scale of political regimes from the most democratic to the most totalitarian" 
24 Ibid., pg. 4 -5. 
25 See for example: Chalk,F., "Redefining Genocide" in G.A. Andreopoulos (ed.), Genocide: 
Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1994, pg. 47 -63. 
26 Canavan, M., op.cit., pg. 18 -44. 
27 Ibid., pg. 104. 
28 Rummel, R. J., loc.cit., 1989, pg. 34 -35. 
29 Ibid., pg. 35. 
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Rummel contends, and "we should find empirically that the more democratic the less 
violence in foreign and domestic affairs, the more totalitarian the more violence.i30 
Importantly Rummel does not claim that democracies are incapable of violence, but that 
"democratic freedom reduces violence ", and notes a "consistent and significant, but low, 
negative correlation... between democracies and collective violence... ".31 Consequently, 
"openness, political competition, leaders responsible to their people, and limited 
government" all tend to prevent the slide toward violence and hence the ultimate 
conclusion is that "democracy is a general method of nonviolence.s32 From the 
perspective of liberal international relations theory, the pacific tendencies of liberal 
states manifest themselves in the establishment of peaceful relations with other liberal 
states. 
II. PACIFIC STATE TO PACIFIC UNION 
It is widely accepted within liberal international relations literature that liberal - 
democratic states do not fight one another. According to Fukuyama liberal- democratic 
regimes "manifest little distrust or interest in mutual domination... [because they] share 
with one another principles of universal equality and rights... ".33 Indeed the 
peacefulness of liberal states in their dealings with other liberal states has become an 
almost unquestionable axiom within liberal international relations theory. For Levy, 
"the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an 
empirical law in international relations" while Russett argues that the inter -liberal state 
peace "is one of the strongest nontrivial or nontautological generalisations that can be 
made about international relations.s34 Exhaustive efforts have been made to 
demonstrate the validity of such statements with empirical data which purport to show 
that liberal- democracies do not fight one another.35 Michael Doyle however, has 
provided the most sophisticated defence of the argument that "constitutionally secure 
liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another" and that a steadily increasing 
number of liberal states world -wide indicates that a "liberal zone of peace, a pacific 
0 Rummel, R. J., loc.cit., 1995, pg. 5. 
n Rummel, R. J., loc.cit., 1989, pg. 38. 
32 Ibid., pg. 25. (Italics in original). 
n Fukuyama, F., op.cit., pg. 263. 
34 Levy, J.S., "Domestic Politics and War ", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (3), 1988, pg. 662; 
and Russett,B., op.cit., 1990, pg. 123. 
35 See for example a recent defence of the democratic peace thesis by one of its most prominent 
proponents, Maoz, Z., "The Controversy Over the Democratic Peace ", International Security, 22 (1), 
1997, pg. 162 -198. 
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union, has been maintained and has expanded... ".36 Nonetheless he contends that liberal 
states do not necessarily pursue peaceful means in their dealings with non -liberal states 
and hence, the pacific union "extends as far as, and no further than, the relations among 
liberal states... ".37 Doyle bases his position on Kant's teleological account of the 
emergence of a pacific federation of republican states characterised by a unique 
combination of principle (right) and self- interest.3ß Kant is celebrated for having 
realised not simply the normative superiority of liberal -republican states, but to have 
acknowledged that they were also most likely to fully engage in commerce and trade 
with other nations, gaining thereby greater wealth and economic power than other 
states.39 Consequently, the great complexity and diversity of economic ties between 
liberal, republican states prevents any conflict of interest between them from dominating 
and souring the overall relationship. In relations with non -liberal states however, the 
very paucity of relations with economically powerful liberal -republican states invites 
just this sort of problem. Such relationships are likely to be ruptured and may lead to 
war when a conflict of interest develops and no other profitable relations are able to 
counter- balance the resulting "tension ".40 
The economic success of liberal states however, is not without its own perils for it may 
lead to aggressive policies toward weak non -democratic states to protect commercial 
interests, and while liberalism has enjoyed considerable success in eliminating war 
between liberal states, its record in dealings between liberal and non -liberal states is less 
than glorious.'" In a more recent paper Doyle suggests that the source of this conflict 
lies in the perception that non -liberal states are "in a state of aggression" with their own 
populations and hence lack legitimacy.42 As Owen has put it, liberal states "seek their 
citizens' true interests" and are therefore "pacific and trustworthy" while non -liberal 
states are deemed "dangerous because they seek other ends, such as conquest or 
36 Doyle, M.W., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1 ", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
12 (3), 1983, pg. 213 -214 (italics in original). 
Ibid., pg. 223. 
38 Ibid., pg. 227 -230. 
39 Ibid., pg. 231. 
4° Doyle, M.W., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affaris, Part 2 ", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
12 (4), 1983, pg. 326. (Hereafter referred to as "Part Two "). What is worth noting here is the primary 
assumption that world trade and a global market seems to be confined to the community of liberal states, 
ignoring the power now exerted by the global economy through its major multi- national players over 
individual states. See, Hoffmann, S., loc.cit., 1995, pg. 175. 
41 Doyle, M.W., "Part Two ", pg. 335 -337. 
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plunder."' From the liberal point of view, non -liberal states play the role of 
"troublemakers" and the liberal world will "be truly secure only when the latter have 
been transformed into democracies, too.s44 The liberal response to the presence of non- 
liberal states is thus motivated by the perception that they are "unreasonable, 
unpredictable, and potentially dangerous... ruled by despots, or with unenlightened 
citizenries... [seeking] illiberal ends such as conquest, intolerance, or impoverishment of 
others. "45 As Russett argues "if people in a democracy perceive themselves as 
autonomous, self -governing people who share norms of live- and -let -live, they will 
respect the rights of others to self -determination if those others are also perceived as 
self -governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self -serving 
elite. "46 
Buttressing this normative appraisal of the peacefulness of liberal- democracies is the 
Kantian conviction that in actual military competition liberal states will prove more 
powerful and resilient than non -liberal states.47 The reality of armed conflict between 
states will therefore ensure the ultimate victory of liberal over non -liberal states, thereby 
hastening "a global society... encompassing an ever larger zone of peace..." (which 
Doyle calculates to be achievable by the year 2113).4ß What one writer has called the 
"stunning simplicity" of the democratic peace thesis and the "equally impressive" 
empirical data used to attest to it buoys such dramatic conclusions.49 Nonetheless, 
considerable dispute persists over just why liberal- democracies pursue peace.50 One of 
the more influential explanations emphasises the `structural' constraints built into 
liberal- democratic states which militate against war -making. In other words, peace is 
attributed to the domestic limitations of democratic government, the separation of 
powers, institutionalisation of popular consent in regular elections, popularly elected 
42 Doyle, M.W. "Liberalism and International Relations" in R.Beiner and W.J. Booth (eds.), Kant and 
Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, pg. 191. 
43 Owen, J.M., "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace ", International Security, 19 (2), 1994, pg. 
89. 
44 Layne, C., "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace ", International Security, 19 (2), 1994, 
pg. 46. 
45 Owen, J.M., loc.cit., pg. 96. 
46 Russett, B., op.cit., 1993, pg. 31. 
Doyle, M.W., loc.cit., 1993, pg. 189. 
4B Doyle, M. W., "Part Two ", pg. 351, 352. 
49 Ray, J L., "The Democratic Path to Peace ", Journal of Democracy, 8 (2), 1997, pg. 51. 
5° Layne, C., loc.cii., pg. 6. 
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parliamentary representatives, and the supposed need of democratic governments to 
obtain the consent of the populace before declaring wars' 
A second alternative emphasises the importance of shared norms between liberal - 
democracies, the respect for human rights, the aversion to violence, and the assumption 
that such governments serve their citizen's (rather than their own) interests. The former 
explanation purports to show that liberal- democracies are inherently pacific, the latter 
that they are more inclined to peaceful relations with other liberal- democracies.52 Either 
liberal states are essentially pacific in their conduct because of structural constraints to 
war, which must be true of their dealings with all and not just liberal states, or liberal 
states are inclined to an exclusive peace between similarly liberal states. Both 
explanations however, privilege the association between peace and popular consent 
within liberal- democratic polities." Proponents of both explanations assume that 
popular consent will act as a limiting discipline upon the state's ability to wage war, and 
indeed further assume that illiberal and undemocratic states which ignore the popular 
will face no such restriction and are thus more likely to wage war. The distinction 
between liberal- democratic states in which popular consent ensures peace and illiberal 
and undemocratic states in which authoritarian rule ensures violence signifies an 
assumption that these latter states are dangerous because they are undisciplined and 
uncivilised. In other words, it is assumed that the international system of states is 
composed of some states who can be relied upon to conduct themselves peacefully, and 
others with whom peaceful relations are unlikely. Michael Mann has argued however, 
that just such assumptions have bolstered what he has called "civil society militarism ", 
an aggressive militarism largely fuelled by a popular will to `civilise' the globe.54 
Consequently, a perpetual source of conflict is built -in to the international system of 
states based on the presumption that liberal states must arm themselves against 
51 Onuf, N.G. and Johnson, T.J., "Peace in the Liberal World: Does Democracy Matter ?" in C.W. 
Kegley (ed.), op.cit., pg. 185 -191. 
52 Bruce Russett has attempted to subject normative and structural factors to statistical evaluation. See 
for example Russett, B., op.cit., 1993, pg, 76 -93. 
n Owen, J. M., loc.cit., pg. 90 -96. Owen attempts to resolve the tension between `normative' and 
`structural' explanations by arguing that the vital determinant of the liberal state's willingness to wage 
war are the popular "perceptions" of the citizens of each state as to whether or not the other state is in fact 
liberal and democratic. 
54 Mann, M., "Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution From Comparative and Historical 
Sociology' in S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 221 -239. 
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uncivilised, aggressive, illiberal `troublemaking' states which are both untrustworthy 
and illegitimate. 
Liberals therefore accept that the global order is constituted as Doyle puts it, by a 
"heterogenous state of peace and war ", while realists interpret that same order as a 
"relatively homogenous state of war ".55 The key distinction is that realists anticipate a 
perpetual state of war between states over which domestic liberal and democratic 
institutions have little influence. According to Doyle however, liberals insist on a 
distinction between inherently aggressive and inherently pacific states, but beyond this 
fundamental claim liberal theorists diverge in trying to explain the sources and nature of 
the inter -liberal state peace.56 What Doyle calls "First Image" liberalism traced the 
source of peace to the provision of rights to protection and property, while "Second 
Image" liberals emphasised domestic commerce and market economies. Following his 
earlier work on Kantian international relations theory, Doyle suggests that "Third 
Image" liberalism provides a more convincing explanation by focussing on the relations 
between liberal states, and between liberal and non -liberal states. Neither of these 
formulations however, entirely escapes the fundamental liberal assumption that external 
peace is a function of domestic state structure. Doyle's `third image' liberalism for 
instance, accepts that the very domestic institutions and values which incline liberal 
states to mutual trust and co- existence, lead to distrust and a propensity for aggression 
toward non -liberal states. His explanation traces the incidence of war to the perception 
that liberal- democratic states are "[d]omestically just" because they rest on popular 
consent ", while "nonliberal states" are unjust in that they do not reflect the "free 
consent" of their populace.57 War is waged against illiberal states because they are 
perceived to be `troublemakers', and they are perceived to be `troublemakers' because 
they are neither liberal nor democratic. The very perception of another regime as 
legitimate and trustworthy makes warfare with that state unlikely, while the perception 
that a state is illegitimate leads to the view that they are untrustworthy and more 
warlike. 
ss Doyle, M., Ways of War and Peace, W.W.Norton, New York, 1997, pg. 210. 
56 The following information is drawn from ibid., pg. 213 -300. 
Doyle, M., "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited ", in C.W. Kegley (ed.), op.cit., pg. 99. 
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As Stanley Hoffmann has argued, liberal international relations theory accepts as 
axiomatic that the "nature" of the state "is a key determinant" of its "behaviour" toward 
other states.58 Liberal -internationalists such as Robert Keohane claim that attributing 
the externally peaceful conduct of liberal states to their prior achievement of domestic 
peace is indicative a particular variant of avowedly Kantian or "republican" liberalism 
of which he is sceptical.59 He has therefore sought an explanation which traces peace 
not to the domestic realm but to the structure of the international system, and in 
particular to transnational agreements "that promote and guarantee openness" and 
"provide incentives for peaceful rather than aggressive expansion.s60 The assumption 
here is that the greater the economic "interdependence" between states, the more they 
will be inclined to cooperate rather than compete violently.61 Keohane's "sophisticated 
liberalism" reverses the democratic peace argument, that domestic structure is a source 
of international peace, but does so only to reinforce one of the most important bulwarks 
of the democratic peace thesis, that the expansion of the zone of peace is coeval with the 
expanding global economy. Onuf and Johnson for example, argue that there is a 
positive link between prosperity and the development of a peaceful "cosmopolitanism" 
which sees war as "childish or parochial" and a threat to the "increasingly sophisticated" 
lives of cosmopolitan societies.62 Such a view tends to discount the destabilising 
influences of globalisation, and along with democratic peace theorists, liberal 
internationalists share the primary assumption that liberal- democratic states exist in an 
international realm of real and potential violence as already pacified, morally superior 
states.63 
The assumption of moral superiority is also central to realist analysis which claims to 
disavow normative explanations for peace.64 Samuel Huntington's The Third Wave for 
instance, casts considerable doubt on the prospect of a global conversion to liberal - 
democracy, but accepts that liberal states are inherently inclined to peace because of the 
ss Hoffmann, S., loc.cit., pg. 167. 
ss Keohane, R.O., "International Liberalism Reconsidered ", in J.Dunn (ed.), The Economic Limits to 
Modern Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pg. 177 and passim. 
Keohane, R., loc.cit., pg. 183. 
6' Ibid., pg. 186. 
62 Onuf, N.G., and Johnson, T.J., loc.cit., pg. 192. 
67 Indeed, Little argues that this assumption also shapes realist and neo- realist international relations 
literature which, he argues, is underwritten by an implicitly liberal theory of the state. Little, R., loc.cit., 
pg. 33 -36. 
ea Waltz, K., op.cit., pg. 222. 
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toleration of dissent and the institutionalisation of opposition, providing governments 
and their opponents "fewer incentives to use violence" and making change "moderate 
and incremental" rather than sudden and violent.65 The sole sufficient condition for the 
existence of democracy therefore is regular "competitive elections by the people ".66 
While he notes the possibility that democracy can be defined in terms of important 
values (such as respect of civil and political rights, the separation of powers, or the 
value of the individual) he dismisses such "fuzzy norms" as providing an insufficient 
criterion for evaluating whether a state is or is not democratic.ó7 Despite this claim 
however, Huntington in fact attributes the emergence of liberal- democratic states 
precisely to democratic norms and the ability and willingness of citizens to make 
normative judgements. While elections clearly constitute a central element of 
democratic practice, Huntington admits that their value and the number of states which 
have institutionalised them depend upon the "prevalence of democratic norms globally" 
and the "development of values and attitudes supportive of democracy" within nations.óe 
The very sustainability of democratic regimes depends he argues, on a shared 
commitment to "the value of the democratic system" which could not be made in the 
absence of shared norms.69 Indeed, despite his reluctance to speak of the "fuzzy norms" 
of democracy, it is hard to see how his analysis of democracy can be anything other than 
`normative'. 
For Huntington, violence is most closely associated with non -democratic or 
"authoritarian" regimes.7" The "routine murder by government" of its opponents is "an 
inherent characteristic of many authoritarian regimes" he argues, claiming that the use 
of violence is the essential feature of authoritarian rule, and notes that, 
Throughout history armed revolts have almost never produced 
democratic regimes. ... Governments created by moderation and 
65 Huntington, S. P., The Third Wave.- Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, University of 
Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991, pg. 28 -29. See also, Grieco, J.M., "Anarchy and the Limits of 
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" in C.W. Kegley (ed.), op.cit., pg. 
160. 
66 Ibid., pg. 6. 
67 Ibid., pg. 9. 
u Ibid., pg. 106. 
69 Ibid., pg. 258. 
70 Similarly, Gurr and Jaggers claim that "democracy is the opposite of autocracy." Gurr, T.R., and 
Jaggers, K., "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave With the Polity III Data ", Journal of Peace Research, 
32 (4), 1995, pg. 469. Gurr and Jaggers do not insist on violence as the distinguishing characteristic, but 
maintain a firm distinction nonetheless between democracy and "autocracy ". 
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compromise ruled by moderation and compromise. Governments 
produced by violence ruled by violence." 
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the liberal state is "morally 
complete" and therefore non- violent.72 This assumption reinforces a tendency to focus 
on violence between states in the form of inter -state rather than civil war. One of the 
leading democratic peace theorists for instance, defines war as a function of state -hood 
involving "large -scale institutionally organised lethal violence" between states, thereby 
excluding civil war." It is assumed therefore that war can be prevented, "if enough 
states become stably democratic" and they, 
...reconstruct the norms and rules of the international order to reflect 
those of democracies in a majority of interactions. A system created by 
autocracies centuries ago might now be recreated by a critical mass of 
democratic states.74 
In theorising the growth of a liberal zone of peace therefore, the focus of attention is 
placed on organised conflict between states, while the violence which occurs within 
states is often ignored.75 
This approach to the definition of warfare, and hence to the identification of peace is 
insensitive to the dramatic rise in the number and intensity of violent conflicts and 
warfare now occurring largely within states.76 An implicit boundary between the society 
of pacified liberal -democratic states, and the realm of violent, authoritarian, or 
troublemaking states sustains the assumption that violence within states is only a 
problem for this latter category of states. Thus Holsti for example, argues that those 
"weak" states most susceptible to domestic and international violence are those which 
lack legitimacy and order, while those peaceful "strong" states which possess legitimacy 
and order also often happen to be democratic." The association of peace with liberal- 
7' Huntington, S.P., op.cit., pg. 192 and 207. 
72 MacMillan, J., loc.cit., 1996, pg. 296. 
73 Russett, B., Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post -Cold War World, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993, pg. 12, 13 -14. The criterion of "large- scale" consists in over 1000 
battle casualties. 
Ibid., pg. 138. 
15 As one writer defines it, a zone of peace is a "discrete geographical region of the world in which a 
group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves... though civil wars and domestic 
unrest and violence might still occur within their borders... ". Kacowicz, A.M., "Explaining Zones of 
Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers ? ", Journal of Peace Research, 32 (3), 1995, pg. 266. 
76 As one recent critic has noted, "all of the major armed conflicts fought in the world in 1995 were 
intrastate wars." Paris, R., "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', International 
Security, 22 (2), 1997, pg. 54. 
Holsti, K.J., The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 
141 -149. 
251 
democratic regimes in particular, has lead to attempts to create more democracies 
through programmes of "peacebuilding" guided by the "assumption that the surest 
foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a 
liberal democratic polity and a market -oriented economy. "'a As critics of this approach 
have observed however, the belief that democracy can be "inserted and instituted" 
within such nations usually involves the infliction of tough micro -economic reforms 
upon poor countries and a corresponding weakening of state structures capable of 
providing relief to those who most need it.79 The imposition of market structures and 
democratic institutions upon war -torn nations has often failed to produce more peace 
because both require vigorous competition, and the high levels of inequality which 
usually accompany economic liberalisation has usually exacerbated social tensions.' 
III STATES AND VIOLENCE 
The assumption that violence can only be eliminated within and between liberal - 
democratic states leads to the attribution of violence to the non -liberal world of 
`uncivilised' states. The boundary between the peace `inside' and the violence `outside' 
the borders of the liberal- democratic state is thus sharpened by seeing this `outer' 
violence as the responsibility of non -liberal states. Even when it is acknowledged that 
liberal states have fought wars, it is explained that this violence is caused by the fact that 
the states with which liberal -democracies fight are illegitimate, untrustworthy, and 
illiberal states. If there were more liberal- democracies, the argument runs, there would 
be more peace. In contrast to realists, liberals assume that - ideally - the state exists as 
the "effective expression" of the popular consent of its population and characteristically 
deny that each state confronts all other states as potential sources of competition and 
conflict.' It remains the case however, that liberal states as much as any other type of 
state, must manage their domestic populations in order to maximise their strength. 
Sovereign states perpetuate the segregation of humanity into a series of competing 
entities whose sovereignty depends on the willingness to use violence to discriminate 
78 Ibid., pg. 56. 
Leftwich, A., "On the Primacy of Politics in Development" in A. Leftwich (ed.), Democracy and 
Development: Theory and Practice, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 4 -12. 
80 Paris, R., loc.cit., pg. 76 -78. París examines the progress of peacebuilding programmes in eight 
worn-torn countries (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and 
Bosnia), and concludes that all but one of these cases (Namibia) peacebuilding has exacerbated tensions, 
and in some has led to renewed hostilities. See ibid., pg. 64 -73. 
° Hoffmann, S., Janus and Minerva: Essay in the Theory and Practice of International Politics, 
Westview, Boulder, 1987, pg. 404. 
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between its own and other populations, between citizens and foreigners, `us' and 
`them'.82 This imperative is a function of an international system of states which 
imposes upon member states, both liberal and illiberal, the need to organise themselves 
in such a way that they may possess an efficient control and administration of violence 
which, "provide[s] unlimited opportunities for domestic cruelty, external interventions 
that aggravate violence, bloody wars, and terrorism."83 
The processes by which states develop and maintain their sovereignty requires not only 
that they be prepared to use violence externally against other states, but that they 
effectively control the means of violence within their own borders also. According to 
Giddens, modern states have enhanced their own domestic power by removing violent 
challengers to their authority within their borders and focussing their increased control 
of violence on the international realm of relations with other states!' The state's 
monopoly of violence however is perpetually challenged by "unruly others ", criminals, 
law- breakers, dissidents, or rebels whose threats must be controlled.85 The incidence of 
war on the international level therefore is but a continuation of processes of violence 
within states. Indeed as John Gray has noted, wars today "are often not fought 
[exclusively] by agents of sovereign states but... by political organisations, irregular 
armies, ethnic or tribal militias and other bodies that may owe allegiance to no 
sovereign state.iS6 Warfare represents one part of the process by which states separate 
themselves from competing sources or units of power within and outside their borders. 
The maintenance of state sovereignty need not always be pursued in an aggressive 
manner, but the logic of bureaucratic and diplomatic decision -making entails that 
national interests are defined and defended as separable and sovereign and thereby each 
state confronts other states (or other challengers to their sovereignty) as potential 
aggressors. Michael Mann argues for example that the Vietnam and Falkland Islands 
wars each developed as a consequence of "essentially private, autonomous decisions" of 
bureaucrats and diplomats which confined the range of options each government felt 
82 Hindess, B., "Divide and Rule: The International Character of Modern Citizenship ", European 
Journal of Social Theory, 1 (1), 1998, pg. 57 -70. 
83 Hoffmann, S., op.cit., pg. 406. 
B4 Giddens, A., The Nation -State and Violence, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, pg. 327. 
85 Hoffman, J., "What on Earth Have Sovereignty and the State to do With the Question of Gender ? ", in 
I. Hampsher -Monk and J. Stanyer (eds.), Contemporary Political Studies, Volume I, Political Studies 
Association of the United Kingdom, Belfast, 1996, pg. 629. 
86 Gray, J., "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present ", International 
Affairs, 74 (1), 1998, pg. 155. 
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able to take to pursue their interests until war seemed the most logical and effective 
means available.87 
Realists accept the connection between sovereign states and warfare but are inclined to 
conclude as Hedley Bull put it, that warfare between states has "so far proved 
compatible with the survival of the human species, and indeed with the maintenance of 
civilised social life... ".88 From this perspective sovereign states present a reasonably 
effective means for managing global conflict, restricting it to a narrow range of 
circumstances subjected to rules of engagement, preventing the eruption of domestic 
conflicts onto the international scene, and thereby securing a tolerably stable order 
between sovereign entities. This conception of order rests on the notion that each state 
claims an exclusive right to control a domestic population by offering protection from 
other states or internal competitors by developing the capacity and capability to 
monopolise the use of violence. Warfare is interpreted as "organised violence" between 
sovereign "political units" which sanction, organise, authorise, and most importantly 
control, limit and confine violence.89 The assumption here is that states have in fact 
managed to limit both the incidence of war and the violence of warfare, and that under 
normal circumstances they preserve domestic peace. According to Charles Tilly 
however, states "commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats" in order to 
foist their `protection' upon a subject population from which it is able to extract 
resources (in the form of taxes or military service), thereby enhancing its own power by 
operating "in essentially the same ways as racketeers.i90 In early -modern Europe, and 
in parts of Africa today for example, waging wars stimulates the development of state 
structures designed to meet foreign and domestic threats and consolidates internal 
control through the development of a monopoly of the control of violence thereby 
eliminating internal rivals.91 Securing a monopoly of violence ensures that each state 
can then pursue the further extraction of more resources to drive its own external and 
internal consolidation. Limited liberal states developed in early -modern Europe Tilly, 
B7 Mann, M., The Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, 
pg. 774. On the autonomy of the state and decision- making see Holsti, O.R., "Theories of International 
Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and its Challengers ", in C.W. Kegley (ed.), op.cit., pg. 35 -65. 
88 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Macmillan, London, 1977, pg. 
283. 
ß9 Ibid., pg. 184 -185. 
90 Tilly, C., "War Making and State Making as Organised Crime" in P.B. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, T. 
Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pg. 171. 
91 Ibid., pg. 181. 
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suggests, because the protection they offered struck a fine balance between a monopoly 
of military power and a framework of formal, legal procedures and court structures 
which were used not only to secure domestic peace and security of property, but to limit 
state power.92 In "the increasing scale of war and the knitting together of the European 
state system through commercial, military, and diplomatic interaction" in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth -centuries "the war -making advantage" was held by those states which 
had fostered market economies and were better able to develop standing armies.93 
In the process of waging war therefore, the states which had the greatest chances of 
surviving and thriving were those which provided a secure protection at home and 
fostered the most productive and efficient economies. This involved states in a host of 
non -military activities, such as infrastructural development, law enforcement, and 
administration.94 In the process however, modern European states acquired 
unprecedented military power (spurred by scientific and technological advancement) 
which in the twentieth- century, has resulted in the bloodiest conflicts and highest loss of 
life in war.95 The apparently `peaceful' domestic activities of the state were interwoven 
therefore with an imperative to control and use violence, which as the twentieth- century 
has also shown, can be used as easily within as outside the state's borders. It is in this 
sense that Lifton and Markusen referred to the "murderous lawfulness" of the Nazi state 
and the "relative niceness ", "civilised demeanour ", and "democratic convictions" of the 
defenders of the American nuclear arsenal, the ultimate form of genocidal weapon.96 
The taint of genocidal violence can be seen in the history of many states, not simply 
those of Germany and Russia, but of apparently liberal- democratic states such as the 
Unites States, Canada, and Australia. The indigenous populations of these countries 
were subjected to genocidal policies until comparatively recently which were often 
tempered only by the feeling that such peoples were destined for extinction anyway.97 
92 Ibid., pg. 186. An example of such limitations was the English Parliament's abolition in the 1630's 
of the Star Chamber and other courts used to assert the Royal Prerogative. 
n Tilly, C., Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 -1990, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, 1990, 
pg. 15. 
Mann, M., "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in J.Hall 
(ed.), States in History, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pg. 109 -136. 
95 Tilly, C., op.cit., pg. 72 -74. 
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From a Foucauldian or `governmental' perspective, liberalism is seen as a rationality of 
government, a method of developing state power by promoting individual autonomy 
and freedom within market economies. This rationality revolves around the idea that a 
domestic population is best governed by shaping individual citizens who can be relied 
upon to govern themselves peacefully. The aims of this discourse, which previous 
chapters have attempted to trace, is to create a society of autonomous citizens whose 
conduct is self -regulated in accord with the expectation that each individual will 
participate in and contribute to the productivity of society. Enhancing social 
productivity is in turn pursued by encouraging each individual to pursue their own 
material advantage, thereby driving the national economy - from which the state 
benefits - by extending market disciplines, such as `rational' economic planning and 
corporate management structures, throughout society in order to ensure maximum 
efficiency of production while minimising direct state involvement." On this view, 
liberal government and its doctrines of limited state power can be seen as a particularly 
successful manifestation of raison d'etat. The liberal state has enhanced its power by 
promoting individual liberty, and the foundations for this view were laid by earlier 
liberal theorists such as Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, and Kant. For its proponents, the 
success which liberal states have had in achieving international pre- eminence is a direct 
consequence of having pacified their own domestic populations and their relations with 
other liberal states.99 This view effectively places the onus of responsibility for causing 
violence onto non -liberal states and assumes that liberal states will pursue foreign 
policies consistent with and constrained by domestically pacific liberal institutions, 
values, and principles.100 
By tracing the origin of peace to the domestic structure of the state liberals are unable to 
account for the "interactive" nature of peace, that is, its emergence within the context of 
particular relationships between states.101 It may also be argued that it was the prior 
9s This issue is discussed at length in Hindess, B., "Neo- Liberal Government and the Institutionalisation 
of Arbitrary Power ", Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the Australasian Political Science 
Association and European Union Studies Association of New Zealand, Christchurch, Volume I, 1998, pg. 
330 -337. 
" Considerable doubt persists however, on what states `democratic peace' theorists consider to be liberal 
and democratic. For this and related criticisms see MacMillan, J., "A Kantian Protest Against the 
Peculiar Discourse of Inter- Liberal State Peace ", Millenium, 24 (3), 1994, pg. 559; and Spiro, D.E., "The 
Insignificance of the Liberal Peace ", International Security, 19 (2), 1994, pg. 55 -58. 
100 Macmillan, J., "Democracies Don't Fight: a Case of the Wrong Research Agenda ? ", Review of 
International Studies, 22 (3), 1996, pg. 280 -284. 
01 Ibid., pg. 287. 
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creation of "niches" of international peace that allowed the subsequent development of 
liberal states.t02 Recent attempts have been made to re- conceptualise the nature of the 
relationship between states that transcends the conventional liberal focus on either 
domestic state structure or the global economy as the determinants of international 
peace. Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilisations is one such attempt, and 
displays considerable scepticism of the claim made by democratic peace theorists that 
the global spread of democracy heralds the prospect of a lasting global peace. 
Huntington claims that the post -Cold War world is riven by massive cleavages between 
civilisational blocs within which individual states form a loosely aligned network of 
"kin" states. Within this framework of supra -national, cultural identity and political 
allegiance, 
...the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be 
between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined 
groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. 
Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilisations. Violence 
between states and groups from different civilisations, however, carries 
with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these 
civilisations rally to the support of their "kin countries ".103 
Importantly however, Huntington's analysis while seeming to suggest that states can no 
longer be considered independent sovereign entities, relies nonetheless on the concept of 
the state as a vehicle of peace. In effect, much of the international instability 
Huntington fears is described as a consequence of modernisation which has created 
powerful non -Western states which now threaten the cultural hegemony of the West.164 
Huntington goes on to claim however, that the boundaries between states are being 
"redrawn to coincide with cultural ones" and indicates thereby that civilisational identity 
is coming to resemble state- hood.105 As a consequence civilisational conflict closely 
resembles state conflicts, 
...the sources of conflict between states and groups from different 
civilisations are, in large measure, those which have always generated 
conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and 
102 Thompson, W.R., "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse ? ", International 
Organisation, 50 (1), 1996, pg. 147. 
103 Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, 
New York, 1996, pg. 28. Civilisations are defined as containing a set of shared norms, manners, and 
culture; they are broad and comprehensive, not limited by geography or national borders, they encompass 
regional entities (such as cities and states), often share the same or similar religion, have long life -spans 
through which they continue to evolve, and may contain any number of different political entities (such 
as empires, states, or tribes). Huntington lists as the major civilisational blocs in the world today, Sinic, 
Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin -American, and possibly an African civilisation: Ibid., pg. 40 -7. 
104 Ibid., pg. 91 -92. 
los Ibid., pg. 125. 
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resources, and relative power, that is the ability to impose one's own 
values, culture, and institutions on another group...106 
In this new world order, peace is to be secured by "core states" from which the 
dominant values and cultural identities emerge and who alone are capable of 
establishing order within their own civilisational bloc and between civilisations, through 
negotiation with other "core states ". If peace is to be secured at all he concludes, core 
states must refrain from intervention in the affairs of states in other civilisational 
groupings, and be prepared to negotiate their differences with the states of other 
civilisational blocs peacefully.107 
Huntington's analysis of civilisational conflict questions the liberal faith in the spread of 
peace through the universal acceptance of liberal democratic norms and values. As John 
Gray points out however, Huntington underestimates the degree to which states are 
agents of violence and conflict by entrusting to them, and to core states in particular, the 
task of creating and maintaining peace.108 In Chapter Four of this thesis it was also 
suggested that Huntington assumes that peace - domestic and global - is a quality of 
Western civilisation, and fears that the decline of the West will entail increasing 
instability, conflict and war. On this view, the problem of war is traced not to the nature 
of states but to the persistence of non -Western, illiberal states. By seeing the state itself 
as intimately linked to the problem of war, other liberal theorists have attempted to 
envisage a "cosmopolitan democracy ", the extension of democratic norms of 
accountability and representation to the international realm, empowering people rather 
than their states.109 The central aim of cosmopolitan democracy is to entrench a system 
of rights and a network of protective agencies which "cut across the territorial 
boundaries of the nation- state.i10 Cosmopolitan democracy is thus built upon the 
recognition that violence and abuses of human rights are not confined to illiberal states, 
but are perpetrated by all kinds of states and regimes. 
106 Ibid., pg. 129. 
107 Ibid., pg. 316. 
10B Gray, J., "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations ", International Affairs, 74 (1), 1998, pg. 155- 
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258 
Part of the problem is that apparently peaceful states which do not employ violence 
against their own or other populations are caught in a web of international relations in 
which they cannot help but have a detrimental effect on the peoples of other states. In 
other words, the very system of competing sovereign states entails that each state 
privileges the interests of their own populations over those of other states, and the 
pursuit of those interests inevitably conflicts with the interests of other peoples and 
states. "' Cosmopolitan democracy rests on the promotion of a "transnational civil 
society" incorporating a multitude of non - government organisations, international 
agencies, and global pressure groups, constituting "the only vehicle for the promotion of 
the law of humanity... [and] humane geo- governance... ", a kind of "globalisation -from- 
below" challenging the "prevailing dominance of globalisation- from -above... ".12 This 
view recognises that state sovereignty enforces upon its claimants the need not only to 
organise for war, but to pursue interests which inevitably conflict with (and inflict 
suffering upon) the people of other states. Such decisions are a function of the moral 
quarantine exercised by state boundaries in which the pursuit and protection of a 
`national interest' requires the defence of that interest against the interest of all others, 
often represented as the `legitimate' defence of one's own peaceful interests against the 
illegitimate aggression of others. The exclusionary nature of state sovereignty results in 
a system of competing sovereign units whose own particular interests not only take 
precedence over the interests of others or of humanity as a whole, but the pursuit of 
which requires the internal organisation and management of domestic populations in 
order to maximise the state's ability to employ violence. The main weakness of 
cosmopolitan democracy is that it cannot convincingly explain how cosmopolitanism 
can be established in a global environment dominated by sovereign states. The 
successful resistance of transnational pressures by states such as Burma, China, Iraq, 
and Serbia leads to a less sanguine conclusion that the faith in international courts, 
multilateral agreements and a global civil society is relevant only to a world of states 
which choose to abide cosmopolitan institutions. 
Hindess, B., loc.cit., 1997, pg. 348. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been argued in this chapter that liberal international relations theory is informed 
by an implicit discourse of civilisation. The influence of this discourse can be seen in 
the tendency of liberal international relations theorists to assert the connection between 
liberal- democratic states and peace, and to attribute the persistence of violence and war 
to illiberal states. The prospects for peace are therefore identified as coeval with the 
prospects of liberal- democracy and the modern, Western civilisation which has given 
rise to it. Even where a theorist like Huntington questions the spread of liberal - 
democracy and fears the eclipse of Western civilisation, the contention is not that some 
other civilisation will establish peace, but that the peace of Western civilisation will be 
replaced by instability and war. What is feared is the rise of non -Western civilisations 
and illiberal states which are assumed to be more inclined to pursue their interests 
through violence. Violence and warfare are thereby associated, as both Montesquieu 
and Kant maintained, with the uncivilised and authoritarian conduct of illiberal and 
undemocratic states. 
Violence is here represented as the illegitimate use of force to conquer and subdue 
others; it represents irrational and barbaric conduct. Francis Fukuyama for instance, 
argues that violence is a consequence of the desire to seek unilateral recognition, to 
subdue or subordinate others and thereby to gain recognition and respect. Violence is 
thereby equated with anti- liberal norms, a "warrior ethos" evident in the activities of 
"gangs" who "make their living dealing drugs ", or of others who "run around risking 
their lives in bloody battle over a name, or a flag, or a piece of clothing... ".13 This is the 
violence of private war and conquest; it is the deliberate, unauthorised, and bloody 
suppression of liberal values and institutions often associated with the rise of fanatical 
nationalism or religious fundamentalism.14 On this view, violence can only consist in 
relations of domination which by their very nature cannot exist within liberal societies 
and states. This is the view most articulately expressed by Hannah Arendt for whom 
violence was a purely instrumental attempt of the one to overpower and subdue the 
collective and as such was antithetical to `power', a quality which inhered only when 
individuals acted "in concert".15 Within the liberal literature the presence of violence 
11 Fukuyama, F., op.cit., pg. 148. 
"° Gray, J., Post -Liberalism; Studies in Political Thought, Routledge, New York, 1993, pg. 317 -318. 
''s Arendt, H., On Violence in Crises of the Republic, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, pg. 113 -115. 
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within liberal- democracies is either overlooked or ignored, and scant reference is made 
to the persistence of violence such as capital punishment, or the use of torture in 
putatively liberal and democratic states.1' 
It is no coincidence that these forms of `authorised' violence are ignored, because both 
are perpetrated by the functionaries of law and order against those who have been 
identified as threats to that order. This thesis has argued that liberal discourse has been 
resistant to viewing the actions of the upholders of law and order as violence. The 
reason for this is not that liberals employ some double -standard which excuses 
`authorised' violence while condemning `unauthorised' violence. Rather, liberal 
attitudes to violence have been shaped by a discourse of civilisation in which violence 
has been equated with barbarism and the law of the jungle' which threatens to intrude 
upon and destroy the security and safety of civil society. Civil society is the product of 
the civilising process, a social realm purged of violence in which the lives and 
properties of citizens are secured by democratic states with limited powers committed to 
preserving peace within their borders and extending it beyond them. Violence is most 
readily identified in the actions of those individuals who defy or threaten the civil order, 
those "single individuals" as Arendt put it who "refuse to be overpowered by the 
consensus of the majority. "' Violence is thus confined by boundaries of definition 
which allow its identification in those actions which threaten the peace and disturb the 
order of civil society. In the process, `violence' is distinguished from those acts by 
which the civil order is itself upheld, and from those which neither threaten nor defend 
civil society but merely persist within the supposedly peaceful realm of civil society. In 
the next and concluding chapter to this thesis, attention will turn to the ways in which 
the `problem' of violence has been framed within recent literature on civil society. 
116 See for instance: Reiman, J.H., "Justice, Civilisation, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den 
Haag ", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (2), 1985, pg. 115 -148. For a `liberal' defence of capital 
punishment see van den Haag, E., "Refuting Reiman and Nathanson ", ibid., pg. 165 -176. Here he argues 
that there is "nothing uncivilised in imposing the risk of subjugation and death on those who murder." 
(169). For a more recent discussion of the issue see Lynch, T., "The Liberal Case Against Capital 
Punishment ", Political Theory Newsletter, 8 (1), 1996, pg. 7 -15; and Millett, K., The Politics of Cruelty; 
An Essay on the Literature of Political Imprisonment, Penguin, London, 1994, pg. 79 -116 
11' Arendt, op.cit., pg. 119. 
261 
CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSION 
THE FORGE OF PEACE? 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE `PROBLEM' OF VIOLENCE IN LIBERAL DISCOURSE 
...the threat (and fear) of violence always seems to have been lurking behind the concern 
with civility. Uncivility [sic] was the ghost that permanently haunted civil society. In 
this respect, civilisation was normally understood as a project charged with resolving 
the permanent problem of discharging, defusing and sublimating violence; uncivility 
was the permanent enemy of civil society. Civilisation therefore denoted an ongoing 
historical process, in which civility, a static term, was both the aim and the outcome of 
the transformation of uncivil into civil behaviour. 
- John Keane, Reflections on Violence, Verso, London, 1996, pg. 19. 
This thesis has explored the development and implications of a liberal discourse of 
civilisation in which, as John Keane's opening quotation illustrates, violence has been 
associated with an uncivilised and barbaric past. Liberal discourse on civilisation is 
premised on the view that civilised societies have managed to exclude barbarous 
violence from the sphere of civil interaction, the realm of civil society. In Chapter One 
it was argued that this exclusion had been achieved under the auspices of states which 
claimed a monopoly on the right to use violence within their borders. As Norbert Elias 
suggested however, it has also depended on the development of patterns of self -control, 
self -restraint and self -government which reduced the need for the state to use violence. 
Liberal discourse on civilisation has therefore been characterised by persistent attempts, 
explored in Chapters Five to Eight, to envisage a pacified civil realm inhabited by self - 
governed and self -restrained individuals. Much of this discourse has been concerned to 
identify the boundaries of civil society, within which peace reigns but outside which 
violence is tolerated or overlooked. Much effort has also been devoted to specifying 
how self -government and self -restraint can be achieved by the inhabitants of civil 
society and how, once achieved, they can be relied upon to prevent the transgressions of 
the boundaries of the civil realm and the contamination of civil society by violence. The 
result, as Chapters Two to Four outlined, is that liberalism has been shaped by the fear 
that the appearance of violence heralds the destruction of the rights and securities upon 
which civil society rests. 
It has already been argued that boundaries which exclude violence from the `pacified' 
realm of civil society, protected by the benign institutions of liberal -democratic states, 
also imply the acceptance of violence outside those boundaries. In the previous two 
chapters it has been argued that liberal international relations theory has been shaped by 
the assumption that there is a boundary separating the `inner' realm of peace and 
security within liberal- democratic states, and an `outer' realm of violence and warfare. 
The celebration of peace within the boundary has therefore been accompanied by the 
recognition of violence outside it. In this final and concluding chapter, attention will be 
turned to the boundaries operating within the apparently already pacified realm of 
liberal -democratic states and societies. It will be argued that the very conception of 
civil society itself relies upon the maintenance of boundaries which separate the sphere 
of peaceful civil interaction from those spheres in which violence is still accorded a 
263 
necessary or useful role. The effect of such boundaries has been to sustain the image of 
a pacified society despite an intensification of violence alongside the values and 
institutions which claim its elimination from civil society. 
The concept of civil society has enjoyed a rather startling revival within social and 
political discourse. Political analysts grappled with the term in attempting to account 
for the sudden collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes.' Political theorists 
have sought to reinterpret and reapply the concept, breaking it free from the legacy of 
Hegelian and Marxist thought, while philosophers have sought to revive related notions 
of civility and decency.' International relations theorists have turned to the concept in 
the wake of 'globalisation' and the growing influence of transnational organisations.' In 
the realm of public policy, civil society has been used as an ideal in shaping the 
determination of suitable ends for policy initiatives.' What many of these approaches 
share is the concern to define civil society as "a space in which social groups could exist 
and move - something which exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable 
conditions of existence.' Civil society thus represents the culmination of the civilising 
process, a realm from which barbarism and violence have been eliminated. 
In this concluding chapter, it will be argued that the conception of civilisation as a 
process of pacification based on the manifold disciplines of self -government and self - 
restraint explored in earlier chapters, has obscured the exclusion of some forms of 
On civil society in the Eastern European context see the essays in R.F. Miller (ed.), The Developments 
of Civil Society in Communist Systems, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992. 
2 Some of the political theory literature will be surveyed in more detail below. On civil society in Hegel 
and Marx see the essays in Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political 
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. For examples of the revival of interest in 
civil society in political and social thought see Cohen, J. L., and Arato, A., Civil Society and Political 
Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1995, pg. 29 -116. On the renewed interest in civility and 
decency see Margalit, A., The Decent Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1996; and 
Carter, S.L., Civility: Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy, Basic Books, New York, 1998. 
3 For applications of civil society to international relations see the essays in D.Archibugi and D. Held 
(eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Polity, Cambridge, 1995. 
For examples of the use of the concept in relation to policy debates see Rorty, A.O., "From Decency 
to Civility by Way of Economics: `First Let's Eat and Then Talk of Right and Wrong "', Social Research, 
64 (1), 1997, pg. 112 -130; one should also note Eva Cox's 1995 Boyer Lectures broadcast on ABC Radio 
entitled "A Truly Civil Society" in which she argued that the revival of civil society required the 
development and creative use of social capital. One should also note Robert Putnam's Making 
Democracy Work: Civil Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, pg. 17- 
91. Putnam discusses a variety of policy issues which he relates more closely to the classical republican 
ideal of a "civic community" rather than the liberal ideal of a "civil society". 
s Hall, J., "In Search of Civil Society" in J.A. Hall (ed), Civil Society; Theory, History, Comparison, 
Polity, Cambridge, 1995, pg. 1. 
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violence from the civil realm and the intensification of others. Recent liberal literature 
on civil society, which will be discussed in the first section exemplifies this problem by 
accepting as axiomatic the assumption that the realm of civil society is a realm of peace 
which must be extended through the institutionalisation of democratic procedures. This 
assumption will be explored further in the second section in which it will be argued that 
within this recent literature the `problem' of violence has been framed in such a way as 
to represent it as alien to the values and institutions of civil society. The third section 
will explore the implication that the concept of civil society leads to the acceptance of 
forms of violence outside the boundaries of civil society, in realms enclosed and 
partitioned from the public peace of civil society. 
I. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 
The current interest in civil society has been shaped by persistent attempts to broaden 
the concept beyond the confines of earlier notions of civil society centred on the realm 
of unhindered economic activity.' In earlier chapters it was argued that civil society was 
initially conceived as a highly exclusive community of property- owning individuals 
engaged in contractual commercial activity with one another guarded by states whose 
function was to protect the economic liberty of the inhabitants of civil society. On this 
view the state occupied a separate but parallel dimension to the civil realm, guarding its 
boundaries from threats not only from other states and societies, but from those sectors 
of the domestic population who were excluded from civil society, such as women, 
labourers, `master -less men', vagabonds, pirates, and the `idle poor'.' The image of 
civil society was thus conceived in terms of a tripartite relation between the state, the 
restricted circle of citizens in civil society, and the wider uncivil society of non -citizens. 
Considerable emphasis was placed in this literature on identifying the boundaries 
between civil society and the state on the one hand and the wider uncivil society on the 
other. These boundaries were then to be defended against incursion from either the state 
or from elements of uncivil society.' 
Srubar, I., "Neoliberalism, Transformation and Civil Society ", Thesis Eleven, 47, 1996, pg. 38 -43. 
' See for example Christopher Hill's excellent Liberty Against the Law: Some Seventeenth -Century 
Controversies, Penguin, London, 1996. 
Hirst, P.Q., "Democracy and Civil Society ", in P.Hirst and S Khilnani (eds.), Reinventing Democracy, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, pg. 98 -100. 
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Such conceptions of civil society often resembled pacts of mutual self -preservation, 
emphasising the peacefulness of civil society by juxtaposing it to a partly mythical state 
of nature characterised by continual violence.' Hobbes and Locke are often considered 
exemplars of this approach, but Locke's conception in particular was subtle and 
complex, drawing attention to the necessary but not always clear separation of private 
and public realms. Locke's warning of the "great danger" consequent upon the 
interference of one sphere upon the other highlighted the precarious balance that civil 
society had to sustain between individual freedom and conscience on the one hand, and 
the public authority of binding laws on the other.10 Importantly, both Hobbes and Locke 
also distinguished between civil society and the pre -civil or uncivil communities evident 
in their comments on pirate organisations, the ancient Greeks, and American Indians. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, and in the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment in 
particular, civil society came to be seen as an exclusively Western European creation, a 
product of the process of civilisation which had rendered these societies peaceful and 
productive by introducing the practices of self -restraint and self -government. What this 
implied was that civil societies were one among a number of other varieties of 
association, but that only civil associations offered the protection, security, and rights 
required for a full and flourishing life." The chief distinction between civil and uncivil 
societies was that only civil societies encompassed the "properly political" aspirations 
of its inhabitants to seek an arrangement of public power consonant with private 
conscience and self- government.12 
On this view, civil society is a bounded entity, separate on the one hand from the 
confined and limited state which protects it, and from the wider and threatening uncivil 
societies and "outlawed spaces" which surround it.13 Recent literature on civil society 
however, has attempted to break free from this image of civil society as a restricted 
realm separated from and threatened by other entities and forms of association. 
Persistent attempts have been made to escape from the exclusivity of older conceptions 
9 Schmidt, J., "Civil Society and Social Things: Setting the Boundaries of the Social Sciences ", Social 
Research, 62 (4), 1995, pg. 900 -901. 
19 Locke, J., "A Letter Concerning Toleration" [1685], in D. Wootton (ed.), Political Writings of John 
Locke, Mentor, New York, 1993, pg. 421. 
" Schmidt, J., loc.cit., pg. 905 -906. 
12 Ibid., pg. 912. 
13 Chandhoke, N., State and Civil Society; Explorations in Political Theory, Sage, New Delhi, 1995, pg. 
187. 
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by broadening membership of civil society to make it a more inclusive realm 
incorporating sections of social life previously excluded." As John Keane defines it, 
...civil society can be conceived as an aggregate of institutions whose 
members are engaged primarily in a complex of non -state activities - 
economic and cultural production, household life, and voluntary 
associations - and who in this way preserve and transform their identity 
by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions.15 
The broadening of civil society to include those elements of the population excluded 
from previous definitions is pursued by attempting to separate the concept of civil 
society from attachment to the market. Keane's definition for instance, incorporates the 
conventional conception of civil society as the sphere of relations free from state 
control, but widens it to include "a plurality of public spheres" beyond those of the 
economy.16 The attempt to separate civil society from the economy has been fuelled by 
fears that `economic rationalism' - and with it 'globalisation' - threaten to reduce civil 
societies to mere productive units in a world economy." What lies behind such fears is 
that the market in fact threatens the very diversity and plurality of contemporary 
conceptions of civil society by reducing social interaction to the imperatives of profit 
maximisation. Consequently, proponents of civil society preach the value of its 
diversity and the "continuously shifting alliances" of groups and associations in civil 
society which prevent the ossification of settled and mutually antagonistic interests!' 
In recent literature it is the state that is seen as the vital mechanism by which this 
diversity within civil society may be protected not simply from the threat of violence (as 
in older accounts), but from the `straightening' pressures and gross inequalities of the 
market. It is in this sense that the current literature identifies the democratic state as 
central to the viability of civil society, because the extension of legal, property and 
franchise rights that democracy promises offers scope for the continual expansion of 
civil society.19 The health of civil society in other words, requires support from a 
democratic state able to protect the disadvantaged and provide funding for non- 
economic community groups and inìtiatives.20 Such states are also thought to be 
14 Keane, J., Democracy and Civil Society, Verso, London, 1988, pg. 35 -51. 
15 Ibid., pg. 14. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Pusey, M., "Economic Rationalism and the Contest for Civil Society ", Thesis Eleven, 44, 1996, pg. 
74. 
$ Rorty, A.O., loc.cit., pg. 124. 
19 Keane, J., op.cit., pg. 19. 
20 Ibid., pg. 22 -23. 
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vulnerable to agitation and campaigns mounted by the members of civil society, and 
thereby the realm of civil society is identified as a continually expanding zone of 
interaction from which workers, women, racial or religious minorities are no longer 
excluded and indeed provided with particular forms of state support, such as child care, 
equal opportunity or anti -discrimination legislation to enable their wider participation. 
The state and civil society thus stand side -by -side as component parts of a democratic 
whole. As Michael Walzer puts it, the state "frames" and "fixes the boundary 
conditions and basic rules" of civil society, and in the process the state reflects the 
democratic spirit of civil society, 
Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a 
democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state. The civility that 
makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the 
associational networks; the roughly equal and widely dispersed 
capabilities that sustain the networks have to be fostered by the 
democratic state.' 
Vibrant public debate appears to be one of the necessary criteria for the viability of civil 
society, which in John Hall's words requires a "complex balance of consensus and 
conflict, the valuation of as much difference as is compatible with the bare minimum of 
consensus necessary for settled existence. "22 The prevailing orthodoxy of the current 
literature is that democracy, in Cohen's words, is "the most plausible general 
framework" within which group conflicts can be "politically mediated" and compromise 
sought.23 Indeed the manifold organisations and open media of civil society are seen as 
a source of democratising pressure continually exerted on the hierarchical and 
straightening tendencies of the state and the market.24 
Such conceptions of civil society are descriptions of an ideal which like all ideals, is 
defined by the reality that does not conform to it. As one recent commentator put it, 
civil society may, despite its European origins, "with luck, skill and imagination, spread 
21 See for example, Walzer, M., "The Concept of Civil Society" in M. Walzer (ed.), Toward a Global 
Civil Society, Berghahn Books, Providence, 1995, pg. 23- 24; and P.Q. Hirst, loc.cit., pg. 105 -115. 
22 Hall, J. A., loc.cit., pg. 6. 
23 Cohen, J., "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society ", in D. Rasmussen (ed.), Universalism vs. 
Communitarianism, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1990, pg. 96. 
24 Ibid., pg. 97 -99. In a more recent work, Cohen argues that civil society is "a sphere of social 
interaction distinct from economy and state, composed above all of associations (including the family) 
and publics. Modem civil society is created and reproduced through forms of collective action" quite 
separate from "political society" (parties, bureaucracies, parliaments) and "economic society" 
(corporations and unions). See Cohen, J., "Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society ", in M. Walzer (ed.), 
op.cit., pg. 37 -39. 
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to some other regions of the world" where it is yet to make itself at home.25 This view 
implies that civil society possesses a particularity which other societies do not possess, 
and that societies of the latter variety are by definition uncivil. What is most civil about 
civil societies is that they are realms in which "basic social conditions" have been 
secured and relations between individuals have been pacified either by law, fear of 
punishment, or sublimation by economic competition or the disciplines of civil 
conduct.26 By eliminating violence from the sphere of civil society the prospect of 
domination, of rule by force or terror is averted and civil society remains an exclusive 
domain, "the space of uncoerced human association ".27 As one writer has put it, "the 
use of violence to adjudicate conflicts... permissible in earlier forms of society, are 
outlawed" in civil society, and all are subjected alike to the requirement that disputes be 
resolved through peaceful judicial means.28 
ZI. FRAMING THE `PROBLEM' OF VIOLENCE 
Despite recent efforts to transform it, the concept of civil society remains an exclusive 
ideal of boundaries which separate the realm of civility from barbarism and incivility.29 
Civil society is as one writer put it, 
...nothing other than a bounded community which divides the world into 
a milieu of those with whom it is acceptable and safe to associate, and a 
milieu of those with whom association is unacceptable and potentially 
dangerous. ...Outside of this society lies that society which is invariably 
defined as inferior and, to one degree or another, beyond the pale of 
association.30 
The exclusionary nature of civil society derived from the manifest dichotomy 
established within the discourse on civilisation between the civil realm of peace and a 
barbarous realm of violence. What is remarkable about the current revival of interest in 
the concept of civil society is that such exclusionary implications still inhere in the 
language used to revitalise and reinterpret the concept. Ernest Gellner's spirited 
Conditions of Liberty for instance, speaks of civil society as a creation unique to what 
he calls "liberal civilisation ", the foundations of which rest in the "Atlantic society" of 
is Hall, J.A., loc.cit., pg. 25. 
26 Ibid., pg. 16. 
27 Walzer, M., loc.cit., pg. 7. 
28 Chandhoke, N., op.cit., pg. 186. 
29 For a related critique of the modem notion of citizenship see Hindess, B., "Divide and Rule: The 
International Character of Modem Citizenship ", European Journal of Social Theory, 1 (1), 1998, pg. 57- 
70. 
30 Tester, K., Civil Society, Routledge, London, 1992, pg. 10. 
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liberal states (by which he presumably means Western Europe, the United States and 
Canada).31 This ethnocentric account of civil society is reinforced by the view that the 
Western achievement of civil society is one of the key distinguishing features between 
Western civilisation and culture and its great Eastern rival - Islam - which has not 
achieved civil society because it displays a "strong tendency towards the establishment 
of an Umma, an overall community based on [a]... shared faith and the implementation 
of its law. "32 
Gellner's definition of civil society incorporates as its central element the contrast (and 
balance) between civil society as a realm of free activity and the state, 
Civil Society is that set of diverse non -governmental institutions which is 
strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the 
state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between 
major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and 
atomising the rest of society." 
That civil society could develop at all was due to the uniquely Western pairing of 
internal pacification with economic growth driven by the embrace of reason and science. 
Within civil societies wealth rather than domination became a new means of political 
power, thus averting to a considerable degree the need for coercive violence.34 The 
capacity for violence was thus increasingly divorced from civil society and placed in the 
hands of states. Such states Gellner argues, developed more powerful monopolies of 
violence than their competitors, but were also rendered less harmful to the civil societies 
that provided them with the financial means for sustaining their monopolies. In other 
words, these states accepted limitations on their internal powers in order to gain thereby 
the increased revenues from flourishing market economies, and therefore became "even 
more effective militarily than the societies based on and practising the old martial 
values ", 
Nations of shopkeepers, such as the Dutch and English, organised in 
relatively liberal polities, repeatedly beat nations with... martial and 
ostentatious aristocracies, addicted to the values of aggression and war.35 
In liberal polities violence was used predominantly to further the economic interests of 
society, and war became "...a continuation of commerce by other means... ".36 
31 Gellner, E., Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and Its Rivals, London, 1994, pg. 13. 
32 Ibid., pg. 21 and 26. See also, 26 -27, 36 -43. 
33 Ibid., pg. 5. {Gellner capitalises Civil Society throughout} 
34 Ibid., pg. 73 -75. 
35 Ibid., pg. 32 -33. 
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Gellner's analysis is premised on the view discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, 
that civil society is the outcome of a civilising process in the West driven by the state's 
successful monopolisation of violence which created "pacified zones" within society in 
which individual self -government could be relied upon to maintain the public peace.37 
The self -government of individuals is the foundation of what Gellner believes to be the 
decisive characteristic of liberal civil societies namely, "modularity", a term which 
conveys a conception of social order which, like modular furniture, can be assembled 
and re- assembled by combining free -standing units which can either be used in 
conjunction with other units or on their own 38 The social order created by such 
modular selves is one in which each unit is radically individualised, and interaction with 
other "genuinely independent productive and property- controlling units" does not 
compromise or impair their capacity to function independently.39 The `modular' social 
order is mediated by contracts between mutually independent and productive selves 
whose singularity ensures vigorous competition in the market as a counter -balance to 
the totalising power of the state. In arguing so Gellner makes civil society a function of 
economic development, and argues that Third World economies are too weak to prevent 
the domination of self- serving state elites whose activities ensure persistently low levels 
of economic development and high levels of internal violence. Both of these features 
are entirely incompatible with the "values and assumptions" of civil society which 
require citizens to "shed their side arms" and engage in the peaceful pursuit of improved 
productivity 40 Despite the high levels of gun ownership and violence in `civil' societies 
such as the United States, Gellner's image of liberal civil societies is one from which 
violence has been purged, stored unthreateningly in the institutions of limited, 
democratic states. This image is sustained by contrasting the apparent peacefulness of 
Western societies to the endemic violence and tyranny of non- Western societies. 
Gellner draws attention in his analysis of civil society, to the very same features of the 
liberal discourse on civilisation outlined in Chapter One of this thesis, and in particular, 
the successful purging of violence from significant areas of social life by the inculcation 
36 Ibid., pg. 67. 
Elias, N., The Civilising Process, Volume II, Power and Civility [ 1939], translated by E. Jephcott, 
Pantheon Books, New York, 1982. 
Gellner, E., op.cit., pg. 100. 
ss Ibid., pg. 88. 
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of habits of self -restraint under the auspices of a constitutionally limited, monopoly 
state. More recently however, liberals on both the `right' such as John Gray, and those 
on the `left' like John Keane, have been concerned that this `grand narrative' of a global 
liberal civilisation can no longer be sustained. They have reacted by trying to un- couple 
the concept of civil society as a pacified zone from its deep association with an over- 
arching discourse of civilisation, progress and the global triumph of liberalism. Gray in 
particular has been animated by the desire to separate himself from what he derisively 
calls the "Panglossian liberalisms of the Enlightenment" which emphasised a necessary 
connection between liberal institutions and social harmony.'' 
Concerned by the growing divergences of lifestyles and moral choices in modern 
societies, Gray initially sought a genuine "post- liberalism" shorn of an Enlightenment 
faith in the progress of civilisation, but which reaffirmed "the living kernel of 
liberalism ", civil society.42 For Gray civil society consisted precisely in that sphere of 
social interaction suppressed by totalitarian states, namely, the "sphere of autonomous 
institutions, protected by a rule of law, within which individuals and communities 
possessing divergent values and beliefs may coexist in peace. "" Contemporary Western 
liberal states however, were criticised on the grounds that even under neo- liberal 
governments they retained too much control over economic resources which prompted 
incessant conflicts over the distribution of those resources, in which groups pursued the 
advantage of being defined as `underprivileged' or `deprived'. Gray's position here 
stood in contrast to those conceptions of civil society discussed in the first section in 
which the state had an active role to play in enhancing the life of civil society through 
the enaction of affirmative action or other enabling legislation to promote the interests 
of various minority groups. 
Gray argued that civil society was best able to secure peace and prosperity for its 
members when the state's role was restricted to the provision and enforcement of a 
system of laws, and individual rights were accorded respect as the basis of the social 
order. The commitment to individual rights also committed him to the acceptance of the 
a° Ibid., pg. 179, 193. 
41 Gray, J., Enlightenment's Wake; Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, Routledge, 
London, 1995, pg. 29. 
42 Gray, J., Post -Liberalism; Studies in Political Thought, Routledge, London, 1993, pg. 314. 
as Ibid., pg. 157. 
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essentially incommensurable life -styles, moral choices, and desires of individuals and 
groups within society. Only civil societies were capable of accommodating such 
incommensurability and ensuring `peaceful coexistence'. This conviction was based on 
the recognition that "civil war or strife is a great evil, threatening all modes of 
commodious Iiving ", which civil society averted by the "unending pursuit of a 
provisional modus vivendi" which reduced "to a minimum the decisions on which 
recourse to collective choice - the political or public choice that is binding on all - is 
unavoidable.s45 Gray discredited alternatives to what he called "the modernist 
movement toward civil society" as reversions to "barbarism and poverty", but noted 
also that the expectation of a "universal" triumph of civil society may well be 
misplaced 46 
Gray has subsequently amplified these concerns by arguing that his earlier `post -liberal' 
faith in civil society was "mistaken ", and now favours a "political and legal pluralism" 
based on securing peace through recognition for "different communities" and "distinct 
jurisdictions ".47 This shift is a significant move away from the earlier individualism of 
post -liberal civil society toward an arrangement whereby different groups may be able 
to be accommodated together which "does not presuppose, or entail, endorsement of the 
central institutions of Western civil society.'' The pluralism of which he speaks here 
similarly does not necessarily imply dependence on liberal or democratic political 
forms. Pluralism is called forth by the incommensurability between "individual plans of 
life and personal conceptions of the good" and hence accepts that any `ways of life 
embodying genuine forms of human flourishing" are to be tolerated, even illiberal 
ones.49 This "agonistic liberalism" is premised on the recognition that conflict within 
and between "liberal ...and other forms of life" is "an ineliminable and therefore 
permanent feature of the human condition ".50 This position is contrasted to the 
prevailing liberal orthodoxy on value -neutrality which he believes is a recipe for social 
disintegration and the intensification of the incommensurability of moral choices. 
Value- neutrality is based he argues, on the Panglossian' assumption that different 
44 Ibid., pg. 211-214. 
as Ibid., pg. 315. 
4e Ibid., pg. 318, 320. 
Gray, J., Enlightenment's Wake, pg. 136. 
48 Ibid., pg. 137. 
49 Ibid., pg. 141. 
so /bid., pg. 68. 
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groups within society will accept the equal right of all other groups to live as they do, 
and ignores the necessity for some common or shared understandings to bind society 
together. Agonistic liberalism on the contrary, privileges the toleration of difference 
based on an underlying broad consensus on the limits of appropriate conduct 51 Gray's 
position amounts to a rejection of the traditional "liberal project" of a global peace 
achieved through the triumph of liberal civilisation, and an acceptance of the 
inevitability of conflict in which only toleration and a commitment to pluralism offer the 
hope of securing a continually re- negotiated "peaceful modus vivendi".' 
The concern animating Gray's revision of his earlier `post- liberalism' appears to be the 
fear of incessant conflict between the identities and choices of groups within society 
which modern states lack the will or the capacity to restrain.53 His repeated insistence 
on the need for a `peaceful' modus vivendi indicates a fear that such conflict entails the 
possibility if not the reality of `atavistic' violence, a reversion to what Schumpeter once 
called "bloody primitivism ".54 Although modern liberal societies have been quite adept 
at accommodating different individuals and groups choosing widely divergent life -styles 
and moral choices, violence persists in such societies not as `primitivism' nor because of 
weakened states, but as an intractable feature of modern societies fuelled by the supreme 
value placed on individual rights. In some cases, and especially in the United States for 
instance, the `right' to own firearms has massively contributed to high homicide rates, 
and to frequent armed challenges to the state's monopoly of violence 55 It may of course 
be objected that this is an extreme case, as the passing of far more stringent gun laws in 
Australia following the Port Arthur massacre in 1996 indicates that in Australia at least 
governments are occasionally willing to "override arguments about individual rights".' 
Nonetheless, there is still a widespread view that the inhabitants of supposedly peaceful 
5' Ibid., pg. 22 -29. 
sz Ibid., pg. 140 -141. 
53 Gray, J., Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought, Polity, Cambridge, 1997, pg. 178- 
179. 
54 I am indebted to Christine Standish of the University of Tasmania for this point. On Gray's position 
see his Post -Liberalism, pg. 318; the quotation is taken from Schumpeter, J., Imperialism and Social 
Classes [1919], translated by H. Norden, Augustus M. Kelley Inc., New York, 1951, pg. 44. 
55 Nichols, R., "Gunning for Freedom: Arms, Anti- Statism and the Right in America ", Arena Journal, 
7, 1996, pg. 17. Here Nichols writes that "America's 260 million people are currently estimated to 
possess at lest 220 million guns" boosting the homicide rate to eight times that found in England, and 
four times of Australia's. Sixty per cent of all homicides in America are inflicted by guns, and Nichols 
concludes that the persistent challenges to the state from armed militias indicates that by Weberian 
standards, "contemporary America lacks a proper `state." Ibid., pg. 22. 
274 
civil societies have a right to possess firearms for their "personal defence" against both 
the state and other individuals.57 The widespread ownership of such devices however, 
merely ensures that they are regularly used not in legitimate cases of self -defence 
(whatever they might be), but in innumerable cases of domestic violence and petty street 
crime. 
Even where the persistence of such violence is acknowledged, civil society is still 
defended as a solution to the problem of violence. This defence hinges upon the way in 
which the `problem' is framed, as John Keane's insightful Reflections on Violence 
demonstrates. Keane questions the teleological assumptions implicit in the liberal 
discourse of civilisation and civil society, but does so be reiterating the relevance of the 
distinction between civil and uncivil societies. Although he denies that civil societies 
are completely pacified zones, he goes on to stipulate that civil societies may actually 
"regress" into less civilised conditions, clearly denoting an assumption that `incivility' 
represents a retrograde condition.58 In order to hold back such a regression, he suggests 
a revival of interest in civility, indeed a "politics of civility", the purpose of which is to 
`publicise and reduce' recurrent forms of violence and exploitation, the most important 
of which relate to the monopoly of violence held by modern states.59 What Keane has 
most in mind here is the "rational- calculating use of violence as a technique of 
terrorising and demoralising" populations through war or the threat of it, programs of 
terror, or `ethnic cleansing', all of which represent revivals of incivility.ó0 The 
democratic overtones of Keane's discussion are deliberate, for the survival of civil 
society in the face of potentially massive state violence requires the "democratisation of 
the means of state violence ", that is, the subjection of those who have control over the 
state's monopoly of violence to public scrutiny and supervision.' What he has in mind 
here is not simply the institutions of popular election which have often been ineffective 
in preventing violence, but "organised citizen's initiatives" for peace or against war.ó2 
56 Parkin, A., "Liberal Democracy and the Politics of Criminal Justice in Australia ", Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, 44 (3), 1998, pg. 462. 
Munday, R., "The Right to Arms ", The Salisbury Review, 15 (4), 1997, pg. 6. Munday argues that 
the restriction of private gun ownership in Britain after 1946 has given rise to an increased incidence of 
"serious armed crime ". Ibid., pg. 8. 
58 Keane, Reflections on Violence, Verso, London, 1996, pg. 22. 
ss Ibid., pg. 22, 28. 
60 Ibid., pg. 31. 
b1 Ibid., pg. 44. 
62 Ibid., pg. 50 -51. 
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This `politics of civility' he argues, is a vibrant affirmation of the purpose of modem, 
democratic, civil societies, a form of "resistance to intrusive and violent forms of state 
power that... restrict and overwhelm the plurality of independent associations that are 
the stuff of which civil society (ideally) consists.s63 
The reality however, is that incivility is a "chronic feature" of all societies and may 
dominate social interaction resulting in increases in acts of violence which are described 
as "prima facie incompatible with the civil society rules of solidarity, liberty and 
equality of citizens.s64 For Keane then, violence is uncivil and is by definition 
inconsistent with the conditions of civil society. Although violence may persist in even 
the most civil of societies, he argues that it is a regrettable fact which - if the society in 
question is truly civil - remains relatively limited by the prevailing civil peace. In 
arguing so, Keane wishes to distance his own account of civil society from the 
exclusivity of earlier notions which identified violence as the artefact of a pre -civil or 
uncivilised barbarism. It is not at all clear however, that Keane manages to escape just 
this sort of dichotomy because at significant junctures his approach to violence belies a 
tendency to see violence as both uncivil and barbaric. 
Violence occurs in civil society Keane argues, because of the very complexity of 
modem civil societies which present individual citizens with a bewildering array of 
pressures and influences, competing values, and contradictory signals which tend to 
"unnerve and disorientate" citizens.65 Here Keane assumes that because humans are 
"prone to stress, anxiety and revenge" the complex social and economic pressures of 
modem society (such as unemployment or anomie) cause "anxiety and frustration 
[which] encourages violent responses..." resulting in "archipelagos of incivility within 
an otherwise civil society... ".66 This approach places violence in the category of the 
irrational; an instinctive or pre -reflexive response to a triggering stimulus, such as 
"confusion, fatigue, ambivalent feelings of love and hate... emotionally and 
intellectually impoverished visions... [or merely] a crazed decision to murder... ".67 He 
observes that many contemporary terrorists and guerilla fighters behave as if "autistic ", 
b3 Ibid., pg. 57. 
64 Ibid., pg. 63-68. 
65 Ibid., pg. 116. 
66 Ibid., pg. 115. 
67 Ibid., pg. 122. 
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and that urban gangs "mindlessly" seek to gratify their "private fantasies" through 
violence and "take leave of sense itself'.68 Even the emergence of nationalism is 
interpreted as an attempt to resolve the ambivalence and confusion of modern society by 
imposing upon it an artificial unity with a "fanatical core ".69 Analyses such as this are 
premised upon the questionable assumption explored in Chapter Four of this thesis, that 
emotional imbalance or psychological distortion brought about by social or economic 
pressures results in a `moral short- circuit' which makes violence likely. On this view 
violence is equated with sub -rational, pre -reflexive, instinctual or natural forces which 
are normally restrained by civilised individuals who have learned to use reason to 
restrain their impulses, and to govern themselves appropriately. Despite his endeavour 
to escape from the implicitly teleological and ethnocentric language of civil society, 
Keane's analysis of violence tends to fall -back on many of the assumptions of this 
earlier discourse. 
The current spate of bitter conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia, Kossovo, and Afghanistan for 
instance are described as "uncivil wars" which expose the fragility of civil society.70 
What is striking about Keane's analysis of `uncivil wars' is his reliance upon the old 
dichotomy between a civil and uncivil condition, in which civility denotes order, rules, 
and restraint, while incivility conveys a sense of uncontrolled, irrational and barbarous 
violence. He argues for instance, that many contemporary conflicts "lack any logic or 
structure" defying the "sober restrictions covering the ground rules of war" causing 
massive and apparently senseless slaughter and terror." Despite Keane's criticism of 
his approach we hear in these arguments a distinct echo of Adam Ferguson's conviction 
that a central standard of civilisation was the development in the West of strict rules and 
codes of war. Modern uncivil wars Keane contends, disrupt the order of civil societies, 
"produce chaos" and, 
...ransack the legal monopoly of armed force long claimed by states; they 
put an end to the distinction between war and crime; ensuring that 
conflict degenerates into `criminal anarchy'... into deathly destruction 
and self -destruction... 72 
68 Ibid., pg. 141. 
69 Ibid., pg. 126. 
0 Ibid., pg. 135, 137. 
" Ibid., pg. 137, 139. 
72 Ibid., pg. 141. 
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Keane also resurrects the Kantian dictum that "war is often bad for business ", not only 
in consuming valuable profits and destroying property and vital infrastructure, but in 
wasting the "dense and delicate forest of nonviolent civil institutions" upon which a 
healthy market economy depends." 
Keane contends that the greatest hope of reducing violent incivility lies in the defence 
and extension of public debate within civil society itself because there is a "categorical 
tension" he claims, between violence and free public debate which subjects the violent 
to public scrutiny, criticism and ridicule, and provides a medium for offering victims 
sympathy and support.74 Public debate has certainly played a role in reshaping public 
attitudes to violent phenomena such as corporal punishment and may still play a useful 
role in campaigns against female genital mutilation, child abuse, and animal cruelty. 
But public debate may itself be strictly limited and its applicability determined not only 
by the vigour of public debate, but the instruments of publicity, and the responsiveness 
of both victims and perpetrators. It is often the case for example, that people who suffer 
violence are unwilling to talk about it, or even to see their sufferings as `violent'. As the 
literature on rape laws indicate, the publicity of trial can often be a painful experience 
for those who seek redress, and therefore acts as a deterrent to others to publicise their 
own experiences.75 The effectiveness of publicity is also limited when the perpetrators 
can obtain protection from the law, where the violence is implicitly or explicitly 
sanctioned by the authorities (as is often the case with torture of political prisoners), or 
where there is substantial community sympathy for it (as in cases of racist violence).76 
The right to free speech itself may be no real defence against violence where for 
example, it is used as a defence for the publication of all kinds of offensive, violent, 
racist, and sexist material. Where the publication of material such as pornography, has 
contributed to violence perpetrated on the individuals or groups represented in that 
material as targets for violence, the `liberal' right to free speech itself is implicated in 
" Ibid., pg. 154 -155. 
74 Ibid., pg. 166. 
There is a vast amount of literature on this subject, and I would merely direct those interested to 
Edwards, S.S.M., Policing 'Domestic' Violence: Women, the Law and the State, Sage London, 1989; and 
Matthews, N.A., Confronting Rape; The Feminist Anti -Rape Movement and the State, Routledge, 
London, 1994. 
6 On the problem of publicity or public support for violence'see for example Taylor, P., Beating the 
Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1980; and 
Tompson, K., Under Seige; Racial Violence in Britain Today, Penguin, London, 1988. 
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the perpetration of that violence." It also makes the alleviation of suffering more 
difficult because the violence is perpetrated under the legal protection afforded by a 
right to free speech which is zealously guarded against infringement. It is also doubtful 
that free speech and publicity has much hope of reducing violence beyond the confines 
of the society in which it occurs. Maximum publicity failed to prevent slaughter in the 
former Yugoslavia, violent persecution in Palestine, or genocide in Cambodia. 
None of these are arguments against publicising violence of course, but the problematic 
assumption which lies behind the strategy of publicity is that the reduction of violence is 
best pursued within democratic civil societies. Here again we return to the problem of 
exclusivity within the liberal discourse of civility and civil society; peace is seen as a 
condition secured by the practices of civility nurtured within the cradle of civil society. 
The democratic procedures which are assumed to be vital to civil society ensure that 
campaigns to publicise and thereby reduce violence remain centred on life within civil 
society. The corresponding assumption is that those who live in civil society have 
already achieved a substantial pacification of their relations with one another, and are 
therefore best placed to achieve further reductions of violence. This is but a restatement 
of the conviction central to liberal discourse, explored in earlier chapters and especially 
in Chapter Nine, that civil societies are those characterised by a secure internal peace. 
Faith in the peacefulness of civil societies however, masks the extent to which violence 
not only persists within liberal civil societies, but has actually been encouraged and 
intensified by the very values and institutions which claim its elimination. 
III. DISCIPLINED CRUELTY, CIVILISED VIOLENCE 
It has been argued throughout this paper that the early -modern and contemporary 
discourse of civil society is premised on exclusivity. This exclusivity expresses itself 
most clearly in the dichotomy between the peace of civil society and the barbarous 
violence of `uncivil' societies. Consequently the discourse of civil society, in both its 
modern and earlier variations, represents violence as an outburst of irrationality, a 
MacKinnon, C.A., "The Roar on the Other Side of Silence" in C.A. MacKinnon and A. Dworkin 
(eds.), In Harm's Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.), 1997, pg. 7. Of course the hearings documented in this book provide some substance to the 
claim that public debate may offer hope that violence at least can be addressed; but where such public 
debate challenges the deeply entrenched belief in the necessity for free speech, its chances of reducing 
violence seem remote. 
279 
throw -back to some precivil condition, or as a wild "untamed fragment of nature ".78 
Violence thus appears in this discourse as a problem; it is seen as a threat to civil society 
and its elimination is required in order for civil society to be secured. I am not of course 
suggesting that violence is unthreatening or unproblematic; rather, that the discourse of 
civil society defines the problem of violence in such a way that it masks the insinuation 
of violence within civil society. The idea that civil societies are those in which 
substantial pacification of individuals and society as a whole has been accomplished, 
rests on the mistaken premise that violence is equivalent to brutality and barbarism and 
that because the civilising process which gave rise to civil societies involves the 
transcendence of brutality and barbarism, violence - ipso facto - has been eliminated. 
Violence is conceived as a deliberate choice to engage in an act of brutality which defies 
the rules of lawful, orderly social conduct. This assumption leads to the mistaken 
attribution of violence largely (if not solely) to those who resist or defy the law while 
exonerating those who use violence to uphold it. The role of violence in the creation 
and maintenance of normal, civil order is thereby ignored leading to the misleading 
assumption that that order is free of violence. 
This thesis has argued that liberal discourse on civilisation represents liberal civil 
societies as realms from which violence has been largely expunged. As a consequence, 
liberalism has been characterised by the tendency to interpret violence as a reversion to 
barbarism, as the wilful, malicious, infliction of pain upon others, abrogating their rights 
as fellow citizens of civil society. Such acts constitute a `problem' and are to be 
suppressed, but such an approach is based on a restriction of what constitutes violence. 
The appearance of other forms of violence within civil societies is either ignored or 
tolerated by defining them as unproblematic, restricted to areas where it cannot intrude 
upon the relations of civil society. Many have drawn attention, for instance, to the 
violence of the law. "Legal interpretation" Cover argued "takes place in a field of pain 
and death" occasioning the "imposition of violence upon others" leaving behind 
"victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organised, social practices of 
violence.s79 The argument developed in this chapter however, is not simply that liberal 
78 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish; The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan, Penguin, 
London, 1977, pg. 
79 Cover, R., Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover, edited by M. Minow, M. 
Ryan, and A. Sarat, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1992, pg. 203. Also see the essays in 
Sarat, A and Kearns, T.R., (eds.), Law's Violence, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1992. 
280 
civil societies rely on forms of violence which are systematically obscured, but that 
liberal conceptions of violence both restrict the extent of the `problem' of violence and 
make that problem intractable. 
Recent feminist literature for example, suggests that the extent and nature of violence 
against women (and others) in civil societies is misconstrued in liberal literature.80 
Much of this violence is gendered insofar as women are targeted as women.81 This goes 
well beyond the conventional liberal view that violence consists in acts of individual 
malice which merely obscures the regularity of violence against women, perpetrated not 
by malicious individuals at random but by a very high proportion of `normal' men in 
the context of `normal' families.B2 The social context of violent men is such that they 
do not merely interact in transparent relations with other individuals, but are decisively 
shaped by the context in which they act.83 hi other words, their actions alone do not 
constitute the context in which they interact; that context is in part pre -constituted and 
makes particular forms of action probable or likely. Male violence against women is 
therefore enabled by the condition of patriarchy which, as Millett observed, `pervades' 
and shapes self -development and interaction with others.84 Such violence has 
traditionally been overlooked within liberal discourse because most of it occurs in the 
private sphere of the home and family "in which male domination... traditionally 
realises and asserts itself.iß5 Marital rape, domestic violence, child abuse, and routine 
exploitation of female labour in the home have all taken place against the backdrop of 
an uneven distribution of power between the sexes. As Elizabeth Stanko put it, such 
violence is a "manifestation of male domination" which is "not prohibited" but 
"regulated" as a legitimate power "afforded to men as a gender over women as a 
gender.i86 In other words, male violence against women is deeply ingrained and 
shapes, even when not directly present, the lives and expectations of men and women. 
60 An exception to this observation is John Keane's Reflections on Violence. 
ß1 See for example, Erika, S., "Break the Silence: The State and Violence Against Women ", Refractory 
Girl, 36, 1990, pg. 13; Graycar, R. and Morgan, J. "Injuries to Women: Gendered Harms ", Refractory 
Girl, 36, 1990, pg. 9; and Walby, S., Theorizing Patriarchy, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, pg. 134. 
82 McCarthy, T., " "Battered Woman Syndrome ". Some Reflections on the Invisibility of the Battering 
Man in Legal Discourse, Drawing on R v. Roby", The Australian Feminist Law Journal, 4, 1995, pg. 146. 
83 Walby, S., op.cit., pg. 143. 
84 Millett, K., Sexual Politics, Virago, London, 1969, pg. 25. 
85 Kappeler, S., The Will to Violence; The Politics of Personal Behaviour, Spinifex Press, Melbourne, 
1995, pg. 35. 
86 Stanko, E.A., Intimate Intrusions: Women's Experience of Male Violence, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1985. pg. 71. 
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The focus on the peace of the public realm of interaction in civil society thus obscures 
the extent of violence in the private sphere and contributes to the unwillingness of 
political and legal systems to enforce women's rights through effective intervention.$' 
Marilyn French has argued that acts of violence against women are employed to 
reinforce the subordinate position of women in those societies; such acts include forced 
marriage and childbirth, rape, domestic violence, genital mutilation, the regular abortion 
of female foetuses and the killing of baby girls in some societies.88 According to 
French, such acts "could not be as epidemic" as they are "without the cooperation of the 
entire social system...[and the] firm backing" of political and legal institutions.89 
Violence against women is clearly implicated in the maintenance of and contributes to 
the unequal power relationship between men and women in society, and often still 
receives official sanction from the courts, or is demonstrably lightly punished. Thus 
Edwards argues that current legal systems overwhelmingly construe violence narrowly, 
emphasising visible physical harm (such as broken bones and puncture wounds) 
inflicted by weapons, and excluding intimidation, harassment, and even rape.90 In this 
way, legal systems often perpetrate a form of violence against women who seek redress. 
Police inaction if not overt hostility to complaints, non -prosecution and comparatively 
light sentences for offenders, and the notorious `second rape' of court room cross - 
examination (often involving the accusation that the survivor was responsible for 
initiating the attack) all intensify the harm already suffered by survivors of violence. 
Furthermore, this has resulted in the virtual omission of the responsibility of violent 
men for their actions, and has contributed to keeping a great many cases of routine 
87 Thomas, D.Q., and Beasley, M.E., "Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue ", Human Rights 
Quarterly, 15 (1), 1993, pg. 43 -46. It should be noted that the experience of many women who attempt 
to obtain legal redress for rape or domestic violence has lead to many seeing the legal system itself as 
violent. Police inaction, non -prosecution and comparatively light sentences for offenders, and `the 
second rape' of court room cross - examination often intensify the harm suffered from the original act of 
violence. See for instance Edwards, S.S.M., Policing `Domestic' Violence: Women, the Law and the 
State, Sage, London, 1989, pg. 153, 163 -4, 172 -5. 
es French, M., The War Against Women, Summit Books, New York, 1992, pg. 118. French quotes the 
estimation of Amartya Sen that over 100 million women have been killed by such means as part of 
"...men's purposeful policy..." and she asks, "If this figure referred to a religious, ethnic, or racial group, 
we would be using the term "genocide ". French also refers to pornography as encouraging male "sexual 
terrorism and the subordination of women." Ibid., pg. 168. For feminist analyses of rape as violence see 
Brownmiller, S., Against Our Will; Men, Women and Rape, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975; and Card, 
C., "Rape as a Terrorist Institution" in R.G.Frey and C.W.Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pg. 296 -319. 
89 French, M., op.cit., pg. 182. 
90 Edwards, S.S.M., Policing 'Domestic' Violence: Women, the Law, and the State, Sage, London, 
1989, pg. 159 -163. 
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violence against women out of the courts altogether.91 The relations which sustain the 
civil realm therefore go beyond the very public relations between individual citizens, or 
between competing interest groups, and includes the largely hidden relations of power 
between men and women separated from the `public' realm. Such `private' relations of 
power shape the construction of self -identity and the self -expectations of individual 
men and women, and hence have important implications for the `public' position of 
men and women, largely determining how easy or difficult it will be for them to access 
social resources.92 
While the civilising process has unquestionably resulted in a greater intolerance for 
some forms of violence such as public executions, torture, and the maintenance of 
private armies, other forms of violence remain. According to Elias, the civilising 
process does not eliminate violence as such but has merely removed it, shunted it 
behind the scenes of the everyday life, locked it up in the barracks and prisons, or 
replaced it by less physical forms of violence such as economic competition. All the 
same he argues, we are better off for it because violence is now a less obvious and 
threatening presence in the life of society. As we saw in the first chapter however, 
Zygmunt Bauman argued that as we have become more `civilised' so too has our 
violence, and we fail now to notice it at all.93 Civilisation may have removed some 
forms of violence from everyday life, but it has done so only by making state violence 
and genocide a much more real and frightening possibility. Bauman's critique of 
modernity hits hard at the raw nerves of the self -image of our age. But Bauman's 
alarmist critique tends to ignore the disquieting possibility that although admittedly 
horrific, episodes of genocide are just that, episodes of terror in an otherwise less 
spectacular, less noticeable continuum of everyday violence and repressed suffering 
which goes on under our very noses. What Bauman does not discuss is the possibility 
that violence is not recognised because it is merely one among a whole range of human 
behaviours which like all other behaviours (modes of dress, speech, gestures) is prone to 
91 Beaman -Hall, L., "Abused Women and Legal Discourse: The Exclusionary Power of Legal Method ", 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 11 (1), 1996, pg. 125 -139; and Buss, D.E., "Women at the 
Borders: Rape and Nationalism in International Law ", Feminist Legal Studies, VI (2), 1998, pg. 171- 
203. Beaman -Hall argues that legal discourse excludes the experiences of abused women, while Buss 
contends that rape and women's suffering in war has been obscured in international law. 
9z Hanmer, J., "Violence and the Social Control of Women" in G.Littlejohn, et.al., (eds.), Power and 
the State, Croom Helm, London, 1978, pg. 229. 
n Bauman, Z., Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity, Cambridge, 1989. 
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change, alteration and cultivation. To blame violence - or genocide at least - on the 
artificiality of modem modes of thought leaves us without a clue as to how to explain 
the very ubiquity of violence throughout all societies, in every age, throughout recorded 
history. What is important about this recognition is that it requires us to understand how 
violence is understood and why it is defined in one way rather than another. The first 
four chapters of this thesis attempted to demonstrate that liberal thought is premised on 
a limited conception of violence which was traced in later chapters to a discourse on 
civilisation. 
If violence lies at the very heart of modem, civilised, disciplined societies it is not 
barbaric, savage violence, nor is it episodic, genocidal violence; it is rather a more 
common place, often unnoticeable violence which shapes and moulds our conduct or is 
inscribed within the very structures and values of civil society. Foucault's work on the 
disciplinary society and governmentality point toward this interpretation; in an 
unforgettable phrase he suggested that "[w]e are now far away from the country of 
tortures, dotted with wheels, gibbets, gallows, pillories.s94 Modem societies are no 
longer dominated by the spectacle of violent and tortuous executions, and have 
substituted for it penal institutions "linked to a whole series of 'cameral' mechanisms 
intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort.. [and] which all tend, like the prison, to 
exercise a power of normalisation. ...[all resting on] techniques, `sciences' that permit 
the fabrication of the disciplinary individual.s95 Nonetheless, Foucault also suggested 
that the positive power over the life and health of individuals magnified in modem civil 
societies was matched by a corresponding enhancement of the modem state's capacity 
to inflict massive violence and death. Foucault's explanation of why these two effects 
of power should manifest themselves together remains incomplete because it is unclear 
what significance is attributed to the development of the monopoly of violence by 
modem states. The connection Foucault identifies between "life- administering" power 
and the "formidable power of death" in modem states rests on the fact that power in 
modem states is now "exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and... 
population" and consequently, this imbues the exercise of power with the need to use 
Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish; The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan, Penguin, 
London, 1977, pg. 307. There is an interesting discussion of the visibility or torture and execution in 
Medieval life in Norbert Elias' The History of Manners, translated by E. Jephcott, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1978, pg. 208. 
95 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, pg. 308. 
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violence to ensure the physical survival of the race or population, resulting in the 
intensification of violence in warfare and genocide.96 This analysis implies however, 
that the increased potential for violence in modem states is part of the self - 
consciousness of civil society, and thereby underestimates the degree to which modern 
civil societies rest upon a sweeping denial of violence which was traced in the 
development of a liberal discourse on civilisation in chapters Five to Nine. 
Michael Shapiro has recently written of the moral and physical "distantiation" which 
became the hallmark of modern military technology, allowing the development of a 
massive potential for violence held by the same states which nurture and protect 
domestic civil societies.97 This increased potential for violence is only partly explicable 
as a consequence of the modem state's monopoly of violence, and arguably less 
explicable as a result of the development of modern "life -administering power". The 
unprecedented concentration of specific technologies of war and genocide has largely 
been developed in states and societies which see themselves as having transcended 
violence. The peculiar accomplishment of the liberal discourse on civilisation is that its 
greatest influence is exerted in states and societies which possess a frightful capacity to 
inflict violence in the name of pacified civil societies from which violence - the 
barbarous and cruel infliction of pain on others - has been (largely) expunged. This is 
clearly the view shared by many in Australian society (and the current and former 
governments) of their history, which shuns the record of genocidal acts and policies 
unquestionably directed at the original inhabitants of this land.98 This systematic attack 
upon and dispossession of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia had been obscured until 
very recently, by the legal fiction that the continent was `discovered' in 1788 and found 
to be unoccupied and empty. Such violence "did not occur in single acts of policy 
centred on state or para -state agencies like the Nazi Holocaust" but was "irregular, 
decentralised" though nonetheless "persistent, organised violence" driven by public 
96 Foucault, M., History of Sexuality, Volume I, translated by R. Hurley, Penguin, London, 1978, p. 
136 -137. 
Shapiro, M., Violent Cartographies, Mapping Cultures of War, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1997, pg. 75 -80. 
98 See for instance, Reynolds, H., Frontier: Aborigines, Settlers and Land, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 
1987; and Evans, R., "Blood Dries Quickly: Conflict Study and Australian Historigraphy ", Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 41, 1995, pg. 92. 
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opinion and the very citizens who accepted that it was their "civilising mission" to use 
this violence against the uncivilised.99 
For Lawrence Keeley the modern intensification of the violence of warfare is 
attributable simply to the "vastly greater resources" that "civilised societies" are able to 
deploy. loo The study of warfare in so called `primitive' or tribal societies reveals that 
such societies were no less violent than modern societies, and that on the contrary, 
"peace was a scarcer commodity for members of bands, tribes, and chiefdoms than for 
the average citizen of a civilised state.s101 Indeed, in a manner reminiscent of 
Ferguson's celebration of Western warfare Keeley suggests that the armies of civilised 
states are more inclined than `primitive' warriors to clemency and mercy toward their 
vanquished foes, and seek mere "submission" of enemies rather than "genocide ".102 
`Primitive' warfare however, "consists of war stripped to its essentials: the murder of 
enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, and essential resources; and 
the inducement in them of insecurity and terror.s103 In these circumstances, high levels 
of combatant casualties, property destruction, and the obliteration of any distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants are to be expected, and the claim that modern 
warfare is in fact more prone to these phenomena is unsustainable. The argument of this 
thesis however, does not call into question a continuity between `primitive' and 
`civilised' violence, but suggests that there are powerful reasons for supposing that in 
modern civilised states and societies violence may perhaps be more widespread, but is 
certainly more lethal owing to the development of the technology of killing. 
In modern civilised societies many types of violence are administered insofar as the 
incidence of such acts invites the sanction of the law administered by the police, the 
courts, and penal or `correctional' institutions.104 The objects of this `administration' are 
ss Mann, M., "Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution From Comparative and Historical 
Sociology" in S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 232 -235. 
'°° Keeley, L.H., War Before Civilisation, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pg. 75. 
101 Ibid., pg. 39. 
102 Ibid., pg. 87. 
103 Ibid., pg. 75. 
04 According to Foucault the prison system does not `correct' but administers criminality. It is through 
association with the prison system that inmates can be watched, interrogated, become informants and lock 
most inmates into a life of crime which effectively isolates the individual criminal from public sympathy 
and support. The modem `criminal' is not the `highway man', `pirate', `bush ranger' or `bandit' of pre- 
modern societies. In modem societies, criminality is perceived as a social problem and the criminal as an 
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the perpetrators of those `barbarous' and `cruel' acts which transgress the boundaries of 
civil society and intrude upon and interfere with the processes of discipline which create 
self -governing, productive, autonomous citizens. Violence which does not intrude upon 
this process attracts less attention (and consequently fewer sanctions) because it is 
confined to areas of social life in which it presents little or no threat to the aims and 
purposes of productive society. In other words, violence which is carefully contained 
within boundaries which exclude it from civil society is regarded as less problematic 
than violence which is not so contained. The boundaries of civil society largely exclude 
the violence of the private sphere or that of the moral nether -world of the prisons from 
consideration because both occur outside the public, civil realm. Much of the violence 
within the prison system for instance, is perpetrated by inmates on other inmates within 
the physical and moral confines of a system which has been purposely isolated from the 
rules, rights and regulations of civil society. While few could deny that the violence 
occurs, the point is that it is not perceived to be as much of a problem as violence on the 
streets for example. One is contained within walls and is perpetrated by and on those 
who have been (temporarily) suspended from civil society. The other occurs in the heart 
of civil society and endangers the security and liberties upon which civil societies rest. 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that modern liberalism has been shaped by an implicit discourse 
of civilisation in which violence is seen as extrinsic to the life of civil society - hidden 
away in the private sphere or confined within the walls of institutional structures. When 
violence appears in civil society, it is decried as the brutal and undisciplined act of the 
uncivilised, those who have been unable to benefit from the civilising process and 
remain, despite their modern appearance, barbarians in modern society. If violence 
occurs in civil society, it appears as John Keane put it as an "archipelago of incivility in 
an otherwise civil society ". But the violence that is being referred to here is of a 
particular kind; it is obvious, deliberate, and physical; it occurs outside of institutional 
control and sanction; it is undisciplined and appears to be spontaneous; it links victim 
anti -social individual. As Manning Clark made clear in his monumental History of Australia, the `bush 
ranger' was a kind of social rebel, a focus for political and social opposition and a far more costly and 
dangerous problem for the authorities than mere petty criminality. The official response to bushranging 
he also points out, was conditioned by the conviction that such "outlaws and ruffians" were no more than 
"bush barbarians" to be forcibly suppressed by "the forces of order and civilisation ". The transformation 
of the `social bandit' into the `criminal' is a mechanism of channelling the `delinquent' into a life of petty 
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and perpetrator in an intimate and destructive relationship. This violence is unruly and 
barbarous, it crosses the carefully constructed boundaries of modern civilised life - 
between the state and civil society, between government and citizens, and between 
individual citizens. 
On this view, violence is an obstacle to be removed, a problem to be solved, and its 
solution involves drawing more boundaries around it, institutionalising it, subjecting it 
to a regime of administration. This should not be mistaken for the elimination of 
violence, but merely a change or substitution of form. The discourse of civilisation is 
premised on the view that cruelty and violence are attributes of a barbarian mentality, a 
mentality uncontrolled by the courtesies and sensibilities of civilisation. Alasdair 
Maclntyre once counselled us to wake up to the corrosive impact of liberalism on the 
moral life of modern societies by drawing a parallel between our time and the last days 
of ancient Rome. The barbarians, he thought, were no longer knocking at the gate, but 
had been ruling us for some time.105 Perhaps a little of the barbarian has been rubbed - 
out in all of us and we have all, like those ancient Visigoths, swapped our bearskins for 
togas and look back on our tribal forbears with a shudder of revulsion. But in our haste 
to separate ourselves from that dreadful past, do we notice that the togas we wear are 
perhaps a little shabby? 
Some forms of violence are now almost entirely consigned to the pages of history, and 
this thesis does not question that achievement. The elimination of capital punishment 
and torture (in most if not all civil societies), slowly increasing awareness of domestic 
violence, rape, and child abuse, as well as vigorous campaigns against cruelty to animals 
bear witness to some little progress in the reduction of violence. But in saying so, it 
does not follow that we have become less willing to inflict harm on our fellow creatures; 
or that we have become more sensitive to the suffering of others. If we accept the image 
of barbarians as wild and cruel, this much at least can be said of them, that there was no 
denying their violence and brutality.106 But brutal though they may have been, their 
violence was also limited by the reach of the sword, limited by the strength of the 
crime, which while no doubt economically costly is politically expedient. Clark, C. M. H., A History of 
Australia, Volume IV, Melbourne University Press, 1978, pg. 203 and 334 -5. 
ms Maclntyre, A., After Virtue, Duckworth, London, 1981. 
06 Contact between `barbarian' and `civilised' warfare is illuminatingly discussed in Ian Steele's 
outstanding Warpaths; Invasions of North America, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994. 
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sword -arm, limited by the stamina of the horse, limited because it was technologically 
primitive. The technological advancements pioneered by modern civil societies have 
greatly increased the capacity to inflict injury, and have given rise to the possibility that 
one person can kill tens, hundreds, or thousands without even having to see their victims 
or the effect of their actions. What is more, we can do it under the comforting illusion 
that we are not responsible for it. Conversely, this same weapons technology, the ease 
of access and the supposed `right' to possess and use such weapons has intensified the 
terrible intimacy of killing. It could be said that there is now a kind of `cottage 
industry' of violence in many civil societies due to the widely dispersed and relatively 
simple manufacture and endemic use of automatic and semi -automatic weapons.107 
What is remarkable about the contemporary discourse on violence is the widespread 
acceptance of the idea that liberal civil societies represent pacified zones despite the 
frightening intensity of killing power now at their disposal. In the story of civilisation, 
the barbarian's inescapable awareness of their own brutality has been transcended by the 
citizen's awareness of their own peaceful civility. Such convenient assumptions 
maintain the comforting illusion that life in civil society is not violent. What I have 
suggested in this thesis is that concentrating on the idea of barbarous violence leads to 
an unwillingness to acknowledge our own civilised violence and disciplined cruelty. 
107 I am indebted to Barry Hindess for making this point. 
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